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ABSTRACT 
 
Values matter in both legal decision (lawmaking and lawapplying) and 
discourse (lawshaping and lawinfluencing). Yet, their purported subjectivity 
means that gaining or improving knowledge about values (whether they be 
epistemic, legal, moral, ethical, economic, political, cultural, social, or 
religious) in the context of analytic legal thought and understanding is often 
said to be at odds with its goal of objectivity. This phenomenon is amplified at 
the international level where the infusion of seemingly subjective political 
values by sovereigns, and the decisionmakers to whom they delegate, can, and 
does, interfere with an idealized and objective rule of law. The discourse on 
value subjectivity, and its relation to the purpose and function of the law, is 
particularly apparent in evolving international legal orders such as investment 
treaty arbitration.  
The primary aim of this work is to provide a new method for gaining empirical 
knowledge about value subjectivity that can help close a weak link in all 
nonpositivist (value-laden) legal theory: a weakness that has manifest itself as 
skepticism about the possibility of measuring value objectively enough to 
permit its incorporation as a necessary component of analytic jurisprudence. 
This work proposes a theory of configurative fairness for addressing the 
problem related to the development or evolution of legal regimes, and how legal 
regimes perceived as subjectively unfair can be remedied. Such a theory 
accepts the premise that perceptions of fairness matter in directing the way 
that legal orders develop, and that perceptions of fairness relate to the manner 
in which values are distributed and maximized in particular legal orders. It is 
posited that legal orders perceived as fair by their participants are more likely 
to be endorsed or accepted as legally binding (and are therefore more likely to 
comply with the processes and outcomes that such laws mandate).  
The purpose of a theory of configurative fairness is an attempt to provide a 
methodological bridge for improving knowledge about value in the context of 
legal inquiry through the employment of a technique called Q methodology: an 
epistemological and empirical means for the measurement and mapping of 
human subjectivity. It is a method that was developed in the early twentieth 
century by physicist-psychologist William Stephenson: the last research 
student of the inventor of factor analysis, Charles Spearman. What 
Stephenson did was to create a way for systematically measuring subjective 
perspectives, and although not previously used in jurisprudential thought, Q 
methodology will facilitate a means for the description and evaluation of 
shared subjectivities. In the context of law generally, and in investment treaty 
arbitration specifically, these are the subjectivities that manifest themselves as 
the conflicting perspectives about value that are omnipresent in both 
communicative lawshaping discourse and authoritative and controlling 
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lawmaking and lawapplying decision. Knowledge about these shared value 
subjectivities among participants in investment treaty arbitration will allow the 
legal analyst to delineate and clarify points of overlapping consensus about the 
desired distribution of value as they relate to the regime-building issues of 
evolving legal orders.  
The focus for a theory of configurative fairness pertains to the identification of 
the various value positions that participants hold about a particular legal 
order and to configure those values, through its rules and principles, in a 
manner that is acceptable (and perceived as fair) by all of its participants. If 
such a value consensus can be identified, then particular rules in the legal 
order can be configured by decisionmakers in a way so as to satisfy 
participants’ shared value understandings. To engage such a theory, a means 
for identifying shared value subjectivities must be delineated. This work 
conducts a Q method study on the issues under debate relating to regime-
building questions in investment treaty arbitration. 
The Q method study asked participants knowledgeable about investment 
treaty arbitration to rank-order a set of statements about the way that the 
values embraced by this legal order ought to be configured. The results of the 
study demonstrate that there is significant overlap about how participants in 
investment treaty arbitration perceive the desired distribution of values across 
the regime. The Q method study identified six distinct perspectives that 
represent shared subjectivities about value in the context of the development 
of investment treaty arbitration. The Q method study was also able to identify 
where there is an overlapping consensus about value distribution across the 
distinct perspectives. It is these areas of overlapping consensus that are most 
likely to reflect shared value understandings, and it is proposed that it is upon 
these shared value understandings that the future development of investment 
treaty arbitration ought to aim. 
12 
 
 
 
PREFACE 
 
In April of 2009, José Alvarez delivered a lecture titled The Evolving BIT. In 
that lecture, he stated that perceptions do matter in international legal 
development – whether or not they are ‘right.’ This simple observation was a 
statement that caused considerable concern in the international arbitration 
community with many claiming that there is no place for these kinds of 
subjective concessions in the law; in fact, it was argued, they are antithetical 
to the very purpose and function of a rule of law. By no means limited 
specifically to investment treaty arbitration (or even international law in 
general), this concern about the inappropriate infusion of subjective thought 
in objective legal inquiry (especially in theories of interpretation and 
adjudication) is something that spans all of legal philosophy.  
However, such concerns tend to be particularly acute in international law – 
and especially in the discourse about the scope and applicability of 
international law. I was initially drawn to legal theory when noticing that most 
things I had learned in law school about the doctrinal analysis of law could 
not answer many of the particular regime-building questions facing 
investment treaty arbitration. I have always been struck by the fact that the 
discourse about problems in investment treaty arbitration are rarely confined 
to doctrinal analysis, and even when they are, they are always infused with 
the underlying worldviews and value perspectives of its proponents and 
detractors. These values in turn comprise an element of conviction, and are 
often grounded in ideas of individual and political morality. Living in an era 
where dominant philosophical theories hold that values are both subjective 
and relative, claims about objectifying values in the context of law tend to ring 
hollow. As such, attempting to gain objective knowledge about metavalues 
such as fairness and legitimacy remains a challenge. 
It is this problem and challenge in law that most excites me, and it is from 
these issues that the theoretical basis of this work springs. The goal of this 
thesis is not to provide definitive answers about which value perspectives in 
investment treaty arbitration are right or wrong; rather, the idea is to provide a 
methodological and theoretical approach for advancing practical knowledge 
about value in the context of the law. In attempting to measure and gain 
knowledge about the perspectives, underlying viewpoints, and worldviews that 
all legal decisionmakers and discoursers use to inform and influence the way 
that they approach legal problems, I hope that such knowledge can assist in 
delineating points of overlapping consensus about issues of fairness in 
investment treaty arbitration in a way that the discourse can begin to move 
from ‘perceptions matter’ to ‘this is how and why the various types of 
perceptions matter.’ 
13 
 
 
 
This work seeks to tackle a big subject: it is project that seeks to improve 
value knowledge in a manner that its integration in nonpositivist theories 
about law will succeed. This is a topic of debate that the most eminent minds 
of the philosophical tradition have dedicated their lives to solving; and yet, 
there remains no definitive solution to its thorniest issues (such as how to 
provide objectively measurable evidence about the subjectivity of value). It may 
be a sign of naiveté, arrogance, or both, in taking on such a subject; but it is 
from this narrative that I nonetheless present my modest contribution. In 
writing on complex ideas, one always runs the very real risk that their ideas 
will not be fully developed or that the work will be incomplete at best – and 
inaccurate at worst. One of the ways that this risk can be mitigated is through 
the incorporation of the intellectual traditions of previous scholarship: a 
strategy that I seek to fully employ.   
14 
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CHAPTER 1 
AN INTRODUCTION 
 
Fairness is not a fixed destination; it is a journey or process. Fairness as a destination remains for 
us always an open question. What matters is the opportunity for discourse: the process and its 
rules. The issue is not a society’s definition of fairness in any particular instance, but rather the 
openness of the process by which those definitions are reached.1 
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the 
prevalent moral and political theories, institutions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even 
the prejudices which judges share with their fellow men, have had a good deal more than the 
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed.2 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This work is about an idea: the idea is that so-called subjective value 
considerations in both legal decision and legal discourse can be made 
empirically verifiable through Q methodology. This will permit the conversion 
of value and evaluation into objective phenomenon called shared 
subjectivities. These shared subjectivities can thus meet the requirements of 
social fact, making their incorporation into both positive and nonpositive 
descriptions of the law possible. Once these shared subjectivities are known, 
they can be used to configure evolving legal orders in a manner that its 
participants consider to be fair. As such, this is a work about human values 
and how individual worldviews, perspectives, and viewpoints influence and 
motivate the way that legal problems are approached and addressed.3 It is 
about what types of values are applicable to legal thought and how these 
values do, or should, shape the way legal decisions are made; and it is about 
the epistemic possibilities for improving the measurement of subjective value 
judgments and perspectives in the context of legal inquiry.  
Most of jurisprudential thought draws a distinction between legality and 
morality, questioning when, if ever, the two ought to be intertwined.4 However, 
                                                            
1 Thomas Franck (1995). Fairness in International Law and Institutions. Oxford, OUP, p. 83. 
2 Oliver Wendell Holmes (1881). The Common Law.  Boston, Little Brown, p. 1. 
3 See statement of Percy Spender in his dissenting opinion of the Temple of Preah Vihear Case of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1962: “[i]n the nature of things different minds 
approach problems in different ways. The approach to a legal problem is no exception.  What is 
to be solved will be solved according to the manner of him who solves it.” Temple of Preah Vihear 
Case (Cambodia v. Thailand). Dissenting Opinion of Percy Spender, ICJ Reports 6 (1962). 
4 This is the classic separability thesis in conceptual legal positivism. See Jules Coleman (2007). 
Beyond the Separability Thesis: Moral Semantics and the Methodology of Jurisprudence. Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies. Vol. 27, p. 581. 
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the scope of value – and the judgments and the tools that one uses to justify 
the incorporation of value in law – often extends far beyond the relatively 
limited value category that one might call moral. Values of all types play a 
significant role in the way that human beings (and institutions, including 
states) view, use, shape, and become obligated by, the law. Yet, the purported 
subjectivity of value inquiry means that objective value knowledge in the 
context of legal thought often remains elusive as a topic of inquiry.  
The purpose of this work is to explore the possibilities for expanding our 
knowledge (and measurement) of value judgments in the context of both 
solving legal problems (that is, how specific decisions are made), and in 
deepening our understanding of the developmental path that legal orders take 
(that is, how value discourse affects legal development). The entry point of this 
inquiry will be directed at evolving international legal regimes5 and will focus 
on how subjective value claims, demands, and expectations (perspectives)6 
influence and motivate the work of both legal decisionmakers (that is, 
legislators, judges, and arbitrators) and legal discoursers (that is, 
commentators, participants, and scholars).7 The basic claim is that subjective 
perceptions about the right distribution of value in both legal decision and 
legal discourse plays a critical role in determining the evolutionary path that a 
particular legal order takes,8 and that therefore a theoretical and 
methodological grounding for this kind of value knowledge can go a long way 
in enhancing our understanding about the when, what, where, why, and how’s 
of international legal development.9  
                                                            
5 The particular focus in this work will be on the development of international investment treaty 
arbitration. However, there are a number of international legal orders that could be considered 
on a rapid evolutionary track. The method and theory proposed here could be applicable to 
international intellectual property law, international trade law, international criminal law, or the 
decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to name but a few. Almost every area of 
international law has seen rapid development in the years since the Second World War; in some 
cases, many regimes of international law have not only evolved during this time, but did not 
even exist in a legalized form prior to the mid-twentieth century.  
6 Collectively, these subjectivities are what can be described as perspectives: that is, they are 
the values that any human being or group of human beings collectively has claims to, makes 
demands of, or has expectations about. 
7 The distinction between legal decision and legal discourse claims that the focus of inquiry 
about the law is differentiated according to the perspective of the individual tasked with the 
inquiry. Resolving disputes or making binding decisions about the law are a distinct enterprise 
from that of scholarly inquiry about the law. This work claims that legal theoretical frames 
should be sensitive to the distinction (it is called the observational standpoint according to the 
policy-orientated approach of the New Haven school). 
8 See Eileen Braman (2009). Law, Politics, and Perception: How Policy Preferences Influence Legal 
Reasoning. Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press. 
9 Legal development or evolution in this work are terms used to signal the process of legal 
decision and discourse over time, and how such processes modify, influence, and improve legal 
orders in a way that more closely approximates the needs of legally-based human governance 
structures. 
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In international law, the perception that political and moral values motivate 
legal decisions is widespread.10 There are generally two different modes of 
inquiry for addressing this problem. The first is to propose that international 
legal theory ought to restrict itself to that which is identifiably and verifiably 
legal in nature, and that by focusing inquiry in this way, many of the 
subjective political and power claims can be purged: a formalistic and 
idealized form of international law that can transcend politics.11 The second 
option for legal theory is to acknowledge that different degrees of subjective 
value judgments form a part of the law and that international legal inquiry 
mandates that one strive for an improved understanding of such subjective 
considerations.12 While the second option may provide the most realistic 
understanding of international law and the work it is tasked with, it is always 
hampered theoretically by the fact that subjective value knowledge is so 
difficult to obtain and articulate objectively.13 
This work proposes that innovative and creative methodologies for gaining 
subjective knowledge (that is, the measurement of the underlying perspectives 
about value that all legal decisionmakers and legal discoursers bring to their 
endeavors) are not only possible, but can act as an addendum to various 
nonpositivist (and some positivist) orientations in legal theory by providing 
sound empirical evidence about value claims, demands, and expectations 
(perspectives) among relevant legal communities. The cognitive turn in 
psychology over the past half century has advanced methodologies for social 
scientists trying to measure what has long been considered outside the reach 
of empirical research: the scientific study of human subjectivity.14 If one 
accepts the postmodern view that the things that human beings value are 
diverse, and that what human beings value is particular to each individual or 
                                                            
10 However, the depth of inquiry into such a claim tends to stop immediately after it is made. 
11 In international law, the positions of Bruno Simma or Gerald Fitzmaurice personify this 
position. Early codification projects in international law as led by such eminent jurists as Elihu 
Root can also be seen as endorsing such a view. As Bruno Simma and Andreas Paulus have 
written, “[l]aw is regarded as a unified system of rule that, according to most variants, emanate 
from state will. This system of rules is an ‘objective’ reality and needs to be distinguished from 
law ‘as it should be.’” Bruno Simma & Andreas Paulus (1999). The Responsibility of Individuals 
for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View. American Journal of 
International Law. Vol. 92, pp. 302, 304.  
12 This position is mostly attributable to process-based or goal-orientated visions of 
international law. This would include political realists and there affinity for power over rule 
compliance in explaining international law, but such a view generally only has marginal force as 
a theory about law. More robust theoretical positions supporting this view would include the 
work of Abram and Antonia Chayes, Thomas Franck, Rosalyn Higgins, Harold Koh, Oona 
Hathaway, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and the policy-orientated jurisprudence of Harold Lasswell, 
Myres McDougal, and Michael Reisman. 
13 This presents particular problems due to the fact that the concept of the Rule of Law is 
primarily tethered to its ability to be articulated in an objective manner. 
14 Chief among these is Q methodology: it provides a method for exploring cognitive and 
noncognitive mental processes in a way that can map one’s subjective viewpoint or perspective 
on a particular topic in relation to viewpoints of others who are similarly positioned.  
21 
 
 
 
community (contextualism),15 then one possibility for gaining value knowledge 
in this way is not in search of objectivity or universality, but in the search for 
what can be described as shared subjectivity.16 That is, can one empirically 
identify the convergences and divergences in value preferences among 
individuals and communities to which a particular legal order aims? To satisfy 
such a hypothesis, this work will develop a theory of configurative fairness 
contingent on the use of Q methodology: a form of factor analysis aimed at 
clarifying shared subjective patterns of thought across individuals.17  
In facilitating such an approach to legal and value inquiry, the choice of 
theoretical orientation is important. In terms of a legal theory that takes value 
knowledge seriously (forms of nonpositivism),18 the configurative or policy-
orientated jurisprudence (also referred to as the New Haven School) of Harold 
Lasswell, Myres McDougal, and Michael Reisman presents a good starting 
point for exploring the ways that methodological advancements in value 
knowledge and clarification can assist in the justification of a value-laden, 
nonpositivist jurisprudential outlook.19 Their jurisprudence is both normative 
and descriptive in orientation: law is defined as a continuous process of 
authoritative and controlling decision, and this process is aimed at securing 
and shaping the explicit goal values needed for the promotion of a public world 
order of human dignity.20 For policy-orientated jurisprudence, inquiry is 
focused on the intellectual tasks needed to identify, describe, and clarify what 
participants in social processes actually value. A project aimed at improving 
value knowledge in the context of legal inquiry, such as the one that will be 
                                                            
15 See Melissa Williams & Henry Richardson (2009). Moral Universalism and Pluralism. New 
York, New York University Press. 
16 Shared subjectivity is a term that describes where a group of individuals will hold the same or 
similar value positions when tasked with evaluating a particular problem, set of choices, or legal 
position. These shared value subjectivities are not objective in the sense that they derive from 
the existence of a universal object or entity; rather, they are subjective in that they emanate 
from the internal mental processes of individuals. While it is possible under such a view to 
claim that every individual values things differently, empirical evidence tends to demonstrate 
that there is only a limited number of perspectives on a particular topic and that, in fact, 
individuals actually share value positions more than they do not. It is the goal of this work to 
identify such shared subjectivities in relation to a particular legal context. 
17 Steven Brown (1980). Political Subjectivity: Applications of Q methodology in Political Science. 
New Haven, Yale University Press; Bruce McKeown & Dan Thomas (1993). Q Methodology: 
Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences. London, Sage. 
18 The distinction between general positivist and nonpositivist orientations is made primarily to 
identify the different ways that the law is conceptualized. At the center of such a distinction is 
whether law and morality can be separated (positivists say no, nonpositivists say yes). While the 
positivist-nonpositivist divide is quite crude, it helps in making the distinction between those 
theories that believe a value-free description about the nature of law is possible (positivists) and 
those who do not (nonpositivists). Typically, nonpositivist thought includes all of the natural law 
schools, the legal realist schools, and the process-based schools of jurisprudence.  
19 Harold Lasswell & Myres McDougal (1992). Jurisprudence for a Free Society: Studies in Law, 
Science, and Policy. Volume I and II. New Haven, New Haven Press; Michael Reisman (1999). 
Theory About Law: Jurisprudence for a Free Society. Yale Law Journal. Vol. 108, p. 935. 
20 Michael Reisman (1992). A View from the New Haven School of International Law. American 
Society of International Law Proceedings. Vol. 86, p. 118. 
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described in this work, may provide a useful addendum to nonpositivist 
frames or inquiry generally, and the New Haven school specifically.21  
The delineation of shared value perspectives (subjectivities) in the context of 
legal inquiry will be facilitated through the use of Q methodology. The various 
value typologies that emerge from such an empirical investigation will then be 
applied to a theory of configurative fairness for evolving legal orders. A theory 
of configurative fairness is a normative theory about law derived from the 
framework of inquiry found in both policy-orientated jurisprudence and 
Rawlsian22 and neo-Rawlsian23 theories about justice. The specific task of a 
theory of configurative fairness is to identify shared value subjectivities among 
participants in a particular legal context and to use this knowledge as a 
foundation for justifying the configuration of a legal order whose legal rules, 
principles, and norms would be considered fair (subjectively just)24 by both its 
lawgivers and lawtakers.  
Configurative fairness is thus a term of art that connotes the value 
configuration of a particular legal order according to what its participants 
would subjectively endorse as fair. Fairness in this context is a metavalue that 
describes the ‘right’ distribution and configuration of lesser values in a 
particular legal order. A theory of configurative fairness is a theory of justice 
that claims – despite deep skepticism about the objectivity of justice – fairness 
is possible if the rules, principles, and norms that develop under such a 
system of law are expressive and inclusive of participants’ shared value 
expectations. The specific subject-matter for testing such a theory of 
configurative fairness will be aimed at the evolving international legal order of 
investment treaty arbitration. This is a legal order that is currently on an 
evolutionary trajectory, and because of its decentralized development it has 
been the subject of protracted and continual debate about how its values 
ought to be configured.25 
                                                            
21 Most process-based jurisprudential outlooks see law as aimed at a purpose or function. This 
goal or aim of jurisprudence is to promote a means for ordering human interaction; and as 
such, the law is not an end in itself, but is a facilitator (means) to a purposive end. In this way, 
most process-based schools of thought do not see law as an end in itself, but as an instrument 
for achieving a goal (which in the case of the New Haven School is the shaping and promotion of 
the values of human dignity within the structures of public order). 
22 John Rawls (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Harvard University Press; John Rawls & 
Erin Kelly (2001). Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 
23 Neo-Rawlsian thinkers might include the work of economist-philosopher Amartya Sen, legal 
philosopher Ronald Dworkin, and moral philosopher Christine Korsgaard.  
24 Subjective justice as fairness is a claim that despite absolute ontological truth about what is 
universally just, the idea of fairness is a determinable value according to what members of a 
relevant legal community would agree to as fair (both substantively and procedurally).  
25 However, a theory of configurative fairness and the proposed utility of Q methodology in 
jurisprudential thought are conceived as general approaches that could be applicable to all 
types of legal orders, both domestic and international. For example, it is possible for future Q 
method studies to focus on international human rights law, international environmental law, 
international humanitarian law, or international criminal law.  
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This work conducts a Q method study on the issues under debate relating to 
regime-building questions in investment treaty arbitration. The Q method 
study asked participants knowledgeable about investment treaty arbitration to 
rank-order a set of statements about the way that the values in the regime 
ought to be configured. The results of the study demonstrate that there is 
significant overlap about how participants in investment treaty arbitration 
perceive the regime. The Q method study identified six distinct perspectives 
that represent shared subjectivities about value in the context of the 
development of investment treaty arbitration. The Q method study was also 
able to identify where there is an overlapping consensus about value 
distribution across the distinct perspectives. It is these areas of overlapping 
consensus that are most likely to reflect shared value understandings, and it 
is proposed that it is upon these shared value understandings that the future 
development of investment treaty arbitration ought to aim. The interpretation 
of the results of the Q method study will be discussed in detail in Chapter 8. 
 
2. A STARTING POINT 
Values matter in both legal decision (that is, lawmaking, lawadjudicating, and 
lawinterpreting) and legal discourse (that is, lawshaping and lawinfluencing). 
Yet, their purported subjectivity means that gaining knowledge about all types 
of value26 in the context of legal thought and understanding is often said to be 
at odds with the law’s goal of objectivity. This difficulty in clarifying the proper 
place for value inquiry in legal thought is broadly attributable to two major 
developments in twentieth century philosophical thought. The first 
development is traceable to the popularity of the conceptual theory of legal 
positivism, and its two-fold theses on the seperability of law and morality and 
of pedigree-based legal validity. The second development is traceable to 
postmodernism in the social sciences more generally, whereby the 
epistemology of value has been greatly influenced by concepts of relativity, 
contextuality, and plurality. While these developments are primarily geared at 
diminishing the possibility of objective moral knowledge,27 they have also 
                                                            
26 These include epistemic, cognitive, legal, economic, moral, ethical, political, cultural, social, 
or religious values. The term value as used in this word denotes a very broad definition. Values 
pertain to all of the things that conscious beings value. This includes political and moral values 
about how one ought to treat others, ethical values about how one is to live a good life, and all 
of the things that one values in constructing and understanding a vision of the world and her 
place in it. When speaking of values as a noun, it is referring to anything that human beings 
hold to be good or valuable. When speaking of values as a verb, it is a reference to the tools 
human beings use to evaluate, judge, and justify ideas, subjects, and objects. 
27 The debate about the metaphysical truth of morality is both diverse and divisive. Some moral 
thinkers believe that the only entities that should constitute moral inquiry are those aspects of 
morality that are identifiable as ‘real’ entities that can be shown to exist naturally in some form. 
Since there are very few philosophers who hold that such knowledge is possible, the limitations 
for moral knowledge under such a view are profoundly bleak. However, some moral 
philosophers believe that moral knowledge is objectively knowable as a product of a priori 
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influenced value inquiry more broadly, often acting as thought-stoppers when 
the topic of value knowledge is engaged.28  
This phenomenon is amplified at the international level where the infusion of 
subjective political values (even naked power) by sovereigns (political realism) 
can, and does, interfere with an idealized and objective rule of law (legal 
idealism). The debate on the appropriate level of value subjectivity (precepts-
principles-policies-politics-power)29 that should be permitted to influence 
international legal decision and discourse remains a core issue in delineating a 
clear theoretical understanding about international law both analytically and 
normatively. Theories about international law have oscillated between its 
nonexistence (power realism) at one extreme to a utopian vision of a 
universally applicable and respected rule of law at the other (legal idealism).30 
While these extremes are likely to be unhelpful in determining the scope and 
relevance of international law as it stands today, it is noteworthy to observe 
that they both attribute value a central role: one is claiming the supremacy of 
power in a hierarchy of values (power realism) and the other is claiming the 
supremacy of order (legal idealism). With that said, mainstream international 
legal thought today can roughly be divided along two paths: positivism 
(including adjudicatory theories such as legal formalism)31 and nonpositivism 
(including adjudicatory theories such as legal realism).32 However, these 
theories about law contain a common thread throughout: all explanatory 
                                                                                                                                                                              
reason. While there are significant problems with such a traditional Kantian metaphysics about 
morality, there is a strong claim that values are objectifiable as entities that exists in the human 
mind (either as a product of reason or emotion). 
28 Hilary Putnam (2004). The Collapse of the Fact-Value Dichotomy and Other Essays. 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, p. 44. 
29 These five P’s of subjectivity represent the degree spectrum that is often discussed in legal 
thought. At the one end are precepts. These primarily constitute cognitive values or epistemic 
values (such as coherence, simplicity, predictability, or reliability) that are used to gain 
knowledge and understand particular ideas or objects. Most conceptual positivists (and logical 
positivists too) claim that epistemic values are nonmoral values and thus permissible in framing 
inquiry and designing theories about the law. Principles are noncodified norms that inform 
reasoning. Ronald Dworkin, who famously attempts to form a bridge between positivist and 
nonpositivist thought, is compelled to believe that principles (as rooted in morality) also form a 
part of the law. Policies can be described as a level of nonarbitrary subjectivity in theories about 
the law that claim the law should be used instrumentally to achieve the goal values of a 
particular community. Politics and power form the far end of the spectrum and are identifiable 
as the most negative inferences about subjectivity: arbitrary, capricious, and often abusive 
behaviors used to further the interests of a particular party or state. 
30 See Martti Koskenniemi (2006). From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal 
Argument. Cambridge, CUP. 
31 Positivism as a conceptual theory can be divided into inclusive (soft) or exclusive (hard) 
positivism. While not a conceptual theory, most positivists are likely to view adjudicative 
theories in formalistic terms. The exemplar of soft positivism is attributable to HLA Hart, while 
the chief proponent of a hard positivism is that of legal philosopher Joseph Raz. 
32 Nonpositivism as a conceptual theory is primarily aimed at various natural law 
(transcendental) theories about law. However, they also often include the process-based schools 
of jurisprudence and Ronald Dworkin’s interpretivism. Adjudicatively, most nonpositivists are 
drawn to some form of legal realism in looking to explain how legal decisions are actually made. 
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theories of law can be categorized by the degree of subjective value knowledge 
that ought to be permitted in describing what the law is.  
Positivist inquiry mandates a separation of law from moral value, creating 
theories about law that focus primarily on the identification of legality as 
defined by particular criteria (that is, that which has been posited). A 
descriptive positivist or analytic jurisprudence aims at understanding the 
concept of law and legality.33 Conceptual positivists are focused on deriving 
the essence or nature of law. They are trying to figure out what the concept of 
the law is for the purpose of being able to identify and verify legality. However, 
this is a quite different focus from trying to understand how legal decisions 
(judgments) should be made, or in determining what the content of the law is 
or should be.  
The unfortunate problem is that an unsophisticated legal positivism tries to 
convert the idea of a naturalized or objective set of criteria for the concept of 
the law into a similar set of criteria for understanding legal content and legal 
decision, which often results – adjudicatively – in crude forms of mechanical 
legal formalism. While it is debatable whether the project of a completely 
value-free, objective, and naturalized theory about the content-independence 
of law is possible, it is at least plausible.34 However, an objective or naturalized 
theory for understanding legal content and legal decision fails almost 
immediately. Basic empirical evidence about content and decision quickly 
demonstrates that it is infused with value claims that are only rarely amenable 
to exact scientific and empirical verification (what HLA Hart calls ‘social 
facts’).35  
Nonpositivist theories about law reject the positivist ideal of value-free legal 
understanding, and hold that the purpose and function of law – and especially 
the particulars of legal content and legal decision – are not only inseparably 
tied to value, but are a necessary component of it. This view does not negate 
positivism as a sound conceptual theory; it merely holds that it is incomplete: 
all law and legality cannot be understood in purely positivistic terms. However, 
the nonpositive theory employed as the jurisprudential basis for a theory of 
configurative fairness is one that is ontologically agnostic about the concept of 
the law: that is, no claims are being made as to whether a pure conceptual 
theory about law can be true. This is not to say that both positivist and 
nonpositivist conceptual theories about the nature or essence of the law do not 
                                                            
33 Analytic jurisprudence is a conceptual theory focused on the existence and nature of the law. 
Therefore, it is not orientated towards understanding the content of the law (although Hartian 
positivism is) as it is (descriptive) or as it should be (normative); nor is it orientated towards an 
understanding of adjudication or decision.  
34 See Matthew Kramer (2007). Objectivity and the Rule of Law. Cambridge, CUP. 
35 Social facts are a term in Hartian legal positivism used to denote the outside boundaries of 
legal content. Social facts are those collective behaviors of social interaction that are empirically 
observable. Thoughts to be found in the consciousness of individuals are not social facts 
according to such a description.   
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exist. They do. However, answers to the truth existence of the concept of law 
are not required in determining what content users of a legal order would 
endorse as fair.36  
Therefore, the use of the word theory in this work will aim at a practical 
jurisprudence on the epistemology of law and value. The focus of such inquiry 
aims at the following: how does one gain knowledge about law and value in a 
manner that can assist in explaining and evaluating how legal orders ought to 
develop? A nonpositivist approach of this type will reject sharp dichotomies 
between law and justice, instead choosing to focus how the interrelation of 
these two ideas presents the closest possibility for an improved understanding 
of how legal orders (especially international ones) actually develop.  
Throughout the history of legal thought, one of the major impediments to 
nonpositivist orientations – especially those of the historicist, realist, and 
natural law schools – is the question of value objectivity and whether moral or 
ethical claims about what is good and right are objectively knowable. The 
philosophic work in this area runs the gamut: from values existing as mind-
independent entities (moral realism) to values being nothing more than 
nonentities of emotive expressions (noncognitive sentimentalism). With the 
exception of moral realism, which claims that moral values are truthapt 
ontologically, all value theories are responding to two claims against it: 1) 
values are incapable of being expressible as true or false propositions, and 2) 
value are incapable of identification as empirically verifiable objects. In 
mainstream thought, these two claims about value means that value 
knowledge is a subjective enterprise incapable of being objectively known in 
the scientific sense, or as some claim, in any sense. These skeptics claim that 
the idea is ‘nonsense upon stilts.’37 For most legal theories, all of which pride 
themselves in delivering an objective account of legal phenomenon, the 
problem of subjective knowledge is always lurking in the background. If true, 
then what exactly is there to know about value, and is there any possibility for 
achieving value knowledge that even remotely resembles a scientifically 
observable fact?  
                                                            
36 Such questions go to the deep conceptual metalegal and ontological issues in law that pertain 
to the essence or nature of the law as described in the previous paragraph. The classic way to 
describe these ontological issues is whether or not Nazi law was law. Generally speaking, 
positivist theory will claim that it was law, but bad law. Nonpositivist theory will claim that 
values such as justness must be considered in determining whether a law is law; and in the 
case of Nazi law, so the theory goes, its wickedness negates its legalness. 
37 “That which has no existence cannot be destroyed – that which cannot be destroyed cannot 
require anything to preserve it from destruction. Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and 
imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense – nonsense upon stilts.” Jeremy Bentham (1792). 
‘Anarchical Fallacies; Being an Examination of the Declaration of Rights Issued During the 
French Revolution,’ republished in John Bowring (1843). The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Volume 
II. Edinburgh, William Tait. 
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One possibility for advancing value knowledge in legal thought is through the 
use of Q methodology. By providing a methodological bridge for gaining and 
improving knowledge about value in the context of nonpositivist legal inquiry, 
Q methodology will provide a means for systematically and empirically 
measuring subjective perspectives. Q methodology is an empirical method that 
blends quantitative and qualitative experimental structures for measuring 
human subjectivity. It is a method that was developed in the early twentieth 
century by physicist-psychologist William Stephenson: the last research 
student of the inventor of factor analysis, Charles Spearman. What 
Stephenson did was to create a method for systematically measuring 
subjective perspectives; and although not previously used in jurisprudential 
thought, Q methodology will facilitate a means for the description and 
evaluation of shared subjectivities about value.38  
In the context of law, value subjectivities manifest themselves as the 
convergent and divergent perspectives that are omnipresent in both 
communicative lawshaping and lawinfluencing discourse and authoritative 
and controlling lawmaking and lawapplying decision. It is claimed that 
knowledge about these shared value subjectivities is possible through the use 
of Q methodology and that such knowledge will be useful in assisting both 
decisionmakers and discoursers in delineating and clarify points of 
overlapping consensus39 about the desired value distribution among 
participants in a particular legal context. This information about shared 
values can then be used to configure a legal order whose rules, principles, and 
procedures are considered fair by its users. 
The theoretical components of this work will focus on the methodological 
objectification of values (as shared subjectivities) in a manner that can be 
sufficiently relied on in legal analysis. The starting point for such inquiry 
rejects the idea about the dichotomy between fact and value, instead holding 
that the structure of fact and value are entangled: one requires the other.40 
However, if one claims that knowledge about values and knowledge about 
facts are distinct enterprises, and that only facts can be scientifically and 
objectively analyzed and described, then knowledge about value becomes 
irrelevant to scientific inquiry. This claim has always presented problems in 
philosophic inquiry about how one comes to know facts and how one comes to 
know values. In the context of law specifically, and the social sciences 
generally, the problem often manifests as a limitation: by ignoring knowledge 
about values in understanding the complexity of social processes because they 
cannot always be objectively described or analyzed, the researcher or analyst 
                                                            
38 William Stephenson (1953). The Study of Behavior: Q-Technique and Its Methodology. Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press. 
39 John Rawls (1987). The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. 
Vol. 7, p. 1. 
40 Putnam, supra note 28; Jürgen Habermas (1996). Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to 
a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, translated by William Rehg. Cambridge, MIT Press. 
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potentially leaves large swaths of critical knowledge uncovered. Therefore, the 
goal of this work is to provide a method for looking at values in a way that can 
bring these often unobservable phenomena of the subjective mind to the 
surface. This will be done by providing a method (Q methodology, specifically) 
for learning about shared subjectivity through the empirical objectification of 
subjective value knowledge.41 
The practical approach of this work will focus on the metavalue of fairness in 
the context of how the content of evolving international legal orders ought to 
be configured. This idea will be built primarily on the framework for legal 
inquiry as developed in the policy-orientated jurisprudence, and modified by 
advances in moral, psychological, and political philosophy (especially through 
the work of Rawlsian theorists). The result will be to propose a theory of 
configurative fairness that is based on the determination of shared value 
subjectivities. The purpose of such inquiry is built on the following hypothesis: 
a concept about the content of law, as a legitimate and dynamic process of 
authoritative and controlling decision, presupposes that the law is perceived 
as fair by the community members to which it is directed, and that the 
fairness of a particular legal order is defined as one that is configured around 
shared community or societal subjectivities about the agreed distribution of 
values in a particular context.  
While this claim may appear too abstract for application, its importance lies in 
the idea of achieving fairness, in the context of law, as inextricably linked to 
knowledge about the configuration of value and how individuals perceive it. If 
correct, this means that legal orders rejoicing in the application of logically 
derived, value-neutral rules can only achieve fairness, if ever, by accident. 
Fairness is a value, and therefore the achievement of fairness (subjective 
justice)42 requires value knowledge. As such, if one claims that perceptions 
and perspectives on fairness are an important consideration in the 
evolutionary change of legitimate legal orders, then a theory for configuring 
fairness around converging subjective value perspectives could prove useful in 
grounding future decision in controversial areas of legal development.  
 
3. TWO PRELIMINARY DISTINCTIONS 
In understanding the exact focus of inquiry, there are two distinctions that are 
critical for the type of theory about law and value that is being proposed. The 
first distinction is between epistemology and ontology, and the second 
                                                            
41 Put slightly differently, the goal is to identify subjective value knowledge in a way that 
qualifies it as a Hartian social fact. 
42 Subjective justice (fairness) can be seen as a means of distinguishing ‘right’ values from mere 
self-interested preferences. In other words, it is a claim that, while subjective to the self, 
fairness can be articulated objectively as shared value perspectives. 
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distinction is between the internal and the external. While both of these 
conceptual distinctions are often implicitly or explicitly discussed in legal 
theory, they can quickly become confused and muddied. Since these 
conceptual distinctions circumscribe the intellectual boundaries for advancing 
a theory about value knowledge in the context of law, clarity about these terms 
is important. For the first distinction, the importance for understanding value 
in the context of law lies in the type of claims being made: are they ontological 
(metaphysical) claims or epistemological claims about value?  
Ontological questions about value look to the truth claims about value: that is, 
do values exist – and if they do – what is their nature or essence? 
Epistemological questions about value make claims about how knowledge 
about value is gained: that is, what is valued, how can one understand these 
things called values, and what is there to know about them? The importance 
of this distinction in the context of value in legal thought is that regardless of 
whether absolute truth claims about value are possible, knowledge about 
value can be gained or improved. The claim is that despite their subjectivity, 
values (as a product of the deliberating mind) can be the target of 
epistemological inquiry, even if ontological claims about value remain mired in 
skepticism.43   
For the second distinction, the importance for understanding value in the 
context of law lies in the type of inquiry being made: that is, what is the focus 
of the inquiry and what is the observational standpoint or perspective of the 
individual making the observation? What is it when one says something like 
the ‘internal point of view’ or ‘external to the law?’ The delineation of this type 
of inquiry can be configured in a variety of ways that will have profound effects 
on particular understandings about the law. For example, such inquiry can 
focus on the observational standpoint of the inquirer – such as the internal 
decisionmaker or the external discourser or scholar, or it can focus on the 
nature of inquiry – such as internal deliberations of the mind or the external 
observations of the world.  
The importance of the distinction between internal and external inquiry in the 
context of legal and value knowledge centers on where particular forms of 
knowledge emanate. The objectivity of law is claimed when a determination of 
the law is identifiable as an object external to the particular subjectivities of 
the lawgiver or lawtaker (this is the conceptual definition of the Rule of Law). 
The subjectivity of value is claimed when a determination of value is 
identifiable as a state of mind internal to a particular individual. Taken one 
step further, the question for legal inquiry is whether value subjectivity can or 
should be internal to our understanding of the law itself, or should it remain a 
                                                            
43 In other words, the truthaptness of a proposition is a different enterprise from that of 
empirically documenting normative claims. This is a common distinction in most political and 
moral theory. 
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consideration external to the scope of legal knowledge? Both the 
epistemological-ontological and the internal-external distinction help clarify 
the starting point for inquiry about value in law, and it is from these two sets 
of distinctions that knowledge about shared subjectivities will be pursued. 
 
3.1 Value Epistemology and Value Ontology 
When speaking about law, it is frequently the case that questions of 
normativity – such as legitimacy, justice, and fairness – are sheered away from 
questions of descriptive analysis. This is the traditional distinction made 
between analytic and normative jurisprudence. In the realm of legal 
knowledge, this sharp divide between what is and what ought to be is partially 
the result of the success and dominance of legal positivism over the past few 
centuries. Most attempts at the analytical integration of value and law are 
quickly labeled foolish because, as legal positivists claim, a description of what 
makes law law is not value contingent: it has no moral compass – it is a 
scientifically factual enterprise. Either it contains the properties of legalness or 
it does not.  
For the positivist, this determination of what makes law law can be done 
without recourse to value knowledge. However, for most nonpositivists, the 
legalness of a particular entity is not always determinable without some 
reference to value, and even when the legality of a particular entity is factually 
determinable, questions about how such legal content ought to be applied or 
interpreted often requires reference to value. This is because law serves a 
purpose – it provides a service, and that service is to guide and regulate social 
behavior. In this way, the content of legal norms – and how this content is 
applied and interpreted – will always require an element of value inquiry in 
determining whether or not they are performing their desired service. However, 
if such value inquiry is subjective and commonly unobservable, then gaining 
knowledge about value in a manner that is objective enough to satisfy the 
objectivity mandate in legal knowledge – as demanded by positivist thought – 
can be a challenge. 
In proposing a method for improving knowledge about value in the context of 
law, the objectivity-subjectivity distinction and the fact-value distinction are of 
central concern. While there is considerable difficulty in sustaining a clean 
division between objectivity and subjectivity in the context of legal knowledge, 
there remains a widespread consensus in contemporary thought holding that 
law is objective and value is subjective. What exactly does this mean? Is this a 
claim about law as objective and value as subjective, or is it a claim about the 
objectivity of law and the subjectivity of value? This simple dissection of the 
terminology exposes very different conceptual uses of objectivity and 
subjectivity. For purposes of this work, two critical distinctions about 
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objectivity and subjectivity are being made here. Broadly speaking, the first 
distinction relates to the epistemology of law and value, and the second relates 
to the ontology of law and value. The first aspect relates to how one gains 
knowledge about both the concept and content of law and value 
(epistemological questions), while the second relates to what there is to know 
about the existence (truth claims) of concepts about law and value (ontological 
questions).  
The focus of this work is on the epistemological aspects of value. That is, can 
one gain knowledge about value despite its purported subjectivity? Does its 
subjectivity mean that it is impossible to gain knowledge about it, or is such 
knowledge just difficult to obtain? If it is the latter, then it is likely that the 
possibility of gaining value knowledge has been conflated with the practicality 
of gaining value knowledge. Along these lines, it is often the case that the 
objectivity or subjectivity of a particular claim is based on what is empirically 
observable and what is empirically unobservable. Some aspects of value are 
observable and one tends to call them objective or naturalized phenomena 
(what sociologists call social facts). Some aspects of value are less observable 
or unobservable and one tends to call these subjective phenomena (conscious 
and unconscious thoughts and feelings). Yet, this really says nothing about 
value objectivity or subjectivity in either the ontological or epistemological 
sense. Rather, it is something much less sophisticated. It is merely 
acknowledging the difficulty in the measurement of value subjectivity.  
The practicality of knowing value in the context of legal decision and discourse 
should not foreclose the idea that such knowledge is possible. Whether value 
exists ‘out there’ externally in the world or as the internal deliberation of the 
reasoning or feeling mind, answers to questions of value are possible. 
Objective and infallible truth in scientific inquiry is never required: there are 
many mysteries that remain beyond the grasp of human knowledge. Yet, not 
surprisingly, scientists continue to search for answers. While an infallible and 
absolute determination of the exact contents of value may be an impractical 
aim, the reigning skepticism about value knowledge in the context of law is 
largely unhelpful.  
The second question alluded to in the proceeding paragraphs can be framed 
ontologically as: is there truth about value, and is it objective or subjective? 
This type of ontological inquiry often relates to discourse about the concept 
and structure of value. Is value natural, nonmaterial, emotive, or cognitive?44 
                                                            
44 These are questions relating to the essence of value and where they may exist, if at all. Moral 
realist theories about value claim that values are identifiable as mind-independent entities. 
Cognitive theories about value claim that values exist as a product of human reason and 
thought, while emotive or sentimentalist theories about value (noncognitive) also claim that 
value is internal to the self, but that what one values is a product of desire and feeling – not 
rational thought or reason.  
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Is value unitary, plural, universal, or relative?45 The ontological claims about 
the objectivity (that is, universal or unitary, and natural or cognitive) or 
subjectivity (that is, relative or plural, and nonmaterial or noncognitive) of 
value – and the resulting truth claims made about these concepts – are 
questions that have, and continue to, occupy the greatest minds of human 
history. These questions are of central concern in the context of both theories 
about law and theories about justice, and yet definitive answers to these 
ontological questions remain elusive.  
The epistemological questions about the objectivity and subjectivity of value 
knowledge are a bit less problematic. Theories that attempt to provide 
ontological truth about value are distinct from theories that attempt 
epistemological inquiry and clarity about value. Epistemically speaking, 
knowledge about value can be divided into two categories: 1) subjective, which 
are internal to the self and sometimes unobservable (even unconscious) 
aspects of value knowledge that relate to states of the mind,  and 2) objective, 
which are external to the self and often observable behavior aspects of value 
knowledge that are empirically verifiable from experience (social fact).  
 
3.2 The Internal and the External 
The second important preliminary inquiry referenced above relates to how 
subjective value knowledge can be incorporated into the analysis and 
understanding of both the internal components of law and value, and the 
external components of law and value. As the major thrust of this work is to 
improve understanding on how the subjective worldviews, perspectives, and 
value preferences of individuals motivate and influence the way that legal 
problems are approached, it is useful to clarify the focus of inquiry that can 
produce guidance for such a task.  
In order to gain knowledge about how international legal orders evolve and the 
role that value perspectives play in the evolutionary path that such legal 
orders take, inquiry will focus on the following two considerations: 1) the role 
of the scholarly observer discoursing about the law from the outside and how 
such discourse can influence and motivate the way that the law develops, and 
2) the role of subjective value perspectives as internal deliberations of the 
mind (often unconscious and unobservable phenomena) as distinct from the 
                                                            
45 These are questions relating to the structure of value and how they may exist, if at all. 
Unitary theories about value claim that the only way to understand value is a single unifying 
concept from which all other values flow. A pluralistic theory about value claims that values are 
often incommensurate with each other; and therefore, they cannot be explained as a unity. The 
classic example of this claim is between the political values of liberty and equality, and how, if 
ever, they can be reconciled. Universal and relative theories about value connote the difference 
in conceptualizing value as applicable across all conscious beings (universally true) or as 
relative to a particular context (relatively true).  
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objective value perspectives that are external to the self and expressible as 
empirically observable behavior (social fact). The purpose of these foci are to 
claim that the external discourse about the law plays a critical role in the 
shaping of authoritative and controlling decision, and that social fact 
insufficiently represents what individuals actually value.46  
As such, the terms internality and externality will be used to differentiate 
between four ideas. The first idea relates to subjectivity as internal to the self 
and objectivity as external to the self. The second concept relates to the 
separation of legal inquiry into distinct law jobs that are internal and external 
to the law itself: internal legal decision (making and applying authoritative and 
controlling decisions) and external legal discourse (lawshaping and 
lawinfluencing discourse about legal decision as viewed externally from the 
decision process itself). The third concepts relates to how knowledge about the 
law is categorized and integrated: internal considerations include the 
relationship between different legal orders (such as the relationship between 
domestic law and international law, for example) and external considerations 
include the relationship between different legal schools of thought and 
extralegal disciplines (such as the relationship between sociology and the law, 
for example). The final distinction relates to the internal and external point of 
view in Hartian positivism: an important idea that forms the basis of his 
theory on rule acceptance. All of these distinctions are relevant and important 
when trying to gain knowledge about value in the context of legal thought.  
For the first conception, inquiry relates to knowledge internal to the self and 
knowledge external to the self. Doctrinal law acknowledges the difficulty in 
gaining knowledge internal to the self, such as subjective states of the mind 
(what might be called internal subjectivities) – whether conscious or 
unconscious – and therefore focuses on that which is external to the self and 
objectively observable in the world: legal doctrine, social fact, or historical 
tradition (what might be called external objectivities). This focus on objective 
fact is an important tenet of all legal theory, but especially legal positivism in 
all its iterations. One of the key aspects of external objectivity is an attempt in 
legal theory to base analysis of the law on a methodology that is confined to 
naturalized and observable states of the world.47 However, in many cases, 
there are subjective states of the mind that influence and affect objective legal 
inquiry. It is this relationship about the interplay between external 
objectivities and internal subjectivities that is the focus of this work.  
The second conceptualization of internal and external is noticeably different. 
Accordingly, in the context of law, there are two ways in which subjective 
                                                            
46 This is an idea akin to the requirement of both state practice (social fact) and opinio juris 
(subjective and internal considerations about value that yield as sense of obligation) in 
constituting customary international law. 
47 See Brian Leiter (2007). Naturalizing Jurisprudence. Oxford, OUP. 
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perspectives manifest themselves: internal to the law and external to the law. 
The internal aspect of subjectivity relates to value perspectives of lawmakers 
and lawappliers: that is, the subjective and often externally unobservable 
states of mind that individual decisionmakers employ when reasoning and 
making judgments about the law.48 While the relationship of value and law in 
the internal context will focus on decisionmaker subjectivity, the relationship 
of value and law in the external context focuses on the subjectivity of 
community or societal discourse: that is, the universe of perspectives about 
value that influence and guide the social process and lawshaping discourse 
over time. In looking to understand how subjective value perspectives 
influence and shape the law, this distinction between decision inquiry and 
discourse inquiry will be sustained in the context of this work. 
While the first and second concepts of the internal and external form base 
distinctions that are critical to this work, the third and fourth concepts are 
slightly tangential – but are important nonetheless. The third concept focuses 
on the way that law is conceptualized as an overarching idea that governs 
specific areas of human behavior. That is, within both legal decision and 
discourse, there is an ongoing debate about how the law as a self-contained 
concept interacts with the larger world. Within these debates, which come 
largely from nonpositivist orientations about the law, there are hermeneutic 
issues about how to incorporate knowledge about social phenomena into our 
understanding about the way that the law works in the larger social context.49 
Positivist orientations on the other hand tend to eschew such considerations 
and limit inquiry about the content of law to social facts: a process that can 
include nonlegal disciplines only if they are contained within posited law.   
The fourth and final idea about internality and externality in the law relates to 
a particular conception employed by Hart. Called the internal point of view in 
Hartian legal positivism, this concept hinges on the way that rule acceptance 
is internalized by its subjects.50 It is an idea that is suspiciously subjective in 
nature, and yet it is a central feature in this descriptive theory about what 
makes law law. According to Hart, there is something about the nature of law 
(probably its authority) that causes individuals to internalize externally 
observable social fact and to accept these facts (legal rules) as part of their 
internal makeup. According to this view, subjects – as seen from the internal 
point of view – accept the obligation of law because it is law, not because of its 
                                                            
48 This reference to law includes the task of the decisionmaker in both the making of law, and in 
the adjudication of disputes arising under the law. 
49 Such as the way that sociological, psychological, economic, and political disciplines can 
inform our understanding of what the law is or should be. However, even this categorization can 
be further parsed into another set of internal-external distinctions when the relationship 
between different specialties in law are being discoursed. An example of this might be the way 
that principles of environmental law are analyzed in the context of human rights law or trade 
law or investment law. 
50 See Dennis Patterson (1999). Explicating the Internal Point of View. Southern Methodist 
University Law Review. Vol. 52, p. 67. 
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moral legitimacy or authority, or because of the threat of law’s coercion-
backed sanction. For Hart, this means that legal rules impose an obligation to 
accept the law in a manner that is internal to the self. The external point of 
view, on the other hand, is the set of rules that cannot bind the subject 
because they remain as social facts external to the subject’s constitution. 
The importance of Hart’s internal point of view for value inquiry in the context 
of law is that it appears to be contingent on an evaluative component that 
requires individuals to accept a rule as legally obligatory. In the context of a 
theory of configurative fairness, the internal point of view is an important idea 
for the evaluation of what compels people (or states) to obey the law. For Hart, 
the sense of legal obligation comes from the fact that a primary rule is derived 
from a secondary rule such as the rule of recognition.51 However, what if the 
rule does not derive from a rule of recognition? How then does one accept the 
rule as binding from the internal point of view?  
An example of such a rule would be to look at Ronald Dworkin’s favorite legal 
concept: the legal principle.52 In some cases, a judge or adjudicator feels 
bound to apply a legal principle even though no rule of recognition can identify 
it. Where does such a sense of obligation derive? An answer may come from 
research in social psychology holding that why one obeys the law is rooted in 
the way one’s mind perceives that law or rule to be just: for example, the idea 
that a rule is perceived as substantively fair, or at a minimum, it is perceived 
as part of legitimate process (that is, procedurally fair).53 Such a 
conceptualization of rule acceptance expands Hart’s internal point of view to 
include senses of fairness or justice in evaluating whether the law obligates. If 
true, such insight provides a significant empirical foundation for the idea that 
how one perceives the obligatory nature of law as inescapably intertwined with 
value (sometimes even moral value). 
 
4. THE VALUE OF METHOD AND THEORY 
The goal of obtaining sufficiently objective knowledge about subjective value 
may appear oxymoronic. And yet, it does seem fairly routine and commonplace 
                                                            
51 Julie Dickson (2007). Is the Rule of Recognition Really a Conventional Rule? Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies. Vol. 27, p. 373; see also HLA Hart [1961](1997). The Concept of Law, edited by 
Joseph Raz. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
52 See Ronald Dworkin (1986). Law’s Empire. Cambridge, Belknap Press. 
53 “If people view compliance with the law as appropriate because of their attitudes about how 
they should behave, they will voluntarily assume the obligation to follow legal rules. They will 
feel personally committed to obeying the law, irrespective of whether they risk punishment for 
breaking the law. This normative commitment can involve personal morality or legitimacy. 
Normative commitment through personal morality means obeying a law because one feels the 
law is just; normative commitment through legitimacy means obeying a law because one feels 
that the authority enforcing the law has the right to dictate behavior.” Tom Tyler (1990). Why 
People Obey the Law. Princeton, Princeton University Press, p. 4. 
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for discussions of universal human rights to hold sway in both popular and 
academic culture. What can one make of such claims in the context of value 
knowledge? Where do these universal human rights come from and how are 
they to be identified? Are these rights universal in the sense that every 
conscious being would agree to such rights (subjectively just in the rational 
sense of Rawlsian and neo-Kantian thought), or is there a mind-independent 
entity that exists universally that one can observe as a human right 
(objectively just)?  
The answer to this question remains unproven in a scientific sense, but 
demonstrates why theoretical design and focus of inquiry are important to 
obtaining a realistic understanding of the social processes that is called law. In 
positivist thought, it does not matter where human rights come from: so long 
as they have been posited in a legally valid form. For them, this is enough. For 
almost every strain of nonpositivist thought however, this is intellectually 
unsatisfying inquiry. If the law has a purpose and that purpose is to guide the 
manifest of human interaction in the time-space continuum, then a deeper 
knowledge about what human beings value (and what rights they have) is 
needed to achieve such a purpose.  
 
4.1 The New Haven School and Q Methodology 
The New Haven School developed in the mid-twentieth century as a reaction to 
both political and legal realism in domestic and international jurisprudential 
frames. Its founders claimed that an understanding of the process of 
authoritative and controlling decision as a constitutive description of law was 
unidentifiable when viewed through the prism of power realism. Power-based 
or political realism places all of its analytical focus on the concept of control 
and interests, leaving the equally necessary component of legal authority and 
legitimacy underevaluated. Likewise, New Haven scholars found that legal 
idealism in its various incarnations limited legal understanding by 
overemphasizing perspectives at the expense of operations. One of the main 
underlying tenets of the New Haven School is to claim that a comprehensive 
method of inquiry into the law requires a theory about law that can balance its 
emphasis on authority and control, and on perspectives and operations.54 In 
formulating inquiry in this way, one could say that power matters in 
international law – but so does authority; and that state practice (operations) 
matters in international law – but so does perspective.  
At the center of such a comprehensive map of legal understanding is the 
explicit postulation of the goal values to which a world public order of human 
dignity should aim. In this way, the New Haven School incorporates a 
                                                            
54 See Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 19. 
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normative and prescriptive orientation in its formulation of a theory about law. 
In most jurisprudential thought, such normative aims are the exclusive 
domain of justice theories as justified (possibly erroneously) by David Hume’s 
famous maxim ‘no ought from an is.’55 By framing inquiry in such a goal-
orientated or teleological manner, the New Haven School “aimed from the 
beginning not simply to understand the way the world worked, but to shape 
it.”56 The purpose of a theory about law for them is to appraise the process of 
authoritative and controlling decision in light of its capacity to achieve a 
preferred future public world order of human dignity.57 Accordingly, a public 
order of human dignity for the New Haven School is defined as: 
one which approximates the optimum access by all human beings to all things they 
cherish: power, wealth, enlightenment, skill, well-being, affection, respect, and 
rectitude.58  
It is the right distribution of these human values that guides the way in which 
legal decisions ought to be made.  
As stated, the explicit reliance on human values as a condition of legal 
appraisal puts the New Haven School significantly on the side of nonpositivist 
orientations in law. In fact, the use of human value claims in this way is 
similar to contemporary natural law theorists such as John Finnis, whose 
concept of objective goods (goods that all human beings desire) parallels many 
of the values of human dignity in the New Haven School.59 The primary 
distinction between the New Haven School and other nonpositivist orientations 
is their demanded balancing between all of the conditions that make and 
shape the law.  
In this way, the New Haven School is a framework for inquiry that refuses to 
shun any legal theory (or political, psychological, or social theory for that 
matter) if it sheds light on the reality of the legal process.60 There are elements 
                                                            
55 The is-ought problem in metaethics, as articulated by philosopher David Hume, is that many 
thinkers make claims about what ought to be on the basis of statements about what is. 
However, Hume found that there seems to be a significant difference between descriptive 
statements (about what is) and prescriptive or normative statements (about what ought to be), 
and it is not obvious how we can get from making descriptive statements to prescriptive 
statements. 
56 Oona Hathaway (2007). The Continuing Influence of the New Haven School. Yale Journal of 
International Law. Vol. 32, pp. 553, 558. 
57 Michael Reisman, Siegfried Wiessner, & Andrew Willard (2007). The New Haven School: A 
Brief Introduction. Yale Journal of International Law. Vol. 32, pp. 575, 576. 
58 Id. 
59 John Finnis (1980). Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford, OUP; see also Nigel Simmonds 
(2008). Central Issues in Jurisprudence, Third Edition. London, Sweet & Maxwell, pp. 113-135. 
60 In the concluding paragraph of a recent article about the New Haven school, three of its 
proponents quote a Chinese proverb and proclaim: “[i]t does not matter whether a cat is black 
or white but whether it catches mice. Our loyalty is to the values of human dignity and our goal 
is a world order producing and distributing those values. The New Haven School was 
established to refine and apply tools to achieve that goal. If there is a better cat around, we 
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of positivism, natural law, justice theories, moral philosophy, political science, 
and cognitive psychology embedded in their theory about law. It is a theory 
that is both prescriptive and descriptive: it is about the concept of law, the 
content of law, and it is also a theory of adjudication and interpretation. In 
whole, the New Haven School is an approach to legal understanding that 
attempts to comprehensively and holistically map social choice in a global 
context.61 
Strangely, the New Haven School is a theory about law that has been 
somewhat discounted in legal thought in the decades since its formulation. A 
partial explanation of this marginalization can be blamed – not on the 
substance of the theory – but on temporal proximity to larger debates in legal 
philosophy in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. Policy-
orientated jurisprudence developed at a time when legalization and legal 
positivism was entering a renaissance, leading some theorists and legal 
scholars to criticize the policy-orientated approach as excessively subjective in 
the negative sense.62 Some critics have claimed that by aiming a theory at 
subjective goal values, the justification for any legal outcome could be 
manipulated to suit the interest of the more powerful party.63 However, it is 
not the recognition of the role that values play in the legal process that 
undermines the approach; rather, the policy-orientated approach has been 
challenged by legal positivism in the same way that all nonpositivist 
orientations have. Legal positivists claim that gaining knowledge about 
unposited value can never meet the objective mandate of posited law, and 
therefore can never be claimed as law properly so called.  
In the same way that some are skeptical about the idea of universal human 
values or universal human rights, some legal theorists tend to steer clear of 
the idea that objective knowledge about value can be determined in a manner 
that would justify their foundation or grounding in a theory about law. The 
policy-orientated approach does not retreat from such a possibility. In a very 
similar vein to that of the philosophical pragmatists, the New Haven scholars 
claim that theory should be orientated at a framework of inquiry, and that 
comprehensive inquiry can lead to real knowledge. To place a marker or target 
of such inquiry, the New Haven school postulates the overriding goal value of 
human dignity to which all inquiry ought to aim. It is the aim of this work to 
provide further methodological clarity about how to determine what 
constitutes the particulars of any theory about human dignity or justice. It is 
hoped that Q methodology can provide a mode for gaining empirical knowledge 
                                                                                                                                                                              
would be the first to use it. As far as we have been able to tell, there is not.” Reisman, Wiessner, 
& Willard, supra note 57 at p. 582. 
61 See Reisman, supra note 20 at p. 119. 
62 e.g. Simma and Paulus describe the New Haven school as “conflating law, political science, 
and politics.” See Simma & Paulus, supra note 11 at p. 308. 
63 See Martti Koskenniemi (2001). The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of 
International Law, 1870-1960. Cambridge, CUP, p. 476. 
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about value subjectivity in a manner that assists in closing a weak link in all 
nonpositivist theory: a weakness that has manifest itself as skepticism about 
the possibility of measuring value objectively enough to permit its 
incorporation as a necessary component of jurisprudential thought.  
Q methodology constitutes a technique for measuring subjective perspective 
by mapping and factoring points of convergence and divergence across a set of 
individuals.64 It is often considered to be an inverted form of factor analysis in 
that traditional factor analysis correlates a set number of variables or tests 
across a population of persons, while Q technique correlates a population of 
persons across a set number of variables or tests.65 Take the following 
example. In traditional factor analysis, the scores of a number of tests (one on 
reading comprehension, one on algebra, and one on advanced finance) are 
correlated to a set number of college students who have taken these tests. 
Traditional factor analysis will be able to identify, passively, if there is a 
statistically relevant positive correlation between the scores on one test in 
relation to another. The speculation would be that there is a positive 
correlation between the scores on the algebra and finance tests (because the 
subject-matter is related).  
Q methodology inverts this process and focuses on how a set number of 
individuals respond actively to a set of tests or variables (usually a number of 
subjective statements on a particular topic). So, for example, in a Q method 
analysis, a set of individuals will be asked to evaluate a number of statements 
on a particular topic (called a Q sort). Their responses to these statements will 
be factor analyzed in a way that correlates shared modes of thinking on that 
topic. Instead of being passively subjected to measurement as is the case in 
traditional factor analysis, Q methodology requires participants to actively 
rank-order a set of statements from a subjective or first-person point of view 
(called operant subjectivity).66   
Q methodology is a technique for identifying shared subjective perspectives on 
a particular topic. The Q sorting process is specifically tuned for identifying 
shared patterns of subjective thought as they relate to value. In being able to 
                                                            
64 For an overview of Q methodology, see Simon Watts & Paul Stenner (2012). Doing Q 
Methodological Research: Theory, Method, and Interpretation. London, Sage. 
65 Id. at pp. 7-10. 
66 The idea of operantcy “can be traced to Skinner [the eminent American behaviorist], and 
before that to Spearman [inventor of factor analysis], who were on the trail of this idea even 
before it became a central principle in physics. Science deals with operations associated with 
confrontable events, and in Q methodology self and subjectivity are rendered operational 
through Q technique. In the process of Q sorting, the person operates with statements or other 
measurable stimuli by rank-ordering them under some experimental condition. The operation is 
subjective inasmuch as it is me rather than someone else who is providing a measure of my 
point of view, and the factors which emerge are therefore categories of operant subjectivity.” See 
Steven Brown (1995). The History and Principles of Q Methodology in Psychology and the Social 
Sciences. British Psychological Society Symposium, ‘A Quest of for a Science of Subjectivity: The 
Lifework of William Stephenson.’ 12-14 December 1997. London, University of London. 
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map shared patterns of thought across a set of individuals, Q methodology 
configures the way that individuals respond similarly to a set of subjective 
statements on a particular topic. In the same way that traditional factor 
analysis can identify unobservable factors among empirically observable 
phenomena (such as test scores), Q methodology can identify unobservable 
factors among empirically unobservable (even unconscious) phenomena (such 
as cognitive process of the mind).  
An example of a Q methodology study relevant to the law would be to ask a set 
number of legal scholars to rank-order a set of statements (usually from most 
agree to most disagree) on how the underlying values that make up the 
principle of good faith ought to be understood. An analysis of this particular Q 
sort would be able to identify a number of patterns across the individuals 
completing the Q sort. These shared patterns, although only subjectively 
knowable to each individual, can – once factor analyzed – form a foundation 
for shared subjective knowledge about value in that particular context. While 
this is still a long way from scientifically objective knowledge, the shared 
perspectives that emerge from a Q method study can go a long way in 
advancing our understanding of subjective value in the context of legal 
inquiry.  
 
4.2 A Fair Configuration of Shared Subjectivity 
The basic premise of this work is to advance value knowledge for legal inquiry 
by providing a theory and method for configuring legal fairness as based on 
shared subjectivities about value. This process is embedded with a number of 
assumptions that might be useful to delineate. What is meant by configuring 
fairness? What is meant by shared subjectivity, and why would knowledge 
about shared subjectivities provide a more robust and comprehensive 
understanding about how the law works as means of ordering society?  
To start, the word fairness is being used to differentiate the term from that of 
justice. In some cases what is fair may also be just. For this reason, a clean 
division between justice and fairness is not possible or desirable. However, in 
the context of this work, fairness is being used to describe subjective justice. 
Subjective justice is how a society or community67 would configure and 
maximize value distribution in a particular context. According to those of the 
Kantian tradition, a distinction between fairness and justice is not relevant 
                                                            
67 One of the major tenets of a theory of configurative fairness is the identification of a relevant 
legal community. This can be difficult to identify at the international level. However, a theory of 
configurative fairness is a specific theoretical application to particular legal orders. In this way, 
it may be easier to identify a community as those with a stake in the way in which a particular 
legal order develops. That is, it will focus on the identification of the users or participants of 
such a legal order. 
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because that which is subjectively fair is objectively just. The reason for this is 
the importance given to the rational mind as being able to determine 
objectively that which is just. That is, what an individual wills as just through 
the rational process of the deliberative mind is objectively just. All individuals 
would come to the same conclusion about what is just through the use of their 
rational faculties alone. Kant calls this the categorical imperative.68 While 
building on the thought of Kant, Rawls theory does not go quite so far. Instead 
he relies on a ‘thin theory of the good:’ an idea that there are a few basic 
objective principles of justice that all human beings – if acting rationally – 
would agree upon.69 
The theory of configurative fairness being advocated in this work does not 
make either Kantian or Rawlsian claims about the ontological truthaptness of 
justice. Rather, fairness is what a particular society or community would agree 
to about the configuration of shared value subjectivities. In the context of 
justice thought, this distinction is very important. For the Kantian, the 
categorical imperative allows for justice to become objectified as right reason. 
For the Rawlsian, the rational mind in the original position would always 
choose a set number of just principles upon which all other principles could 
be determined.  
A theory of configurative fairness makes no such ontological claims about the 
truth value of justice. Instead, it claims that fairness – regardless of whether 
there is objective or absolute truth about it – can be determined by appealing 
to that which all members of a society or community would subjectively will. 
Under such a theory, the importance then shifts to determining what these 
shared subjectivities about value are. The focus for a theory of configurative 
fairness is on value epistemology: how can one gain knowledge about value in 
a manner that permits its description objectively. The intellectual tool for 
achieving this goal is shared subjectivity.  
 
4.3 The Evolution of Investment Treaty Arbitration 
International law in general has expanded significantly in the past fifty years, 
and for many, this increased level of legalization and specialization (negatively 
                                                            
68 Kant holds that the fundamental principle of our moral duties is a categorical imperative. It is 
an imperative because it commands us to exercise our wills in a particular way, not to perform 
some action or other. It is categorical in virtue of applying to us unconditionally, or simply 
because one possesses a rational will, without reference to any ends that one might or might not 
have. 
69 “We need what I have called the thin theory of the good to explain the rational preference for 
primary goods and to explicate the notion of rationality underlying the choice of principles in the 
original position.” Rawls, supra note 24 at p. 349.  
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referred to as fragmentation)70 at the international level is a good thing. 
However, it does present new problems for legal understanding because of the 
way that international law is structured – from outwith sovereignty, not 
within. International legal understanding is often complicated by the fact that 
most explanatory legal theories have primarily developed over the past half 
millennia through the prism of domestic sovereignty. As such, a number of 
significant conceptual hurdles must be overcome in transposing, if at all, 
general theories about law into specialized international and global theories 
about law. In the decentralized and anarchical world of autonomous 
sovereigns, a pure positivistic concept about the law as derived from within 
sovereignty is likely to provide only a minimal level of insight.  
The transposition of legal theory from the domestic level to the international 
level has always been a challenge. Some theories, such as those of 
international legal idealism (as an attempt to codify international law in a 
manner similar to domestic legal structures), were quickly dismissed by 
political realists who believed that a rule-dominant understanding of 
international law failed to account for the power dynamics among sovereigns. 
They claimed that such idealism fostered a false confidence about rule 
adherence in the face of raw power. From a New Haven School perspective, the 
distinction between legal idealism and political realism is one that centers on 
the distinction between what Michael Reisman calls the ‘myth system’ and the 
‘operational code.’71 Accordingly, excessive reliance on an ideal form of legal 
codification that does not operate in practice is both fool-hardy and 
dangerous. At the same time, ignoring the interactive communicative 
dynamics that gives rise to an international rule of law (however weak) is a 
similarly unbalanced approach. While an extreme version of a utopian 
international rule of law is unlikely given the dynamics of power from outwith 
sovereignty, the cynicism of the political realists has demonstrably failed: 
international law does obligate.72 While the claim that it is challenging, and 
sometimes impossible, to enforce international law among autonomous 
sovereigns is valid, it becomes less valid when viewed through the lenses of 
increasingly nuanced and creative theories on how international law gains 
compliance.73  
                                                            
70 For the negative implications, see Gunther Teubner & Andreas Fischer-Lescano (2004). 
Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law. Michigan 
Journal of International Law. Vol. 25, p. 999. 
71 Riesman’s own philosophic orientation about the law has been labeled as a realistic idealism. 
For more on the idea of the myth system and operational code, see Michael Reisman (1977). 
Myth System and Operational Code. Yale Studies in World Public Order. Vol. 3, p. 230. 
72 Not all the time, but neither does domestic law. The fact that people break the law does not 
mean that it is not a law that they are breaking. 
73 See Oona Hathaway & Scott Shapiro (2011). Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and 
International Law. Yale Law Journal. Vol. 121, p. 252; Jutta Brunnée & Stephen Toope (2010). 
Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account. Cambridge, CUP; Andrew 
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This is never to say, however, that political and moral values do not influence, 
motivate, and even dominate, legal decisions in the international sphere. In 
fact, it may be that value plays an even more significant role in international 
law than domestic law. One of the overriding problems at the international 
level lies in determining if there is such a thing as an international 
community, and whether or not such a community contains a collective 
interest whose values are shared. At the domestic level, the community to 
which a legal order aims is more easily identifiable and is often restrained to a 
finite geographic proximity. This is not always possible at the international 
level. There are considerable problems that arise in attempting to identify a 
relevant international legal community, and even if such a community of 
interests is identified, sovereignty often confuses matters. Claiming that a 
state forms a single community interest in the international legal system will 
often be held as insensitive to the contextual particularities of each state – and 
to the individuals residing within it. As such, when looking at particular legal 
orders at the international level, it is often difficult to articulate what values its 
participants espouse. A possible way to understand these problems is to look 
at a particular international legal order and to analyze how values influence 
and impact its development. 
International investment treaty arbitration is one such regime74 whose rapid 
development and diverse value claims make it an ideal candidate for a theory 
that seeks to clarify what participants using this legal order value; and 
whether or not there is any possibility for identifying if the diverse and often 
conflicting value claims, as perceived by participants in the regime, overlap in 
any meaningful way (despite its overwhelmingly global scope). The idea is that 
by identifying shared patterns of thought about value subjectivity in the 
context of investment treaty arbitration, unobservable factors will emerge that 
demonstrate a way forward on seemingly intractable issues. Can for example, 
an acceptable definition of what constitutes an ‘investment’ ever be 
understood in such a global context of diverse interests?75 A theory of 
configurative fairness claims that the underlying value subjectivities that 
inform various legal positions (such as a definition of investment) are 
identifiable. The question for the theory is whether the identification of these 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Guzmán (2007). How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory. Oxford, OUP; Harold 
Koh (1997). Why Do Nations Obey International Law? Yale Law Journal. Vol. 106, p. 2599. 
74 The term regime is being used to differentiate it from a system. It will be used throughout this 
work to refer to particular international legal orders. A legal order described as a regime may be 
less comprehensive and cohesive than a legal order conceived as a system of law. A regime, as 
used in this work, is taken from Stephen Krasner who defines an international regime as: 
“[i]mplicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which 
actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” Stephen Krasner (1983). 
‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,’ in Stephen 
Krasner, ed., International Regimes. Ithaca, Cornell University Press. 
75 For an overview of this particular debate, see Julian Mortenson (2010). The Meaning of 
Investment: ICSID’s Travaux and the Domain of International Investment Law. Harvard 
International Law Journal. Vol. 51, p. 257. 
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various value positions converges in a manner that would permit a 
configuration of the law in a way that is acceptable to all of its participants. If 
such a value consensus can be identified, then particular rules in the legal 
order can be configured in a way so as to satisfy the shared value 
understandings that inform such legal rules. 
Investment treaty arbitration is a particular form of international dispute 
resolution that is embedded in thousands of bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) and in investment chapters in a number of plurilateral free trade 
agreements (FTAs).76 From a theoretical perspective, the systemic issues of 
this legal order concerns whether such an international dispute settlement 
mechanism can ever be fair and legitimate when resolving disputes about the 
internal affairs of a state. The particular (adjudicative) issues relating to 
investment treaty arbitration pertain to the practice of actual arbitrations, 
with scrutiny focusing on the manner and scope of the decisions that 
arbitrators render in such disputes.  
This dissection exposes two theoretical angles to the discourse on investment 
treaty arbitration. The first is based on a regime-building and process-
orientated focus that is entrenched in questions of how a system of law of this 
type ought to be configured, and the second is based on a decision-orientated 
and adjudicative focus: that is, what can legal theory tell us about the 
decisions that international arbitrators do or should make? The focus of 
inquiry into these two areas of investment treaty arbitration are interrelated, 
but distinct. The first focus is to ask: how should this legal order develop? The 
second focus is to ask: how should arbitrators decide cases? The focus of the 
Q method study being conducted in the context of this work will look at the 
first question. The study is concerned with drawing insights about how the 
worldviews and perspectives of individuals using this system of law perceive 
its capacity to maximize the values that they believe such a legal order ought 
to endorse. 
In attempting to improve knowledge about value in international legal theory, 
the Q method study used in this work focuses on the issue of fairness in 
investment treaty arbitration,77 and looks at the diverse issues under debate 
                                                            
76 For a good overview of international investment law, see Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer 
(2012). Principles of International Investment Law, Second Edition. Oxford, OUP; José Alvarez 
(2011). The Public International Law Regime Governing International Investment. The Hague, 
Pocketbooks of the Hague Academy of International Law; Jeswald Salacuse (2010). The Law of 
International Investment Treaties. Oxford, OUP; Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah (2010). The 
International Law on Foreign Investment, Third Edition. Cambridge, CUP; Peter Cameron (2010). 
International Energy Investment Law: The Pursuit of Stability. Oxford, OUP; Zachary Douglas 
(2009). The International Law of Investment Claims. Cambridge, CUP; August Reinisch (2008). 
Standards of Protection in International Investment Law. Oxford, OUP; Campbell McLachlan, et 
al. (2007). International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles. Oxford, OUP. 
77 The Q method study was conducted online, and is located at: www.fairnessdiscourse.org (last 
visited 1 September 2013). The title of the study is: Measuring the Immeasurable? Fairness 
Discourse in Investment Treaty Arbitration. 
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in investment treaty arbitration in the hope of clarifying points of subjective 
value knowledge that are shared. Investment treaty arbitration blends together 
many, if not all, of the most thorny issues in current jurisprudential thought.78 
It therefore, provides an ideal forum for proposing a theory about law and 
value in the context of legal thought and understanding. Broadly speaking, 
four major focal points in investment treaty arbitration provide such a basis 
for inquiry: 1) it is a regime of international law, which forces considerations 
about sovereign authority and autonomy largely absent in the domestic or 
municipal context, 2) it is a rapidly evolving legal order with a decentralized 
institutional organization (rules are largely being developed by ad hoc arbitral 
tribunals and influential publicists), which means that ideas relating to the 
sources of law continue to be discussed, 3) it is a legal order thick with debate 
about its content, purpose, and function, which in the context of gaining 
knowledge about value is central, and 4) it is a legal order whose hybridization 
of both public-private and domestic-international issues in the context of 
international legalization creates a tension in value perspectives about the 
scope of private law in the framework of public law authority and control, and 
about the interplay between domestic and international rules in the context of 
international adjudication.  
 
 
 
                                                            
78 A survey of some of the major issues enveloping the discourse are detailed in an increasingly 
large scholarship, see e.g.: Devashish Krishan (2011). ‘Thinking about BITs and BIT Arbitration: 
The Legitimacy Crisis that Never Was,’ in Stephan Schill, ed. International Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law. Oxford, OUP; Michael Waibel, et al., eds. (2010). The Backlash against 
Investment Arbitration. The Hague, Kluwer; David Caron (2009). Investor-State Arbitration: 
Strategic and Tactical Perspectives on Legitimacy. Suffolk Transnational Law Review. Vol. 32, p. 
513; Noemi Gal-Or (2009). The Investor and Civil Society as Twin Global Citizens: Proposing a 
New Interpretation in the Legitimacy Debate. Suffolk Transnational Law Review. Vol. 32, p. 271; 
Charles Brower & Stephan Schill (2009). Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of 
International Investment Law? Chicago Journal of International Law. Vol. 9, p. 471; Christopher 
Ryan (2008). Meeting Expectations: Assessing the Long-Term Legitimacy and Stability of 
International Investment Law. University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic 
Law. Vol. 29, p. 725; David Schneiderman (2008). Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization: 
Investment Rules and Democracy’s Promise. Cambridge, CUP; Jason Webb Yackee (2008). Do We 
Really Need BITs? Toward a Return to Contract in International Investment Law. Asian Journal of 
WTO & International Health Law & Policy. Vol. 3, p. 121; Andrea Björklund (2007). Private 
Rights and Public International Law: Why Competition Among International Economic Law 
Tribunals is Not Working. Hastings Law Journal. Vol. 59, p. 241; Jeswald Salacuse (2007). Is 
There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-State Dispute Resolution. 
Fordham International Law Journal. Vol. 31, p. 138; Ann Capling & Kim Nossal (2006). 
Blowback: Investor-State Dispute Mechanisms in International Trade Agreements. Governance. 
Vol. 19, p. 151; Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah (2006). A Law for Need or a Law for Greed? 
Restoring the Lost Law in the International Law of Foreign Investment. International 
Environmental Agreements. Vol. 6, p. 329; Susan Franck (2005). The Legitimacy Crisis in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions. 
Fordham Law Review. Vol. 73, p. 1521. 
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5. VALUES AND JURISPRUDENTIAL THOUGHT 
The incorporation of value knowledge in theories about law presupposes that 
values matter in the way that legal orders develop. It claims that the way that 
decisionmakers decide and the way that scholars analyze and discuss the law 
is premised on the way that he or she conceptualizes the world; and that the 
intellectual work that one is tasked with is influenced and motivated by the 
manner in which the human mind appraises the things that it values. It is 
from this foundation that a theory of configurative fairness can be grounded.  
Such a theory also assumes that value is infused in any theory about law, 
albeit in varying degrees according to the particular theoretical orientation 
that one takes as their starting point for inquiry. For conceptual theories 
about law, epistemic values about predictability, coherence, and determinacy, 
for example, are claimed as sufficient to understand the law.79 However, while 
not explicitly moral – or aimed at justice – epistemic or cognitive values are 
values too.80 They are things that one values in a legal system or order. They 
are the things that its proponents believe are indispensable to a properly 
functioning system. For normative theories about law, moral and political 
values (in addition to epistemic values) must also be considered in both the 
description and evaluation of the law. For some political theorists, especially 
those of a realist orientation, law is rooted in the value of political choice and 
power prerogative. What all of these theoretical orientations have in common 
is that they are infused with value. It is an unavoidable dilemma in human 
thought: all thought is informed by the capacity of the human mind to judge.  
The question for legal theory then is not to ask whether a value-free ideal is 
possible, but rather, it is to ask what degree of subjective value should be 
permitted in the way that the law is conceptualized. To do this, the goal of a 
legal theory must be delineated. What is the work it is trying to do? If one 
looks at the function of law as its capacity to order human interaction, then 
the ability of the law to achieve its goals must not derogate its focus away from 
the things that human beings value. The goal of the law, under such a view, 
becomes more important than its intrinsic nature. It is a tool for shaping and 
sharing values among a community of individuals. It is from this perspective 
that a theory of configurative fairness derives its utility.  
Combined with the claim that law and value are entangled at every level of 
theoretical inquiry, the job of jurisprudence is to assist in advancing our 
understanding of what goals the law should orientate itself towards, and how 
an improved knowledge of the things that human beings value can help 
achieve such a goal. The identification and analysis of value in legal decision 
                                                            
79 See Brian Leiter (2003). Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in 
Jurisprudence. American Journal of Jurisprudence. Vol. 48, pp. 17, 34. 
80 Putnam, supra note 28 at p. 30. 
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and discourse – whether the focus be inside or outside the state – is an arena 
that can benefit from the development of innovative, empirical, and creative 
methodologies for its measurement. Nearly a century ago, Benjamin Cardozo 
stated that:  
[w]e may try to see things as objectively as we please. Nonetheless, we can never see them 
with the eyes except our own. I have little hope that I shall be able to state the formula 
which will rationalize this process for myself, much less for others.81  
Now in the early twenty-first century, it is hoped that the use of Q 
methodology can assist in rationalizing just such a process.  
 
6. A ROAD MAP 
This first Chapter is intended as both a general overview of the theory and 
method being proposed, and to lay out the structure of subsequent Chapters. 
The main objective of this work is to provide a theory for the incorporation of 
subjective knowledge about value into the analysis of law through the 
employment of Q methodology: a method for the measurement of human 
subjectivity that combines psychometrics with empirical research procedures. 
Q methodology will be demonstrated through a study on the fairness discourse 
in investment treaty arbitration. The study will be structured as means for 
configuring fairness in the context of evolving international legal orders.  
It is hoped that the combination of this study, and the underlying theoretical 
and methodological foundation upon which it is based, will significantly 
improve the way that value knowledge can be obtained in the context of 
nonpositivist theories about law. As noted in the preceding section, the 
problem of subjective knowledge in jurisprudential thought is a longstanding 
and unresolved issue. Attempts at measuring the way individuals think, and 
more importantly, how values and preferences influence and motivates legal 
reasoning and legal actions, is considered to be a most formidable task. It is 
proposed that Q methodology can provide valuable insight into understanding 
how individuals, both inside and outside the law, think about it. When 
speaking about thought in this context, one is presupposing that values 
matter in both legal decision and legal discourse: a claim that fact and value 
are not separate, but necessarily connected in legal thought and reasoning.  
 
 
                                                            
81 Benjamin Cardozo (1921). The Nature of the Judicial Process. New Haven, Yale University 
Press, p. 9. 
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6.1 Research Questions 
As a contribution to jurisprudence, this work seeks answers to the following 
two-fold research question: first, if one claims that all lawmaking, lawapplying, 
lawshaping, and lawinfluencing – from the local to the global – involves 
subjective value judgments in both decision and discourse, can shared 
knowledge about these perspectives (subjectivities) be gained in a sufficiently 
objective manner so as to support their integration into legal analysis; and 
second, if one claims that individual and community perspectives about value 
distribution are influential in the evolution of legal regimes, can knowledge of 
shared expectations about values in the discourse on investment treaty 
arbitration ground a theory of configurative fairness for evolving international 
legal orders more generally?  
 
6.2 A Brief Outline 
As these research questions may indicate, this work cuts across vast swaths of 
intellectual inquiry. Before contemplating the details of configurative fairness 
in the context of investment treaty arbitration, a more general description of 
the theoretical underpinnings of this project must be delineated. The 
remainder of this Chapter will briefly describe the content of the theoretical 
and methodological models that will be used to develop a theory of 
configurative fairness. The following sections will summarize the Chapters of 
this work. Structurally, the Chapters will move from the general to the 
specific, with the intention of laying out the main issues that are being 
proposed. Chapters in this work will proceed under the following eight main 
headings, and will be briefly introduced in the following sections of this 
Chapter: between objective fact and subjective value; legal positivism and legal 
nonpositivism; values and international legal theory; a theory of configurative 
fairness; Q methodology and legal analysis; investment treaty arbitration and 
its discontents; configuring fairness in investment treaty arbitration; and the 
way forward. 
 
6.2.1 Between Objective Fact and Subjective Value 
Before detailing the specifics on legal theory and how knowledge about values 
can be determined in the context of legal inquiry, it is necessary to outline 
some of the general philosophical debates about knowledge and truth. In 
terms of values, the general philosophic discourse looks at distinguishing 
between facts and values. These two simple concepts, and how they are 
defined, are discussed in many areas of philosophical inquiry, including: 
metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. And sub-types of such inquiry will 
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focus on the philosophy of science, the philosophy of law, political philosophy, 
moral philosophy, and reason and logic. In each of these categories, the 
problem of differentiating between fact and value is central. This is because 
what is factual and what is valuable go to the core of what truths human 
beings can know about themselves and the world. The search for these truths 
(and how one gains knowledge about them) is the focus of philosophical 
inquiry in general. However, as will be seen, the debate trickles down into 
specialized areas of philosophical inquiry such as the philosophy of law. This 
Chapter will explore these debates by looking at the fact-value relationship, 
the subject-object relationship, the mind-world relationship, and the 
epistemology-ontology relationship. All of these relationships have bearing on 
how legal philosophy is approached, and how knowledge about law and value 
can be determined.      
 
6.2.2 Legal Positivism and Legal Nonpositivism 
Moving from general philosophical inquiry about truth and knowledge in the 
context of facts and values, this Chapter will narrow in on jurisprudence more 
specifically. The focus of this Chapter is to distill legal theory along lines that 
improve clarity about the role of values in jurisprudential thought. In terms of 
the contemporary discourse on the philosophy of law, there are two major 
categories that form the basis of inquiry: positivism and nonpositivism.82 This 
Chapter is intended to form a foundation for understanding how subjective 
values can be illuminated as shared subjectivity; and in turn, how they can be 
used to form a basis for a theory of configurative fairness. The first goal of this 
Chapter then is to make the case for why values (and knowledge about them) 
are critical for comprehensively understanding what the law is and how it 
actually operates in practice. Once this argument has been articulated, the 
role of values in the various types of legal theories will be explored.  
At its most refined level, positivism and nonpositivism are theories about law 
that turn on whether or not the value-free ideal for the concept of law is 
possible. From there, theory moves into distinctions between various areas of 
specialized jurisprudence (such as constitutional law, international law, or 
theories of adjudication), and whether or not these theories of law (as opposed 
to theories about law) can be determined (both described and evaluated) 
without resort to values (especially moral and political ones). The final 
distinction turns on the separation of theories about law (analytic 
jurisprudence) and theories about justice (normative jurisprudence). In terms 
of value knowledge, a key consideration in looking at these types of theories is 
to determine if a distinction between them is actually sustainable.  
                                                            
82 An important caveat being that there are a whole host of terms and concepts used in 
jurisprudence that make the simple dissection of legal thought into two camps impossible. 
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6.2.3 Values and International Legal Theory 
This Chapter will turn its gaze on international legal theory and the particular 
problems that arise in understanding international law. While value knowledge 
in the context of sovereignty presents specific problems for determining exactly 
what a state values, the general problems about value epistemology and the 
challenges involved in incorporating value knowledge in legal theory are not 
completely unique to international law. Such an observation can be made at 
the micro-level as well: that is, understanding law and value at all levels – 
from the local to the global – involves many structural similarities. All law 
involves human interaction in particular social contexts; whether they be at 
the global level and as defined by persons representing states, or at the 
microlaw level as informal legality between individuals.83 Given this reality, it 
is surprising that legal theorists tend to focus on a particularly narrow 
conception of law as that emanating from the authority of the state. This 
limited view in legal theory is changing though, and theorists are increasingly 
looking at comprehensively understanding the regulation of social behavior 
whether inside or outside state. This Chapter will begin by historically 
reviewing the evolving concept of sovereignty in the post-Westphalian period. 
From there, particular international legal theories will be explored, 
culminating with an explanation of the policy-orientated jurisprudence of 
Harold Lasswell, Myres McDougal, and Michael Reisman.  
 
6.2.4 A Theory of Configurative Fairness 
At this point in the work, the focus will shift from descriptions about the 
relationship between law and value to a theory of configurative fairness. A 
basic premise of this theory is the prerequisite of improved knowledge about 
value in the context of legal understanding. If knowledge about value can be 
determined in a manner that is sufficiently objective so as to facilitate its 
incorporation in jurisprudential thought, then a theory of configurative 
fairness can be used to evaluate how a fair legal order ought to be configured. 
Such a statement makes a number of assumptions that should be clarified. A 
theory of configurative fairness assumes that legal knowledge and value 
knowledge are inseparably intertwined. It assumes that fair, just, and 
legitimate legal orders cannot be determined or evaluated without recourse to 
value understanding. It assumes that the concept of fairness should be 
described as ontologically subjective (that is, it makes no truth claims about 
the universality or objectivity of justice). The meaning given to fairness in this 
context is one that claims that fairness is the configuration of shared 
subjectivities about value to which members of a particular community or 
society would agree. A theory of configurative fairness assumes that knowledge 
                                                            
83 See Michael Reisman (1999). Law in Brief Encounters. New Haven, Yale University Press. 
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about value can be measured as shared subjectivities, and that an overlapping 
consensus about value claims can be determined using methods such as Q 
methodology. Finally, it assumes that legal orders can be developed by 
configuring legal rules, principles, rights, and obligations around shared 
expectations about value maximization and distribution.   
 
6.2.5 Q Methodology and Legal Analysis 
This Chapter will explore the theoretical underpinnings of Q methodology, how 
the technique is used, and the implications for its use in legal thought. Q 
methodology is an essential aspect of this work and provides a methodological 
bridge for gaining knowledge about value in legal inquiry. The novelty of this 
method as applied to legal thought is its potential to derive sufficiently 
objective (as shared subjectivities) information about values in a particular 
legal context. It is theorized that Q methodology can provide a mode of 
empirical analysis that will permit a theory of configurative fairness to work. Q 
methodology seeks to provide both a qualitative and quantifiable analysis of 
human subjectivity, with self-referential meaning and interpretation being 
central.   
In the context of this work, Q methodology will be able to create typologies 
(called shared subjectivities) about value claims in legal thought. These 
typologies will be constructed by determining the value perspectives of 
individuals in a particular legal context. In terms of incorporating value 
knowledge as a component of legal knowledge, Q methodology allows the 
researcher to evaluate value positions as they are thought about and justified 
by the individual interpreting particular legal problems. This technique 
mirrors the position on value knowledge taken in this work: values are 
epistemologically subjective in that they are determined as reasoned 
deliberation, argument, and justification that is internal to the self. If this 
position is correct, then Q methodology can accurately map value perspectives 
across individuals (resulting in shared subjectivities about value).  
 
6.2.6 Investment Treaty Arbitration and Its Discontents 
This Chapter will focus on a specific legal order: the evolving global order of 
investment treaty arbitration. International and global law has been 
transformed since the Second World War: traditional regimes have evolved and 
revolutionary regimes have emerged. While the treatment of aliens has been a 
longstanding topic of law, it was not until fifty years ago that modern 
investment treaties emerged. Relating to the treatment of foreign direct 
investment by states hosting such investments, the investment treaty regime, 
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and its principal method of dispute resolution – investor-state arbitration, has 
provided significant challenge to the traditional conceptualization of 
international law. Two aspects have been deemed most radical: 1) the 
extension of legal personality to individuals and corporations in international 
law, and 2) the decoupling of sovereignty and dispute resolution through use 
of party-appointed arbitrators in resolving claims of public interest. In addition 
to these two core aspects, there are a multitude of specific legal issues that 
have made this evolving legal regime one of the most controversial in the 
present globalization era. This Chapter will explore how this legal order is 
evolving, and why there is so much discontent with it.  
 
6.2.7 Configuring Fairness in Investment Treaty Arbitration 
This Chapter will describe, analyze, interpret, and evaluate the Q methodology 
study on the fairness discourse in investment treaty arbitration. The goal of 
this study is not to provide definitive answers about which perspectives on 
fairness in investment treaty arbitration are right or wrong. Rather, the idea is 
to provide sufficiently objective analysis about these human subjectivities in a 
way that the discourse can begin to move from ‘perceptions matter’ to ‘this is 
how and why the various types of perceptions matter.’ In attempting to 
measure and understand the value perspectives that all legal decisionmakers 
and discoursers use to inform and influence the way that they approach legal 
problems, the results of this study will assist in delineating points of 
overlapping consensus on issues relating to value distribution in investment 
treaty arbitration. The results of the study demonstrate the utility of Q 
methodology in determining shared value understandings and how these 
shared subjectivities can assist in configuring legal orders that its participants 
consider to be fair.  
 
6.2.8  The Way Forward 
This brief final Chapter will attempt to pull together the insights gained from 
the diverse strands of knowledge explored in this work. The focus will be to 
evaluate the utility of Q methodology as a tool for advancing knowledge about 
values in jurisprudential thought. While there is little doubt that Q 
methodology can provide insight into the way one thinks about the world, the 
question for this work is whether or not the subjectivities that Q methodology 
can capture are insightful measures of how values are thought about in the 
context of legal decision and discourse. It is claimed that Q methodology 
indeed provides a compelling method for legitimizing legal theories that rely on 
value considerations in determining and evaluating the content of the law. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BETWEEN OBJECTIVE FACT AND SUBJECTIVE VALUE 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This is a work of jurisprudence, but before delving into the details of legal 
thought, it is important to distil a number of more general philosophic 
inquiries. Central to this inquiry are the concepts or ideas of objectivity and 
subjectivity, and fact and value. These concepts are very general in nature and 
can be used to delineate a number of diverse ideas. It therefore might be a 
good idea to explore these ideas in some detail before moving on to the details 
of jurisprudence proper: the subject of the following Chapter. The purpose of 
this Chapter is to lay the philosophical groundwork for a discussion about 
how values can be described and measured in legal decision and discourse. 
For many, the measurement of values is not possible because what one values 
is a purely subjective enterprise that cannot be accessed in terms of true or 
false statements. Furthermore, the way that facts are determined – as 
corresponding to some kind of empirically verifiable object – does not work for 
knowing values. Values, under this view, are not objectifiable in any real 
sense, they are only the result of judgment, and judgment is a process of 
justification and argument:1 either as a felt sentiment or intuition (forms of 
emotivism) or as reasoned deliberation (forms of cognitivism).  
These distinctions have created innumerable problems for the way that one 
thinks about values in the context of legal decision and discourse. The goal of 
this Chapter is to determine under what configuration of reality could values 
become objectively measurable. It is posited that, while values do not exist ‘out 
there’ in the world, they are capable of objective reflection as shared 
subjectivities. This view is akin to Kantian moral objectivity (but without its 
metaphysics)2 and its ability for value knowledge, while subjective, to be 
discovered (or constructed)3 through rational processes. The problem has 
                                                            
1 Making judgments and valuing is always going to be subjective in the sense that it emanates 
from a process internal to the self and not external (unless one supports a position of moral 
realism). However, there are theories (primarily in the Kantian tradition) that hold that, despite 
emanating from the subjective self, the process of evaluating and judging about values can be 
done in an objective manner. That is, such judgments are not idiosyncratic. Rather, they are 
capable of a singular ‘correct’ answer across all subjective selves.  
2 In essence, the view about the possibilities of value knowledge is one that closely approximates 
Kantian morality without its metaphysics. This is not a novel viewpoint. It is something long 
developed by John Rawls and Christine Korsgaard. See e.g. John Rawls (1980). Kantian 
Constructivism in Moral Theory. Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 77, p. 515; Christine Korsgaard 
(1996). The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge, CUP. 
3 The question of whether values are discovered or constructed is another problem that arises in 
this area of philosophical thought. However, the answer to this question deals with the 
metaphysical aspects of value existence. For the purposes of this work, empirical knowledge 
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always been that empirical verification of such objectivity is difficult to obtain 
given the subjective locale (internal processes of the mind) of such knowledge. 
However, if one does not get bogged down by the metaphysical aspects of 
having to prove whether shared subjective knowledge about value is capable of 
truth, then the ability to determine how values are shared across human 
minds is possible through knowledge of shared perspectives; and it is 
proposed that empirical knowledge of such shared subjectivity is possible 
through the employment of Q methodology.  
This work will focus on two distinctions that relate to how one understands 
values in the context of jurisprudence: 1) the objectivity-subjectivity 
distinction and 2) the fact-value distinction. These concepts will first be 
discussed in terms of how the distinctions are thought about in everyday life. 
Such a description may provide a useful point of departure for discussing 
these concepts as they are thought about in epistemology and ontology more 
generally. Once the history of ideas about these concepts is briefly analyzed, 
the discourse will turn to the way the ideas of objective fact and subjective 
value fit in the context of jurisprudential thought. It is hoped that providing a 
background on these concepts will enhance later discussions on how value is 
described, analyzed, and evaluated in jurisprudence. 
 
2. WHAT IS A FACT AND WHAT IS A VALUE 
When one speaks about facts and values, it is common to hear that facts are 
objective and values are subjective. But what exactly does that mean? The 
common usage of a fact is something (an entity) that has actually occurred or 
is actually the case. To make such a claim, the standard for determining a 
statement of fact lies in its verifiability; that is, whether or not the fact can be 
proven to correspond with experience. In philosophical terms, this is 
considered to be the correspondence theory of truth.4 It claims that what 
makes a proposition true is that it corresponds to a fact related to the world. 
Facts of this type can be understood as those entities to which a true sentence 
refers (called matters of fact). An example of this might be to say that it is a 
fact that Jupiter is the largest planet in our solar system. The fact that the 
largest planet in our solar system is Jupiter makes it true. Matters of fact are 
dependent on experience or empirical evidence.  
However, there is another way that the concept of fact is also used: the 
relation of ideas. Facts of this type can be understood as those entities that 
                                                                                                                                                                              
about the way that values are shared does not require proof about whether they are discovered 
or constructed.   
4 This theory is in contradistinction to the coherence theory of truth which holds that the 
truthaptness of a statement (fact) lies in the relationship between other such statements and 
not the world. The truth or falsity of a statement requires no correspondence to a fact existing in 
the world. 
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make a true sentence true. For example, it is a fact that all bachelors are 
unmarried; or that two plus two equals four. These are facts that are knowable 
through logical thought alone: the statement makes them true. Finally, the 
idea of what is a fact also relates closely to scientific inquiry. A scientific fact is 
generally regarded as something that is an object independent of the observer 
(the subject). This correlation places objectivity and fact as mutually 
supporting concepts. It is commonly claimed that which is objectively 
verifiable is a fact. This idea will be detailed in the following sections as it is 
central to historical understandings of the distinction between facts and 
values. Essentially, in common usage, facts are objectively verifiable entities 
whose truth exists independently from how anybody thinks (reasons) about 
them. 
Values, on the other hand, do not possess the same attributes as facts; and as 
such, knowledge about values are considered distinct enterprises. This work 
challenges this view in claiming that while knowledge about facts and values 
may be distinct enterprises, they are not dichotomous (as opposed to 
distinctions).5 This means that knowledge about facts cannot be uncovered 
without reference to values; and that knowledge about values are irrelevant 
without reference to particular states of the world and how human agents 
interact with others in the world. However, regardless of whether or not there 
is a fact-value dichotomy, there is common usage of the word value that 
relates to relative degrees of importance given to: 1) other values (the 
relationship between values); and 2) matters of fact to which values refer (the 
relationship of values to ideas, concepts, and entities). In this sense, values 
can be seen as relative or contingent upon the ideas to which they refer, and 
therefore are said to be subjective to context.  
Values are also said to be subjective in that they relate to states of the mind as 
opposed to states of the world. If values do not exist ‘out there’ in the world, 
and they are confined to the internal deliberations of the self, then knowledge 
about them is considered to be subjective. However, there are all kinds of 
theories (developed below) that claim that values are actually objective in 
nature: that is, they are either capable of stating true propositions, or they 
actually exist in the world independent of the human mind. In the postmodern 
era, these views are minority positions. The general problem with values is 
that they are assumed to be incapable of stating truth propositions and 
therefore lead many to believe that values can only be subjectively knowable. 
This use of the word subjective is often used as code for the impossibility of 
objective6 knowledge about values. Under this common view, values merely 
                                                            
5 The difference in terminology is important because a dichotomy connotes that fact and value 
inquiry can never cross paths. A distinction, on the other hand, connotes a difference, but does 
not create an analytical barrier between concepts. 
6 Objective in the sense that values can conform to either the correspondence or coherence 
theory of truth. 
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reflect feelings, emotions, intuition, or preference. There is nothing that can be 
objectively known about them.7  
Like facts, values are a broad category of type that are not easily generalized. 
Facts contain distinct subcategories that each have their own methods for 
inquiry.8 Likewise, values come in a wide variety of subtypes. While it is 
common to think about values as referring to ethics and morality – what one 
values in terms of both what constitutes a good life and how we are to treat 
each other – there are many categories of value that can be dissected. There 
are ethical values, moral values, political values, social values, cultural values, 
legal values, economic values, religious values, aesthetic values, cognitive 
values, epistemic values, among others. Each type of value claim has its own 
set of particular values that carry more or less weight in different contexts. 
One of the key differences between the various types of facts and the various 
types of values is the way in which one gains knowledge about them. It is 
commonly stated that values require making judgments, and that one can 
only make judgments by reasoning with the use of tools such as justification 
and argument. Advocates of a rigid fact-value dichotomy reference this 
difference in how one gains knowledge about value as diametrically opposed to 
how one gains knowledge about facts.  
 
3. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FACT AND VALUE 
Now that a basic description of facts and values has been given, a brief 
historical survey of the fact-value divide will be provided. In attempting to 
improve knowledge about values in the context of legal decision and discourse, 
this work is explicitly interested in understanding why knowledge about values 
in jurisprudence are often considered to fall outside the realm of possible 
objective legal knowledge. However, this debate between facts and values is 
not specifically a jurisprudential problem. It spans all of philosophy. According 
to Hilary Putnam:  
[t]he idea that value judgments are subjective is a piece of philosophy that has gradually 
come to be accepted by many people as if it were common sense. In the hands of 
sophisticated thinkers this idea can be and has been developed in different ways. [Some] 
hold that ‘statements of fact’ are capable of being ‘objectively true’ and capable, as well, of 
                                                            
7 However, this is only one way of looking at the subjectivity of value. There are a number of 
theories holding that value knowledge is a product of the mind, but that they are produced from 
reasoned thought, and therefore are not mere preference. Under such theories, values are 
subjective in that they are internal to the self, but they are objective because all right thinking 
selves would understand the truth of a particular value in the same way. This is akin to Kant’s 
famous categorical imperative. 
8 Some of these subtypes of facts include: scientific, natural, analytic, synthetic, mathematical, 
or logical facts. These types generally refer to the two general fact categories stated above: 
matters of fact (a posteriori factual knowledge) or relations of ideas (a priori factual knowledge). 
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being ‘objectively warranted,’ while value judgments, according to these thinkers, are 
incapable of object truth and objective warrant. Value judgments, according to the most 
extreme proponents of a sharp ‘fact-value’ dichotomy, are completely outside the sphere 
of reason.9  
If Putnam is stating the contemporary understanding of the difference between 
facts and values, then there may be little that one can come to know about 
values. What then is the connection between subjectivity and values? And 
does the subjectivity of value mean that knowledge about it is unobtainable? 
The quote above is indicative of a common claim: the word subjective in 
reference to values means that they neither exist in the external world or in 
the internal reasoning mind. Instead, it is claimed that values are mere 
preference, emotion, or feeling. They are incapable of empirical verification 
(except as conscious external behaviors).10  
For example, take the following claim: the level of subjectivity accorded to the 
legal decisionmaker can lead to decisions that are based on ideological or 
political preferences. Such a statement is commonplace in legal discourse and 
yet it is almost impossible to understand what exactly is being said. For the 
most part, the subjectivity of the legal decisionmaker, in this context, is seen 
as a negative attribute because it is implicitly stating that it is impossible to 
predict how one will decide. This makes decisions arbitrary, interest-based, 
indeterminate, biased, or willy-nilly. However, this negative claim about 
decisionmaker subjectivity is grossly overstated; otherwise, there would be no 
semblance of order whatsoever, and that clearly is not the case. The question 
then is to ask why legal subjectivity is considered such a negative concept; 
and why the answers for overcoming such subjectivity in law is constrained to 
concepts of positivism. Could not another possibility be in the search for 
improving knowledge about subjective value considerations on their own 
terms? History may provide a partial answer as to why this has not occurred. 
 
3.1 The Humean Legacy 
The modern debate about the fact-value divide, and how knowledge and 
ontological truth about facts and morality11 is to be determined can be traced 
largely to the philosophy of David Hume. As a key enlightenment era thinker, 
                                                            
9 Hilary Putnam (2004). The Collapse of the Fact-Value Dichotomy and Other Essays. Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, p. 1. 
10 This is the view in psychology of behaviorism. The unobservable mind is not amenable to 
empirical study and therefore psychological inquiry is to focus exclusively on externally 
observable phenomena. Under this view, what is knowable must be presented as observable 
behavior. Trying to find out what exists in the mind is beyond the scope of empirical inquiry.  
11 The work of David Hume predates a discourse on a formal fact-value divide. However, the 
distinction between factual knowledge and moral knowledge is central tenet in all of Western 
philosophy. 
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Hume developed a philosophy holding that desire, not reason, governed moral 
human behavior, and that humans can only have knowledge of things that 
they directly experience (empiricism). This philosophical outlook is skeptical 
about the ability of reason to generate any kind of knowledge or truth (whether 
it be facts or morality). However, the empiricists claimed that there was indeed 
a world that existed independent of the mind, but that one comes to know the 
world from sense impressions, not reason. His skepticism about rational value 
knowledge, one the one hand, and the existence of a mind-independent world 
on the other, are important in understanding how philosophers since Hume 
have responded to his ideas. Most importantly,12 Kant famously credited 
Hume with awakening him from his ‘dogmatic slumber,’13 and indeed much of 
Kantian thought is aimed at a refutation of Hume’s empiricism. 
 
3.1.1 Moral Antirationalism 
For the purposes of this work, Hume’s moral philosophy is particularly 
relevant for understanding why gaining objective knowledge about value is a 
challenge. For Hume, it is not just a challenge, there is actually nothing to 
know about them through reason. He claims that:  
[m]orals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason itself is utterly impotent 
in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.14  
Under this view, Hume is endorsing a form of emotion or sentiment as 
grounding morality. This mean that, for him, gaining objective and universal 
knowledge about morality specifically, and all other types of value judgments 
more broadly, is not possible. Reason for him is a slave to the passions; and 
passions cannot be reasoned about or directly observed by the senses (they 
are purely subjective).15 This means that, while often observable as external 
behavior, they are incapable of being truthapt. Combined with his empirical 
approach to knowledge, there leaves little room for knowledge about value 
(whether existing as the internal deliberations of the reasoning mind or as 
external entities existing ‘out there’ in the world). For these reasons, Hume’s 
moral philosophy is often called antirationalism or moral sense theory.16 The 
                                                            
12 This is because his outlook deals with the most complex and core issues in philosophical 
thought: epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. 
13 “I freely admit that it was the remembrance of David Hume which, many years ago, first 
interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave my investigations in the field of speculative 
philosophy a completely different direction.” Immanuel Kant [1783](2004). Prolegomena to Any 
Future Metaphysics, translated by Gary Hatfield. Cambridge, CUP, p. 4. 
14 David Hume [1739](1978). A Treatise of Human Nature. Book III: Of Morals. Oxford, OUP, 
Section I. 
15 Id. 
16 Moral antirationalism is a metaethical view that rejects the possibility of moral truths as 
knowable a priori, by reason alone. Moral sense theorist, likewise, believe that reason and 
59 
 
 
practical implications of such a moral philosophy will bear heavily on the next 
two hundred years of philosophical thought; and create innumerable problems 
relating to the nature and meaning of value, especially in jurisprudence.17 
 
3.1.2 Matters of Fact and Relation of Ideas 
For Hume, the only judgments that can be reasoned about are those that are 
capable of being empirically observed through direct experience. Such 
distinctions expressly exclude value (moral) judgments, which are to be 
understood as sentiment or feeling. However, while Hume was a skeptic about 
rational moral knowledge, he was a significant moral thinker.18 He held that 
morality could not correspond to sense impressions, and therefore this kind of 
knowledge was not amenable to empirical verification. But he did not believe 
that the investigation of morality was meaningless (as the later logical 
positivists did). Rather, he thought that moral knowledge could only be 
described as patterns of subjective emotion. As an empiricist, Hume focused 
on the way that the mind (reason) could verify knowledge gained through the 
senses. For him, knowledge could be gained objectively (truthful) as 
propositions that are true by virtue of their meaning alone (relation of ideas), 
and as propositions that are true by how their meaning relates to empirically 
observable natural facts about the world (matters of fact).19 In this way, Hume 
anticipated the analytic-synthetic distinction20 that Kant would develop: a 
distinction (some call a dichotomy) that also features as a central tenet in the 
philosophy of the logical positivists.  
 
3.1.3 The Is-Ought Problem 
In terms of jurisprudence, it is probably Hume’s is-ought problem that has the 
most direct effect on the way that values are discussed in legal thought. The 
is-ought problem, which is also called Hume’s Guillotine or Hume’s law, 21 
                                                                                                                                                                              
emotions are distinct faculties, and that the foundations of morality lie in sentiment, not reason. 
This view is also sometime called ethical sentimentalism. 
17 The reason for this lies in two observations that Hume made famous. First, that empirical 
knowledge is derived from sense impressions, and secondly, that moral knowledge is derived 
from the ‘passions’ and is not capable of being reasoned about. Combined, moral knowledge is 
neither capable of reasoned thought nor empirical verification. This does not leave much room 
for knowing values (moral truths) in any objective or factual manner. 
18 Putnam, supra note 9 at p. 29. 
19 He did not believe that moral judgments could ever fall within these two categories. 
20 This distinction will be detailed below. Briefly speaking, analytic truths correspond with 
relation of ideas and synthetic truths correspond with matters of fact. The key issue in the 
analytic-synthetic distinction is that value knowledge is not capable of either synthetic or 
analytic knowledge.  
21 “In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the 
author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a 
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would later morph into the fact-value dichotomy.22 Essentially, the is-ought 
problem is stated as the claim that no ‘ought’ statement can be derived from a 
statement of what ‘is.’ In moral thought (and for that matter, legal thought), 
the is-ought problem states that no descriptive statement or proposition about 
what ‘is’ the case can ever turn into a prescriptive or normative statement 
about what ‘ought’ to be the case. From this idea, it becomes readily apparent 
that a proposition of this type correlates with the idea in jurisprudence that 
analytic (descriptive) jurisprudence is a distinct enterprise from normative 
(prescriptive) jurisprudence – and never should such paths of inquiry cross.  
However, if one looks at the is-ought problem in the context of Humean 
philosophy in general, it seems quite obvious that what Hume was discussing 
was quite different than the way the is-ought problem is discussed in 
jurisprudential thought. Hume was a moral skeptic, holding that moral or 
ethical values cannot be reasoned about because they do not meet the 
prerequisite of either analytic (relation of ideas) or synthetic (matters of fact) 
facts.23 This means that, according to Hume, there can be no valid 
descriptions of what ‘is’ morality; and therefore no ‘ought’ statements either. 
Without an ‘is’ statement there is no way to express an ‘ought’ statement 
about it. This understanding of the is-ought problem in the context of Hume’s 
moral philosophy seems plausible: he claims that there is no such thing as 
objective moral knowledge. Despite this dim view of moral knowledge, the is-
ought problem (as the fact-value dichotomy) will present more substantial 
problems for moral knowledge when rational theories about morality emerge; 
and actual knowledge about value judgments (either in the mind – cognitively, 
or in the world – naturally) becomes possible according to these theories.   
 
3.2 The Rational (Re)Turn 
While sentimentalism and empiricism developed as a philosophical account of 
ethics, epistemology, and ontology in Britain,24 the German thinker Immanuel 
Kant was developing a strong philosophical rebuttal to Hume’s moral 
                                                                                                                                                                              
God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised to 
find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no 
proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; 
but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new 
relation or affirmation, ‘tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same 
time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new 
relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do 
not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am 
persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us 
see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor 
is perceived by reason.” Hume, supra note 14. 
22 Putnam, supra note 9 at p. 28. 
23 Id. at p. 16. 
24 See Stephen Priest (1990). The British Empiricists. New York, Penguin Books. 
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skepticism, rooted in the centrality of the human mind’s ability to think 
rationally. Kant presents a return to rationality25 and its potential for gaining 
knowledge about value (including moral and ethical) judgments in a manner 
that can be formulated objectively and universally as cognitive processes of the 
reasoning mind. Kant sought to unite reason and experience in a way that 
could move beyond the skeptical conclusions about morality advanced by the 
empiricists. Kant argued that knowledge from experience is purely subjective 
without first being processed by reason. One cannot understand experience 
without the faculty of reason presupposing it. He claimed to present a 
Copernican Revolution in reverse, stating that:  
up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition [reason] must conform to the 
objects [experience]; but . . . let us once try whether we do not get farther with the 
problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition.26  
While such a claim may have gone too far,27 the idea that moral statements 
can be rationally justified has had lasting sway. Kant divided his projects 
about ontology and epistemology in two ways: 1) the Critique of Pure Reason28 
(analytic and synthetic truths) and 2) the Critique of Practical Reason29 (moral 
and ethical truths).  
Pure reason is that knowledge that can be derived from empirical experience 
and upon which truth claims follow. These are the famous analytic and 
synthetic truths. Analytic propositions are true by virtue of their meaning 
alone (relations of ideas). These are those types of propositions that relate to 
ideas, such as all triangles have three sides. Synthetic propositions on the 
other hand are true by how their meaning relates to the world (matters of fact). 
For example, the fact that all main sequence stars are red is something that is 
observational verifiable, and as such qualifies as a synthetic judgment. In 
modern thought, these are generally considered to be what one calls facts.  
                                                            
25 From the earlier work of continental philosophers such as Rene Descartes. 
26 Immanuel Kant [1781](1998). Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Paul Guyer & Allen 
Wood. Cambridge, CUP, p. 110. 
27 The reason why it may have gone too far is that the pendulum swings so far in the direction 
of cognition for Kant that experience from the world is marginalized (the opposite of the 
empiricists and their dim view of what knowledge cognitive thought could produce). 
Furthermore, “[w]hile there are some distinguished moral philosophers (e.g. Barbara Herman 
and Christine Korsgaard) who think Kant's account – at least as reconstructed by John Rawls – 
is fundamentally right, most philosophers today find Kant's moral philosophy overly dependent 
on the rest of Kant's metaphysics, which few if any philosophers are able any longer to accept.” 
Putnam, supra note 9 at p. 17. 
28 Kant, supra note 26. 
29 Immanuel Kant [1788](2004). Critique of Practical Reason, translated by Thomas Abbott. New 
York, Dover Publications. The Critique of Practical Reason is a standalone work, but is also 
responding to his earlier works. See Immanuel Kant [1785](2002). Groundwork for the 
Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Allen Wood. New Haven, Yale University Press. 
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Practical reason, on the other hand, is the faculty of the reasoning mind that 
allows us to decide how to act.30 For Kant, moral and ethical propositions were 
not analytic or synthetic, but were nonetheless capable of being objectively 
true. The primary tool he employs to demonstrate the objectivity of moral 
knowledge is through the categorical imperative. This notion holds that one 
must “act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will 
that it should become a universal law without contradiction.”31 The categorical 
imperative is typically seen as the way of evaluating motivations for action. In 
this way, Kant is stating that a moral maxim must be universally valid and 
can be applied to any rational being. Such an imperative is not found in the 
subjective preferences of individuals, but exists universally in all rational 
beings thinking properly.  
Facts, for Kant, are possible through a mixture of empiricism and rationalism 
(somewhat similar to Hume, but with an increased emphasis on the rational 
over the natural). Values, which Kant calls morals or ethics, are possible 
through reason alone (they are not natural entities existing in the world). In 
both cases, objective knowledge is possible. In terms of value knowledge, this 
is significantly different than Hume. Hume believes that value knowledge (he 
also uses the term morals and not the broader category of values) is neither 
rationally knowable nor empirically knowable as facts. This means that his is-
ought problem has therefore been largely misconstrued in modern thought.32 
The is-ought problem claims that a description of how the world ‘ought’ to be 
cannot be derived from a description of how the world ‘is.’ However, this 
statement is confined to what Hume would call sense impressions (the focus of 
his empirical knowledge). His is-ought problem is not making any claims for 
determining objective moral knowledge because he does not believe that either 
what ‘is’ moral or what ‘ought’ to be moral can ever be objectively known (no 
analytic or synthetic facts about morality exist).  
Under the Kantian view, however, the is-ought distinction becomes more 
problematic because of the way Kant constructs moral knowledge in the mind. 
While he would agree with Hume that there are no empirically observable facts 
about morality that are analytic and synthetic, there are rationally observable 
facts about morality that are objectively knowable. This means that a rational 
description of what ‘is’ moral can clearly inform how one ‘ought’ to act. Many 
critics of this view would hold that this is deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘ought.’33 
However, that is precisely the point: neither Kant nor Hume believed that there 
are analytic or synthetic facts about morality that are knowable. So, the idea 
that there is no fact to inform our moral actions is not telling us anything 
                                                            
30 Kant’s ethical view is called deontological ethics. This is the normative ethical position that 
judges the morality of an action based on the actions’ adherence to a rule or rules. 
31 Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 29 at p. 421. 
32 Putnam, supra note 9 at p. 28. 
33 Id. at p. 14. 
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about the possibility of the human mind to objectively know what one ‘ought’ 
to do.  
 
3.3  Hegelian Subjectivity 
Before turning to the work of the logical positivists of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, and how their construction of the world essentially 
halted the possibility of objective value knowledge (particularly ethical 
knowledge), a brief mention of GWF Hegel is necessary. Hegel and other so-
called German idealists essentially claimed that ontological reality, as one can 
know it, is fundamentally mental, mentally constructed, or otherwise 
immaterial. Epistemologically, idealism manifests as skepticism about the 
possibility of knowing a mind-independent thing existing in the external 
world.34 In terms of moral and ethical knowledge, the idealists can generally be 
seen as extending the Kantian project to its rational extreme.35 While Kant is 
skeptical about a mind-independent world, the idealists are generally 
considered to be antirealists about a mind-independent world.36 This 
metaphysical view claimed that, while the Kantian idea about a Copernican 
revolution in reverse is accurate, the inability to trust our senses in 
determining an objective reality outside of our mind means that the only 
reality one can know is internal to the self, not external to the self.37  
For the idealist, this means that knowledge is inherently subjective because 
there is no external reality to which an internal objective reality can 
correspond (as Kant believed). The question for the idealist at this point is to 
ask how knowledge can be gained given such a subjective predicament. One of 
Hegel’s solutions to this problem was to claim that ethical or moral knowledge 
existed in the idea of an objective spirit.38 The idea of an objective spirit is 
found in knowing the collective (shared) subjectivities about morality in a 
particular context.39 Hegel is also attributed to a school of thought called 
                                                            
34 The philosophical meaning of idealism here is that the properties discovered in objects 
depend on the way that those objects appear to perceiving subjects, and not something they 
possess ‘in themselves,’ apart from our experience of them. The question of what properties a 
thing might have independently of the mind is considered an incoherent concept for idealism. 
35 This is the mainstream view about German idealism as “essentially the culmination of the 
Cartesian tradition,” which is usually accompanied by “a seductively simple narrative” that 
makes it “the gradual and inevitable completion of Kant’s ‘Copernican Revolution.’” Fredrick 
Beiser (2002). German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism, 1781-1800. Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, pp. 1-2. 
36 Generally speaking, this means that they refuted the possibility that the world (external 
reality) is anything more than what the mind (reason) can comprehend. 
37 This is the complete antithesis of Humean empiricism. 
38 The objective spirit is another word for one’s culture. One is born into a social relation that 
presupposes culture. Knowing ethical or moral obligations requires knowing the collective spirit 
of one’s culture.    
39 “It is thus that Hegel has effected (sic) the transition from a phenomenology of ‘subjective 
mind,’ as it were, to one of ‘objective spirit,’ thought of as culturally distinct patterns of social 
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historicism. The historicist position of Hegel, combined with the notion of 
spirit, claimed that any human society and all human activities are defined by 
their history, and that only through understanding such histories (cultural 
development over time) can one know how to act morally and ethically.40 
Famously, this concept is embodied by the term zeitgeist, although Hegel 
himself never used this word.41 The zeitgeist, when used to explain Hegelian 
thought, is the total reality that is an inherent unity of mind and represents 
the concrete embodiment of social processes and actions. In terms of gaining 
knowledge about such a subjective, mystical, and vague concept, Hegelian 
philosophy did no favors for those seeking answers about the world and how 
human beings engage it. As such, an idea like the zeitgeist or objective spirit 
would become easy fodder for the logical positivists (and other forms of 
analytic philosophy that followed the idealists). 
 
3.4 The Logical Positivists 
The late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century saw great 
advances in scientific knowledge, and in turn, spawned philosophical 
movements about how truth about the world could be determined in light of 
such advances. Central to this is enterprise is a group of thinkers that came to 
be known as the logical positivists.42 The goal of their project was to determine 
what types of knowledge were possible for accurately describing the state of 
the world and human interaction within it.43 The logical positivists, also called 
the Vienna Circle, provided an early example of the burgeoning field of analytic 
philosophy:44 a type of philosophic inquiry that would be highly influential 
                                                                                                                                                                              
interaction analyzed in terms of the patterns of reciprocal recognition they embody.” Paul 
Redding (2012). Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available 
at: http://plato. stanford.edu/entries/hegel (last accessed 1 September 2013). 
40 Whether such a conception can ever be known objectively is open to debate, but the Hegelian 
view is that this process can produce real objective knowledge about morality. 
41 Instead, Hegel uses the phrase ‘der Geist seiner Zeit’ (the spirit of his time). For example, in 
his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, he says “no man can overleap his own time, for the 
spirit of his time is also his spirit.” See Glenn Magee (2011). The Hegel Dictionary. London, 
Continuum International, p. 262. 
42 Logical positivism (also known as logical empiricism, scientific philosophy, and neo-
positivism) is a philosophy that combines empiricism – the idea that observational evidence is 
indispensable for knowledge – with a version of rationalism incorporating mathematical and 
logico-linguistic constructs and deductions of epistemology. 
43 And to limit inquiry only to those categories of knowledge that were deemed as capable of 
truth.  
44 As described by Bertrand Russell, “[m]odern analytical empiricism . . . differs from that of 
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume by its incorporation of mathematics and its development of a 
powerful logical technique. It is thus able, in regard to certain problems, to achieve definite 
answers, which have the quality of science rather than of philosophy. It has the advantage, as 
compared with the philosophies of the system-builders, of being able to tackle its problems one 
at a time, instead of having to invent at one stroke a block theory of the whole universe. Its 
methods, in this respect, resemble those of science. I have no doubt that, in so far as 
philosophical knowledge is possible, it is by such methods that it must be sought; I have also no 
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through most of the twentieth century. It is also within this broader 
philosophic context that the work in positivist jurisprudence entered a 
renaissance. The two greatest legal positivists of the twentieth century, HLA 
Hart45 and Hans Kelsen,46 derive some of their positions on the nature of law 
from the broader philosophical project of the logical positivists.47  
The focus of the logical positivists centered on what the cognitive processes of 
the mind were able to tell us about the external world. Drawing heavily on 
Humean thought, the logical positivist famously held that knowledge about 
morality and ethics was a ‘nonsense,’ and therefore cognitively meaningless.48 
Such a view is not skeptical about moral knowledge, rather it posits that there 
is nothing to know about morality and ethics. This turns out to be an extreme 
view of Humean emotivism (noncognitivism), and a clear rejection of Kantian 
rationalism (at least in terms of his ideas about the rational mind and its 
capacity to know universal moral and ethical truths).  
For the purposes of this work, there is almost nothing that the logical 
positivists can tell us about the nature of moral knowledge. However, their 
position on such knowledge is wholly important in understanding why value 
knowledge has been so challenged in the last one hundred years. While the 
outlook of the logical positivists was effectively dismantled in the mid- 
twentieth century by the pragmatists,49 its legacy in jurisprudence and the 
social sciences persists.  
So what is the philosophy of the logical positivists?  Generally speaking, it is a 
philosophic outlook that combines empiricism with a version of rationalism.  
In a way this is very similar to the Kantian project; however, it is much more 
limited than Kant’s attempt at a comprehensive approach (that is, it did not 
concern itself with Kant’s philosophic projects on morality and aesthetics). The 
logical positivists were interested in nailing down just what empirical 
observations could be the object of rational knowledge. It is at this point that 
they attempted to purge all ethical and moral thought from their project. By 
both embracing Humean skepticism and being totally dissatisfied with the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
doubt that, by these methods, many ancient problems are completely soluble.” Bertrand Russell 
(1945). A History of Western Philosophy. New York, Simon & Schuster, p. 834.  
45 HLA Hart [1961](1997). The Concept of Law, edited by Joseph Raz. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
46 Hans Kelsen [1960](2009). Pure Theory of Law, translated by Max Knight. New Jersey, Law 
Book Exchange. 
47 Specifically, Kelsen sought to create a legal science that would provide a foundation for all law 
as based on a science of norms that could be derived a priori with no element of evaluation. 
Hart, sought to create a legal positivism within the broader framework of analytic philosophy. 
48 Putnam, supra note 9 at p. 24. 
49 See WVO Quine (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review. Vol. 60, p. 20. This 
article, which is considered by many as one of the most important articles in twentieth century 
philosophy, attacked two propositions by the logical positivists. One, that the analytic-synthetic 
distinction collapses under scrutiny and two, that analytic truths (relation of ideas) could not 
meet the verification theory of meaning (that all meaningful statements have to correspond with 
direct experience).  
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project of the idealists – and their focus on knowing historical subjectivities as 
a basis for ethical knowledge – the logical positivists did not take a skeptical 
view about ethical knowledge, rather they claimed such thought was 
cognitively meaningless. That is, there is absolutely nothing to know about the 
objective truth of ethical or moral thought. 
The logical positivists introduced a tripartite classification for all putative 
judgments.50 They claimed there were analytic and synthetic judgments that 
were cognitively meaningful and all ethical, metaphysical, and aesthetic 
judgments which were cognitively meaningless. According to the logical 
positivists, analytic statements are those that are true or false on the basis of 
logical rules alone; and synthetic statements are those that are empirically 
verifiable of falsifiable.51 All other types of judgments that did not meet the 
criteria of an analytic or synthetic judgments were not capable of knowledge.52 
What they failed to realize is that the criteria for determining what was 
cognitively knowable and what was cognitively unknowable was not 
determinable by the very criteria that they set for themselves.53 That is, what 
should be considered a cognitively meaningful judgment and what should be 
considered a cognitively meaningless judgment is neither empirically nor 
logically verifiable. 
 
3.5 The Philosophy of Pragmatism 
In attempting to purge all knowledge about judgments not factual,54 the logical 
positivists provided a good starting point for another philosophic tradition 
developing around the same time: pragmatism. Pragmatism is a broad 
philosophical orientation that emerged in many forms and covers many 
subjects. However, pragmatism can be seen as a counter argument to almost 
all of the projects in the analytic tradition of philosophy (such as that of the 
logical positivists). For the purposes of this work, the ideas encased in 
pragmatism provide philosophical support for nonpositivism in the social 
sciences generally, and in legal thought specifically.  
In same way that there are a number of corollaries between logical positivism 
and legal positivism,55 there are a number of corollaries between pragmatism 
                                                            
50 Putnam, supra note 9 at p. 10. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 A major tenet of the logical positivists was in the verifiability criterion of meaning. A 
statement or  question is only legitimate if there is a way to determine if a statement is true or 
false. However, this criterion is itself not verifiable. It is self-refuting.  
54 Factual here is defined as how the logical positivists restricted it: analytic and synthetic 
judgments. 
55 This is a claim that legal positivists still hold that the verifiability of law properly so called can 
be determined exclusively of any form of evaluation or evaluative criteria (whether it be of the 
moral type or not). 
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and legal nonpositivism. The project of the legal positivists, and their 
insistence on a dichotomy between law and morality, closely mirrors the 
dichotomy between meaningful (analytic and synthetic truths) and 
meaningless statements (ethical, aesthetic, and metaphysical truths) made by 
the logical positivists. The pragmatists not only reject this dichotomy, they 
also rejected the analytic-synthetic dichotomy (the universe of meaningful 
statements, according to the logical positivists). One of the underlying themes 
in pragmatic philosophy is that of holism: the idea that truth and knowledge 
cannot always be reduced to absolute categories. This holism is also a 
characteristic of much of legal nonpositivist thought.  
In many ways, pragmatist thought is a critical approach to knowledge and 
truth. It is this critical orientation that makes pragmatism difficult to 
categorize. Much of pragmatic thought is aimed at challenging the rigid 
dogmas of the Western philosophic tradition. As such, pragmatic thought 
takes many forms: from those pragmatists who believe that truth is possible to 
those who believe that the fallibility of our knowledge leads us to the 
conclusion that there can never be any certainty about truth (for example, the 
work of contemporary neopragmatist Richard Rorty).56 Generally speaking, 
however, pragmatism is characterized by four interrelated theses:  
(1) antiskepticism: the pragmatists hold that doubt requires justification as much as 
belief; (2) fallibilism: pragmatists hold that there is never a metaphysical guarantee to be 
had that such-and-such a belief will never need revision; (3) the thesis that there is no 
fundamental distinction between ‘facts’ and ‘values;’ and (4) the thesis that, in a certain 
sense, practice is primary in philosophy.57  
This view provides a strong basis for rejecting the outlook of the logical 
positivists in regard to both epistemology and ontology. As such, the pragmatic 
theory of truth is rooted in the idea that knowledge of the self and world is 
possible, but that one must free themselves from traditional philosophic 
dogma in order to determine such truth.58 This means that the restricted 
approach of the empiricists (and later, the logical positivists) about observation 
                                                            
56 “Truth cannot be out there cannot exist independently of the human mind because sentences 
cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not. 
Only descriptions of the world can be true or false. The world on its own unaided by the 
describing activities of humans cannot.” Richard Rorty (1989). Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity. Cambridge, CUP, p. 5. 
57 Hilary Putnam (1994). ‘Pragmatism and Moral Objectivity,’ in James Conant, ed. Words and 
Life. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, p. 152. 
58 The pragmatic theory of truth varies according to some of its early expositors, such as 
Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and George Mead, but there are some common 
features including: a reliance on the pragmatic maxim (“consider what effects, that might 
conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our 
conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object”), and an emphasis on 
the fact that the product of belief, certainty, knowledge and truth is the result of a process of 
inquiry. Charles Peirce (1992 & 1999). The Essential Peirce: Volumes I & II. Bloomington, 
Indiana University Press, p. 107. 
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and verifiability left much knowledge about the mind and the world outside 
the realm of inquiry. Likewise, the pragmatists saw the projects of Kant and 
the later idealists as excessively reason-dependent, and that their goal of 
seeking absolute (metaphysical) truth about morality was misguided and 
largely unnecessary.59  
According to John Dewey, a leading early American pragmatist:  
the best definition of truth from the logical standpoint which is known to me is that by 
Pierce: ‘[t]he opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate we 
mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real.’60  
Essentially, the pragmatist project sets the goal of determining what is to be 
known about the world and the mind in terms of a process of inquiry.61 Such a 
process of inquiry relies heavily on the ability of reason to assist in 
determining truth; and reasoning requires evaluation. The pragmatists have 
long demonstrated that the process of inquiry required to describe facts (both 
matters of fact and relation of ideas) requires evaluation.62 In this way, fact 
and value knowledge are entangled (that is, the process of inquiry for knowing 
both facts and values requires descriptive and evaluative components). Under 
this view, both factual (seen as existing externally) and value (seen as existing 
internally) knowledge is obtainable, and that while both modes of inquiry are 
not absolute metaphysically, knowledge about them is possible 
epistemological. It is this core practicality that provides the basis for this work, 
and which will be developed in the context of law and the social sciences in the 
following Chapters.  
From a commonsense perspective, the logical positivists and their rejection of 
the possibility of moral knowledge seems untenable. Even if moral knowledge 
is subjective in the negative sense (akin to a mere utterance), there is still 
knowledge that can be gained about such utterances; maybe not in any 
metaphysical sense (as truthapt propositions, for example), but certainly such 
utterances can be described. Furthermore, the logical positivists also failed to 
understand the structure of values and valuing more generally.63 Instead, they 
focused their attention on how to banish ethical judgments from scientific 
thought. In fact, as the neopragmatist Hilary Putnam has point out, the 
                                                            
59 See Hilary Putnam (2005). Ethics without Ontology. Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 
60 John Dewey [1938](2008). Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. New York, Read Books, n. 348.  
61 This process is applicable to both fact and value inquiry. This is the “the principle that Ruth 
Anna Putnam and I [Hilary Putnam] have attributed to John Dewey, the principle that ‘what 
applies to inquiry in general applies to ethical inquiry in particular.’” Putnam, supra note 9 at p. 
133. 
62 Putnam, supra note 9 at p. 9. 
63 Morality and ethics are but subcategories of the larger category of value. The concept of 
values and valuing includes all concepts that are evaluative. This includes epistemic values as 
well. These are values commonly needed to describe facts. Values such as simplicity, 
compatibility, reasonableness, and the like are values. They may not be moral in type, but they 
are values nonetheless.  
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leading logical positivist Rudolf Carnap never speaks of value judgments but 
only of regulative ethics.64 All discussion about cognitively meaningless 
judgments is targeted at ethical and moral thought.65 According to Putnam:  
[e]ver since Hume, the fact that there are many types of value judgments that are not 
themselves of an ethical (or ‘moral’) variety tends to get sidelined in philosophic 
discussions of the relation between (so-called) values and (so-called) facts.66  
He goes on to explain the reason for such a limited definition of value 
judgments by stating:  
[the positivists’] real target is the supposed objectivity or rationality of ethics, and in 
disposing of this topic, they take themselves to have provided an account that covers all 
other kinds of value judgments as well.67  
This confusion about what types of values are permitted to influence inquiry 
into knowing facts is widespread. It presents challenges for gaining value 
knowledge because it separates values into false dichotomies. While moral and 
ethical values are indeed distinct from other types of values, all values rest on 
their relative valuableness. In this way, moral values are structurally 
indistinguishable from cognitive values. A cognitive or epistemic value (such as 
simplicity or neutrality) is evaluated in terms of its value in the same ways as 
is the valuableness of a moral value (such as equality or liberty).  
 
3.6 The Entanglement of Fact and Value 
All combined, the pragmatists provide a solid foundation for value (not just 
moral) inquiry generally. A central tenet of the pragmatist (and neopragmatist) 
project is the entanglement of fact and value.68 This entanglement is critical to 
value knowledge because, if correct, it means that the processes of inquiry for 
deriving facts is not fundamentally dichotomous from the processes of inquiry 
for determining values. Furthermore, if the entanglement thesis is correct, the 
interaction of facts and value represent a symbiotic relationship whereby each 
requires the other if one is to properly understand the world and the mind. 
This outlook views inquiry as a form of holism that attempts to reconcile the 
empiricism of Hume and the rationalism of Kant. It creates a vision of the 
world and the mind that is both knowable and uncertain. While this may seem 
like a contradiction in terms, it bears out in practice. Neither factual 
                                                            
64 Putnam, supra note 9. 
65 This is a common feature in both the philosophy of science and the philosophy of law. Value 
discourse is limited to morality and how and ‘objective’ science or law can be determined in a 
value-free manner. However, value-free generally means moral-free.  
66 Putnam, supra note 9. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at p. 28. 
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knowledge nor moral knowledge is insulated from the need for revision and 
reflection. There are countless scientifically factual truths that have been 
considered infallible, only to be debunked at a later point.  
The same can be stated about moral truths. If one combines the entanglement 
thesis with that of fallibilism, the outcome is a philosophic outlook claiming 
that absolute truth should not be the focus of inquiry, but that improved 
knowledge (about both facts and values) should be. This is the approach taken 
in this work: a distinction between epistemology and ontology in terms of 
advancing what there is to know about values. If one claims that there is no 
absolute truth and certainty about the factual world, that there is nothing 
fundamentally distinct between how facts and values become known, and that 
knowledge of facts and knowledge of values are entangled, then it follows that 
the same metaphysical uncertainty about facts would apply to values as well. 
Such a claim does not prevent us from improving factual knowledge (this is 
the entire enterprise of what is called science). It should likewise not prevent 
us from attempting to improve value knowledge as well.   
 
4. THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALUES 
Turning from the philosophic history of the debate about the objectivity of fact 
and the subjectivity of value, the following sections will highlight the way that 
moral philosophers think about values; and how the various theories about 
the nature and the content of values hinder or enhance the possibility of value 
knowledge. In the context of this work, and specifically in reference to the idea 
that elements of moral and political thought can be analytically understood in 
jurisprudence, the concepts of what one labels subjectivity and objectivity 
becomes especially important. If, for example, all subjective knowledge is 
attributable to our understanding of values, and that all value knowledge is 
subjective, then jurisprudential projects that focus on the understanding of 
objective and natural factual knowledge will hold that all value considerations 
fall outside the scope of jurisprudential knowledge whatsoever.  
The goal of this work is to challenge this view, and to provide a theory for 
understanding value judgments as shared subjectivities. These shared 
subjectivities are the product of inquiry holding that absolute metaphysical 
truth about the existence of values (including morality, ethics, and politics) 
remains an open question. However, at the same time, the possibilities for 
understanding the process by which the self makes valuations using its 
rational faculties are real. This means that what is valued in a particular 
context can be evaluated as points of overlap among individuals who are 
reflecting rationally about moral and ethical propositions (or any other type of 
value). For this work, values are subjective in two important ways: 1) they do 
not exist external to the self as naturalized entities, and 2) they are not 
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capable of being discovered as absolute truths (ontological). However, despite 
this limitations, it is claimed in this work that values can be reflected upon as 
shared outcomes of thought processes such as what is typically called right 
reason (legal or otherwise). In other words, real knowledge about value is 
obtainable. 
 
4.1 The Concept of Values 
The concept of value is a complicated endeavor. A value (noun) and the 
process of evaluating (verb) both fall within the domain of value knowledge. 
Generally speaking, a value is some kind of entity that is valued. Their essence 
cannot be evaluated in absolute descriptive terms. The first question is to ask 
whether values exist at all (ontological inquiry), and if they do, how does one 
come to understand them (epistemic inquiry). In many ways, this type of 
discussion mirrors the primary project of conceptual legal theorists. Central to 
this project is inquiry about the concept of law: what is the phenomenon 
called law, does it exist, and how can it be verified and validated? For 
conceptual legal positivists, the concept of law can be understood scientifically 
without recourse to moral evaluation. Most conceptual legal nonpositivists 
(essentially those of the natural law school) believe that the concept of the law 
can only be known through an evaluation of its justness (usually as a form of 
reasonableness). And that this justness, while a metavalue, is objectively 
knowable.  
This conceptualization has many corollaries to Kantian moral philosophy (at 
least in terms of understanding the concept of morality). For Kant, the 
grounding of objective morality requires reduction to a base maxim that 
provides for the authority of morals to bind. Interestingly, the Hartian rule of 
recognition and the Kelsenian basic norm also seek to provide a nonreducible 
maxim for understanding the authority of law to bind in absolute terms. 
However, for the legal positivists, the derivation of a base maxim can be 
exclusively achieved through the tools of inquiry developed by the logical 
positivists. Legal positivists as far back as Jeremy Bentham believe that this 
maxim is derived with no recourse to moral evaluation; and that the truth 
about the concept of the law can be derived from what the logical positivists 
call facts (analytic or synthetic truths). As has been demonstrated in previous 
sections though, the understanding of how facts are verified according to the 
logical positivists is flawed.  
The pragmatists, such as Quine and Putnam, have shown that the basis upon 
which the logical positivists (and the legal positivists) understand facts is not 
sustainable.69 They have shown that not all analytic truths are amenable to 
                                                            
69 See Putnam, supra note 9. 
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empirical evidence and that the verification theory of meaning requires 
evaluative components. This collapse of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy and 
the fact-value dichotomy demonstrates that the entire positivist project in the 
social sciences is built on assumptions in the physical sciences that are not 
sustainable under scrutiny.  
In terms of understanding the concept and structure of value, the 
entanglement of description and evaluation is important. It is important 
because it deflates the ideas of objectivity and subjectivity as they relate to fact 
and value inquiry. One must make value determinations (even if they are 
cognitive or epistemic values like unity, simplicity, and the like) in making 
descriptions. Under such an understanding, objective fact requires subjective 
value. Does this undermine the way that objectivity is understood? Does it 
mean that nothing is capable of objectivity, or does it mean that objectivity 
and subjectivity – as they are commonly understood – are incomplete ways of 
conceptualizing the differences between facts and values? This work takes the 
second approach. There are ways to understand facts as containing objective 
and subjective elements; and likewise there are ways of understanding values 
as containing objective and subjective components. This, however, does not 
mean that the subjective components are unknowable. The next sections will 
look at ways of understanding the concept and structure of value that is based 
on the intertwined categorization of what is called objective and subjective. 
 
4.1.1 Value Epistemology and Value Ontology 
For this work, the dissecting of value knowledge from value truth is so central 
that it constituted a section in the introductory Chapter. While it is of course 
the case that these two philosophic foci of inquiry are interrelated, they 
produce distinct sets of questions that can be answered (in some ways) 
independently of the other. As stated in the previous Chapter, epistemology 
refers to how things (both material and nonmaterial) can be known; and 
ontology (metaphysics) refers to what is there to know. In the context of both 
factual inquiry and value inquiry, there is a difference between epistemic 
inquiry and ontological inquiry.  
A good analogy for understanding this distinction is that of dark matter. Dark 
matter is one of the greatest puzzles in science generally. It meets the 
requirements of a synthetic judgment as understood by the logical positivists 
in that it relates to a matter of fact (probably). It is probably a matter of fact 
because it is external to the self and it is thought to be amenable to empirical 
observation through the senses. Yet, no one knows definitively what it is; nor 
does anyone know how to regard its existence metaphysically. In the case of 
dark matter, the epistemic tools employed are generally those found in particle 
physics; and while a description of what is dark matter eludes, scientists 
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nonetheless continue to seek knowledge about it. What is it about dark matter 
that makes us so antiskeptical about scientific inquiry and so skeptical about 
value inquiry?  
While there is no simple answer to this question, a preliminary proposal is to 
claim that the pursuit of scientific knowledge is worthwhile because it is more 
truthapt than value knowledge, and therefore, while absolute scientific 
knowledge is elusive, there is also the belief that such absolute knowledge is 
possible. Value knowledge is assumed to be incapable of absolute truth and 
that no matter how much energy is exerted in gaining value knowledge, there 
will never be a metaphysical truth about values that will emerge. In other 
words, it is a futile enterprise.  While this may be a popular view about the 
truth existence of values, it is a conceptualization that also reduces the 
attractiveness of epistemic inquiry. The example of dark matter is intended to 
demonstrate: 1) that metaphysical certainty in the sciences does not foreclose 
epistemological inquiry, 2) that metaphysical skepticism in regard to values is 
distinct from the project of epistemological inquiry about values, and 3) that 
the pursuit of value knowledge should not be limited by questions of 
metaphysical uncertainty. 
 
4.1.2 Three Possibilities 
In terms of the concept of values, and in looking to distinguish between value 
ontology and value epistemology, there are three general possibilities for 
understanding values. This section will look at these three possibilities in 
relation to the theories that have been generated about value knowledge and 
value truth. Since most of the discourse has focused on moral knowledge 
versus scientific knowledge, these terms will be used to represent the 
philosophic inquiry into what one might call scientific fact and moral value.  
The focus here is on value knowledge, and how different approaches to value 
knowledge can improve inquiry. The terms objective and subjective will be 
used in the following ways: objective and subjective will be used to distinguish 
1) between mind-independent knowledge (objective) and mind-dependent 
knowledge (subjective), 2) between the capacity for universal metaphysical 
truth about value (objective) and metaphysical skepticism about value truth 
(subjective), 3) between natural entities (objective) and nonnatural entities 
(subjective), and 4) between cognitive capacity for rational knowledge 
(objective) and noncognitive emotivism (subjective).  
These various ways of categorizing objectivity and subjectivity will have a 
direct correlation to a number of metaethical theories about the conceptual 
nature (existence) of morality specifically, and values generally. These theories 
include the following: moral realism, moral quasi-realism, and moral 
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antirealism;70 moral cognitivism and noncognitivism;71 ethical naturalism and 
nonnaturalism;72 moral skepticism and antiskepticism;73 moral rationalism;74 
moral sense theory and emotivism;75 ethical subjectivism and moral 
intuitionism;76 and moral error theory.77 
In addition to metaethical views about the existence of value, there are a few 
structural views that are also discussed. These include value universalism78 
and value relativity;79 and value monism80 and value plurality.81 All of these 
                                                            
70 Moral realism is the metaethical view which claims that ethical sentences express 
propositions that are truthapt and those propositions are made true by objective features of the 
world. Some less robust forms of moral realism could be categorized as quasi-realism in that 
they believe that some moral propositions can indeed be true in the objective sense, but that 
these propositions do not exist as features of the world. Instead, ethical sentences project 
emotional attitudes as though they were real properties. This makes quasi-realism a form of 
noncognitivism. Antirealism rejects that moral propositions can be true, and they likewise reject 
the idea that moral propositions correspond to objective facts. 
71 Moral cognitivism is the metaethical view that ethical sentences express propositions and can 
therefore be true or false. In many ways, moral cognitivism is compatible with moral realism. 
However, there are forms of moral cognitivism that do not rely on the need for moral entities to 
be mind-independent in order for them to be objectively true. Moral cognitivism is a mind-
dependent theory. In this way, it has many similarities with Kantian moral rationalism. It 
rejects the idea that moral sentences merely state emotional attitudes. Most forms of moral 
noncognitivism claim that moral statements do not express propositions and thus cannot be 
true or false. This is the view of the logical positivists.  
72 Ethical naturalism is an extreme form of moral realism that claims that moral propositions 
are capable of truth, they contain features independent of the mind, and these mind 
independent features can be reduced to some form of nonmoral features existing as naturalized 
entities in the world.  
73 Moral skepticism is a class of metaethical theories holding that no one has any moral 
knowledge. Moral skepticism comes in a variety of subclasses such as moral error theory, 
sentimentalism, moral antirealism, and moral noncognitivism. Moral skeptics hold that moral 
cannot be expressed as true or false statements. They are not truthapt. Most moral skeptics 
also hold that moral statements are neither mind-independent or mind-dependent. Instead, 
they hold that moral propositions merely state attitudes. 
74 Moral rationalism is a view in metaethics according to which moral truths (or at least general 
moral principles) are knowable a priori, by reason alone.  
75 Moral sense theory is the metaethical view holding that knowledge about morality is grounded 
in moral sentiments or emotions. Morality is not knowable through reason (either a priori or a 
posteriori). Emotivism is a metaethical view which claims that ethical sentences do not express 
propositions but emotional attitudes. 
76 Moral intuitionism is a view in metaethical holding there are objective facts of morality that 
are knowable, but that these evaluative facts cannot be reduced to natural facts, and that 
human beings have an intuitive awareness or knowledge of value that forms the foundation of 
ethical knowledge. An empiricist version of moral intuitionism is similar to that of moral sense 
theory, while a rationalist version is similar to that of moral cognitivism. Ethical subjectivism is 
a form of moral cognitivism and antiskepticism. It is a metaethical view that, while ethical 
sentences state attitudes, they are capable of being known as true through cognitive processes.  
77 Moral error theory is hyper-skeptical view about moral knowledge holding that all moral 
claims are false and that there is reason to believe that all moral arguments are false. 
78 Value universalism is a metaethical position holding that some system or ethics or morality 
applies universally to all similarly situated individuals. What is right or wrong for one individual 
is right or wrong for all individuals regardless of context. This theory is closely associated with 
those who believe that there are objective moral truths that exist. 
79 Value relativity is the metaethical view that moral or ethical truths differ according to context. 
This is the antithesis of value universality. Under such a view, nobody is objectively right or 
wrong when disagreeing about such-and-such belief. Value relativism can be the view that there 
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structural theories hold that values do indeed exist in some form, and that 
there is some knowledge that can be gained about them. While the metaethical 
views described above are normally confined to general philosophic inquiry, 
the structural questions about value also permeate social science discourse.  
 
4.1.2.1 Objective-Objective 
The objective-objective approach to value is one that would claim that values 
are real and naturalized entities that are capable of being known and verified 
as scientific facts. Furthermore, they are objective in the sense that they exist 
external to the self: that is, values exist ‘out there’ in the world and are 
capable of being known through empirical verification.82 This type of approach 
to value knowledge could be called moral realism or ethical naturalism. This 
approach is normally advocated by those seeking to claim that values 
(especially moral ones) can be known in the same way as scientific facts are 
known. That is, moral values are capable of being true, and that moral values 
are capable of empirical verification. If the objective-objective position is 
correct, then value knowledge could be determined in exactly the same way as 
factual knowledge. As mind-independent entities, values are determinable in 
the same way that the natural world is discoverable: through the process of 
experience based on empirical observation. In terms of value structure, this 
approach would likely endorse views on value universality and value plurality.  
Criticism of the objective-objective approach typically comes in the form of 
ethical nonnaturalism. Primarily attributable to the what GE Moore calls the 
open question argument or the naturalistic fallacy, this idea holds that any 
attempt to identify morality with some set of observable natural properties will 
always be an open question (a question that cannot be deduced from the 
conceptual terms alone).83 Another version of the naturalistic fallacy, which is 
not attributable to Moore, is the idea that one cannot attribute what is natural 
                                                                                                                                                                              
is nothing objective to know about values because they can be applied in different ways by 
different cultures and communities, or it can be the view that there are objective moral truths, 
but the manner in which they are applied depend on particular contexts.  
80 Value monism is the view in metaethics holding that value systems (moral or otherwise) are 
cohesive and unitary. It is a view that value positions are mutually supporting and that there 
are no inherent conflicts among competing values.  
81 Value pluralism is the view that there may be a number of particular values that are equally 
correct and fundamental, and yet they are incommensurable. A common example given for this 
phenomenon is between the values of liberty and equality in political thought. Each value is 
valuable, but they often cannot be reconciled with each other (at least in absolute terms) when 
applied in specific political systems. 
82 This is akin to the category of synthetic truths that the logical positivists considered to be one 
of the main foci of meaningful (real) knowledge. 
83 Moore further argued that if this is true, then moral facts cannot be reduced to natural 
properties and that therefore ethical naturalism is false. See GE Moore [1903](2011). Principia 
Ethica. London, CreateSpace Publishing.  
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with what is good.84 This form of the naturalistic fallacy is common in 
everyday use, and if it is true that there are no natural moral properties that 
describe goodness, then the reverse should hold: there is no property of 
goodness attributable to nature. 
 
4.1.2.2 Subjective-Subjective 
This is essentially the Humean view, which has been extended in the past 
century as forms of emotivism, noncognitivism, moral antirealism, and moral 
skepticism. It is a view that values do not exist metaphysically as either mind-
dependent or mind-independent entities. It likewise holds that there is nothing 
epistemologically that can be known about values (especially moral and ethical 
ones). Rather, such a view holds values are incapable of rational reflection, 
and that value preferences merely indicate an desire, feeling, attitude, or 
emotion. This idea follows on Humean sentimentalism and is taken to its 
extreme by logical positivism and moral error theory. For these theorists, 
moral values are subjective all the way down. In terms of structure, this 
approach would endorse modest versions of value plurality and value 
relativism.  
It is this view about moral values (and other values as well) that presents the 
greatest challenge for a theory based on the improvement of value knowledge 
(the focus of this work). This type of theory provides ample ammunition for 
those who attribute the most negative aspects of value subjectivity to advance 
positions advocating for its complete removal from any kind of objective 
inquiry. Under this view, values and valuation merely reflect an individual’s 
attitude or feeling; and therefore, not only is there nothing objective to know 
about such utterances, there is nothing to know whatsoever (they are 
cognitively meaningless). However, the idea that moral values are cognitively 
meaningless is a fairly recent phenomenon and is not reflective of many 
skeptical views about moral epistemology. For example, behaviorism in 
psychology is of the belief that emotion and feeling are measurable as 
empirically verifiable human behaviors. While such a view is skeptical about 
whether emotion or desire is metaphysically truthapt, it is antiskeptical about 
the possibility for knowing such emotion or desire as empirically observable 
behavior.  
                                                            
84 This similar to the naturalistic fallacy but is a more general proposition holding that it is false 
to attribute what is good with what is natural. 
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4.1.2.3 Objective-Subjective 
Under this approach, moral values are mind-dependent (subjective) but they 
are objectively knowable through cognitive processes and rational thought.85 
In some ways, this is a version of the objective-objective approach because, 
like the moral realists, followers of Kantian moral rationality hold that moral 
propositions are capable of being truthapt. In other words, they are not 
metaphysically skeptical about the existence of values. However, where these 
positions differ is in relation to whether values exist as mind-independent 
entities. For the objective-subjective approach, knowledge about values is 
possible through cognitive processes of the mind alone. Under the Kantian 
view, moral value is ontologically objective (that is, truthapt) and epistemically 
subjective (that is, mind-dependent). This view is attributable to various forms 
of rational ethical intuitionism, ethical subjectivism, and moral cognitivism. 
Structurally speaking, this view would hold that values are capable of 
universality and relativity at the same time.86 Likewise, and depending on how 
the objective-subjective approach is understood, the structure of values could 
be unitary (as a coherent system of mind) or as a plurality of various 
particular values.87 
A more modest form of the objective-subjective approach is the one advocated 
in this work. It is also a version of the position advanced by John Rawls and 
Christine Korsgaard. This view proposes that values can be reflected on, and 
justified by rational inquiry, but that there is no objective truth (ontologically 
speaking) that is necessarily attributable to such a claim.88 Under this 
approach, values exist internal to the self (subjectively), and that while they 
are capable of self-reflection and rational scrutiny, they are only subjectively 
knowable in that values do not exist independent of the mind, and that they 
are not necessarily capable of absolute truth. In many ways, this outlook can 
be seen as the underlying rationale for Rawlsian political thought and 
metaethical constructivism.89 Under these views, the goal of rational inquiry 
                                                            
85 Some theorists might actually call these values as mind-independent (and therefore objective) 
because all reasonable and ‘right’ thinking minds would possess them. This work, however, 
prefers to call such commonly held values as mind-dependent shared subjectivities. For the 
mind-independent and objective view, see Matthew Kramer (2007). Objectivity and the Rule of 
Law. Cambridge, CUP. 
86 This is the view that the mind is capable of knowing value in a universal manner (i.e. across 
all human beings), but that the understanding of these values will differ according to context 
(i.e. they are relative to context). 
87 The seminal article on the distinction between value unity and plurality is Isaiah Berlin 
(1953). The Hedgehog and the Fox. London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson. 
88 However, Rawls does believe that there is a base set of objective principles of justice that all 
rational beings would agree to as a starting point. He calls this his ‘thin theory of the good.’ 
Such a theory sets a constitutive foundation upon which all other values can be determined by 
right thinking individuals. In this way, Rawls theory is both objective and subjective. In other 
words, he holds that there are two principles of justice that all rational beings would choose 
behind a ‘veil of ignorance.’ Once these limited, but objective and true, principles are delineated, 
all other values can be determined. 
89 Rawls, supra note 2. 
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about values is to provide a means for developing a picture of the moral 
landscape that is constructed by describing what values individuals with a 
properly functioning rational faculty would all agree.  
This provides a sound basis for the idea of shard subjectivities and a theory of 
configurative fairness. What is valued remains a subjective and mind-
dependent enterprise, but relies heavily on cognitive processes for rational 
argument, justification, and reflection. The outcome constitutes what 
individuals value. While this claim cannot prove that value claims are capable 
of truth, it can demonstrate that the process of value knowledge is not purely 
subjective in the negative sense (that is, value knowledge is not cognitively 
meaningless). The goal for knowledge under this approach is to determine 
where value subjectivities are shared across individuals. In terms of 
measurement and analysis, gaining knowledge about values under this type of 
rational configuration is distinct from that of behaviorism. It requires the 
researcher to be able to know empirically unobservable phenomena of the 
mind. The difficulty in knowing these unobservable phenomena of rational 
thought across individuals is precisely why the behaviorists limited their 
inquiry to those phenomena that presented themselves as observable 
behavior. However, advances in cognitive science and psychology provide new 
techniques for understanding these normally unobservable phenomena can be 
made empirically observable. Q methodology is one of these techniques.  
 
4.2 The Content of Values 
While the brief introduction into the debates on the conceptual and structural 
nature of values above will surely not exhaust the depth of inquiry or amount 
of ink that philosophers have spilled in discussing such topics, it is hoped that 
the view that the idea of subjectivity and its affiliation with value knowledge is 
not as straight forward as most legal philosophers would like to think it is. In 
moving on to the next set of ideas, which will have some overlap with 
discussions about the concept of values, the focus will shift away from 
epistemic and ontological questions and turn to more practical considerations 
about value types and categories. This section intends to expand one’s ideas 
about what constitutes a value; and how values and valuation extend far 
beyond the boundaries of ethical and moral inquiry.  
When one speaks of values, to what are they referring? The main problem in 
classifying values lies in their observability (or lack thereof). If one claims that 
values are entities, containing properties, then they should be amenable to 
observation and description; and yet sometimes they are not. While the idea of 
a moral fact may not exist as a naturalized entity like a natural fact, moral 
entities are – in many cases – amenable to rational reflection. Values present 
themselves in almost every field of thought (from mathematical values to 
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aesthetic values), and are not limited to moral or ethical inquiry. Take for 
example the value of coherence. In both law and science, the idea of coherence 
is a central concept. However, while there may be a way of evaluating a more 
or less coherent legal system or set of scientific theories, there is no means to 
describe coherence ontologically.  
What then is the difference between the value of coherence and the value of 
liberty, for example? One is what is called a cognitive or epistemic value and 
the other is what is called a moral or political value. In the context of either 
individual or political liberty, the value of liberty can be evaluated against its 
ideal type in describing liberalness, but it is said that such an ideal type fails 
to exist ontologically. If both liberty and coherence are expressible in their 
ideal types, why then is the concept of liberty said to be a purely subjective 
value, while a concept of coherence is said to be a value capable of objectivity? 
The answer lies in the way that values are categorized. 
 
4.2.1 Moral and Social Values 
In later Chapters of this work, ideas about the relationship between 
jurisprudence and the metavalues of justice, fairness, and legitimacy will be 
explored. For many theories about justice, the value of human dignity holds 
central importance. Contemporary justice theorists often conceive of the 
project of justice in terms of its capacity to promote and secure human 
dignity. In terms of these broad overarching ideas, what types of values are 
being spoken about here? Are these ethical, moral, political, or even legal 
values? While it can be argued that all of these values have a moral 
component, it is the process of detailing their goals and aims that uncovers 
their types. As such, one way of looking at values is in terms of the goals that 
they seek to achieve (instrumental value), or the kind of action that they oblige 
(deontological value). For example, political values tell us how we ought to be 
governed; ethical values tell us how we ought to live; and moral values tell us 
how to treat each other. This is a purely instrumental or deontological view of 
value, however. It says little about the intrinsic worth of such values, but 
merely categorizes them against their ability to achieve some greater good 
such as the promotion of human flourishing or human dignity.  
Many philosophers hold that values can also be intrinsically valuable: that is, 
they are valuable in and of themselves.90 An intrinsic value is an end in its 
self. For example, a value that is derived from its inherent goodness could be 
viewed as an intrinsic value. Under such a view, one ought to act in 
compliance with such a value regardless of the goal that that value might be 
attempting to achieve. While there are a number of problems with such a 
                                                            
90 Ben Bradley (2006). Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value. Ethical Theory & Moral Practice. Vol. 9, 
p. 111. 
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claim, the idea is that something that might be called an intrinsic value will be 
invariably connected with some idea of goodness – and thus often called 
moral. Moral and social values can be looked at from either an intrinsic (end 
in itself) or extrinsic (means to an ends) perspective. However, all moral and 
social values claim to guide human action in determining what is good or 
right. While ethics is often used as a term of art for describing philosophic 
inquiry about morality, it can also be used to describe personal values. Ethical 
values under such a view are those values that are employed to guide 
individual reflection about how to live a good life. These values usually relate 
to ideas about self-respect and taking one’s life seriously: for instance, living a 
meaningful life.91  
Moral values, while applicable to all determinations of what is right and 
wrong, can also be seen as those values guiding the way conscious beings 
should treat one another. At this very human level, ethical and moral values 
combine to inform conscious beings how to live and how to treat one another. 
Political and social values, on the other hand, describe the set of values aimed 
at human organization at the communal or societal level. Political and legal 
values, such as justice, fairness, legitimacy, equality, liberty, individualism, 
civic duty, and the like, are values aimed at the moral goodness or rightness of 
systems regulating human behavior in a social context. Social, cultural, and 
family values often relate to forms of political values, but focus primarily on 
belief systems and structures of social organization that fall outside the 
governance context.  
In the context of jurisprudence, considerations about values usually take the 
form of controversies relating to the integration of moral value judgments in 
the decisions related to lawmaking, lawapplying, and most importantly: 
lawinterpreting. Determining the role of these political, social, and moral 
values in the context of legal decision and discourse is the focus of this work; 
and as such, questions about values and how they are intertwined into the 
understanding of jurisprudence become central points of inquiry. In this 
context, one is rarely talking about legal values per se when criticizing the so-
called subjective elements of legal decision and discourse. Instead, they are 
criticizing the political, moral, and social values (and norms) that are injected 
into the law by decisionmakers. However, to complicate matters, the social 
context in which law operates often entails principles, norms, and rules that 
are a mixture of legal, political, and moral values.  
Take for example the principle of good faith or of pacta sunt servanda. Each of 
these core legal principles contains values of the political and moral type. In 
looking to advance knowledge about these values in the context of law, the 
ability to dissect ideas and concepts into their constituent parts is important, 
although challenging. However, there are all types of value judgments that 
                                                            
91 See Ronald Dworkin (2011). Justice for Hedgehogs. Cambridge, Belknap Press. 
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tend to fall outside the scope of what are typically considered moral values. In 
social inquiry generally, and jurisprudence specifically, it is very difficult to 
clearly separate moral from nonmoral value judgments, and from legal and 
nonlegal (that is, moral or political) value judgments. 
 
4.2.2 Epistemic Values are Values Too  
It is often the case that when one speaks of values, it is a reference to ethics 
and morality. However, values enter the discourse in almost every context that 
requires inquiry and understanding. It is argued that description without 
understanding is meaningless, and that understanding requires evaluation. If 
this is true, then description requires evaluation which in turn requires 
knowing something about values. These values need not contain moral 
components (although, it is arguable that anything worth valuing includes a 
claim to its rightness or goodness). Examples of these types of values are what 
are called epistemic or cognitive values. These are the values – while distinct 
from moral values – are values nonetheless.92 In the law, one can think of 
values such as reasonableness, coherence, predictability, adaptability, 
stability, order, consistency, transparency, integrity, and the like.   
These are examples of cognitive values that are used to make sense of 
observable legal phenomena. Scientific inquiry includes a similar set of values 
that make understanding of scientific fact possible.93 What then is one to 
make of these types of values? Why is the coherence of the law considered 
descriptively possible, but the justness of the law is not? The answer may lie 
in that justice is assessing the goodness or rightness of a law or legal system, 
and that coherence is not. Philosophically speaking however, there does not 
seem to be a fundamental conceptual difference. This is not to say that 
making a distinction between the two is not helpful. It is just claiming that the 
pursuit of legal coherence and the pursuit of legal justice may be descriptively 
possible according to a similar set of criteria.  
 
5. GAINING KNOWLEDGE ABOUT VALUES 
This Chapter focused on the general character of facts and values, and how 
understanding, analyzing, describing, and evaluating all require knowledge 
about values. The difficulty in such a theory is that what one values originates 
in the mind in often unobservable ways. The way that one approaches 
problems about the world – either as attempts at understanding the natural 
                                                            
92 Putnam, supra note 9 at pp. 30-31. 
93 Heather Douglas (2009). Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal. Pittsburgh, University of 
Pittsburgh Press, pp. 108-112. 
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world or the social world – presupposes valuing. Knowledge about values thus 
becomes a starting point for any type of inquiry. Yet, the development of 
thought over the past few centuries has produced a restricted view about the 
possibility and practicality of value knowledge. As phenomena that are 
inherently subjective (as emanating from the mind), values pose serious 
problems when knowledge is metaphysically tied to knowing objective and 
observable natural phenomena. However, developments in the cognitive 
sciences and psychology present improved possibilities for overcoming such 
restrictions. Improved understanding of mental processes through scientific 
inquiry means that some previously unobservable phenomena may become 
capable of objective reflection through empirical evidence at some point in the 
future.  
In addition to the problem concerning the unobservability of value, there is an 
interrelated problem that restricts the possibility of value knowledge. It is 
commonly stated that the study of values is about the prescriptive (normative) 
and that the study of facts is about the descriptive (analytical). This distinction 
is rooted in the idea that values are aimed at evaluation, while facts are aimed 
at description. However, it becomes readily apparent that there is a difference 
between value and evaluation. To say that some kind of entity is a value is to 
say that there is something that can be known about it. What makes most 
thinkers uncomfortable is that values do not contain the same types of 
properties attributable to facts, and therefore, there must be something 
fundamentally different about them. The point is that both values and facts (at 
least linguistically described) presuppose some kind of entity, property, or 
phenomena. Facts and values are nouns.  
Describing (facts) or evaluating (values), on the other hand, are processes, not 
entities. They are verbs. Therefore, when speaking of values as being capable 
of evaluation, and facts as being capable of description, it is not clear exactly 
what is being claimed. The problem lies in the focus on observability: that is, a 
naturalized methodology capable of both describing and evaluating facts. 
Values (even if one concedes that they are entities), on the other hand, are 
often incapable of observability and are therefore are not amenable to either to 
a naturalized description or evaluation. This is, at its most essential level, the 
core debate between objectivity and subjectivity, and describes the main 
paradox in epistemology. If such a claim is true and there is no value capable 
of factual description (at least in terms of naturalized entities), how then is one 
to gain knowledge about values? 
The answer to this question lies in the way that values are conceptualized, and 
how processes for evaluating can be objectively known. Once one can reject 
the idea that value understanding is only knowable if it meets the requirement 
of objectively observable phenomena, then the focus of inquiry can shift to 
understanding the ways that values can be known according to a subjective 
and nonnaturalized standard. However, regardless of whether values are 
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naturalized entities capable or observation or nonnaturalized entities created 
by operations of the mind, gaining knowledge about values in both scientific 
and social context requires an understanding of both decision and evaluation 
(including judgments). How one decides and judges is affected by a mixture of 
values and facts, and judgments cannot be made independent of the other. In 
jurisprudence, and especially in science, the possibility of a value-free ideal is 
attractive, but nonetheless unrealistic.94 All modes of inquiry come ‘screaming 
with values’95 and the pursuit of decision or judgment must be informed by 
values. A scientific judgment or a legal judgment cannot be made outside of 
the self who is making the judgment. As such, even if the judgment is being 
made about facts, the process of decisionmaking cannot be made outside the 
context of the observer’s mind.  
This means that conscious and unconscious evaluative elements are always at 
work in determining the way in which one decides or judges. There is no way 
to avoid this. The alternative is to claim that knowledge in both the natural 
sciences and the social sciences can be achieved without values or the process 
of evaluation. In general, this is the project of positivist thought, and while it 
has clarified our conceptual factual knowledge about the natural world, it has 
acted as a thought-stopper in terms of value knowledge. A better science, or a 
better jurisprudence, is premised on the idea that improved understanding 
about the ways the mind values, decides, judges, and evaluates can only work 
to improve our knowledge of the natural and social world, not hinder it. 
                                                            
94 Id. 
95 Putnam, supra note 9 at p. 103. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LEGAL POSITIVISM AND LEGAL NONPOSITIVISM 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter will focus on jurisprudence generally, and how different 
approaches to legal inquiry affect the scope of value inquiry. The purpose of 
such inquiry is to clarify how knowledge about value can be grounded in 
theories about law. The scope of this inquiry will span from the local to the 
global, with the idea being that any realistic theory about law must have 
descriptive and evaluative force in understanding all entities that can be called 
law. This means that law, properly understood, will focus on entities that 
contain properties of legalness: from informal and localized standards of 
conduct, to municipal and state-centric legal systems, and to legal orders 
operating from without sovereign states (international or global law). This work 
challenges the views that the only law that can contain legality is that which 
emanates exclusively from within sovereign authority, and that a purely 
descriptive account of the law is possible without reference to the values that 
its users endorse.  
At the same time, it is important to refrain from confusing that which can 
contain the properties of law from that which cannot. Social and moral norms 
of a society or community can constitute law; but just as importantly, they can 
frequently be distinguished from the law. The puzzle is attempting to figure 
out when the content of a particular phenomenon is morally binding and when 
it is legally binding. At the same time, values more broadly must be 
understood in the context of legal knowledge as entities with standalone legal 
properties (values), or as evaluative processes wrapped up and entangled with 
legal entities (evaluation).1 The claim of this work is that the entanglement of 
law and value means that understanding the law requires an understanding of 
value and evaluation. All jurisprudential thought contains an element of 
evaluation – even analytical conceptions of the law. There is compelling 
evidence for understanding knowledge in general in this way. If true, this 
                                                            
1 Values (noun) include phenomena such as principles of liberty, equality, and democracy; or 
cognitive values such as reasonableness, coherence, simplicity, clarity, and unity. The process 
of including value inquiry in the context of legal knowledge is through a process of evaluation 
not description. Evaluating (verb) requires an assessment of the worth of a legal rule in relation 
to its achievement of a particular value that is endorsed. Even knowing whether a legal rule 
obligates cannot always be described without evaluating the relative merit of the rule in the 
context of the population of individuals to which the legal rule is aimed. Even where a rule 
claims obligation in a descriptive manner that is empirically observable (e.g. a sovereign issues a 
legislative decree), it is based on an evaluation that there is a belief among those to which the 
legislative rule is aimed that they consider it as obligatory.  
85 
 
 
means that the idea of a pure analytical jurisprudence is a difficult concept to 
sustain.  
Primarily, the main disagreement in legal theory lies is in the amount and type 
of value integration that should be permitted in any ‘real’ theory about law. 
However, the point is that even if one is able to explain a pure positivist theory 
about law purged of moral evaluation (the relative goodness or badness of an 
entity), the theory will still be reliant on a certain level of value inquiry 
(including epistemic and cognitive values) in order to make the theory work. 
This is something that has been readily understood by philosophers outside 
the context of the law for a long time.2 Analyzing requires evaluating, even if 
such evaluating is nonmoral and only occurs when evaluating what the scope 
of analysis should entail.3 For most legal positivists, the goal of legal inquiry is 
to reduce the elements of law into empirically verifiable terms. The aim is to 
determine when a law is legally valid, and that this can be achieved through 
purely descriptive analysis. However, at the other end of the spectrum could 
be called the political realists. For these theorists, law is only about values, 
specifically the value of power. The use of the law is merely a ‘tool’ for the 
powerful to pursue their self-interest. In between these extremes are a whole 
host of theoretical outlooks attempting to understand the limits of what can 
and should be considered to be law. It is the focus of this Chapter to 
understand these distinctions in the context of value knowledge. 
This Chapter will begin by looking at jurisprudence in a very general fashion: 
that is, the key terminology for inquiring about law and how the different types 
and categories confuse and or enhance the way the law is understood. Many 
aspects of this Chapter will reflect similar distinctions that were made in the 
previous Chapter: such as the distinction between description and evaluation, 
the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity, and the distinction 
between analytical and normative inquiry. In the context of this Chapter, the 
distinctions between fact and value will turn to distinctions between law and 
value, and to the extent that values and evaluation (especially moral and 
ethical claims) can be separated from both the concept, content, and 
adjudication of the law. 
 
                                                            
2 This is especially the case for the philosophic pragmatists and neopragmatists of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  
3 The claim being made in this work is that even nonmoral values require an assessment of 
their relative worth (goodness), otherwise they would not be considered necessary. Evaluating 
the coherence of the law is not pursued because people believe it is bad. In this way, it is being 
claimed that both moral and nonmoral values are evaluated in terms of their relative goodness, 
and therefore there is nothing structurally that should allow moral values to be excluded from 
descriptive accounts of the law, but allow for cognitive and epistemic values to be incorporated.  
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2. JURISPRUDENCE IN GENERAL 
Jurisprudence is a wide topic. It covers all the collective knowledge available 
about what it is that is called law and how decisions about the law are made. 
As a means for regulating social behavior, both good and bad behavior, law 
has persisted in some form for as long as human beings have been organized 
socially and politically. Since law is wrapped up in our ideas about how 
human interaction should be organized in the context of social and political 
processes, it is very difficult to find the proper balance for understanding what 
is legal, what is social, and what is political. To further complicate matters, 
law – as a means of guiding social behavior – is encased with many normative 
(evaluative) elements about how individuals ought to behave in a social 
environment. This complication often invokes moral and ethical claims. In 
many cases, the law makes moral claims. However, at the same time, the law 
can be unjust and immoral. How is this possible? The answer lies in the way 
that law is conceptualized and what essential properties the law contains, and 
what properties are merely contingent. This section will look at these broad 
categories of legal thought and how jurisprudence attempts to differentiate 
these difficult – and seemingly intractable – problems  between the political-
social and the legal (at the societal level), and the moral-ethical and the legal 
(at the individual level). 
 
2.1 The Concept of Law and the Content of Law 
In the context of legal understanding – and value understanding as well, the 
first major distinction that must be analyzed is the difference between the 
concept of law and the content of law. Like much of the previous Chapter, and 
its focus on epistemology more broadly, the philosophic limitations that are 
placed on what is capable of knowledge and what is not – or only skeptically so 
– has a major influence on the breadth of inquiry. If, for example, one takes 
the scope of possible knowledge to only encompass analytical (relation of 
ideas) and synthetical (matters of fact) knowledge,4 then the way that one 
comes to know the concept of law will likewise be restricted. This can be a 
problem for the legal positivists, and it was a problem for the logical 
positivists.  
For the legal positivist, the concept of law must be capable of describing what 
the law is – and what it is not. It is claimed that the identification of legality 
can be determined without evaluation (especially moral evaluation). Law is a 
concept that is based on entities that are empirically verifiable and hence 
considered objective. For the legal nonpositivists, and especially those of the 
natural law frame, the description of what is the law also turns on an element 
                                                            
4 See Chapter 2, Section 2. 
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of value rationality or reasonableness that requires some degree of evaluation 
in determining legality. Most nonpositivists hold that the concept of law is 
something that can be rationally justified (even if it is not empirically verifiable 
in the scientific or positivistic sense).  
For both positivists and nonpositivists, the concept of law is about what 
makes law law, while the content of law concerns the substantive rules, 
principles, and norms that are contained within the concept. The concept of 
law can be analogized as the properties of an empty box; and what is 
contained within that box is legal content (as opposed to social or political or 
ethical content). The focus for the conceptual legal theorist then is to figure 
out what are the essential properties of this legality ‘box.’ As stated, for the 
legal positivist, the range of inquiry is limited to that which is empirically 
verifiable, and that verification is primarily aimed at describing authority and 
obligation. A law is a law if it is legally valid; and a legally valid law is one that 
is verifiably knowable as claiming authority and obligation objectively. This is 
called the pedigree thesis or the sources thesis, and it is the central 
requirement in a positivist concept about what the law is. For the positivist, 
especially HLA Hart, the pedigree thesis forms the primary component of what 
is required by the term law.5  
However, there is a particular problem with conceptualizing law in this way. 
The authoritative and obligatory nature of law properly so called is primarily a 
normative claim (although arguably not necessarily a moral or ethical claim), 
and as such, is not always empirically verifiable. From an epistemological 
perspective, this limitation is similar to the problems of the logical positivists 
in restricting knowledge only to empirically verifiable phenomena, while not 
realizing that the criteria established for such a concept about knowledge was 
not itself empirically verifiable.6 Under such a concept of law, the question of 
when a law is a legal norm and when it is merely a social or moral norm is 
predicated on the idea of a basic norm7 or some rule of recognition8 that 
validates a social norm as a law. This basic norm or rule of recognition 
possesses no content, but constitutes the essential properties of the legal 
concept ‘box’ mentioned above. However, such a nonreductivist basic norm is 
assumed. It cannot be described objectively as a scientific fact. 
                                                            
5 For Hart, the pedigree thesis holds that the existence of a legal system requires “[o]n the one 
hand those rules of behavior which are valid according to the system’s ultimate criteria of 
validity must be generally obeyed, and, on the other hand, its rules of recognition specifying the 
criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as 
common public standards of official behavior by its officials.” HLA Hart [1961](1997). The 
Concept of Law, edited by Joseph Raz. Oxford, Clarendon Press, p. 113. 
6 See Chapter 2, Section 3.4. 
7 This is the grundnorm in Kelsen’s pure theory of law. See Hans Kelsen [1960](2009). Pure 
Theory of Law, translated by Max Knight. New Jersey, Law Book Exchange. 
8 Hart, supra note 5 at p. 90. 
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While this is an attractive way to conceptualize the concept of the law, it 
presents a significant problem for determining when such criteria are met. 
Authority and obligation are value claims, and while occasionally observable 
and objectifiable, they are often only knowable as unobservable and 
internalized processes of the mind. Furthermore, it can be claimed that the 
identification of authority and obligation is not descriptive, but evaluative; and 
therefore requires value knowledge: a claim that positivists reject (at least so 
far as the description of the concept of law is concerned). However, for some 
positivists, this problem can be solved by claiming that only epistemic or 
cognitive values are needed for understanding authority and obligation, and 
that no moral or ethical recourse is ever required for determining legal 
validity.9  
While the way that the law is conceptualized shows differences between legal 
positivism and legal nonpositivism, the scope of legal content is likewise 
distinguishable between these theoretical frames. Some conceptual positivists 
do not place limits on what can be contained in the legally valid ‘box.’10 
However, contemporary legal positivists, especially those following in the 
Hartian tradition, believe that there should also be limits to the content of law. 
For positivists such as Hart, the content of the law is limited to what are called 
social facts.11 For the positivist, social facts do not need to be evaluated in 
terms of rightness or wrongness. Once they have been posited in legally valid 
form, they are law. While not all values and norms present as empirically 
observable behavior, many do, and they are supposed to reflect the standards 
of acceptable behavior within a particular legal community.  
The basic claim about social facts is that they mimic the way that the 
behaviorist turn in psychology focused on actual behavior in describing 
psychological phenomena. Both in psychology and sociology, the focus on 
behavior and the ability of behavior to be objectively verified as empirically 
observable phenomena made it a popular approach to psychological and 
sociological knowledge for most of the twentieth century. However, the 
cognitive turn in psychology has identified many of the limitations of the 
behaviorists.12 What they have learned is that there is a large amount of 
knowledge that is unobservable, subconscious, and not amenable to direct 
empirical verification. In other words, there is legal content beyond what Hart 
considered to be a social fact.  
                                                            
9 See Brian Leiter (2003). Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in 
Jurisprudence. American Journal of Jurisprudence. Vol. 48, pp. 17, 34. 
10 This is Hans Kelsen’s position.  
11 Social facts are those conventions, beliefs, values, norms, customs, and habits that are 
actually practiced. They are empirically observable as actual behaviors. They are not 
unobservable processes derived from rational thought alone. 
12 The so-called cognitive revolution is traceable to Noam Chomsky’s review of a book by a 
prominent mid-twentieth century behaviorist. Noam Chomsky (1959). Review of Verbal Behavior 
by BF Skinner. Language. Vol. 35, p. 26. 
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One of the main purposes of this work is to provide empirical evidence about 
typically unobservable phenomena that exist only as cognitive processes. If 
these phenomena can be made observable, then they may be able to meet the 
criteria of a social fact. For the nonpositivist, many of these unobservable 
mental processes such as rationality and reasonableness can be included as 
sources of legality. The problem in such a conceptualization of legality is in its 
ability to be verified. Without a means for objectively verifying these ‘natural’ 
laws, positivists will always hold that such a conceptualization of law will 
allow its proponents to manipulate what is the law through subjective 
preferences, desires, and interests. In other words, it deflates the possibility 
for a Rule of Law.13 For most positivists, the notion that law properly so called 
can ever be identified by the mind alone a priori is ‘nonsense upon stilts.’14 
From a nonpositivist perspective, however, such an idea is not nonsense. The 
difference lies in the scope of knowledge that is permitted in legal inquiry. The 
moral rationalists and natural law school have long argued that there are 
properties that can bind action from the internal perspective alone: that is, a 
sense of obligation can be derived from rational thought alone. This is 
essentially the Kantian view, and while most philosophers suggest that a 
concept of cognition such as this is metaphysically untenable (at least the a 
priori part), they continue to endorse the idea that there is knowledge that can 
be gained about both law and morality that is not derived from observable 
phenomena.15 For the purposes of this work, it is these seemingly internal, 
unobservable, subjective, and cognitive processes of the mind that are the 
focus. The goal is to provide new methods for uncovering and observing these 
phenomena in a manner that meets the objective mandate of positivist 
(scientific) reflection.16  
 
2.2 Theories About Law and Theories About Decision 
The distinction between concept and content is important in understanding 
the stance of the positivist and nonpositivist frames in jurisprudence, but from 
a practical perspective, the distinction between law and decision is of equal 
                                                            
13 The Rule of Law in capital letters refers to a broad concept about the function of legal systems 
and their ability to constrain the behavior of even the most powerful actors. The maxim, ‘no one 
is above the law’ is attributable to such a concept. 
14 Jeremy Bentham (1792). ‘Anarchical Fallacies; Being an Examination of the Declaration of 
Rights Issued During the French Revolution,’ republished in John Bowring (1843). The Works of 
Jeremy Bentham, Volume II. Edinburgh, William Tait. 
15 See Chapter 2, Section 3.2. 
16 It is proposed that Q methodology can assist in providing empirically verifiable evidence about 
values in the context of legal thought. And if new methodologies can assist in discovering these 
internal and subjective aspects of rational thought in an empirically observable manner, then 
they can become observable social facts. The important claim here is that making unobservable 
phenomena observable can add to our understanding of what the law is, not just what it ought 
to be (which it might be helpful in assisting with as well). 
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import. The practice of law is about making decisions. These are the decisions 
that lawmakers make when enacting and drafting laws, the decisions that 
lawappliers make when applying and interpreting the law in the adjudication 
of disputes, and the decisions that lawshapers make when influencing the law 
through scholarly discourse and commentary. At all of these levels, decision is 
central. Admittedly, however, the philosophic project of the positivists is not 
focused on such inquiry; rather, it is focused on the sources and properties of 
a legal entity. However, by limiting the scope of inquiry to the concept of law, 
knowledge about both content and decision remain under analyzed. In many 
ways, this makes sense. Discussions about content and decision are mired in 
value considerations – even moral ones: a focus that conceptual positivists 
seek to limit. 
In attempting to theorize about possible ways to improve value knowledge in 
the context of legal knowledge, it is then important that law is looked at 
holistically in terms of concept, content, and decision. Only with such a 
delineation of inquiry is a realistic jurisprudence possible. In the context of 
theories about law, decision is most commonly tied to theories about 
adjudication. Adjudication is about judging and interpreting; and as such, it is 
not a descriptive or analytical task but an evaluative one. In this frame of 
reference, decision is how decisionmakers such as judges or arbitrators apply 
and interpret the law according to the specific circumstances of a dispute. The 
focus of this type of inquiry usually centers on the amount of discretion the 
decisionmaker has in adjudicating the cases before him or her; and this is 
where the discourse on the objectivity and subjectivity of the law often 
becomes relevant.  
In the context of decision, and especially in the context of adjudication, the 
idea of legal subjectivity refers directly to how decisionmakers decide and 
judge. Invariably, legal decision is about judgment and interpretation, and 
both of these processes contain normative and evaluative elements. This 
presents a considerable problem for legal positivists (especially in practice). As 
such, theories about adjudication frequently attributed to those of the 
positivist bent would be called those of legal formalism. The attempt here is to 
strip away as much discretion (subjectivity as a negative concept) about 
judging and interpreting from the decisionmaker as possible. Formalism 
requires the mechanistic application of the law to the facts in a particular 
case. However, as a social phenomenon, the law is never amenable to such 
rigid analytics; and frequently, the vagueness, indeterminacy, or silence of the 
law to a particular case will leave the formalist judge with nothing to apply. At 
the other extreme, and often closely associated with nonpositivist conceptions 
about the law, are those lawadjudicators sympathetic to the theory of legal 
realism in it various incarnations. Here, the vagueness, indeterminacy, or 
silence of the law often presents the lawapplier with the discretion to decide 
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cases in nonlegal terms (or in value terms, such as according to legal 
principles).17  
Arguably, however, both formalism and realism are not ideal theoretical 
orientations. Formalism mandates too little value inquiry and legal realism 
mandates too much.18 In terms of theories about adjudication, there are two 
possible alternatives to legal formalism and legal realism. They derive from the 
interpretivism of Ronald Dworkin19 and the policy-orientated jurisprudence of 
Harold Lasswell, Myres McDougal, and Michael Reisman.20 Both of these 
theories will be highlighted in detail at later points in this work, but for now, it 
is only important to distinguish these middle paths from other theoretical 
positions on decision. In terms of gaining knowledge about value, these two 
theories are the primary frames of reference for postulating a comprehensive 
and realistic understanding of the role of value and evaluation in the context 
of jurisprudential thought. As such, they will form the jurisprudential basis for 
understanding the theory of configurative fairness that will be proposed as a 
means for gaining knowledge about value in the context of law. Both the 
Dworkin and Lasswell-McDougal-Reisman approaches to decision focus on the 
role of value (sometimes moral) knowledge in determining both what the law is 
and what the law should be in the context of decision.  
 
2.3 Legal Decision and Legal Discourse 
One of the major benefits in separating theories about law from theories about 
decision is that it permits the reflection on a further distinction: between legal 
decision and legal discourse. Legal decision refers to lawmaking and 
lawapplying, while legal discourse refers to lawshaping and lawinfluencing. 
These projects are obviously distinct, and yet, they are often discussed 
interchangeably. The problem that arises from such confusion is the potential 
for weakening theories about decision in the context of legal understanding. 
While scholarly work, such as this work, is aimed at enlightenment about 
decision, it is not decision. To say that the discourse about legal decision is 
synonymous with legal decision is both problematic and distorting. Legal 
decision – the actual work of lawmakers and lawappliers – is distinct from the 
way that law is thought about from the outside. This is not to say that 
lawshaping and lawinfluencing discourse does not affect decisionmaking; 
otherwise, legal discourse would only be an exercise in scholarly 
                                                            
17 It is claimed by some theorists, especially Dworkin, that the identification of legal principles 
requires moral reflection. 
18 A criticism of legal realism is that it allows for the judicial decisionmaker to subjectively (in 
the negative sense) decide cases according to his or her own preferences and interests. 
19 Ronald Dworkin (1986). Law’s Empire. Cambridge, Belknap Press. 
20 Harold Lasswell & Myres McDougal (1992). Jurisprudence for a Free Society: Studies in Law, 
Science, and Policy. Volume I and II. New Haven, New Haven Press; Michael Reisman (1999). 
Theory About Law: Jurisprudence for a Free Society. Yale Law Journal. Vol. 108, p. 935. 
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understanding. In fact, the way that one thinks about, talks about, and writes 
about the law is often very influential in the way the decisionmakers respond 
to legal problems. However, they are distinct jobs. 
One of the key distinctions in this regard refers to the job or mandate of the 
decisionmaker and the scholar. What a legal decisionmaker decides reflects 
their capacity to render legal decisions that are legally binding on its subjects. 
Legal discoursers do not have such power. The power of the legal discourser is 
different. It focuses on the ability of the scholar or subject of the law to 
influence and shape the law through writing, thinking, and talking about the 
law. To help clarify these differences, think about the arbitrator or judge 
applying the law in a particular dispute, and then think about the academic or 
scholar commenting on the outcome of that dispute. The arbitrator or judge is 
tasked with the context of the dispute and must apply and interpret the law in 
accordance with the law as it is.21 This job may be very different from the work 
of the scholar or academic who is commenting on the decision of the 
decisionmaker and evaluating its merit according to the outcome as it is, but 
also according to how the outcome could have been (or should have been).  
For the purposes of this work, the distinction between legal decision and legal 
discourse is relevant to clarifying value inquiry in the context of the law. Legal 
decision and legal discourse can be seen as distinguishing between an 
insider’s (internal) and outsider’s (external) perspective. If the discourse on a 
particular topic demands that decisions be taken in a certain way, it can only 
influence actual decisions from the outside. Such discourse has no bearing 
directly (though it does often indirectly) on the minds of the decisionmaker 
working on the inside. This means that the way that a decisionmaker 
incorporates values in making determinations about the law is an exercise in 
using values to evaluate the law from an insider’s perspective (that is, from the 
decisionmaker’s perspective). On the other hand, the way that the discourser 
incorporates values in understanding the merits and outcomes of the decision 
is an exercise in using values to evaluate the law from an outsider’s 
perspective (that is, from the discourser’s perspective). The importance of this 
distinction lies in the observational standpoint22 of the observer and will 
become more relevant when discussing the idea of configurative fairness in 
subsequent Chapters.  
 
                                                            
21 See generally Michael Reisman (2011). Soft Law and Law Jobs. Journal of Dispute 
Settlement. Vol. 1, p. 25. 
22 This is a major aspect of the policy-orientated jurisprudence. See Lasswell & McDougal, supra 
note 20 at p. 22. 
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2.4 Theories About Law and Theories About Justice 
Another distinction that persists in jurisprudential thought is that of theories 
about law as distinct from theories about justice. This distinction is so 
persuasive that discussion about law and discussions about justice rarely 
cohabitate as theoretical approaches to legal understanding. While this is not 
true in all cases, justice as a concept does have important characteristics that 
distinguish it from conceptual understandings of the law. Jurisprudentially 
speaking, conceptions about law are about what the law is (the lex lata – that 
is,  what determines a legally valid rule) and conceptions about justice are 
about what the law ought to be (the lex ferenda – that is, how should a society 
or politic conceive of the good and the right in order to best foster human 
flourishing). In this way, there is a stark distinction – conceptually – between 
the two. Theories about the concept of law are said to be descriptive and in the 
analytic tradition of philosophy, while theories about the concept of justice are 
said to be normative and in the ethical and political tradition of philosophy.  
Theories about justice are primarily normative and evaluative in orientation. 
They seek to explain what principles of justice a society should embrace in 
pursuit of the good or the right. There are essentially two ways to approach 
theories about justice in contemporary thought. One comes from the 
Aristotelian tradition and the other from the Kantian tradition. Theories about 
justice of the Aristotelian variety seek to begin with an idea about excellence; 
and from there it attempts to explain how a political community (or legal 
community) can contribute to the achievement of excellent and worthwhile 
lives.23 Modern philosophic thought might describe such an approach as 
making the good presuppose the right.24 It is a claim that an account of justice 
(the right) must be derived from a deeper account of what counts as a good or 
excellent way to live (the good). The Kantian approach, on the other hand, 
holds the opposite to be true. Kant would state that what is just is objectively 
determinable as categorical imperatives. These principles of justice are 
determinable through reason alone. Once these principles of justice are 
determined, they can guide action in terms of what a good life entails. Kant 
“therefore seeks to make ‘the right’ prior to ‘the good.’”25 While the Aristotelian 
conception of justice remains a valid starting point for contemporary natural 
law theorists – most notably John Finnis, it is far less popular than those 
theories about justice that derive from the Kantian tradition. 
For contemporary justice theorists, most notably John Rawls, the Kantian 
approach permits theorists to seek principles of justice, while at the same time 
allowing for no need to demand a particular vision of what constitutes the 
                                                            
23 Nigel Simmonds (2008). Central Issues in Jurisprudence, Third Edition. London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, p. 10. 
24 Id.  
25 Id. 
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good life.26 In contemporary society, this idea has been the hallmark of 
liberalism; and has spawned the most robust theories about justice in the last 
hundred years. Rawls theory is aimed at the particular problem of how a 
modern pluralistic and democratic society can choose a political conception of 
justice that would serve as the basic structure of that society.27 In doing so, 
his approach seeks to determine what principles of justice are essential for 
ordering a liberal society whose citizens configure their value preferences 
differently.28 In this way, the Rawlsian approach does not propose a theory 
that calls for a particular conception of the good to be pursued. Rather, he 
sought to establish the constitutive process by which rational beings could 
agree on a framework of rights, laws, and principles by which to be governed. 
This entails what Rawls calls a ‘thin theory of the good.’29 It provides basic 
principles of justice that all right thinking human beings would acknowledge 
as true.30 Once these basic principles are established, citizens of a particular 
society can then determine what value configuration they would agree to live 
by.31 
While the liberalism of Rawls theory closely parallels Kantian political 
philosophy, it also has parallels with his treatise on practical reason. As stated 
in the previous Chapter, Kantian ethical theory held that knowledge about 
values (especially ethical ones) could be determined by the mind alone through 
rational processes. He also believed that all rational minds have the capacity 
to come to the same conclusions from these determinations. That is, ethical 
knowledge is capable of objectivity. Rawls, however, does not go so far. In this 
way, the Rawlsian theory of justice is both objective and subjective. It is 
subjective in the sense that moral discourse is internal to the self and that the 
plurality of what can be considered valuable to individuals means that there is 
no unitary concept of the good life: it will vary from community to community. 
                                                            
26 This position is not Kantian, but a neo-Kantian formulation of the idea that reason can 
determine what is the right thing to do. However, in the context of postmodern and liberal 
thought, this approach to value knowledge has permitted theorists such as John Rawls to 
account for justice in a manner that is sensitive to context, plurality, and individual differences.  
27 John Rawls & Erin Kelly (2001). Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, p. 9. 
28 An example of this might be the difference between the atheist and the Catholic living in the 
same liberal society. The question Rawls is seeking to answer is whether there is a set of core 
underlying values (he calls principles of justice) that would permit distinct perspectives to 
cohabitate peacefully and stably over time.  
29 John Rawls (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, p. 348. 
30 The thin theory of the good requires that individuals agree that an objective set of core 
principles of justice exist.  
31 This is similar to some other positions in political philosophy. Most notably, David Gauthier. 
His seminal work, Morals by Agreement, holds a very similar position to that of a theory of 
configurative fairness. Essentially, this positions holds that despite knowing the metaphysical 
truth about morality, societies can configure moral norms rationally according to the choices 
that individuals would make under a set rational conditions. Rational thought processes allow 
individuals to agree to the moral configuration that they would choose to live by. This 
contractarian consensus that forms is similar to the concept of shared value subjectivities. See 
David Gauthier (1986). Morals by Agreement. Oxford, OUP.   
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However, it is objective in the sense that the rational mind is capable of 
objective knowledge about what conception of justice individuals living in a 
liberal society would endorse. This way of conceptualizing justice means that – 
so long as there is a process for making these mental processes of rational 
thought amenable to empirical observation – there is the possibility of 
objectively knowing what values a particular society would choose to live by.  
The translation of the Rawlsian approach to justice (or any justice theory for 
that matter) into the jurisprudential context can be a challenge. For some, it is 
unclear how theories about justice and theories about law could ever overlap. 
The possibility for such interaction is of course complex, but some clarity can 
be gained if the conception of what the law is requires that it is just. If 
objective knowledge about value is possible, then conceptualizing the law as 
claiming justness could be evaluated in the same way as conceptualizing the 
law as claiming authority.32 The challenge lies in determining how to describe 
the justness or fairness of a particular law or legal order. Advancing knowledge 
about the objective description of justice as based on the shared subjective 
understanding of value across individuals could assist in bridging the divide 
between justice theory and legal theory. The goal of this work is to advance 
empirical knowledge about value configurations in particular legal orders in a 
way that can describe fairness. If a theory of configurative fairness is possible 
through the employ of Q methodology, then it may be possible to generate 
more overlap between conceptual theories about justice and conceptual 
theories about law.33 
 
3. LEGAL POSITIVISM AND LEGAL NONPOSITIVISM 
Now that some of the different types of inquiry in general jurisprudence have 
been given, one can turn to some of the particular distinctions between 
positivist and nonpositivist frames of reference. The kinds of inquiry that are 
the focus of positivist thought in jurisprudence are limited primarily to 
conceptual understandings of the law. In this way, it has been said that “no 
legal philosopher can be only a legal positivist.”34 What this claim is making is 
that even if one can contemplate a sound theory about the nature of the law, 
one must still be able to explain how decisions about the content of the law 
                                                            
32 Both justness and authoritativeness are normative value claims and yet one is claimed to be 
descriptively possible (authority), while the other is not. 
33 It is important to note, however, that a theory of configurative fairness is not a metatheory 
that claims about what is universally just. Rather, it is an application specific to particular 
contexts. It is a theory that can assist in determining what a particular legal community 
considers to be fair. There are thousands and thousands of such communities. A fair 
configuration of value as it pertains to particular legal orders will differ among such 
communities.  
34 Leslie Green (2003). Legal Positivism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism (last accessed 1 September 2013). 
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are made, and how the law is to be applied and interpreted.35 These processes 
cannot be determined and understood by a conceptual understanding of the 
law completely separate from the social context in which the law operates. To 
fully understand the law then, one must be able to explain how the law, once 
conceptually understood, operates in practice as a means of ordering social 
interaction (an idea based in philosophic pragmatism).  
With that said, there are a number of different ways that legal positivists 
approach their conceptual model of the law. The most important of these 
distinctions is between exclusive (hard) and inclusive (soft) positivists. The 
exclusive positivists, such as Joseph Raz, holds that the concept of law as 
claiming authority requires the exclusion of moral justification in order to be 
law.36 The inclusive positivists, such as Jules Coleman, on the other hand, 
look to determine what the law is by incorporating a methodology for what 
types of facts can constitute the law. Hart calls these social facts and they are 
limited to observable phenomena of social interaction. The incorporation of 
social facts in Hart’s positivist understanding of law qualifies his theory as 
that of soft or inclusive positivism because it is a claim that law’s authority 
can be inclusive of moral justification if such a justification is observable as a 
social fact through actual practice. In one part of his book, The Concept of 
Law,37 he calls his project for understanding the law as a ‘descriptive 
sociology.’38  
Those who view their orientation as opposed in part or in whole from those of 
the legal positivists are labeled in this work as nonpositivists. In some ways 
this is a misnomer because in the same way that no legal philosopher can be 
only a legal positivist, no nonpositivist can deny that the claims of the legal 
positivists do constitute law in many cases. The primary criticism of legal 
positivism that is held by nonpositivists is that their restriction of what counts 
as law is so limited as to render a full understanding of the law and its role in 
larger social processes incomprehensible. Conceptually speaking, the greatest 
challenge to the positivist thesis is that of the natural law school. Natural law 
theories about the law hold that the content of law is determinable by both 
sheer social fact and as a set of reasons for action. Nonpositivist theories of 
this type therefore claim that there are cognitive processes that can constitute 
                                                            
35 “A complete theory of law requires also an account of what kinds of things could possibly 
count as merits of law (must law be efficient or elegant as well as just?); of what role law should 
play in adjudication (should valid law always be applied?); of what claim law has on our 
obedience (is there a duty to obey?); and also of the pivotal questions of what laws we should 
have and whether we should have law at all.” Id. 
36 See Joseph Raz (1985). Authority and Justification. Philosophy & Public Affairs. Vol. 14, p. 3.  
37 Hart, supra note 5.   
38 In this way, his concept of law incorporates many of the ideas of the sociological positivists, 
such as Emile Durkheim, who sought to remove as many of the unobservable mystical and 
consciousness-based elements from their understanding of social processes. See Emile 
Durkheim [1895](1982). The Rules of Sociological Method, translated by WD Halls. New York, 
Free Press. 
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valid reasons for action that are explicitly excluded from positivism. It is this 
claim about rationality and reasonableness that provides the greatest 
opportunity for gaining value knowledge in the context of legal understanding 
because it contemplates that such knowledge is theoretically possible 
(although, often difficult to measure or understand). 
Another theory of the nonpositivist frame includes the interpretivism about 
law of Ronald Dworkin, which seeks to mark a middle path between the 
positivists and the natural law schools. Likewise, there are a number of 
theories about decision and adjudication that fall under the nonpositivist 
umbrella, and can be seen to include any theory that claims the law must be 
understood as a process of justifying reasons for action. This then would 
include the frame of the legal realists and those configurative theories such as 
the policy-orientated jurisprudence of Harold Lasswell, Myres McDougal, and 
Michael Reisman. While both the interpretivism and configurativism frames 
focus on theories about decision and adjudication, they are in fact claiming 
much more: they state that the very nature of the law must be understood in 
such a context. That is, unlike the natural law school that seeks to include the 
element of reasonableness (rational processes of the mind) to what can 
constitute a law, the process-based theories hold that the law – in terms of 
both content and concept – can only be understood realistically as part of an 
understanding about how decisions are made in the context of social and 
political processes.  
 
3.1 Legal Positivism 
At its core, the positivist thesis holds that the content and concept about law 
must be limited to that which is, in some sense, naturalizable. That is, 
knowledge about the law must be limited to that which is observably 
knowable. No matter what ilk of positivist one claims to be, the methodology 
used for identifying and describing the law must be objective. This is not a 
claim that knowledge about the law exists as a mind-independent entity, but 
that knowledge about the law must be identifiable in terms of observable facts 
and social behavior that can be understood by all those subjects to which the 
law is directed. The positivist also holds that there must be an objective means 
of determining legal validity (the pedigree thesis) and that there is no 
necessary connection between law and morality (the seperability thesis). 
 
3.1.1 A Brief History of Legal Positivism 
This section will look at mapping some of the major thinkers that have 
developed the positivist project over the past centuries, and how it has evolved 
over time. The primary thinkers of the twentieth century in this regard are 
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HLA Hart and Hans Kelsen. While their views on the nature of the law remain 
a constant source of discourse about positivist thought, their ideas have been 
advanced and commented on by many important contemporary thinkers such 
as Joseph Raz,39 Jules Coleman,40 Brian Leiter,41 Matthew Kramer,42 and Scott 
Shapiro,43 among others. While most of contemporary thought about legal 
positivism focuses on refining the concepts of law in the context of postmodern 
societies, its historic roots are closely linked to the concept of sovereignty and 
the problem in political philosophy relating to the legitimate authority of 
government.  
The political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes and Jean Bodin44 in the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries provides a conceptual foundation for the concept of 
sovereignty and its relation to the positing of legal rules. For Hobbes in 
particular, sovereignty is rooted in the idea of a social contract,45 and that 
without such a concept of sovereign authority, individuals would exist in a 
state of nature that leaves the life of individuals as “nasty, brutish, and  
short.”46 By conceding some of one’s freedoms and liberty to a sovereign, the 
sovereign would then be able to provide stability and order to that society 
within its territorial borders. The claim made by Hobbes was essentially that 
whatever freedoms that an individual gave up in order to be bound by the will 
and authority of a sovereign was necessary for removing individuals from a 
state of nature: an idea equivalent to social chaos and anarchy.47 
It is from this conceptualization of sovereignty that new ideas about the scope 
of legal inquiry developed. The question in legal philosophy then became what 
is law in the context of sovereignty; and the answer became: that which is 
posited by a sovereign. From there, the conversation turned to an 
understanding to what ethical and moral structure was the sovereign to be 
constrained by, if at all. For some legal positivists, the authority of the 
sovereign was sufficient for conceptualizing an understanding of what the law 
is. Under this view, once sovereign authority was identified, that which the 
sovereign stipulated as law was law. Describing and identifying the law was 
based on sovereign decree. However, if sovereign authority dictated a duty to 
obey as based on a social contract, when could that sovereign authority ever 
                                                            
39 Joseph Raz (2009). The Authority of Law, Second Edition. Oxford, OUP.  
40 Jules Coleman (2003). The Practice of Principle. Oxford, OUP. 
41 Brian Leiter (2007). Naturalizing Jurisprudence. Oxford, OUP. 
42 Matthew Kramer (2007). Objectivity and the Rule of Law. Cambridge, CUP. 
43 Scott Shapiro (2011). Legality. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.  
44 Bodin defined sovereignty as indivisible authority that is both absolute and perpetual. 
Hobbes, borrowing from Bodin, conceptualized sovereignty as the idea of an entity that 
constitutes absolute authority within a territory to which all of it subjects must obey. 
45 Sharon Lloyd  & Susanne Sreedhar (2011). Hobbes’s Moral and Political Philosophy. Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at:  http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/ 
hobbes-moral (last accessed 1 September 2013). 
46 Thomas Hobbes [1651](2008). Leviathan or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Common Wealth 
Ecclesiasticall and Civil. Oxford, OUP, Section XIII(9). 
47 Lloyd & Sreedhar, supra note 45. 
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be disobeyed? Would a tyrannical sovereign be owed the same duty to obey as 
would a benevolent one? Historically, these are questions that are not dealt 
with by conceptual positivists; rather, they are the questions of moral and 
political philosophy.48  
If this is true, and the identification of what the law is can be disjointed from 
the requirements of morality, then how would the law of a sovereign ever be 
morally unjustified? The claim from a positivist perspective is that there is 
good reason to disobey morally unjust laws, not because they cease to be law, 
but because they have lost their moral authority (but arguably not their legal 
authority). This line of argumentation is in sharp distinction from some 
natural law theories which hold that the conceptual nature of the law requires 
that the law be both authoritative and just (as a requirement of 
reasonableness). Under such a view, an unjust law is not a law at all. 
The modern articulation of legal positivism derives, not from the Hobbesian 
social contract, but from the great utilitarian philosopher, Jeremy Bentham,49 
and his disciple John Austin.50 For them, legal positivism was a conceptual 
theory about descriptive jurisprudence based on sovereign authority. A law 
posited by a sovereign must be obeyed because it is backed by sanction. John 
Austin famously proposed a model of descriptive jurisprudence as based on a 
command theory of obedience.51 A command, according to Austin, is an 
expression requiring a human being to conform his actions or behavior out of 
a habitual sense of obligation to another human being; and that this 
obedience to act or behave in a certain way is generated by a stated or implied 
threat of sanction for noncompliance.52 For Austin, the law is that which 
performs the task of ordering human behavior via a posited sovereign 
command that is backed up by the coercive power of that sovereign. However, 
Hart believed that this account was inadequate for the reason that there are 
laws that can be authoritative and generate a sense of obedience despite the 
fact that they are not coercive or backed up by threat of a sanction.53  
 
 
                                                            
48 However, it is from this idea that the seperability thesis emerges. Such a thesis claims that 
there is nothing conceptually that requires the laws of a sovereign to be morally meretricious. 
The requirements of law and morality are separate enterprises – and are not to be conflated. 
49 Jeremy Bentham [1782](1970). Of Laws in General, edited by HLA Hart. London, Athlone 
Press. 
50 John Austin [1832](1995). The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, edited by WE Rumble. 
Cambridge, CUP. 
51 Simmonds, supra note 23 at pp. 152-53. 
52 Austin, supra note 50 at p. 166. 
53 According to Hart, Austin’s “notion of a habit of obedience is a mere regularity of conduct, not 
a rule.” See Simmonds, supra note 23 at p. 152. 
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3.1.2 HLA Hart and Hans Kelsen 
In the mid-twentieth century, Hart proposed that the concept of law as 
articulated by Austin was too reductivist and sanction-focused,54 and 
embarked on a project to reconceptualize descriptive jurisprudence. His 
conceptual theory about law has been the benchmark for positivist thought for 
much of the twentieth century, and it continues to exert significant influence. 
Hart’s theory both provides a modification of the Austinian sovereign 
command theory, while at the same time clarifying the description of legality 
and legal validity as that which is not necessarily contingent on moral 
evaluation. Hart provides a conceptual positivistic account of the law that 
focuses on the identification of legal authority as rooted in social rules that are 
actually practiced and empirically observable. A legally valid rule is one that 
conforms to the criteria of power-conferring secondary rules, which create a 
sense of obligation because it has been accepted from an official’s internal 
point of view.55  
However, for the uninitiated, the philosophical efforts of Hart are often paired 
with the thinking of another influential legal positivist of the same period: 
Hans Kelsen. While much of their respective conceptual approaches are 
distinct, there are also many similarities. Both Hart and Kelsen sought to 
establish a firm conceptual framework for understanding the law from a 
positivistic, but nonreductive perspective. They also claimed that the duty to 
obey, and the identification of a legally valid norm or rule, did not need to 
presuppose any level of moral evaluation.56 The basis for both the Hartian and 
Kelsenian form of legal positivism then turns on how authority of the law is 
conceptualized and more importantly, how individuals become obligated to 
obey the law.  
However, while Kelsen’s pure theory of law57 aims at describing law in purely 
analytical terms (in the same way as Hart), he maintains (contra to Hart) that 
the function of the law is to prescribe the official application of sanctions.58 
Kelsen’s understanding of the law is based on a hierarchical categorization of 
                                                            
54 Hart believed that legal authority and obligation could not be reduced to simple elements of 
habit and obedience. He also held that the mere fact that a sanction is threatened is not 
sufficient to claim that an obligation to conform one’s behavior to it is required. See Stephen 
Perry (2006). Hart on Social Rules and the Foundations of Law: Liberating the Internal Point of 
View. Fordham Law Review. Vol. 75, pp. 1171, 1178. 
55 Officials believe that a particular rule is binding because it is a regularly practiced social rule. 
It is “this regularity of behavior towards which officials take ‘the internal point of view:’ they use 
it as a standard for guiding and evaluating their own and others' behavior, and this use is 
displayed in their conduct and speech, including the resort to various forms of social pressure 
to support the rule and the ready application of normative terms such as ‘duty’ and ‘obligation’ 
when invoking it.” Green, supra note 34. 
56 This is the seperability thesis and it holds that the identification of a legally binding rule can 
bind its subjects without evaluating the moral merit of its content. 
57 Kelsen, supra note 7. 
58 This focus on sanctions and the authority of the state to prescribe law is aligned with the 
Austinian conception of the law. 
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legal norms, all of which prescribe how one ought to act. The highest of these 
legal norms is the basic norm or grundnorm, which is presupposed.59 The idea 
claims that a legal rule is one that is legally valid; and that its validity is 
derived from a foundational or basic norm upon which all other legally valid 
norms rest. It is this constitutive norm that distinguishes law from nonlaw; 
and the validity of any legal system rests on the effectiveness of the basic 
norm.  
For Kelsen, the basic norm is valid because it is generally followed, and that 
people follow it because they believe it is valid.60 Kelsen holds that a valid law 
is one that ought to be obeyed. The prescribing function of a law as obligating 
its subjects is based on this basic norm. While Kelsen believes that this basic 
norm exists in the ‘juristic consciousness,’ it is ultimately an assumption that 
is required in order for a legal system to be understood. The validity of the 
“basic norm rests, not on another norm or rule of law, but is assumed – for the 
purposes of purity. It is therefore a hypothesis, a wholly formal construct.”61 
From a philosophical perspective, Kelsen’s project is intriguing; however, it is 
difficult to understand how all of this work can be done without recourse to 
any type of evaluative judgment. It seems that the validity of the basic norm is 
premised on a leap of faith: it bases his entire descriptive account of the law 
on a norm that is not empirically verifiable.62  
For Hart, the validity of the law also rests on a constitutive concept: the rule of 
recognition. This is what he calls a secondary rule, and it from these 
secondary rules that the validity of primary rules flow.63 However, Hart’s 
theory about the concept of law holds a number of features that avoid some of 
the perceived problems with Kelsen’s approach. Hart rejects the assumption 
that a valid rule is determined by a sense of obligation backed by some kind of 
sanction. Rather, the validity of a legal rule is premised, not on a (subjective) 
judgment that the rule ought to be obeyed, but by the fact (objectively 
determinable?) that a valid rule “satisfies all the criteria provided by the rule of 
recognition.”64 Hart claims that the identification of a legal rule as meeting the 
                                                            
59 Green, supra note 34. 
60 While this may appear a circular argument, the validity of the law comes from a sense of 
being obligated by it.  
61 Raymond Wacks (2006). The Philosophy of Law. Oxford, OUP, p. 35. 
62 The existence of this basic norm is premised on a metaphysical account of Kantian 
rationality. Whether this metaphysical account of rational thought processes can provide a 
basis for objective truth is open to debate. However, it may be that ‘objective enough’ knowledge 
about the existence of the basic norm is possible by knowing shared subjective understanding 
of the basic norm, but that would require that Kelsen concedes that there is nothing absolutely 
true and objective about the existence of the basic norm. Rather, it requires knowledge about 
how each individual subject to a particular legal system understands and evaluates the 
bindingness of the basic norm. 
63 Secondary rules are meant to be the foundational rules upon which the primary rules are 
created and changed. Secondary rules are said to be power-conferring, whereas primary rules 
are meant to be duty-imposing. Perry, supra note 54 at p. 1182. 
64 Hart, supra note 5 at p. 90. 
102 
 
 
requirements of the rule of recognition is both empirically verifiable and 
descriptively possible.65 For Hart, the rule of recognition is a social rule that is 
accepted by officials as a social practice from an internal point of view.66 That 
is, the rule of recognition must be: 
acknowledged by those officials who administer the law as specifying the conditions or 
criteria of validity which certify whether or not a rule is indeed a rule.67  
This certification of a rule as a legal rule must be internalized as binding and 
obligatory by the official accepting the rule as valid.68 However, one may ask 
how knowledge about the official’s internal acceptance of a power-conferring 
rule can be determined descriptively. 
This brief overview of Hart and Kelsen does not do justice to the nuance and 
sophistication of their respective theories. However, both theories highlight 
many of the core issues in legal philosophy: how does one become obligated to 
the law, how is the law identified, and what makes the law authoritative? 
However, critically speaking, the answers that the legal positivists provide in 
attempting to derive a descriptive account of the law are not unassailable. 
There remain many questions about whether a pure understanding of law (or 
science) can be achieved without reference to any type of evaluation (moral or 
not). A major premise of this work is the claim that purely descriptive 
accounts of legal validity cannot be a purely value-free endeavor but instead 
require knowledge about values and evaluation at every step along the way. 
This does not always mean that such evaluation is always a moral evaluation, 
but it remains value-laden nonetheless. One may not have to evaluate the 
moral merits of a law to internalize it as a binding rule, but that does not 
negate the fact that a judgment of some kind is being asked as to whether 
such a ‘feeling’ of obligation exists.  
For the purposes of this work, the conceptualization of Hart’s social facts is 
especially important. There is nothing in the Hartian conceptualization of 
social facts that prevent value claims or moral claims from becoming a social 
fact. The limitation on social facts is their empirical verifiability. For Hart, 
social facts are empirically verifiable patterns of convergent behavior that are 
identifiable observationally. It is a central feature of this work that improved 
                                                            
65 This means that there is never any need for moral evaluation in determining if the rule of 
recognition is satisfied. 
66 Hart, supra note 5 at p. 90. 
67 Wacks, supra note 61 at p. 28. 
68 The internal point of view may present some problems for a descriptive analysis of the law. 
How can one determine analytically whether or not a rule has been accepted from the internal 
point of view? Such a subjective concept might not be easy to verify empirically as a social fact. 
It requires an ‘official’ to make an evaluation or judgment about whether or not he or she 
believes that the conditions of the rule of recognition have been met. Only once this evaluation 
has been achieved can a legal rule be deemed as valid; and determining this in a sufficient 
objective (i.e. it is factually observable) manner may be difficult (however, this is precisely what 
Q methodology claims to be able to do).  
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value knowledge can result in making unobservable phenomena empirically 
observable through novel methodologies such as Q methodology. If it is true 
that such methodologies can map the many unobservable aspects of 
knowledge about value (subjectivities) that are contemplated by the subjective 
mind, and turn them outward so that they become observable phenomena, 
then there is no reason why such knowledge could not be included in the 
content of the law as social fact.  
The question will of course turn on whether Q methodology can provide 
sufficiently observable information about the way that values are conceived 
and rationalized as internal aspects of the deliberative mind. If this question is 
answered in the affirmative, then positivistic theories about law (and 
nonpositivistic theories as well) can incorporate such previously unobservable 
phenomena into legal content as social fact. Social fact under such an 
understanding could include convergent behavior and also convergent mental 
processes about value (if made sufficiently observable). In other words, Q 
methodology can provide a method for taking what scientists consider to be 
only subjectively knowable and turning them into objectively knowable 
phenomena that meet the requirements of empirically verifiable synthetic 
(matters of fact) knowledge. 
 
3.2 Legal Nonpositivism 
In addition to the category of legal inquiry labeled legal positivism, there are a 
number of frames of inquiry that are distinct. These are what are being 
referred to generally as nonpositivist frames. All of these nonpositivist frames 
of inquiry hold that there is knowledge about values (moral value especially) 
that must be fully considered for any theory about law to hold. For the most 
part, these are not new theories, and for the entire history of human societies, 
philosophers have been attempting to sort out this relationship between 
morality and legality. Most of these theories fall into the category of natural 
law. Natural law theories are diverse, but generally can be understood as 
including two important tenets. The first is that:  
law is best understood, at least in part, as a teleological concept: a concept or institution 
that can be properly understood only when the ultimate objective is kept in mind – here, 
the ultimate objective being a just society. This is in sharp contrast to the, generally 
descriptive, largely empirical, morally neutral approach one finds among legal 
positivists.69  
 
                                                            
69 Brian Bix (2002). ‘Natural Law Theory: The Modern Tradition,’ in Jules Coleman & Scott 
Shapiro, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law. Oxford, OUP, p. 76. 
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The second is that:  
though the legal positivists might be able to offer what appears to be a simpler model of 
law (a model that bears a better-than-passing resemblance to law in practice), a view of 
law that included more about moral claims and moral aspirations of law would be a more 
complete, and therefore better, theory of law.70 
 
3.2.1 Natural Law 
Natural law theories are a challenge to legal positivism conceptually. These 
theories about law claim that, unlike legal positivism, there is a necessary 
connection between legality and morality. However, natural law theories are 
not always in conflict with legal positivism. In many cases, human-made legal 
posits do constitute law for natural law theories. Where the natural law 
theorists differ is in claiming that the validity of the law should not to be 
assessed merely by the satisfaction of some criteria of authority, but also 
according to its merit. In this way, natural law theories can claim that unjust 
laws are not laws at all – regardless of their pedigree as authoritatively valid.  
If, for example, as the positivists claim, that a morally unjust law can be 
shown to be legally valid, how can natural law theories hold that such 
evidence is patently false (in some cases)? If Nazi law was considered to be 
valid law – albeit bad law – how can the natural law theories show that Nazi 
law was not law at all? This is a conundrum that perplexes legal theorists who 
hope to understand law as being held to moral account. While it is difficult to 
justify the examples of tyrannical rulers using law for unjust aims, it is at 
least feasible to argue that the law (conceptually speaking) claims to be just. In 
the same way that positivists hold that law claims authority (even though it 
does not always attain it), natural law theorists can hold that law claims 
justice (even though it does not always attain it). The understanding of the law 
being made here is that there is something inherent in the concept of law that 
requires it to presuppose a claim to authoritativeness or justness. Positivists 
justify the claim to authoritativeness in that it is identifiable as a truth bearing 
proposition, while justice is not. Many positivists claim that while facts about 
the law can exist, facts about morality – and other values assumedly – cannot. 
A general observation among some natural law theorists who reject this view 
would claim that moral facts are indeed possible, and that these metaethical 
questions can be answered by appeals to one’s reason.  
Modern natural law theories come in many types. Most contemporary theories 
on the natural law tradition tend to eschew even using the term natural law 
(with the notable exception of John Finnis) and have chosen to focus on the 
process-based aspects of how a realistic jurisprudence ought to be configured. 
                                                            
70 Id. 
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These process-focused theories tend to claim that legal positivism and its 
clinical isolation of the analysis of law is not very helpful in understanding 
how the law does (or should) be constructed in order to achieve the goals that 
it sets out for itself. In this way, contemporary natural law theories are less 
about nonhuman posited ‘natural’ law and rights that exist independent of 
human interaction, but are instead more focused on how human interaction 
makes the law what it is.  
Modern natural law theories of the conceptual type state that a determination 
of what the law is requires the reflection of practical reason as much as the 
identification of what a legally valid rule is: only through the processes of 
judgment and deliberation can a true understanding of the law be achieved. 
By focusing on the internal operations of the mind as an important 
determinant of what the law is, natural law theories do not demand that moral 
knowledge be expunged from our conceptual understanding of the law. It is 
this process of reasoning about the law along moral or ethical grounds (what 
is right or good) that most clearly differentiates natural law theories from legal 
positivism. One of the main problems for nonpositivist theories lies in 
demonstrating how moral goods can be a component part of a descriptive legal 
theory even though such goods are not always expressible as truthapt 
propositions.  
 
3.2.1.1 Ronald Dworkin 
Ronald Dworkin presents his understanding about the conceptual nature of 
the law from the perspective that legal positivism fails to account for the cases 
when moral considerations – that are not identifiable as observable social fact 
– can still claim legalness. Much of Dworkin’s focus is on what he calls 
interpretivism: a theory about law that seeks to add to a positivist 
understanding of the law. To do this, Dworkin develops his understanding of 
legal principles. It is these principles of law that are invoked frequently by 
legal decisionmakers despite not being able to meet the requirements of an 
observable social fact. He claims that these principles are value-laden and are 
not truthapt, but are used evaluatively in terms of their relevant weight. These 
principles, or value claims, require judgment and reason in their 
determination, and according to most legal and moral philosophers, they 
cannot ever qualify as social facts. Not only are these principles infrequently 
observable phenomena that relate to convergent behavior, they are not even 
capable of qualifying as facts because they involve value-based moral 
considerations, considerations that are said to be unnamable to factual 
analysis. 
To explore his hypothesis, Dworkin famously calls upon what he says are the 
‘hard cases,’ whereby a decisionmaker is compelled to derive the right answer 
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in a particular case when there is no posited law to apply.71 Unlike the legal 
positivists who would claim that a decisionmaker who cannot derive an 
exclusive interpretation of the law as based on a legal rule must apply 
nonlegal rules (so-called equity)72 to render an appropriate decision, Dworkin 
holds that there are principles in these hard cases that have the status of law 
and that decisionmakers are bound and obligated to apply them.73 To give an 
example, Dworkin says that in the case of Riggs v. Palmer,74 a plaintiff would 
benefit under a will to which he was a beneficiary even though he had killed 
the holder of that will.75 According to Dworkin, the judge in that case – in 
looking only to the law as promulgated – would have had to permit the plaintiff 
in this case to prevail because there was no rule against such wrongdoing. 
Dworkin says that the judge resolved the case by invoking the following 
principle: “no man may profit from his own wrong.”76 He states that this 
principle, even though it had never been invoked by the courts before, is a part 
of the law and forms a binding obligation on the judge to apply it.77 He claims 
that such a principle is derived from morality and cannot be identified by a 
fact; and yet, it must be applied by the judge in this case – it is a moral 
requirement. Dworkin explains this requirement through a theory of law as 
integrity.78  
While the focus of Dworkin’s work is fascinating and presents a significant 
challenge to the source-based theories about law as supported by legal 
positivists, it raises as many questions as it answers. Some have criticized his 
interpretive theory as not a general theory about law, but as a much more 
modest particular theory of adjudication.79 These critics hold that there is 
nothing in his interpretive theory that undermines legal positivism.80 For 
example, if Dworkin is claiming that the application of legal principles can only 
be invoked in hard cases and that they can only be used to justify a just 
result, then these principles are not really a component of a descriptive theory 
about law but an interpretive tool for understanding ‘law’ that already exists in 
                                                            
71 Ronald Dworkin (1977). Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, p. 81. 
72 Equity in this way is a legal term of art. It is not about equality. Rather, it is a claim that 
decisionmakers must provide nonlegal means for resolving a dispute when formalistic legal 
considerations would render an absurd result.  
73 In other words, he holds that the application of equity in legal disputes is not nonlegal at all. 
It is part of the law. See Dworkin, supra note 71 at p. 34. 
74 Riggs v. Palmer. 115 N.Y. 506 (1889). 
75 Dworkin, supra note 71 at p. 23. 
76 In analogizing with another similar case, the majority in Riggs held that: “[t]he principle which 
lies at the bottom of the maxim, volenti non fit injuria [to a willing person, no injury be done], 
should be applied to such a case, and a widow should not, for the purpose of acquiring, as 
such, property rights, be permitted to allege a widowhood which she has wickedly and 
intentionally created.” Riggs, supra note 74 at p. 514. 
77 Dworkin, supra note 71 at p. 23. 
78 Dworkin, supra note 19 at pp. 176-224. The law is a seamless web that requires the judge to 
decide cases based on considerations that best fit and justify the law as a whole. He holds that 
when understanding the law in this way, there is always a ‘right’ answer to any legal problem. 
79 Leiter, supra note 9 at p. 27. 
80 Id. at p. 20. 
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some form.81 This account is probably a misunderstanding of what Dworkin is 
claiming however. He is stating that legal principles are applicable as valid law 
even though they are not social facts. These principles, according to Dworkin, 
only become identifiable in hard cases. So where do they come from? Dworkin 
says that they are a requirement of morality and that they derive from moral 
reason.82 It is a claim that morality can be understood objectively from the 
reasoning mind.   
 
3.2.1.2 John Finnis 
Probably the most celebrated thinker of the natural law tradition in the 
contemporary period is that of John Finnis. Finnis works in the tradition of 
Thomas Aquinas by attempting to integrate moral and legal philosophy 
through a focus on how legal knowledge and moral knowledge is identifiable 
by one’s ability to reason. Finnis builds his theory about the law from a 
foundation of ‘basic goods’ that all human beings intrinsically value for their 
own sake.83 They are objective goods that constitute “aspects of authentic 
human flourishing . . . real (intelligent) reason[s] for action.”84 These are goods 
whose ends and purpose can be chosen for their own sake, and not merely as 
a means to other ends. According to Finnis, these basic goods: 
are grounded in human nature, not directly, in the sense of being read off a metaphysical 
theory, but indirectly, in the sense that ‘[t]he basic forms of good grasped by practical 
understanding are what is good for human beings with the nature that they have.’85  
Knowledge about these goods is derived from what he calls practical 
reasonableness. They are self-evident and Finnis believes that: 
[t]here is no way of deducing the goods from something more fundamental because they 
themselves occupy an axiomatic position within our practical reason.86  
While the integration of his moral thought into the legal sphere is quite 
complex, the relevance here is that he is claiming that the law must be 
grounded in knowledge about these basic objective goods; and that the 
purpose of the law is to promote these aspects required for human flourishing. 
For Finnis, a descriptive account of the law cannot be moral value-free: a 
proper theory of law will require moral evaluation.87 It will require moral 
                                                            
81 Id. at p. 24. 
82 Simmonds, supra note 23 at pp. 212-13. 
83 His theory is rooted in the Aristotelian tradition of ethical thought whereby the concept of the 
good presupposes the right.  
84 John Finnis (1980). Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford, OUP, p. 64.  
85 Bix, supra note 69 at p. 86.  
86 Simmonds, supra note 23 at p. 117. 
87 Gerald Postema (2011). A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, Volume 11: 
Legal Philosophy in the Twentieth Century. London, Springer, p. 558. 
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evaluation because law is a form of public practical reason, “stipulating 
solutions to problems of coordinating action in the pursuit of the common 
good.”88 The common good “consists in the set of conditions which enables the 
members of a community to exercise practical reasonableness and lead 
flourishing lives.”89  
Finnis, like other contemporary theorists, rejects a utilitarian approach to 
justice (or law) because it fails to account for the fact that individuals hold 
differing views on what constitutes a valuable life. In this way, Finnis holds 
that while there are objectifiable goods that human beings ought to pursue, 
there is no absolute (or hierarchical) understanding of these goods that is 
possible because no set of individuals will value the same things.90 For the 
purposes of describing what the law is, this claim poses a number of problems 
conceptually. It makes it extremely difficult to propose what a valid law would 
look like under these conditions. The answer that Finnis gives is that a legal 
obligation is to be treated presumptively as a moral obligation; and that 
internalizing this perspective as a requirement of practical reasonableness will 
constitute the central case (the concept in its fullest sense) of the legal 
viewpoint (sense of obligation).91 Such a conceptualization of the law is said to 
be sufficient to move Finnis “across the border from legal positivism (law 
conceptually separated from morality) to natural law theory (moral evaluation 
central to understanding law).”92 
 
3.2.2 The Shift to Legal Process 
While Finnis and Dworkin (arguably) can be seen as direct challenges to 
conceptual legal positivism, there are additional theories in the nonpositivist 
tradition that indirectly challenge legal positivism by holding that the whole 
idea of a conceptual understanding of the law is misguided. These process-
based theorists generally hold that our understanding of the law must be seen 
as a process in particular social context. These theories demand that the law 
as it is must be teleological in orientation. An understanding of the law only 
makes sense when viewed in the context of its goals. For many of these 
theorists, the law can only be understood in the context of process, decision, 
and justice. In accepting this nonpositivistic view of legal understanding, the 
                                                            
88 Id. 
89 Simmonds, supra note 23 at p. 125. 
90 As Finnis understands them, these objective goods are: “ultimate and irreducibly normative, 
providing fundamental reasons for action and for social arrangements and institutions, and 
grounding all practical normativity; objective, independent of inclination and preference; 
abstract, needing to be articulated or specified in order to provide concrete guidance; irreducibly 
plural and diverse; and incommensurable, submitting no rationally grounded metric or principle 
of priority [emphasis in original].” Postema, supra note 87 at p. 551. 
91 Bix, supra note 69 at p. 89. 
92 Id. 
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point of this work is not to undermine the positivist project; rather, it is to 
claim that the positivist project can be enhanced through two nonpositivist 
theses: 1) that value (especially moral) knowledge is a requirement of the law 
(so long as it can be objectively known), and 2) that conceptual knowledge 
about the law requires an understanding of the teleological purpose of the law 
(a claim that can only be identifiable by an interactive and process-based 
approach to law).  
 
3.2.2.1 Lon Fuller 
Lon Fuller’s criticism of legal positivism can be summarized as follows:  
(a) legal positivism treats law as an object – an object of study, like any other subject of 
scientific or quasi-scientific investigation – when it is better understood as a process or 
function; (b) legal positivism seems to believe, or assume, falsely, that the existence or 
non-existence of the law is a matter of moral indifference; and (c) legal positivism presents 
law as a ‘one-way projection of authority,’ when it is better understood as involving 
reciprocity between officials and citizens.93 
Law, for Fuller, is a human project that is “an enterprise of subjecting human 
conduct to the governance of rules.”94 Law is thus a process whose purpose is 
primarily aimed at helping citizens coexist, cooperate, and thrive;95 and once 
one takes such a function-based approach to law, it begins to make more 
sense to claim that an unjust law is not a law at all. For the law to serve its 
function, it must have the aim of being both legally and morally valid. Law 
under this view is best understood as an interactional model of governance 
whereby there is reciprocity between typical lawtakers and lawgivers. Only 
when officials and citizens cooperate, each fulfilling his or her function, can 
law work.  
What Fuller proposes as an alternative to legal positivism is what he terms the 
components of legal understanding that constitute the ‘inner morality’ of law.96 
He declares that there are eight principles of legality that set a minimum 
criteria of excellence towards which any good government would strive. These 
eight principles on the legality of rules are: 1) that rules must have general 
application, 2) they must be promulgated, 3) they must not be retroactively 
applied, 4) they must be understandable, 5) they should not be contradictory, 
6) they should not be impossible to obey, 7) they should remain constant 
through time, and 8) there should be congruence between the rules as 
                                                            
93 Id. at p. 77. 
94 Lon Fuller (1969). The Morality of Law, Revised Edition. New Haven, Yale University Press, p. 
106. 
95 “Unlike modern theories of law, this view treats law as an activity and regards a legal system 
as the product of a sustained purposive effort.” Id. 
96 Id. at p. 41. 
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announced and as applied.97 Whether these eight principles are in fact moral 
obligations or not has been a constant source of criticism from legal 
theorists.98 While Hart held that he has no argument with the claim that such 
principles would likely result in a more efficient legal system, he objected to 
the claim that such requirements are moral in any sense.99 He also criticized 
the idea that a set of largely procedural aspects of law – even if just – could not 
guarantee the substantive rules identified by such procedures would be 
necessarily just.100  
 
3.2.2.2 The Legal Process School 
Around the middle of the twentieth century, and at the same time that Fuller 
and Hart were debating the conceptual nature of law and morality, a new 
school of thought was emerging. While Fuller’s theory about the inner morality 
of law was aimed at a broader conceptual jurisprudence, his ideas about 
process have also had a profound impact in the United States (US) on how the 
process of adjudication ought to be approached. The legal process school 
developed in the 1950s and 1960s, and can be seen as a reaction against the 
realist interpretation of law by certain judges on the Warren Court.101 It 
claimed to be able to formalize some aspects of decision in a way that 
embraced a process-based rule of law approach to legal decisionmaking, while 
at the same time limiting the broad (and subjective in the negative sense) 
interpretive tools attributable to legal realism.102 In this way, the legal process 
school can be seen as attempting to forge a middle path between positivistic 
formalism and nonpositivist realism in adjudication.103  
The basic idea of such a rule of law focus is that the best indicator of an 
efficient legal order lies in both the correct distribution of legal tasks among 
the various institutions of government, and in the correctness of the processes 
of procedure adjudicators must follow.104 A proper system of adjudication is 
one that guarantees its subjects a minimum level of procedural justice; and 
                                                            
97 Id at p. 39. 
98 See most prominently the Hart-Fuller Debate. HLA Hart (1958). Positivism and the Separation 
of Law and Morals. Harvard Law Review. Vol. 71, p. 593; Lon Fuller (1958). Positivism and 
Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart. Harvard Law Review. Vol. 71, p. 630. 
99 HLA Hart (1983). ‘Lon L. Fuller: The Morality of Law,’ in HLA Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence 
and Philosophy. Oxford, Clarendon Press, p. 343. 
100 Id. at p. 350. 
101 This was the period when Chief Justice Earl Warren was the chief justice of the US Supreme 
Court. It is a period where critics claimed that the Court was engaged in an excessive amount of 
policymaking. 
102 See Henry Hart & Albert  Sacks (1958). The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and 
Application of Law. Rochester, Foundation Press. 
103 Mark Tushnet & Timothy Lynch (1994). The Project of the Harvard Forewords: A Social and 
Intellectual Inquiry. Constitutional Commentary. Vol. 11, pp. 463, 476-80. 
104 Dennis Patterson, ed. (2010). A Companion to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, 
Second Edition. Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell. 
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that one of the key means for assuring such processes of adjudication is to 
minimize the possibility of arbitrary decision (or decision that is based on the 
policy choices of the decisionmaker). To do this, the legal process school 
provided a theoretical justification for judicial restraint based on: 
an approach that would help select who should be the definers and determiners of the 
values that would guide the legal system.105  
It claimed that this could be accomplished by shedding light, neutrally, on the 
particular attributes of government institutions; and determining which 
institutions were best suited to decide some issues rather than others.106 
Implicitly, this required that judges refrain from making policy through their 
decisions when such a policy determination was best suited for another 
branch of government.107 These legal process theorists were not focused on the 
conceptual nature of what the law is, but on the ways in which a legal order 
ought to make decisions. It is a theory of adjudication rooted in the idea that a 
proper understanding of the law requires a restrictive view of judicial legal 
interpretation.  
 
3.2.2.3 Legal Realism 
In the same way that the legal process school is considered a theory of 
adjudication, legal realism is likewise a theory of adjudication, not a 
conceptual theory. However, some claim that theories of adjudication are in 
fact what ought to be considered the concept of the law.108 It is unclear 
whether all legal realists would endorse such a view. In general, legal realism 
refers to an intellectual movement among a group of academics and lawyers in 
the 1920s and 1930s in the US who thought of themselves as taking a more 
realistic look at how judges decide cases.109 Legal realism has a wide array of 
definitions in the discourse and has been often confused with both political 
realism and conceptual theories about law.110 However, legal realism really 
claims neither. Rather, it is most accurately seen as a broad theory for legal 
interpretation by decisionmakers in the judicial context.  
                                                            
105 Guido Calabresi (2003). An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to Law and to the 
Allocation of Body Parts. Stanford Law Review. Vol. 55, pp. 2113, 2123. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 “The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I 
mean by the law.” Oliver Wendell Holmes (1881). The Common Law. Boston, Little Brown, p. 5. 
109 . Brian Leiter (2010). Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What is the Issue? Legal Theory. 
Vol. 16, p. 111. 
110 In contradistinction to American legal realism, there is also a school of thought called 
Scandinavian legal realism based primarily on the ideas of Swedish philosopher Axel 
Hägerström. Legal realism also holds some similarities with sociological jurisprudence, but they 
are distinct schools of thought. 
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Legal realism seeks to understand legal decisionmaking as an institution of 
law that does not deny or distort the moral, social, and political context to 
which legal conflicts are inescapably intertwined.111 Under such a reading, 
legal realism holds that legal decisionmaking should not be done in isolation 
from reality.112 Legal realism endorses a number of key concepts, which 
include the following: 1) the belief in the indeterminacy of  reasoning about, 
and interpreting the law,113 2) the view that the law could be used as a tool to 
achieve social purposes (instrumentalism),114 and 3) the belief that judges do – 
and in fact, must – draw on extralegal considerations in making decisions.115 
One of the main strengths of this jurisprudential outlook is its provision of an 
explanation for why legal decisionmaking should not occur in a vacuum: 
decisions are – and should be – derived from a complex process whereby law, 
politics, and society interact with, and influence each other, in myriad ways.  
 
3.2.2.4 The New Haven School 
In the early- and mid-twentieth century, there was a large amount of 
intellectual attention being paid to both theories about law and theories about 
decision; and to how an understanding of one could lead to an enhanced 
understanding of the other. At the forefront of this approach was that of two 
Yale professors, Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougal (and prominently 
carried forward and advanced by Michael Reisman).116 Their project, which 
has come to be known as either policy-orientated jurisprudence, configurative 
jurisprudence, or the New Haven school, is a theory about law that seeks to 
focus legal inquiry on the process of legal decision in the larger social context.  
                                                            
111 Brian Leiter holds that: “the majority of Realists advanced a descriptive theory of 
adjudication according to which (1) legal reasoning is indeterminate (i.e., fails to justify a unique 
outcome) in those cases that reach the stage of appellate review; (2) appellate judges, in deciding 
cases, are responsive to the ‘situation-types’ – recurring factual patterns (e.g., ‘seller of a 
business promises not to compete with the buyer, and then tries to break the promise’) – that 
elicit predictable normative responses (‘this is unfair’ or ‘this is economically foolish’) from most 
jurists, responses that are not, however, predictable based on existing ‘paper’ rules and 
doctrine; and (3) in the commercial law context (a primary focus of the Realists), judges look to 
the ‘normal’ practices in the existing business culture in deciding what is the right outcome 
(that is, the judges treat normal economic practice as the normative benchmark for decision).” 
Leiter, supra note 109 at p. 112.  
112 Patterson, supra note 104 at p. 249. 
113 The indeterminacy thesis is a jurisprudential view about the indeterminacy of legal reasoning 
such that judges do have choices to make and can quite properly construe rules and precedents 
in different ways. See Leiter, supra note 109 at n. 56. 
114 See generally Brian Tamanaha (2006). Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law. 
Cambridge, CUP.  
115 Fredrick Schauer (2012). Legal Realism Untamed. Virginia Public Law & Legal Theory 
Research Paper No. 2012-38, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2064837 (last accessed 1 
September 2013). 
116 See Myres McDougal, Harold Lasswell, & Michael Reisman (1967). Theories about 
International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence. Virginia Journal of International 
Law. Vol. 8, p. 188; Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 20. 
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Their initial call to action, however, stemmed from a perceived inadequacy in 
American legal education.117 This inadequacy was based on an understanding 
of law that could never be isolated from the power structures of political and 
social reality. Likewise, they held that a descriptive theory about what the law 
is one that must not focus on abstract conceptual notions seeking to discover 
legally valid rules in isolation from social process, but that the only way to 
identify the law was to look at the ongoing process of legal decision. 
Furthermore, they claimed that knowledge about the law required inquiry into 
the goal and purpose that the law seeks to achieve. For them, the purpose of 
the law must be evaluated against its capacity to promote and maximize the 
values of human dignity.118  
As such, policy-orientated jurisprudence claims to be an addendum to legal 
realism in that it seeks to expand understanding about the law in a way that 
extends far beyond the particular adjudicative scope of legal realism. The 
theory that Lasswell and McDougal proposed sought to do two things: 1) 
describe law both conceptually and as an ongoing process of authoritative and 
controlling decision; and 2) to evaluate the normative content of the law as 
part of the law by measuring it against a posited set of human dignity 
values.119 They sought to comprehensively map a theory about law that 
refuses to limit legal understanding to specific modes of inquiry, but instead 
integrates all theoretical knowledge about decision, law, and justice under a 
single theoretical approach. Further, it claims to be applicable to all legal 
understanding: from the most local (including the normative social relations in 
everyday life)120 to the most global (including all international law – and even 
space law).121  
There is of course the risk that such a comprehensive approach will be overly 
complex. There is also the problem relating to the theory’s reliance on 
subjective value knowledge as the normative aim of law. Their theory is 
subjective for all of the reasons given in this Chapter and the preceding one: 
by claiming to make evaluative normativity as a component part of their theory 
(usually this is something reserved for theories about justice), it makes an 
understanding about law as contingent on value knowledge.122 In aiming an 
understanding about law as a continual process of authoritative and 
                                                            
117 Harold Lasswell & Myres McDougal (1943). Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional 
Training in the Public Interest. Yale Law Journal. Vol. 52, p. 203. 
118 See Myres McDougal, Harold Lasswell, & Lung Chu Chen (1980). Human Rights and World 
Public Order: The Basic Policies of an International Law of Human Dignity. New Haven, Yale 
University Press. 
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controlling decision that must be evaluated in terms of its capacity to promote 
and maximize the values of human dignity, this jurisprudential outlook must 
be explained according to these seemingly subjective terms. It is for this 
reason that many scholars have held that conceptualizing law in this way just 
opens the door wide open for decisionmakers to make decisions about law in 
an entirely subjective (in the negative sense of the term) way. Such a claim is 
of course based on the idea that objective knowledge about value (to which 
their theory aims) is impossible to know: a claim that this work is attempting 
to overcome. 
 
4. JURISPRUDENCE AND VALUES 
The purpose of this Chapter so far has been to identify some of the major 
features about the law from varying perspectives about concept, content, 
decision, and justice. This focus has attempted to map the various 
perspectives on the ontology and the epistemology of law (and value); that is, 
how does one gain knowledge about the law (and about values) and under 
what conditions and circumstances does it (and value claims) exist. Such a 
focus has identified that a scientific understanding of the law holds that it 
must be rooted in identifiable propositions that are capable of being truthapt. 
This has been the focus of legal positivism and creates real problems for legal 
nonpositivism in that they claim that there are aspects about the nature of law 
that can only be derived from reason. If a priori practical reason is a source of 
knowledge about the law, then legal positivism fails by excluding it. Practical 
reason (reasons for actions) is value-laden: it requires choices and judgments 
to be made about what right reason requires. If these components cannot meet 
the objective mandate of scientific and positivistic descriptions of what the law 
is, then they will fail to become identifiable as social fact in the way that legal 
and sociological positivists demand. For most legal positivists, such objective 
knowledge can never become identifiable independently of social fact; rather, 
they must always be included within the content of an identifiable social fact. 
As such, almost all of the judgments made about value are excluded from 
ideas of legality. One way to address this problem is to make these processes 
of the mind amenable to observation. In the early part of the twentieth 
century, these psychological insights were limited by behaviorism. 
Behaviorism is a form of psychological positivism in that it claims that the 
only psychological knowledge that is valid must be empirically observable in 
some way.123 While such a limitation is almost identical to the limitation found 
in reducing the content of the law to social fact, the development of the 
cognitive sciences has opened new avenues for mapping conscious and 
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unconscious mental processes in a way that makes them observable for 
reflection by the scientist. If such methodologies have relevance for the social 
sciences in general, and the law specifically, it is in their ability to make 
unobservable and inherently subjective processes of the mind observable.  
This is the basic claim of this work: psychological methodologies can expand 
epistemically the corpus of information about value judgments that currently 
fails to meet the mandate of objectivity in the law. Q methodology, the method 
being explored as a means for justifying the theoretical foundations of this 
work, claims to be able to shed new light on these unconscious subjectivities 
in a way that can be measurable. While this is a tall order to fill, it will 
hopefully expand the discourse on the possibility of objectively gaining 
knowledge about value judgments in a manner that sufficiently qualify as 
social fact. The basic claim is that value facts are possible. 
Central to all of these discussions, and something that is a reoccurring feature 
in all discourse about the law is the role and relevance of morality. The 
defining feature between legal positivism and legal nonpositivism is whether or 
not moral evaluation is a component part of what makes the law law. The 
reason why such a divergence is so central to legal understanding is not 
because legal positivists are amoral, callous, and cynical; but because they are 
skeptical about the possibility of moral knowledge that is scientifically 
unobservable. For example, there is nothing in Hartian legal positivism that 
would preclude moral principles from being a part of a descriptive account of 
what the law is. However, they must be empirically verifiable as social fact.  
For example, the principle of ‘equal protection under the law’ can be a legally 
valid postulate, but it must understood as a product of social fact (actual 
behavior, such as how courts have actually interpreted such a principle). My 
understanding of ‘equal protection under the law’ is a moral judgment, but not 
a legally valid one. The nonpositivists would also hold that my understanding 
of ‘equal protection under the law’ is a moral judgment, but that it could 
become a legally valid one if it comports with practical reasonableness that is 
shared and universally cognizable. Both approaches require an element of 
objectification in order to qualify as law. Neither approaches to legal 
understanding would permit mere opinion to qualify as sufficiently valid to 
verify legality.  
 
4.1 The Verification and Justification Problems 
At the core of any inquiry into value knowledge in the context of the law is 
what can be called the verification-justification problem. Whether or not one is 
explicitly knowledgeable about the philosophic underpinnings of such a 
distinction, they will be familiar with its practical implications. The 
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implications of such a distinction are that they reference the modes of inquiry 
for knowing law (fact) and value. Verification of the law as law is the main 
concern of conceptual positivism. Positivists seek to identify what the law is; 
and the tool that is used for such analysis is its verification. Only those rules, 
norms, or laws that are empirically verifiable can qualify as valid legal rules.  
Rules, norms or laws that are not verifiable in this manner cannot meet the 
mandate of legal validity; they are considered subjective in the sense that they 
cannot be objectively knowable. If such subjective considerations were 
permitted to count as law, then anything could be considered law, and anyone 
could claim it to be so. To avoid this problem, positivists require that the law 
must be verifiable. The verification requirement follows from the logical 
positivists and the concepts about the limits of what can qualify as a scientific 
fact. As noted in the previous Chapter, the criteria for verifiable fact as applied 
to the social sciences and to law are restricted to what might be called 
objective fact (analytic and synthetic knowledge).124 
Justification, as opposed to verification, is the concern of practical reason: 
what are the reasons justifying a particular action? The validity of a value 
claim or demand cannot be verified as empirically observable fact. What then 
are the tools of inquiry available for gaining knowledge about values? 
Generally speaking, the tools of justification are those which can be used to 
evaluate the merits of a particular value claim. According to this view, values 
are not verifiable in the same ways as facts are. While this claim is subject to 
the way that different philosophic approaches view the nature of facts and 
values, the basic structural argument is to hold that knowledge about facts 
must be verified and knowledge about value must be justified. Under this 
view, facts are absolute concepts: they can be written as true or false 
propositions. Values, on the other hand, can gain or lose currency relative to 
the reasons used for their justification. It is claimed that values are not 
capable of being verifiable in the empirical sense.  
However, if one claims that values and evaluative understanding about the law 
play a central role in both the description and function of a realistic system of 
law, then it is useful to ask if there is any possibility of value inquiry (as a 
mode of justification) meeting the mandates of legal verification. This question 
often arises in the context of law when attempting to incorporate knowledge 
about how one ought to act (value demands) into a framework of factual legal 
inquiry. If knowledge about normativity can only be gained through 
justification, how can such knowledge ever meet the mandate of empirical 
verification? This is exactly the problem that legal philosophy attempts to 
answer in delineating between what is law (factual inquiry) and what is justice 
(normative inquiry).  
                                                            
124 See Chapter 2, Section 2. 
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The distinction between factual verification and value justification may be the 
most important epistemic problem for law in terms of gaining value knowledge. 
How can justification be empirically verifiable? There are two ways to answer 
this question. The first is to claim that the reasons for justifying a particular 
value position is only verifiable if the reasons given to justify a particular value 
position reflect a pattern of behavior that is identifiable externally to the 
person holding that view. For some moral principles that form a part of the law 
– such as the principle of good faith – the verification of such a principle 
empirically is a project of deriving its meaning from the way that 
decisionmakers have made laws – or resolved disputes – using a certain set of 
justificatory reasons for doing so.  
The second answer would be to verify justification for a particular value claim 
by measuring how such a justification about value is shared among a 
particular group, community, or society. This takes the project of what makes 
law law out of the hands of authoritative decisionmakers and proposes a 
bottom-up alternative for determining when a set of reasons for justifying a 
particular value is valid. Most legal scholars are skeptical about such an 
approach because such information is viewed as subjective, and that the only 
way to determine the merit of a set of justificatory reasons for advancing a 
particular value claim is to ask every community or society member to state 
their reasoned opinion.  
The problem here is that even if you are able to ask such questions, the 
possibility of getting ‘real’ answers is questionable. Most people – when asked 
about the reasons for their value positions – will answer according to how they 
think they are supposed to respond. However, such ‘real’ answers may be 
impracticable, but they may not be impossible. The point here is that if one 
can show a level of shared understanding about what counts as good reasons 
for the justification of a particular value claim or perspective, then such 
knowledge would go a long way in making the claim that value knowledge – as 
an overlapping consensus as derived from shared subjectivity – is not only 
possible, but may actually be verifiable enough to constitute social fact.  
 
4.2 Shared Subjectivity About Value 
In moral philosophy, the idea that value facts are possible is a central feature 
in general ontological and epistemological discourse. There are many that 
claim that there is just not anything to know about values – at least nothing 
that even remotely resembles what one can call a fact. These claims about 
various forms of value noncognitivism or emotivism do not even allow for the 
possibility of a priori reason (or emotion, feeling, or belief for that matter) as a 
metaphysical foundation of value knowledge. For these philosophers, however, 
the deep skepticism about value knowledge is not particularly relevant to any 
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attempts at improving knowledge value knowledge because no knowledge is 
possible. For those holding that the reasoning mind is capable of generating 
real knowledge about value, then attempts at improving knowledge about 
these subjective (internal to the self) processes of the mind may be capable of 
benefits from methodologies in the cognitive sciences and psychology.  
However, it is important to state that what these philosophers are claiming 
skeptically about the existence of value is an ontological claim, not an 
epistemological one. Even Hume, who was deeply skeptical about the existence 
of moral value, would not hold that there was nothing to know about it. 
Rather, he held that moral value was a product of desire – it was rooted in 
what he called the sentiments of human beings. Likewise, while neo-Kantian 
scholars might reject the Kantian ontological claims about the existence of 
moral value as a product of a priori reason, they would never hold that there 
was nothing to know about value.  
Even those skeptical about the metaphysical claims being made about the 
existence of value would not claim that there is nothing one can know about 
it; they are merely making the claim that such knowledge is subjective and not 
amenable to objective (universal) verification. How one person thinks about 
(reasons) or feels about (emotions) a particular value is epistemically 
subjective. Their claim is that knowledge is possible about how a person 
reasons or emotes about a particular value judgment. It is measurable in the 
sense that if one was to ask that person what their position on a particular 
aspect of morality, they could tell you. The claim they make is that if one was 
to ask a large population of people the same question about a particular value, 
one would get a range of responses, but that those responses would be 
knowable epistemically speaking. Furthermore, they would claim that there 
would be a limited range of responses, and that shared patterns of thinking 
and shared patterns of feeling among these individuals would emerge in a way 
that are objectively identifiable even though they are originate as subjective 
(internal to the self) thoughts and feelings. 
This is where divergent possibilities about objective value knowledge emerge. 
For those that view the possibility of value knowledge only emerging as 
patterns of shared behavior (such as Hartian social facts), value knowledge 
must be externally knowable from practice (behavior and actual actions). For 
those that view the possibility for value knowledge as emerging from patterns 
of shared thought (reason) or feeling (emotions), value knowledge is internally 
knowable. In this sense, behavior is objective, while thought and feeling is 
subjective. The question for one seeking to objectively identify patterns of 
shared thought and feeling is whether or not these internal processes of the 
mind can be reflected externally as observable knowledge.  
While those who are deeply skeptical about the very existence of value would 
say that there is no possibility to identify such shared patterns of thought and 
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feeling, those who are agonistic about the ontology of value would remain 
committed to finding ways to make these shared patterns of thought more 
externally observable through processes and methodologies aimed at gaining 
such knowledge. This is precisely the position being advocated in this work. 
This work claims that a method like Q methodology can assist in identifying 
these shared patterns of thoughts and feelings about a particular value claim 
or judgment – despite their subjectivity.  
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CHAPTER 4 
VALUES AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter intends to focus on international law generally, and evolving 
international legal orders specifically. The purpose of such a focus is to look 
at what is international law, how and when it matters and works, and what 
role values and evaluation play in the development of international legal 
thought and understanding. International law has always been plagued by a 
dualism that separates municipal law from international law. This 
Westphalian duo,1 as it is called, dramatically limits theorizing about 
international law because it forces theorists to conceptualize international law 
as either a type of domestic law or as a distinct concept that is completely 
separate from law within sovereignty.2  
However, the concept of law – the idea about what makes an entity or 
phenomenon legal – should apply at all levels of theorizing: legality exists 
independently of sovereignty.3 This is not an insight that early legal positivists, 
especially figures such as John Austin, fully endorsed.4 Austin conceptualized 
legality as authority emanating from sovereign command. For international 
law, the sovereign command theory meant that all law facing outward from 
sovereignty was what Austin called ‘positive morality:’5 an idea that there was 
nothing authoritatively binding and enforceable outside of sovereignty that 
could ever meet the requirements of legality within sovereignty.  
International law as viewed through this lens of traditional positivism (of the 
pre-Hartian type) would claim that international law cannot be more than a 
set of primary rules agreed to by states. International law in this form is both 
static and largely anachronistic. It also fails to be controlling: that is, without 
                                                            
1 William Twining (2009). Globalisation and Legal Scholarship. Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers, 
p. 39. 
2 The problem with this conceptualization is that its detractors demand that international law is 
not only something distinct from municipal law, it is not law at all. 
3 See generally Robert Sloane (2009). More Than What Courts Do: Jurisprudence, Decision, and 
Dignity – In Brief Encounters and Global Affairs. Yale Journal of International Law. Vol. 34, p. 
517. 
4 See Chapter 3, Section 3.1.1. 
5 Most contemporary positivists would consider positive morality to count as law. ‘Positive’ 
morality are those behaviors and habits that are customarily practiced. In this way, Austin was 
not likely critiquing anything about morality per se; rather, he was claiming that these customs 
and habits (positive morality) could constitute law in the domestic context because, when linked 
with a coercive threat of sanction, a social habit or custom could become law. However, outside 
of sovereignty, no such threat of sanction could be delivered; and thus, an important (for 
Austin, a fundamental) component of legality was missing. International law was not law at all. 
It was ‘posited morality.’ 
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the threat of a sovereign backed sanction, law fails to obligate its subjects. 
Overcoming this hurdle remains one of the most difficult areas of international 
legal philosophy for the fundamental reason that conceptual models about 
legality have been understood for the past four hundred years in terms of 
territorial sovereignty.6 Such a concept has traditionally meant something very 
simple, but at the same time it has also been limiting for international law: a 
sovereign has absolute authority within its territory and no authority outside 
of its territory.7 In the postmodern era, this of course has changed and there 
are few, if any, states in the world that claim absolute authority within their 
borders and no authority outside of them. 
As such, most contemporary international legal thought is devoted to showing 
that international law is not a set of primary rules, but a sophisticated and 
proper system of law; and that international law is capable of obligating 
despite its inability to provide a threat of sovereign sanction. Critical to this 
discourse is the understanding of international law as capable of legality 
through defined sources and secondary (constitutive) rules of change, 
adjudication, and recognition.8 Ironically, much of this shift in understanding 
international law can be derived from HLA Hart’s reconceptualization of 
Austinian positivism9 and its aim of decoupling legality from that which is 
backed up by a sovereign threat of sanction. Primarily through his mechanism 
of rule acceptance from the ‘internal point of view,’ Hart was able to 
demonstrate that legality emanated not from a sovereign but from a sense of 
obligation internalized by legal ‘officials’ making and applying the law.10 The 
irony is that while Hartian positivism opened the door for explaining legality 
                                                            
6 For convenience, this is a reference to the approximate start date of the modern concept of 
sovereignty which dates from the Peace of Westphalia. 15 May 1648 & 24 October 1648. 
7 This notion of absolute sovereignty as expounded by Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes must 
largely be considered a relic of the past. It still provides a good theoretical idealization of the 
concept of sovereignty, but practice in this postmodern era of globalization and interdependence 
alerts us to the fact that very few states understand their relationship with other states in such 
absolute terms.  
8 Such a focus mirrors Hart’s theory about secondary or constitutive rules that allow for 
primary rules to change and evolve over time. The constitutive features of international law also 
feature heavily in the policy-orientated jurisprudence. Many claim that secondary rules do not 
exist in international law. If one requires secondary or constitutive rules to mimic those in 
domestic legal systems, then yes, they likely do not exist. However, if one views the secondary 
rules as a constitutive process about how decisions will be made in the international arena, 
then it is likely international law does contain such secondary rules. “I believe it is clear that 
international law does have secondary rules – or their rough analogue, what the New Haven 
School denotes constitutive processes, viz., decisions about how decisions will be made, where, 
and by whom.” Sloane, supra note 3 at p. 519.  
9 Hart [1961](1997). The Concept of Law, edited by Joseph Raz. Oxford, Clarendon Press, p. 113. 
10 In some ways, the sense of obligation that is internalized by officials who are determining a 
legal rule as valid is similar to the requirement of opinio juris in formulating customary 
international law. However, this so-called subjective element of custom is said to be 
descriptively possible under Hart’s conceptualization. Unless one is able to infer obligation from 
practice (Hartian social fact), it appears to be a challenge as to whether a descriptive account of 
legal obligation (in both Hartian positivism and in the formation of customary international law) 
can be understood from actual behavior alone.  
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independent of sovereignty, Hart had very little to say about international 
law.11  
While Hart’s understanding of legality has been influential on all legal 
theorizing, its direct influence on international law has been limited. For 
international law, the most profound influence on its development over the 
past hundred years has been in relation to the way that states view their own 
sovereignty. It is these postmodern versions of sovereignty that are largely 
creditable to the development of international law and to the influence that it 
has had on shaping politics and power outside the territory of a particular 
sovereign.12 However, it is this mention of politics and power that may be the 
most defining feature of contemporary international law and is why many 
believe that it is distinct from municipal law and other localized microlegal 
processes. While these features of politics and power are relevant in all social 
interactions, it is claimed that they are more relevant at the international level.  
Skeptics of international law hold that without a centralized authority (such as 
a world government) or a centralized ability to control (such as a global police 
force), international law is not capable of being law at all.13 Supporters of such 
a view claim that the structure of territorial sovereignty prevents law outside 
sovereignty from existing; they claim it is merely a tool of self-help that is used 
by the powerful to advance political and economic objectives.14 While this view 
holds an extreme side of the spectrum, the other extreme is a position holding 
that an international rule of law can function in a manner identical to a 
domestic rule of law.15  
These extremes in international legal understanding can be labeled as political 
realism at one end and legal idealism at the other. They are views about law 
that are both overly pessimistic (political realism) and overly optimistic (legal 
idealism) about international law. However, there are also a whole host of 
contemporary theories in between these two views that claim to provide the 
best explanation for the phenomenon called international law. It is postulated 
that it is along this spectrum that the definitive characteristic in their 
                                                            
11 Jeremy Waldron (2009). ‘Hart and the Principles of Legality,’ in Matthew Kramer et al., eds. 
The Legacy of H.L.A. Hart. Oxford, OUP, pp. 67, 68-69. 
12 The use of the terms ‘postmodern’ and ‘sovereignty’ is not intended to state a complicated 
theory. Rather, it is merely a claim that the concept of absolute sovereignty as described in the 
modern period is no longer used in understanding the power of states. A postmodern 
sovereignty is one that understands sovereignty through the lens of state interdependence.  
13 This of course equates legalness with domestic understandings of the concept. It may be that 
international legalness exists, but that its existence is not recognizable if viewed exclusively as 
analogous to domestic legal systems.  
14 This view holds that international law does not exist, or only marginally so. For our purposes, 
this understanding of the law will be labeled political realism. 
15 This view holds that an international rule of law is possible. For our purposes, this 
understanding of international law will be labeled legal idealism.  
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distinction is the amount of subjective value considerations that should be 
permitted in any explanatory or descriptive theory about law.16  
At the international level, it is likely that the most accurate theory about law is 
situated somewhere in the middle. Power matters due to the structural nature 
of law from outwith sovereignty, but the law properly so called also plays an 
increasingly significant role in shaping the behavior of both state and nonstate 
actors working in an international or global context. There are a number of 
theories that seek to chart this middle path between political realism and legal 
idealism, but it is claimed in the context of this work on value knowledge that 
it is the policy-orientated jurisprudence (also called the New Haven school) 
that charts this course most accurately.17  
Policy-orientated jurisprudence defines law as the ongoing process of 
authoritative and controlling decision;18 and that decision of this kind ought to 
aim at the pursuit of human dignity.19 Human dignity, according to this 
approach, is about access to the things that all human beings want and need 
(the things that human beings value).20 In this way, the policy-orientated 
approach requires evaluation about the ‘right’ distribution of values in the 
context of legal decision. In order to know how a decision in a particular 
context ought to be determined, it must be seen in its social context. Under 
such a view, the law is both purpose and value orientated.21 It is a theory 
                                                            
16 See Chapter 1, Section 2. A defining attribute of both normative and descriptive theories 
about international law is the amount of unposited value subjectivity that will be tolerated. 
From the most intense or extreme forms of legal positivism (and its adjudicative derivative, 
formalism) to the most law-denying forms of political realism, all legal theories can be 
categorized according to their subjective components (or attempted denial of such). The 
subjective value chain that can be described according to this claim might look like this: 
precepts-principles-policies-politics-power. It is somewhere along this spectrum that all 
international legal theories fit. From this perspective, policy-orientated jurisprudence sits to the 
right of center in this regard, and therefore is likely to be amenable to a project – such as this 
one – that is attempting to provide new techniques for advancing value knowledge in the context 
of jurisprudential thought. The policy-orientated approach is an amalgamation of realist and 
idealist thought in jurisprudence. It claims to be a theory about law and thus rejects the far 
right end of the spectrum of law-denying political and power realism. At the same time, it claims 
to describe law, not as a scientific artifact separable from goal- or value-orientation, but as a 
process of decisionmaking that is more amenable to subjective thought than those legal theories 
at the far left of the spectrum such as legal positivism (or even natural law theories – such as 
those claiming that objective rules exists, just not always in a posited form). 
17 In fact, it is Michael Reisman’s development of the New Haven school that has been labeled 
realistic idealism: an outlook that attempts to understand international legal ‘reality’ as a 
synthesis of both realism and idealism. See Sloane, supra note 3 at p. 517. 
18 Myres McDougal, Harold Lasswell, & Michael Reisman (1968). Theories About International 
Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence. Virginia Journal of International Law. Vol. 8, pp. 
188, 192. 
19 Id. at p. 193. 
20 Id. at p. 201. 
21 E.g. Lasswell and McDougal explain the value orientation of their policy approach: “science is 
sometime said to be value-free; and yet it the most obvious fact about policy is that it is value-
orientated, since policy is only intelligible when it is seen as a deliberate search for the 
maximization of valued goals.” Harold Lasswell & Myres McDougal (1992). Jurisprudence for a 
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about law that is both descriptive and evaluative, with value inquiry being 
central to such a pursuit.  
The goal of this Chapter is to describe the various approaches to international 
law in terms of the ways that subjective value knowledge is approached. It is 
hoped that this can demonstrate, not only that values and evaluation matter 
in international legal theory, but also that improved knowledge about them 
can give the scholar or theorist the tools for understanding international law 
that can map the phenomenon more realistically. The following sections of this 
Chapter will move from the general to the specific. It will begin with a 
discussion of the problem of politics in international legal discourse and how 
values influence and motivate the development or evolution of contemporary 
international legal orders. The final section will describe the policy-orientated 
jurisprudence of the New Haven school and how such a theory about law is 
well suited for the integration of empirically measurable value knowledge in 
legal understanding.  
 
2. WHY VALUES MATTER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
What a society or community values is an integral component of all legal 
theory, both domestic and international. Whether or not one is persuaded by 
the explanatory power of political realism or legal idealism, both theories are 
pursued for the reason that their expositors value them. Political realism 
values power and the pursuit of subjective self-interest to the exclusion of all 
other values. Legal idealism, on the other hand, values the perceived order and 
stability that such a legal understanding promotes. Values of all types are 
embedded in every type of legal theory, and because of that, it is critical that 
value knowledge is pursued from a perspective of nonskepticism. Subjective 
value knowledge is possible, if not always practicable. As noted in the previous 
Chapter, even the most descriptive accounts of analytical jurisprudence 
require some level of evaluation to make their theory work.22  
The example of how customary international law is formed provides a good 
illustration of this hybrid descriptive-evaluative nature of legal knowledge. The 
statutory claim is that noncodified custom must contain two distinct elements 
in order to form the corpus of custom in international law.23 These two 
elements are an objective one called state practice, and a subjective one called 
opinio juris. In order to constitute custom, both elements must be present. 
The difficulty for devotees of the idea of custom is how to establish the 
subjective element in a world that claims that knowing subjectivity is difficult, 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Free Society: Studies in Law, Science, and Policy. Volume I & II. New Haven, New Haven Press, p. 
16. 
22 See Chapter 3, Section 3.1.2. 
23 Martin Dixon (2007). Textbook on International Law. Oxford, OUP, p. 31. 
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if not impossible, to obtain. Some scholars address this problem by holding 
that opinio juris can be inferred from state practice.24 That is, if a state can be 
said to objectively endorse a customary rule or practice (by actually doing it – 
something akin to Hartian social fact), and that this rule is identifiable as 
requiring a state to act in particular way (through statements confirming such 
an obligation), then the subjective element can be inferred.25  
However, it is the subjective endorsement (so-called rule acceptance) of the 
sense of legal obligation (opinio juris) that is a component of legalness, and it 
is different than the identification of practice. In this way, the idea of opinio 
juris has many parallels to the Hartian notion of the ‘internal point of view.’ 
For a rule to be obligatory, the practice (social fact) must not only be identified 
as emanating from an authoritative source, it must also be accepted as 
binding by those officials seen to be in the position of verifying the legality of a 
particular practice. However, the problem is that knowledge about whether a 
state26 has accepted an obligation as legally binding is not always capable of 
analytic description.27  
From a positive perspective, the obligatory nature of a rule of custom can be 
identified by claiming that the pedigree or source of a particular legal rule is 
sufficient to mandate legality. By focusing on the authority of a rule (where it 
emanates from), most legal theories have little trouble in deriving the legality 
of a rule from its authoritativeness. While considerably simple in practice at 
the municipal level, the identification of policy content, authority signal, and 
                                                            
24 See José Alvarez (2009). A Bit on Custom. New York University Journal of International Law & 
Politics. Vol. 42, pp. 17, 59. 
25 Some scholars believe that if such statements can be identified, there is nothing to infer. In 
other words, the opinio juris has been met. Such a descriptive approach works in the majority 
of cases, but it cannot explain where a state may have an obligation that it has internalized but 
that internalization has not been made empirically observable through actual behaviors.  
26 Another problem with the identification of whether the ‘official’ has accepted a rule as binding 
relates to the fiction about the state as a unitary entity that thinks and believes. As Reisman 
has pointed out, there is considerable difficulty in figuring out what the ‘state’ thinks. A state is 
not an entity that thinks; rather it is a collective of individuals who change over time. 
Furthermore, even if the ‘state’ can be disaggregated into the thought processes of individual 
actors, it is often difficult to get to these often inaccessible or hostile elites. “Verifying opinio 
juris as autonomous subjectivity requires the cooperation of often inaccessible or hostile elites 
who are unlikely to submit to depth interviews.” Michael Reisman (1981). International 
Lawmaking: A Process of Communication. American Society of International Law Proceedings, 
Vol. 71, pp. 101, 105. However, while empirical verification of these subjectivities is difficult, it 
is the claim of this work that such knowledge is possible, and that Q methodology may 
contribute to knowledge of such subjectivities. 
27 This makes it difficult to empirically verify as social fact. Sometime it can be verified as social 
fact by actual behaviors that are announced through statements, but just as often, the sense of 
obligation that state officials hold in regard to a particular rule or legal order are internal to 
their constitution and do not present as observable behavior. For some, it is statements about 
the belief that a rule is obligatory, and not the actual belief that constitutes opinio juris. See 
Anthony D’Amato (1971). The Concept of Custom in International Law. Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press, p. 49.  
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control intent28 at the international level is quite a bit more difficult. Subjective 
knowledge about the bindingness (intent to be bound) of a particular law is 
often difficult to know objectively (that is, as an external manifestation of the 
internal intent to be bound).29 Therefore, at least in the context of identifying 
international law, the subjective aspects of rule acceptance should be the 
focus of more attention, not less. In other words, where there is no clear 
authority (such as a legislature) that can prescribe binding obligations on its 
subject (states), the subjective understanding of when a rule is accepted as 
obligatory by a state becomes central to an understanding of legality.30  
The reason for claiming this is psychologically and philosophically apt: in the 
absence of a centralized authority, the legitimacy of a rulemaker or ruleapplier 
is measured not in the identification of a pedigree or source, but in a 
determination of whether or not a particular rule or law has been promulgated 
in a manner that its promulgator considers to be binding. However, in the 
international context, it is not a nonreciprocal situation where the lawgiver 
alone must internalize the practice as binding. In most situations, given the 
legal equality of states, the lawgiver is also the lawtaker (that is, the state is 
both the promulgator and the subject of the law). This is something that 
features prominently in Fuller’s theory (that is, that the law is best understood 
as a reciprocal relationship between officials and citizens),31 and is something 
that Hart’s theory does not consider.  
                                                            
28 Collectively, these three components must be present in constituting legality. These terms 
come from Michael Reisman. All three components must be present and working for a law to be 
considered binding and obligatory. See Reisman, supra note 26 at p. 101.  
29 Michael Reisman and Mahnoush Arsanjani have expressed concern – albeit in the context of 
treaty interpretation – about the difficulty of knowing intent (subjectivities) with anything less 
than such external manifestations. Without a means for measuring and knowing these 
subjective aspects objectively, his advice seems profoundly reasonable. “The very notion of the 
‘subjective’ views of a state involves a personification of a complex social organization to a 
degree that would make Hegel himself blush; even if the personified state is reduced to a key 
person, decision makers are always changing. In multilateral treaties, the quest for the ‘shared’ 
subjectivities of the many states that are involved in any place other than the text of the 
agreement is a pursuit of the ignis fatuus.” Mahnoush Arsanjani & Michael Reisman (2010). 
Interpreting Treaties for the Benefit of Third Parties. American Journal of International Law. Vol. 
104, pp. 597, 602. However, from a theoretical angle, one make ask whether knowing subjective 
intent as an empirically observable phenomenon is possible through the use of Q methodology. 
On the specific difficulties related to the use of Q methodology in this regard, see Andrew 
Willard (1994). The Scientific Study of Subjectivity and the Achievement of Human Rights. 
Operant Subjectivity. Vol. 17, p. 1. 
30 As has been stated, under normal conditions the bindingness of a social fact is relatively easy 
to determine. One can look to the practice (or absence of a practice) of a particular rule and 
determine if that rule has been accepted as obligatory by those to which is subjected. For the 
hard cases, such as the ones that Ronald Dworkin has identified in the municipal context, 
knowledge about the source and practice of a particular rule is not sufficient to determine if a 
rule is obligatory. It often requires reference to a value and a process of reason and evaluation 
in order to understand its bindingness. Such hard cases are more frequent at the international 
level, and because of this, international law often demands reference to value and the processes 
of evaluation in determining if a rule contains the elements of legalness.  
31 See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2.1. 
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International lawmaking highlights this feature in conceptual theorizing. As 
both the lawtaker and lawgiver, the internalization of a rule must be evaluated 
from both perspectives. Therefore, the bindingness of a rule is not as easy as 
looking to see if an ‘official’ views the rule as binding from the ‘internal point of 
view.’ Instead it means that the perceived legitimacy of a law must also be 
considered; and this requires evaluation when accessed from the standpoint of 
the legal decisionmaker (the lawmaker who considers a law or rule to be 
binding on its subjects), the lawtaker (the subject of the rule), and the legal 
commentator or scholar (the discourser who is assessing whether or not the 
lawgiver or lawtaker ought to be bound by a particular rule). This exposes two 
issues with the identification of custom: 1) it cannot be purely described, and 
2) that the evaluation of whether a rule is binding cannot be done in isolation 
from the social context (in this case, the relations between states). 
Such a claim is very subjective in nature, but that is exactly the point. 
Without a clear hierarchical source signaling the obligatory nature of a 
particular legal order, the acceptance of law must be derived from the 
subjective viewpoint: that is, it must reflect an endorsement (intent to be 
bound) of the underlying value claims that a particular international 
community or state seeks to achieve. While relatively clear in theoretical 
terms, the practice of such a claim is of course a messy and often convoluted 
enterprise. However, the subsequent sections of this Chapter will attempt to 
show that this approach to international legal understanding has actually 
received some traction in recent decades, especially in the context of theories 
that understand the law as an ongoing process of social interaction and 
choice.  
 
2.1 The Politics of International Law 
Throughout most of the history of international law, legal theory has oscillated 
between natural law (nonpositivist) theories and legal positivist theories 
(conceptually), and political realism and legal idealism theories (politically). On 
the positivist side, international law is based in state consent. The concept of 
external sovereign autonomy and equality demands that each state must 
consent (whether they do so willingly or not is another question) to 
international legal rules. Absent such consent, legal rules lack their 
bindingness. This is problematic for a variety of reasons, but fundamentally, 
such a concept of consent only includes rules to which a state posits and 
consents. Such a theory will sometimes fail to explain how general principles 
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of law or morality are consented to,32 and it can also fail to explain how 
nonconsensual norms and rules can ever be binding on states.33  
For natural law (forms of conceptual nonpositivism) theories about 
international law, similar problems present, but for different reasons. Under 
such theories, nonposited norms can trump treaty- and consent-based norms 
in some cases.34 However, with the exception of some theories about 
international legal constitutionalization,35 international law lacks any 
centralized hierarchy for categorizing such nonposited norms. In practice, this 
means that general principles can be invoked to supersede principles that 
states have consented to in agreements or treaties. Absent a clear means for 
understanding the relationship between consent and nonconsent among legal 
principles in international law, legal positivists hold that only confusion will 
result.  
However, this confusion and uncertainty may be overstated. In most cases, 
principles and norms are discussed in international legal decisions, they are 
explicitly embedded in treaties, or they are analyzed by publicists through 
written legal discourse.36 This means that a determination of whether a 
principle or norm is applicable in a particular context will be determinable by 
reference to the traditional sources of international law alone. Where problems 
arise is in the determination of whether an emerging principle ought to be 
binding on nonconsenting parties (states), or in cases where it is unclear 
which multisourced equivalent norm should apply in a particular situation.37  
Problems also arise under a consent-based understanding of international law 
when viewed in the context of international political realities and power 
imbalances. Politics and power are a vital component in any understanding of 
international law and will have influencing factors on the way that both 
positivist and nonpositivist conceptual theories about law are approached. 
While positivist and nonpositivist theories about law concern the identification 
of legality, political theories about law at the international level are concerned 
with the balance of power in the making and applying of international law. In 
other words, they are not concerned with a conceptual understanding of what 
is and is not law; rather the focus of political theories about international are 
                                                            
32 In the context of adjudication, this is Dworkin’s claim about the inadequacies of Hartian legal 
positivism. See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1.1. 
33 See Laurence Helfer (2008). Nonconsensual International Lawmaking. University of Illinois 
Law Review. Vol. 2008, p. 71. 
34 These include jus cogens norms and other general principles of international law. 
35 See Mattias Kumm (2004). The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework 
of Analysis. European Journal of International Law. Vol. 15, p. 907; Jan Klabbers, et al. (2009). 
The Constitutionalization of International Law. Oxford, OUP. 
36 In practical terms, these are all sources of valid law according to Article 38 of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute. Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ 
Statute). 26 June 1945, 59 Statute 1055. 
37 Multisource equivalent norms are those norms or principles that are equally applicable and 
equally authoritative in a particular legal context. 
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concerned with how the phenomenon of international works in the context of 
international politics, if at all.  
These theories fluctuate between political realism and legal idealism. Most 
nonlegal political realist theories are skeptical about the ability of law to 
constrain state behavior. Legal idealist theories about international law, on the 
other hand, also believe that law must understood in the context of 
international politics and power, but they hold that law and legality contain 
their own autonomous powers in constraining state behavior (that is, they are 
not international law skeptics).  
According to most theories of political realism, and more modest versions 
which include those such as rational institutionalism,38 the law only guides 
the conduct of states so far as it assists that state in the promotion of its own 
self-interest maximization.39 Such theories do not negate the reality that 
values influence and shape state demands, identities, and expectations 
(perspectives); rather, they claim that the achievement of these goals is not 
contingent on an international rule of law.40 Various forms of legal idealism, 
which are often conjoined with theories of constructivism in both international 
law and in international relations literature,41 on the other hand, are more 
nuanced. They hold that international legal structures have the ability to 
influence and constrain state behavior even in the face of naked power. They 
claim that interests, identities, and expectations (perspectives) are 
constructed, and that states reflect these perspectives in the laws to which 
they consent. In this way, the law is an integral part of state identity, and that 
achievement of state interests can be assisted by an international rule of law.42  
What is critical to such a distinction between political realism and legal 
idealism is the influence of politics on international law. This is not intended 
to discount the importance of the political and legal complexities at the 
domestic level, but rather it is an attempt to distinguish the two because of the 
structural differences arising out of the concept of sovereignty. From within 
sovereignty, the relationship between politics and law lies within a well-
                                                            
38 See Kenneth Abbott (2008). Enriching Rational Choice Institutionalism for the Study of 
International Law. University of Illinois Law Review. Vol. 2008, p. 5. 
39 For the exposition of a theory of political (neo)realism in the international relations context, 
see Kenneth Waltz (1979). Theory of International Politics. New York, McGraw Hill. 
40 Richard Steinberg & Jonathan Zasloff (2006). Power and International Law. American Journal 
of International Law. Vol. 100, pp. 64, 82. 
41 Constructive theories in international relations hold that state identities are not static, but 
that they are given their form by ongoing processes of social practice and interaction. These 
political theories are more optimistic about the ability of the law to assist in constructing these 
state identities. So, while international relations constructivism is not concerned specifically 
about the authority of law to constrain state behavior, they believe that the structure of 
international politics allows for ‘real’ law to develop. On the idea of social constructivism in 
international relations, see Alexander Wendt (1992). Anarchy is What States Make of It: the 
Social Construction of Power Politics. International Organizations. Vol. 46, p. 391. 
42 Steinberg & Zasloff, supra note 40 at pp. 71-76. 
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developed discourse on the rule of law. Sovereign states can be said to have a 
weak or strong rule of law according to how well political subjectivity is 
sheered away from legal objectivity.  
From outwith sovereignty, the relationship between politics and law lies not in 
the weakness or strength of legality, but in the role that legal objectivity can 
play in limiting the influence of political subjectivity. This is what is ultimately 
meant, and nothing more, in claiming the theoretical differences between 
political realism and legal idealism in this context. All international law 
contains elements of political subjectivity: the difference in theoretical 
understandings merely refers to the relative amount of political subjectivity 
that a theory will tolerate in understanding how international law works in the 
context of international relations. 
From inside sovereignty, the division between law and politics is more or less 
articulated, and the discourse thus focuses on the degree to which the two are 
separated (in its strongest form would be to claim that ‘no one is above the 
law’). From outside sovereignty, the structure of sovereign autonomy means 
that the discourse is less sophisticated: its focus pertains to whether or not an 
international rule of law can constrain politics at all. Visions of a legally ideal 
rule of law at the international level have been contemplated in the past, but 
have always been hampered to some extent by ‘political realities.’43 In many 
ways, the skepticism about the ability of international law to function 
independent of politics continues to be based on a – likely false – distinction 
between what can count as law inside sovereignty and what can count as law 
outside of sovereignty. It is this distinction about the role of politics in 
international affairs that continues to exert influence on the way that 
theoretical approaches to international law are conceived.  
The important question in the context of this work is whether one’s theory 
advances a concept of international relations that advocates the advancement 
of values from a political or legal perspective. International theories about law 
tend to focus on whether or not politics or law is best suited at the 
international level to advance commonly held values; not whether or not 
subjective values expectations can be exclusively captured within an 
objectively applicable rule of law. Taken one step further, it is the goal of this 
work on value subjectivity to articulate how the worldviews and perspectives of 
legal decisionmakers and discoursers affect the way that legal orders develop. 
However, this is not to say that political decisionmakers are any less 
influenced by value subjectivity in the way that political problems are 
approached. From an international perspective, the question is whether these 
subjective thought processes can be distilled in a legally meaningful manner.  
                                                            
43 See generally Martti Koskenniemi (2001). The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of 
International Law, 1870-1960. Cambridge, CUP.  
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This section attempted to show that regardless of theoretical orientation at the 
international level, value perspectives play a crucial role in both international 
politics and in international law, and often such political and legal 
subjectivities may in fact be more intertwined than in the domestic context. 
Furthermore, the problem of external sovereign autonomy reduces the 
likelihood of an objective rule of law developing that is analogous to one within 
sovereignty. Therefore, the claim being advanced is that a focus on subjective 
knowledge – whether enshrined in political or legal choice – at the 
international level is critical to a realistic understanding of interests and 
expectations that exist from without sovereign states.  
 
2.2  Koskenniemi’s Critique 
In an effort to further distill the relationship between law and politics at the 
international level, and how the gulf between political realism and legal 
idealism might be bridged, it is useful to look at the structure of the 
international legal argument from the perspective of Martii Koskenniemi. 
Koskenniemi is a proponent of what can be described as new stream 
scholarship in international law as pioneered by David Kennedy.44 This move 
in the history of international legal thought is yet another example of domestic 
legal theory being applied to international legal theory. Both Kennedy and 
Koskenniemi are considered scholars of a movement called critical legal 
studies: a legal methodology whereby the structure of the law is analyzed and 
dissected in a manner that is generally critical of the claims that traditional 
legal scholars advance.   
In his influential monograph, From Apology to Utopia,45 Koskenniemi puts 
forth the argument that international law oscillates between the need to verify 
law’s content by reference to concrete behavior, will, and interest of states 
(concreteness)46 and the need of impartial ascertainment and application of 
law regardless of the behavior, will, or interest of states (normativity).47 He 
claims that international law oscillates between law as an apology for state 
behavior and law as a utopian vision of an autonomous legal order applicable 
to states regardless of interests. This, he argues, creates a structural flaw that 
                                                            
44 David Kennedy (1988). A New Stream of International Law Scholarship. Wisconsin 
International Law Journal. Vol. 7, p. 1. 
45 Martti Koskenniemi (2006). From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal 
Argument. Cambridge, CUP. 
46 “The requirement of concreteness results from the liberal principle of the subjectivity of value. 
To avoid political subjectivism and illegitimate constraint, we must base law on something 
concrete – on the actual (verifiable) behaviour, will and interest of the members of society-
states.” Martti Koskenniemi (1990). The Politics of International Law. European Journal of 
International Law. Vol. 1, pp. 4, 7. 
47 “According to the requirement of normativity, law should be applied regardless of the political 
preferences of legal subjects. In particular, it should be applicable even against a state which 
opposes its application to itself.” Id. 
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makes the description and evaluation of an objective rule of international law 
impossible to formulate.48  
In terms of theoretical outlook, and if Koskenniemi’s account is correct, then 
neither legal idealism (autonomous law) nor political realism (state behavior) 
can ever provide an accurate and objective account of international law.  
Inherent in this argument is the idea that values (normativity) are subjective 
and that therefore they are incapable of ever being objectively verified. 
According to this view, which is premised on the demand that international 
law must be able to achieve legal objectivity and that all international law 
must reflect state will or consent, international rules cannot be 
simultaneously be concrete and normative. Koskenniemi claims that these two 
conditions cancel each other out:  
[a]n argument about concreteness is an argument about the closeness of a particular 
rule, principle, or doctrine to state practice. But the closer to state practice an argument 
is, the less normative and more political it seems. The more it seems just another apology 
for existing power. An argument about normativity, on the other hand, is an argument 
which intends to demonstrate the rules’ distance from state will and practice. The more 
normative the rule, the more political it seems because the less it is possible to argue it 
by reference to social context. It seems utopian and – like theories of natural justice – 
manipulable at will.49 
This insight from Koskenniemi provides two options for international legal 
theory: either to abandon the possibility of objective knowledge about 
normative international law from ever being attainable, or to chart a path that 
claims that there is indeed some objective knowledge about values that is 
possible: the idea that values and norms can be objectively identified and 
therefore can be pursued as a component part of legal validity. The main 
purpose of this work is to advance the possibility of objective value knowledge 
as shared subjectivity; and to determine such a claim through the use of Q 
methodology. If possible, this objectified (or at least empirically observable) 
normative knowledge might assist in moving normativity closer to 
concreteness. 
 
2.3 Evolving Global Legal Orders 
Turning now to the way international law evolves or develops, this section will 
look at how international law is influenced, and to provide a basis for the 
theoretical orientation that this work pursues.50 In the post-war era, 
                                                            
48 Id. at p. 8. 
49 Id. 
50 This is a focus on how international legal discourse shapes and influences the way that 
international law evolves and develops over time.  
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international law and international institutions have proliferated. During this 
same period, many new international legal orders have come into existence; 
and since their inauguration, these same legal orders have evolved and 
transformed in ways that would make their earlier embryotic stages almost 
unrecognizable.51 The shift in the development since the mid-twentieth 
century stems from an increasing interdependence between the global 
community of states, and an increased globalization of the values that states 
have internalized and accepted as binding.  
An understanding of the how’s and why’s of international legal development is 
clarified by bifurcating lawmaking, lawapplying, lawshaping, and 
lawinfluencing into categories of legal decisionmaking and legal discourse.52 
Legal decisionmaking refers to the way that authoritative and controlling legal 
decisions are made and applied by politically relevant actors. Legal discourse 
refers to the corpus of lawshaping and lawinfluencing debate, discussion, and 
analysis made by scholars, but also by individuals and institutions 
(participants) with a stake or interest in advancing international law along 
particular lines. It is claimed that the legal discourse is an essential feature in 
shaping the way that states and other relevant actors (decisionmakers) allow 
for the law to develop. 
For value inquiry in the context of law, this distinction between decision and 
discourse is important because each enterprise is distinct in its goals. The 
focus of value knowledge for decisionmakers (those who make and apply 
international law) is based on the way that they internalize value claims into 
the decisions that they make. The focus of value knowledge among discoursers 
is on how their value claims and demands influence and shape the worldviews 
and perspectives of legal decisionmakers. A theoretical understanding of how 
and why international law evolves and develops must be understood in the 
way that values are distributed and maximized in an ongoing process of social 
choice. Value claims matter in the context of legal evolution; they are integral 
to the process of change.  
However, this work holds the position that questions about the distribution of 
value in the context of legal evolution are not, and should not be understood 
exclusively in the context of how the decisionmaker makes choices. It is 
claimed that the discourser plays an equally important role in shaping and 
influencing the evolution of particular legal orders. Under such a claim, then it 
is important to understand just what the discourser (participant or scholar) 
holds to be the appropriate distribution of value in a particular context. To 
understand why and how international legal orders develop or evolve over 
time, inquiry must focus on how various value claims (political or otherwise) 
shape and influence the law from the outside.  
                                                            
51 E.g. the international law on foreign direct investment or international criminal law. 
52 See Chapter 3, Section 2.3. 
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In assuming that legal discourse does shape and influence the decisions that 
legal decisionmakers make, then it might likewise be assumed that 
perceptions about the law and the value positions that discoursers endorse 
matter in shaping the developmental path that a particular legal order takes. 
In terms of international legal discourse, the hypothesis is that perceptions 
matter in how international law evolves; and that this discourse is driven by 
the way that the law is perceived in addressing the values that comport with 
one’s understanding about how the world ought to be ordered. This manifests 
as the subjective value positions that legal discoursers claim and demand in 
the way that legal problems are approached.  
These subjective value perspectives thus become critical to understanding the 
reasons and justifications that shape and influence legal conclusions. To test 
this hypothesis, the main purpose of this work is to establish whether or not 
insight into the measurement of these subjective perspectives can be known in 
a manner that promotes their integration in theoretical understandings about 
how legal orders evolve. The claim is that, if these value perspectives can be 
identified, then areas of convergence and divergence may likewise be 
identifiable. Since these underlying value perspectives play such a crucial role 
in the way that legal problems are approached, advancing knowledge about 
these subjective states of mind could assist considerably in understanding the 
role of values in both legal decision and legal discourse.  
 
3. CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 
Before looking at the policy-orientated jurisprudence of the New Haven school, 
it may be helpful to briefly map and summarize some of the competing 
international legal theories that have been pursued throughout the last 
century or so. Trends emerge along three major themes of thought: 1) 
international legal theory has been greatly influenced by legal theories 
promulgated for domestic legal understanding and these types of legal theories 
(both normative and descriptive) can be seen to largely mirror developments in 
legal thought at the international level, 2) international legal theories have 
always had difficulty in distinguishing between politics and law, and that even 
the most positivistic international legal theories are infused with political 
thought, and 3) international legal theories (at least in the second half of the 
twentieth century) have been focused primarily on answering the question of 
why – absent a centralized base of authority and control – states obey 
international law and norms most of the time. It is these three underlying 
themes that have most greatly influenced the way that international legal 
theories have been approached over the past century.  
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3.1  An International Law of Rules? 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, international law was primarily 
focused on determining the set of rules that regulate the relations of states. 
This was a shift away from previous international legal scholarship that was 
largely focused on determining how principles of natural law could justify state 
behavior.53 However, by the end of the nineteenth century, and largely 
mirroring the work of positivists in the domestic sphere,54 international legal 
positivism began to challenge what it saw as the ambiguous character of 
natural law in governing the relationship between states. Important thinkers 
such as Lassa Oppenheim and Hersh Lauterpacht55 saw real importance in 
the idea of state consent and posited legal doctrine at the international level; 
and focused their scholarship on the identification of the rules and practices 
that could be identified as deriving from state consent.56  
On the other side of the Atlantic, American international legal scholarship was 
optimistic about the possibility that the law among states could be developed 
in ways similar to domestic or municipal legal systems. Chief among these 
architects for a codification of international law, and the peace and security 
that adherence to such a project would create, was Elihu Root.57 He promoted 
an idealized and positivized vision of an international rule of law that persisted 
in various forms up until the Second World War. 
 
3.2  The (Political) Realist Attack 
The Second World War was a turning point for international legal scholarship 
with scholars such as Hans Morgenthau, who “launched a broad 
epistemological, heuristic, and normative attack”58 on the legal idealism of the 
                                                            
53 See Hugo Grotius [1625](2012). De Jure Belli Ac Pacis, edited by Stephen Neff. Cambridge, 
CUP. “Hugo Grotius expounded the view that the law of nations was based on natural law, or 
law grounded in values and morality, rather than consent of states.” Tai-Heng Cheng (2012). 
When International Law Works. Cambridge, CUP, p. 38. 
54 Particularly influential in this regard are the works of Jeremy Bentham and John Austin. 
55 Lauterpacht (English) and Oppenheim (German) can be considered exemplars of a class of 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century international law positivists. See Hersch 
Lauterpacht [1927](2012). Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law. London, 
Lawbook Exchange; see also Lassa Oppenheim (1921). The Future of International Law. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press.  
56 Cheng, supra note 53 at pp. 43-44. 
57 Elihu Root believed in the power of the law to be able to constrain state behavior: an idealist 
and optimistic view about international law. Law, including international law, was a science and 
could be divorced from politics. He rejected the idea that international law failed to be law 
because it could not effectively sanction. He claimed “the difference between municipal law and 
international law, in respect of the existence of forces compelling obedience, is more apparent 
than real, and . . . there are sanctions for the enforcement of international law no less real and 
substantial than those which secure obedience to municipal law.” Elihu Root (1908). The 
Sanction of International Law. American Journal of International Law. Vol. 2, p. 451.  
58 Steinberg & Zasloff, supra note 40 at p. 71. 
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nineteenth and early twentieth century. He, and others, argued that 
international legal idealism ignored the observable relationships between 
power, international law, and state behavior.59 He claimed that international 
law not enjoying compliance at the international level was not law at all. This 
strain of thought has persisted in a number of forms in international relations 
scholarship ever since. Broadly labeled political or power realism, this frame of 
inquiry holds that power, not law, is what matters in governing the relations 
between states.60 While the catalyst for this turn to realism was the perceived 
inability of an international rule of law in preventing the implosion of Europe 
for the second time in the span of a few decades, it is not a coincidence that 
political realism in international relations followed the emergence of legal 
realism in domestic legal scholarship.  
Both political and legal realism, in their most extreme and negative forms, 
attempt to demonstrate that power and personal preferences often trump the 
application of neutral principles and norms that have been carefully 
formulated from explicit community (or state) consent. For many, legal realism 
was just politics by another means. This discrediting of the authority of the 
law at the domestic level made for an easy attack in the international sphere 
as there was already a certain level of skepticism about how effective an 
international rule of law could be absent a centralized source of authority.  
However, both political and legal realism can be credited in identifying a 
number of characteristics in the realm of international law that are hard to 
ignore. Political realism identified the importance of power and politics in the 
making, applying, and enforcing of international law; it is an insight that 
continues to influence and inform international legal theory. Legal realism on 
the other hand, identified the importance of the decisionmaker in making, 
applying, and shaping the law. Law, for most strains of legal realism, was what 
the judge or adjudicator decided. Arguably this is not always the case, but by 
shifting the inquiry to what decisionmakers actually do when presented with 
difficult cases, legal realism has informed a whole host of theoretical outlooks 
in law that focus on decisionmaking processes more broadly in the context of 
jurisprudence.  
 
3.3  The Post-War Context 
As the event of the Second World War demonstrated, legal theories are not 
only responding to other competing legal theories, they are responding to 
                                                            
59 Hans Morgenthau (1940). Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law. American Journal 
of International Law. Vol. 34, p. 260. 
60 Such a view was not new in the twentieth century. The role of power in the relations between 
states has been documented in political thought throughout history: from Thucydides to 
Machiavelli. 
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political events as well.61 The post-war period has seen the effort to rebuild 
Europe, the decolonization of the global South, the establishment of the 
United Nations (UN), the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the globalization of 
trade and investment. These events have all had a significant impact on the 
way that legal theories are framed and understood. For many, the increased 
interdependence of states in the post-war period has led to an increased role 
for the law in the regulation of transboundary activity. This legalization of 
governance is the result of a variety of factors, but may be heavily reliant on 
the same motivation that drove the early idealists to put so much faith in the 
law: absent a centralized global government, the law presents the next best 
solution for both binding the actions of sovereign states and encouraging 
cooperation.  
 
3.3.1  The Postmodern Turn 
Another marked distinction in the post-war theorizing about international law 
is in its so-called postmodernism. This postmodernism has presented itself as 
a deep skepticism about the base values that underlie any theory about law. 
According to Mary Ellen O’Connell, for example, postmodernists in law 
“contemplate no metanarrative, no conception of human good to be espoused 
and ultimately achieved.”62 In this way, most international legal theories (with 
the possible exception of the New Haven school) refuse to advance a single 
theory about international law that is based on a set of universally applicable 
value claims. Values are plural and relative, and as such, any legal theory 
must be able to understand and articulate contextual sensitivities in their 
approach to legal problems. The answer to the postmodern problem has been 
articulated primarily in theories based on an understanding of how the 
process of law works in practice.  
As noted in the previous Chapter, one of the main responses to the 
rearticulation of positivism by Hart in the mid-twentieth century was in 
shifting the focus of legal inquiry from the conceptual to the practical.63 
However, by the time that Hart was developing his analytic jurisprudence, the 
only options for a practical approach to legal understanding was that of legal 
realism. Seeking a more ‘realistic’ and practical approach to legal 
understanding, but at the same time dissatisfied with the analytic tools and 
adjudicative focus of the legal realists, legal process scholars worked to delimit 
                                                            
61 For a general theory on the role of incidents in the development of international law, see 
Michael Reisman & Andrew Willard, eds. (1988). International Incidents: The Law that Counts in 
World Politics. Princeton, Princeton University Press.  
62 Mary Ellen O’Connell (2008). The Power and Purpose of International Law: Insights from the 
Theory and Practice of Enforcement. Oxford, OUP, p. 92. 
63 This is a claim that the conceptual project of the positivists could not fully articulate how the 
law operates in practice, and that a better jurisprudence was one that could articulate how the 
legal process works. 
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a theoretical frame for international law based on an understanding of how the 
process of lawmaking and lawapplying shapes and influences the way that 
laws develop. This postmodern turn towards process has spawned a large 
literature over the past number of decades and remains the most advanced 
response to the various forms of political realism (rule skepticism in 
international law).  
These process-based approaches to international law hold that, as shared 
values coalesce around legal principles that are enshrined as law properly so 
called, international law can provide a means of achieving a minimum level (at 
least) of world order.64 While different types of process-based theories of 
international law differ in understanding the way that such world order can be 
achieved, they all implicitly carry a certain level of optimism about the idea of 
international law.  
 
3.3.2  The Influence From International Relations 
Before moving to the process-based approaches to international law that have 
dominated in one form or another since the Second World War, a brief look at 
its main theoretical competition is warranted. These are the rational choice 
theories and the various international relations approaches to international 
law. International relations theory, beginning in the 1970s developed along 
four major lines: neorealism (structuralism),65 institutionalism 
(functionalism),66 neoliberalism,67 and constructivism.68 These ‘isms’ are 
identifiable in the works of important thinkers in twentieth century  
international relations theory, and they paved the way for both rational choice 
theories and IR-IL (international relations and international law) theories in 
the late twentieth century.  
These international relations theorists, not explicitly concerned with legal 
theorizing, began to develop ideas about how law was reflected in the state 
behavior and in the international institutions that states created. The 
neorealists and the institutionalists generally hold that state behavior could be 
explained by rational self-interest; and that in the pursuit of self-interest, legal 
                                                            
64 Myres McDougal & Florentino Feliciano (1961). Law and Minimum World Public Order: The 
Legal Regulation of International Coercion. New Haven, Yale University Press. 
65 See Waltz, supra note 39 (neorealism). 
66 See Stephen Krasner (1999). Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton, Princeton 
University Press (regime theory). 
67 See Joseph Nye & Robert Keohane (1977). Power and Interdependence: World Politics in 
Transition. Boston, Little Brown (neoliberalism); see also Robert Keohane (1984). After 
Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, Princeton 
University Press (neoliberalism). 
68 See Friedrich Kratochwil (1991). Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical 
and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs. Cambridge, CUP 
(constructivism); see also Wendt, supra note 41 (constructivism). 
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rules reflected the underlying power dynamics between states. In other words, 
the law is a useful tool in the advancement of self-interest. In this way, 
international law could be mistakenly seen as guiding behavior because it 
appeared that rules were being consented to by states, but in actuality, the 
legal rules merely reflected the preferences of the more powerful state.69 The 
neoliberalists and the constructivists, on the other hand, reject the political 
realist critique as being too focused on power, and instead held that there are 
situations where the law can facilitate legitimate cooperation between states, 
even in cases where a powerful state could use its relative power to deviate 
from such a legal rule.70  
Beginning in the 1990s, international legal scholars began to adapt these 
political theories into legal theories.71 These rational choice and IR-IL theories 
generally look at the ways that international legal orders can facilitate 
cooperation between states and when they cannot. Rational choice theories, 
for the most part, take a limited view of the power of international law to bind 
states in the face of naked power.72 In focusing on state interest as the prime 
mover in explaining the decisionmaking choices that states make, rational 
choice theories hold that international law matters, but only when it can be 
used to justify the political choices that states make. They claim that 
international law has a very limited capacity to bind states when such a 
constraint would be detrimental to a state’s interest. Liberalist73 and 
constructivist74 theories of IR-IL, on the other hand, are more optimistic about 
the use of international law by states. However, they hold that any 
understanding of international law must be seen in the context of state to 
state relations. This means that there will always be a political power 
component in understanding when and how international law works.  
 
3.4  Process-Based Approaches 
As stated in the previous sections, the major shift in international legal 
theorizing over the past half century is attributable to the idea of looking at 
law as process.75 This shift towards process has its beginnings in the 1940s 
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when Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougal set out to change the way that 
legal education was pursued.76 The original frame of inquiry, which would 
come to be known as the New Haven school, was to react, and provide a sound 
alternative, to the pessimism of realism – both politically and legally. If power 
and interests shape the law, then any international legal theory must be able 
to tell decisionmakers what value choices they ought to make. They wanted to 
articulate how the law could advance the promotion of human dignity and 
secure a minimum world order.77 This, they claimed, could only be achieved if 
(moral and political) values matter. According to this view, theorizing about 
law was a normative enterprise where the law was defined as an ongoing 
process of authoritative and controlling decision by politically relevant actors 
who shape and secure community demands and expectations about value. 
This was their main answer to legal and political realism: it offered an 
potential utility for the law as a means of promoting policies in the pursuit of a 
world order of human dignity.  
However, near the same time that Lasswell and McDougal (and Michael 
Reisman) were developing their theoretical outlook, a number of other 
theorists also sought new explanations for when and how international law 
works. Drawing on, and attempting to adapt, the domestic work of the legal 
process school,78 an international legal process school developed. In 1968, 
Abram Chayes, Thomas Ehrich, and Andreas Lowenfeld published a textbook 
for approaching this international legal process.79 They focused on the role of 
the law in coordinating and promoting institutional legitimacy at the 
international level. By looking at the instrumental role of law in achieving the 
goal of organizing and regulating human (and state) behavior around shared 
values, they believed that the law could be objectively known and applied. 
They wanted to show, that despite the insights of the legal realists, law could 
be determined and applied autonomously without reference to power. In some 
ways, the legal process school was about bridging the divide between realism 
and formalism in adjudication.  
However, in claiming that the early process-based approaches did not deal 
sufficiently with the issue of compliance and enforcement in international 
law,80 scholars such as Louis Henkin and Oscar Schachter81 wanted to shift 
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76 Harold Lasswell & Myres McDougal (1943). Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional 
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77 Michael Reisman & Burns Weston, eds. (1976). Toward World Order and Human Dignity: 
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the focus to when international can constrain state behavior. While Henkin 
and Schachter are not easily categorizable in terms of the positivist-
nonpositivist or idealist-realist distinction, they both sought to explain 
international law as real law. Louis Henkin famously stated in his book How 
Nations Behave,82 that “almost all nations observe almost all principles of 
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all the time.”83 
Although challenged on many fronts, this statement marked a shift in the 
scholarship: from does international law matter to how does international law 
matter?  
Towards the turn of the twenty-first century, a whole host of international 
legal theories broadly describable as process-based were published. Some of 
these theoretical frames came from late career scholars such as Abraham and 
Antonia Chayes, Thomas Franck, Michael Reisman, and Rosalyn Higgins; 
while a younger generation of international legal scholars, such as Harold Koh 
and Anne-Marie Slaughter,84 sought new approaches to how the process of 
international law shapes and obliges its subjects.  
 
3.4.1 Abram and Antonia Chayes and Thomas Franck 
The Chayes’s used the international legal process approach to explain how 
international regulatory agreements could gain compliance without sanction.85 
Their so-called managerial approach described how international agreements 
are made more efficient and effective when the state parties are engaged in an 
active and reciprocal dialogue and discourse about the regime norms to which 
they have agreed.86 This ongoing process of active management through 
processes of transparency, verification, and review would result in 
international rules that would be complied with even absent an effective 
mechanism for sanctions.87  
                                                                                                                                                                              
articulated and was not the focus of their inquiry. This presented problems for the international 
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86 Id. at pp. 109-111. 
87 Harold Koh (1997). Why Do Nations Obey International Law? Yale Law Journal. Vol. 106, pp. 
2599, 2637. 
142 
 
 
Thomas Franck on the other hand took a more philosophical approach to the 
issue of effectiveness of, and compliance with, international rules and norms.88 
Rooting his theory of international law in a concept of ‘right process’ and a 
Rawlsian conception of distributive fairness, Franck proposed that the more 
legitimate and fair the system of international law was, the more likely that it 
would be able to exert a ‘compliance pull’ on it subjects.89 He claimed that 
parties who perceive a rule of norm as established by a legitimate and fair 
process are more likely to comply with that rule or norm even if the 
substantive outcome of such compliance would be against the interest of that 
party. Since there is no centralized and authoritative source of legal legitimacy 
at the international level, the legitimacy of norms and rules (and the 
institutions and states that create them) must be rooted in the fairness and 
justness of those norms.90  
 
3.4.2  Michael Reisman and Rosalyn Higgins 
Both Michael Reisman and Rosalyn Higgins are process scholars in the 
tradition of the New Haven school. Michael Reisman – who was an original 
colleague of Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougal, has added fundamental 
insight about policy-orientated jurisprudence through a prolific body of 
scholarship that has spanned nearly fifty years.91 New Haven scholars, such 
as Reisman, see law not as a system of rules, but: 
as a process of decision achieved through a constant stream of communications among 
international decisionmakers issuing demands [to values] backed by authority and 
control.92  
Michael Reisman has developed the New Haven school into a theoretical frame 
that is best understood in its own light. In the 1980s, he built on the New 
Haven school through his own theory about law as a process of 
communication: 
[p]ut in simplest terms, lawmaking or the prescribing of policy as authoritative for a 
community is a process of communication. All groups are, perforce, communications 
networks. An indispensable part of the political processes of groups is communication. An 
ineluctable effect of all communication is political. Like any other communication 
process, prescription involves the mediation of subjectivities from a communicator to an 
audience and, in successful cases, a reception and incorporation by the intended 
audience, resulting in a set of appropriate expectations that are supposed to influence 
behavior and, contingently, to alert community enforcement responses when deviations 
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are deemed to threaten public order. All this, of course, is obvious. The problem is how to 
think about it in a way that facilitates understanding and management.93 
Through a jurisprudential orientation that is rooted in a policy-orientated or 
configurative approach, Reisman’s outlook – while very much a part of the New 
Haven school tradition94 – has been labeled by some of his peers as a realistic 
idealism.95 This realistic idealism is captured in an influential article that he 
wrote over thirty years ago titled, Myth System and Operational Code.96 In that 
article, Reisman distinguishes between systems of law that present the official 
picture (myth systems), but that may not be utilized in practice; and the 
unofficial, but nonetheless effective, guidelines or codes that are consistent 
with actual behavior (operational code): 
[w]here myth [idealized systems of legal norms] and code [the real behavior actually 
practiced] coincided with each other and with relevant values, the New Haven School 
recommended fidelity to rules . . . Where myth and code deviated, however, it was 
necessary for a lawyer to consider both and to offer guidance on the normative 
implications of any decision so that good decisions could be made.97 
Rosalyn Higgins, the first woman president of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ), and a devotee of the New Haven school, published a book titled 
Problems and Processes98 whereby she sought to refine and clarify the New 
Haven school’s approach to international law. Like Reisman and other New 
Haven colleagues, Higgins holds that international law is not a system of rules, 
but a normative system produced and maintained through an ongoing process 
of decision: “for law as a process of decisionmaking, this is enough.”99 
Defending against the criticism that the New Haven school conflates law with 
politics,100 Higgins claims that policy considerations are integral to the process 
of lawmaking and lawapplying, but that policy choices are prearticulated and 
not applied ex post facto.101 In this way, policy choices can often be 
distinguished from political choices.  
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3.4.3  Harold Koh and Anne-Marie Slaughter 
Harold Koh and Anne-Marie Slaughter took international legal process in a 
different direction by focusing on the way that domestic law and domestic legal 
institutions influence and shape the way that international rules develop. 
Harold Koh formulated a theory of what he calls transnational legal process.102 
Under such a conceptualization of how and when states comply with and obey 
international law, he holds that there is a reciprocal process of norm 
acceptance that flows back and forth between the national and the 
international; and that states often internalize international legal norms 
through the entrenchment of these norms by governmental elites in the forms 
of domestic legislation, court decisions, and policy declarations.103  
In a similar vein, but incorporating much of the international relations 
theoretical frame into international legal understanding, Anne-Marie Slaughter 
developed a network theory for international law rooted in liberal international 
relations theory.104 Such a theory claims that the idea of the state in 
international affairs is not a monolithic entity speaking with a single voice, but 
rather is a network of domestic and international institutional decisionmaking 
elites and bureaucrats that shape and influence the development of 
international law and international legal institutions through the exchange of 
information.105 In applying a liberalist international relations theory to 
international law, Slaughter’s theory holds that state preferences, rather than 
state power and capacity, are the primary motivators of state behavior.106 As a 
reaction to political realism, her theory claims that states endorse and 
promote particular value (moral) preferences even when state power and 
capacity would allow such value preferences to be ignored.  
 
3.5  Recent Scholarship 
In the most recent wave of international legal theory scholarship, scholars 
such as Mary Ellen O’Connell, Oona Hathaway, Jutta Brunnée, and Tai-Heng 
Cheng, continue to refine and develop theoretical understandings of how, why, 
and when international law matters. In Mary Ellen O’Connell’s monograph, 
The Power and Purpose of International Law,107 she writes a pointed critique of 
the dismissive attitude that power realists such as Jack Goldsmith and Eric 
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Posner108 hold towards international law. Her book aims at explaining how 
international law is real law because it has the power to sanction.109 In this 
way, international law is distinguishable from moral or social rules. Such a 
conceptualization of law provides a modern addendum to early forms of 
positivism such as that of John Austin: even if law is restricted to that which 
is backed by sanction, international law still meets the requirement of law 
properly so called.  
In a similar vein, Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro have developed a theory 
on outcasting in international law.110 As a theory aimed at explaining law 
compliance, outcasting claims that international law is enforceable through 
sanctions that exclude actors from the benefits of international cooperation if 
they fail to comply with the rules consented to by the community of states.111 
The threat of outcasting often compels states to comply with international 
legal norms. It is the inverse of Franck’s theory about the compliance pull of 
international law. While Franck holds that international law is more likely to 
gain compliance when it is perceived as fair and legitimate, a theory of 
outcasting gains a compliance pull by threatening exclusion. What all of these 
more recent theoretical frames indicate is that international law is entering a 
phase where its sophistication requires that theories explain not only what is 
international law, but how and when it works.  
Tai-Heng Cheng, in the tradition of the New Haven school and the specific 
work of his mentor, Michael Reisman, has developed a justificatory theory of 
international law that appears to pull together many strands of theoretical 
scholarship on the idea of international law.112 In his monograph, When 
International Law Works,113 Cheng puts forth a claim that the normative basis 
of international law demands a fidelity to the moral and ethical expectations 
that the global community increasingly demands of international 
decisionmakers. In placing such emphasis on the underlying values to which 
all legal orders ought to aim, he develops a theory for justifying when 
international rules and norms can be deviated from:   
decisionmakers should explain their reasons for disobedience, so that others can decide if 
those are good reasons, and shift their expectations of appropriate conduct for the 
future.114 
In another recent attempt to clarify international law, Jutta Brunnée and 
Stephen Toope have developed what they call an interactional theory of 
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international legal obligation.115 It is a theory that draws heavily on the work 
of mid-century legal philosopher, Lon Fuller. One of Fuller’s primary insights 
into the legal relationship between lawtakers and lawgivers was that it was not 
an oneway street: law is not merely that which is promulgated on high by 
political elites.116 Rather, in a modern state, the law develops through a 
reciprocal relationship between officials and citizens. According to Fuller, the 
projection of authority is interactional in that the legitimacy of legal authority 
comes from the internal acceptance of legal rules by the subjects of the law, 
not just from the acceptance of rules by legal officials making the law (this was 
Hart’s view).117  
An interactional theory of legal obligation places the authority of the law in 
how that authority is understood by those subjected to it. In the international 
sphere, the horizontal legal equality of all states and the structure of 
international relations whereby the state is both the taker and giver of law, an 
interactional theory on the reciprocal nature of legal obligation is even more 
important than in the domestic context. Like most of the international legal 
process theorists and New Haven scholars, an interactional theory of 
obligation places a great emphasis on the normativity of law and the process of 
how shared expectations about value are constructed and sustained. The 
importance of sharing and shaping normative value expectations is a strand 
that permeates all of these theories. The challenge lies in developing 
methodologies for describing and evaluating these value systems in an 
objective manner. All of these theories have to overcome the practical problem 
of value subjectivity in a way that makes their theory applicable to all 
participants and subjects in the international system.  
 
4. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LASSWELL, MCDOUGAL, AND REISMAN 
The New Haven school of jurisprudence, which is also known as policy-
orientated or configurative jurisprudence, is so called because of its 
geographical and intellectual locus of Yale university.118 It started as a 
collaborative effort by two already prominent Yale professors, Harold Lasswell 
(a political scientist) and Myres McDougal (an international lawyer). Lasswell 
and McDougal (and later Michael Reisman) identified a problem: all past 
theoretical frames of inquiry about the law could not adequately explain the 
interaction between law and politics. To overcome such a problem, they 
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wanted to reject the naïve view that there existed a static and autonomous set 
of rules that – if they could just be written down and identified – could 
constrain state behavior. At the same time, they also wanted to reject the legal 
defeatism of the power realist who claimed that state behavior is never 
constrained by the law. In rejecting this naiveté and defeatism, they saw legal 
understanding as a process whereby the law could reflect shared expectations 
and understanding about the values that the world community ought to 
endorse. They wanted to provide a holistic theory about inquiry into the law 
that could clarify the law in terms of the purposive ends it seeks to advance 
and protect: community value goals. To do this, Lasswell, McDougal, and 
Reisman had to formulate a theoretical understanding of the law that could 
hover between legal idealism and political realism: a task that was both 
challenging and innovative. 
 
4.1  The Background 
The question that Lasswell, McDougal, and Reisman were concerned with was: 
whether there was a way, in spite of the defeatism about international law in 
the immediate post-war period, to configure international legal orders that 
could more realistically have the capacity to constrain state behavior – 
something that international law as it was then configured had repeatedly 
failed to do119 – when faced against the onslaught of naked power? Bridging 
this divide and recalibrating law so that it could achieve this objective 
continues to be the lasting legacy of the New Haven school: it is an idea that 
signified a paradigm shift in the way that international law could be 
approached, and it continues to be such a common goal of contemporary 
international legal understanding that is sometimes difficult to see how 
revolutionary the idea was in the late 1940s.   
In the years since, the New Haven school has run the gamut in terms of 
criticism and commendation.120 What began as a hopeful and optimistic vision 
about the power and purpose of international law in creating a world of peace 
and security turned into a metaphor for those claiming that Lasswell and 
McDougal were in fact doing the opposite. Such criticism has continually 
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claimed that the project of the New Haven school was an apology and 
justification for the value positions held by proponents of post-war American 
exceptionalism.121  
In focusing the critiques in this direction, and attempting to discredit the 
theory on the basis of the negative practical implications of value subjectivity 
(or the hubris of value objectivity), critics tended to bypass any meaningful 
insights into the epistemic and methodological value of the theory itself. It has 
been claimed that the application of the New Haven school conflates law with 
politics,122 that its complicated technique and terminology are impossible to 
apply to practice,123 that McDougal used the theory to justify US foreign policy 
preferences,124 and that despite its efforts at scientific objectivity the New 
Haven school’s aim at goal values only encouraged subjective (arbitrary and 
manipulatable) outcomes to legal problems.125  
All of these critiques seem quite unsophisticated upon close reflection. A more 
appropriate and responsible approach to a critique of the New Haven school 
would be to ask whether its nonreductivist and nonpositivist framework of 
inquiry can provide a realistic image of world public order that can sit between 
theories that either seek to reduce legal understanding to a formal set of 
primary rules to which states must be authoritatively bound (legal idealism), 
or a theories that seek to reduce understanding of international affairs to the 
political interests and capacities of the powerful (political realism).  
For many international scholars, there is a gulf between legal idealism and 
political realism and that in between these poles is nothing but open space. 
This means that there is either law (that is, conceived in a positivistic and 
formalistic manner) or power (that is, conceived of as the absence of objective 
and binding law when confronted with political power), and that any other way 
of conceiving the relationship of law and politics is impossible. In general, and 
not in specific reference to the New Haven school, nonpositivist orientations or 
frames about the law (although not conceptual natural law theories) hold that 
there is no void between legal idealism and political realism: international law 
is in many senses a political enterprise.  
                                                            
121 Richard Falk (1995). Casting the Spell: The New Haven School of International Law. Yale Law 
Journal. Vol. 104, pp. 1991, 2001. 
122 Simma & Paulus, supra note 101. 
123 “Some scholars have tried to mock what they have presented as the daunting complexity of 
this approach. In fact, much of its intellectual power lies in its comparative simplicity and the 
extraordinary condensation which its authors achieved. None of the particular tools requires 
one to remember more than eight terms or to count on more than eight fingers. Perhaps those 
who have criticized the theory for complexity may find even this beyond their own resources, 
but they have missed the point by a large margin. Life is complex, and anyone familiar with 
international political life knows that it is extraordinarily so. NHS [New Haven School] has 
developed an economical way of comprehending, addressing and devising strategies that seek to 
change it.” Michael Reisman’s remarks in Weston, supra note 118 at pp. 279-80. 
124 See Richard Falk’s remarks. Id. at p. 281. 
125 See Oscar Schachter’s remarks. Id. at p. 271.  
149 
 
 
4.2  Four Foci for a Theory About Law 
To achieve their goal for a theory about law that could comprehensively map 
social choice, Lasswell, McDougal, and Reisman pursued a theoretical frame 
that was decidedly value-orientated in character. Their approach sought to 
take legal realism with “its critical focus on the interplay between rules and 
social processes in the enunciation of law in authoritative form,”126 and inject 
it with Lasswell’s insights from his policy sciences and communications 
theory, and turn it “into a comprehensive framework of inquiry.”127 Under 
such a conceptualization of law generally, and international law specifically, 
their idea was that the law can be used as a means for achieving social ends 
through a nonreductivist, contextual, and problem- and process-orientated 
understanding that focused on the fundamental (and objectively attainable) 
values that could produce a world public order of human dignity. Lasswell, 
McDougal, and Reisman were the first to attempt to conceptualize 
international law in a way that could overcome the structural argument that 
Koskenniemi would later identify.128 To achieve such a goal, they articulated 
what can be defined as four fundamental foci upon which their theory about 
law would be based.  
 
4.2.1 A Focus on Decision 
First, the New Haven school would be a theory about law that focused on 
decision. Deriving from the natural law tradition and brought forward into the 
modern period primarily by the various legal realist movements of the early 
twentieth century, the focus on decision allows a framework for inquiry about 
law that is not framed in terms of obedience to a particular rule, but as a 
process of making social choices that are relevant for a particular 
community.129 Like the legal realists, the focus of inquiry would be on what 
decisionmakers actually do.130 By shifting the inquiry in this direction, legal 
understanding becomes less about the identification of a set of rules and more 
about the process by which choices are made. The New Haven school sought 
to develop “a functional critique of international law in terms of social ends 
that shall conceive of the legal order as a process and not a condition.”131   
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4.2.2 A Contextual Inquiry 
Second, the New Haven school is nonreductivist and contextually orientated. 
In this way, the theory is a framework for inquiring about the law and not a 
reductivist account of law as something that meets a set of criteria or 
conditions. This aspect of the New Haven school sees law as deeply rooted in 
social context and is attributable to the influence of the Lasswellian policy 
sciences. Law, under such a frame, is a process of shaping and articulating 
social choices through a rigorous and scientific approach to decision. This 
process must be understood in the broader community context: 
[l]egal institutions, which are part of the process of value shaping and sharing, must be 
appraised according to the contributions which they make to value outcomes and 
institutions. In any community, the legal system is but part of a more inclusive system, 
the system of public order, which includes a preferred pattern for the distribution of 
values and a preferred pattern of basic institutions. The appropriate scope of inquiry into 
any legal system is, therefore, to appraise its significance for the system of public order 
which it is expected to fulfill and protect . . . In the aggregate, a legal system is to be 
appraised in terms of the values to be maximized in the total context of public order.132 
 
4.2.3 An Ongoing Process 
Third, the New Haven school defines law as an ongoing process of 
authoritative and controlling decision. Law and decision are not synonymous. 
If they were, decision would be indistinguishable from naked power. Instead:  
only those decisions, i.e., communications with policy, or prescriptive, content, that are 
taken from communitywide perspectives of authority and backed up by control intent, are 
characterized as law. These are decisions that are made by the persons who are expected 
to make them, in accordance with criteria expected by community members, in 
established structures of authority, with sufficient bases in effective power to secure 
consequential control, and by authorized procedures [emphasis in original].133 
The law, according to such a view, must be both authoritative and controlling 
in order to meet the requirements of legality. However, the content of the law is 
also a critical component. According to Reisman:  
while much of general communications may; as I have suggested, be relevant to law 
formation, what is distinctive about prescriptive or lawmaking communications is that 
rather than transmitting a single message, they carry simultaneously three coordinate 
communication flows in a fashion akin to the coaxial cables of modern telephonic 
                                                            
132 Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 21 at pp. 16-17. 
133 Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew Willard (1999). Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Human 
Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity. American 
Journal of International Law. Vol. 93, p. 319. 
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communications. The three flows may be briefly referred to as the policy content, the 
authority signal and the control intention. Unless each of these flows is present and 
effectively mediated to the relevant audience, a prescription does not result. Equally 
important, even if the three components are initially communicated, they must continue 
to be communicated for the prescription, as such, to endure; if one or more of the 
components should cease to be communicated, the prescription undergoes a type of 
desuetude and is terminated.134 
According to these definitions, the law is a process of ongoing communication. 
Law is made by decisions that are both authoritative and controlling. This is a 
dynamic process, whereby the policy content may change over time in order to 
reflect the community goals that the law aims to protect. Policy content, in 
addition to a decision’s authority signal and control intent, must be appraised 
according to its capacity to achieve community goals. Even if authoritative and 
controlling, decisions must contain content in consonance with the 
fundamental goals of the international community to obtain their legalness.135  
  
4.2.4 Goal and Value Orientated 
Fourth, the New Haven school is decidedly goal- and value-orientated. It sees:  
the end of law and the criterion for appraisal of particular decisions [in] their degree of 
contribution to the achievement of a public order of human dignity.136  
The primary jurisprudential and intellectual tasks of the New Haven school are 
the prescription and application of policy in ways that maintain community 
order, and simultaneously achieve the best possible approximation of the 
community’s social goals and values.137  This normative commitment is based 
on what McDougal and Lasswell considered to be a logically exhaustive, but 
empirically open, set of eight core values.138 The values, which are detailed in 
the next sections, are nonhierarchical and represent categories of things that 
all human beings want, cherish, or desire. A world public order of human 
dignity is defined as one which approximates the optimum access by all 
human beings to these values.  
 
                                                            
134 Reisman, supra note 26 at p. 108. 
135 Michael Reisman (1971). Nullity and Revision. New Haven, Yale University Press, p. 562. 
136 Michael Reisman (1999). Theories About Law: Jurisprudence for a Free Society. Yale Law 
Journal. Vol. 108, p. 939. 
137 Reisman, supra note 129 at p. 119. 
138 Michael Reisman, Siegfried Wiessner, & Andrew Willard (2007). The New Haven School: A 
Brief Introduction. Yale Journal of International Law. Vol. 32, pp. 575, 580. 
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4.3  Five Criteria for a Theory About Law 
In order to achieve the goals it sets out for itself theoretically, the New Haven 
school adapts a number of focal lenses from the social sciences:  
a mode of organizing data about various social processes through cultural anthropology’s 
modality of phase analysis and an analytical break-down of the actual components of 
decision.139  
The New Haven school of jurisprudence is organized around five major goal 
criteria: 1) the establishment of observational standpoint, 2) the delimitation 
of the focus of inquiry, 3) the formulation of particular problems for inquiry, 4) 
the explicit postulation of public order goals, and 5) the performance of 
intellectual tasks.140  
 
4.3.1 The Observational Standpoint 
The first goal criterion, the establishment of observational standpoint, 
requires a distinction to be made: 
between the scholarly observer, whose primary concern is for enlightenment, and the 
authoritative decision maker and others whose ultimate interest is in power, in the 
making of effective choices.141  
Such a distinction is critical to a jurisprudence whose focus is on 
authoritative and controlling decision because it requires a clarification 
between the different types of law jobs to which lawyers are tasked. For 
example, a decisionmaker granted the authority to resolve a particular 
problem or conflict must evaluate and respond to a mandate that is aligned 
with the expectations of the parties (participants) involved.142  
The scholar, or legal discourser, on the other hand, seeks to influence and 
shape the work of the legal decisionmaker from the outside. The role of the 
legal discourser, in the context of authoritative and controlling decision, is 
passive (although often highly influential in shaping future decisions), while 
the role is the legal decisionmaker – tasked authoritatively with resolving a 
particular legal problem – is active. Understanding the distinction between 
what the decisionmaker actually does, and what the discourser claims the 
                                                            
139 Id. at p. 576. 
140 Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 21 at pp. 3-4. 
141 Id. at p. 22. 
142 The New Haven school argues that the participants are part of the decisionmaking process 
as well. This work holds that the participants are part of the discourse, note the decisionmaking 
process. Decisionmakers are tasked with making decisions. Participants are not. They are of 
course part of the process of decisionmaking, but they only exert influence over the 
decisionmaker through the discursive process.  
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decisionmaker should do (or should have done), are critical to the framework 
of inquiry about law that the New Haven school seeks to clarify.  
Once one has identified their observational standpoint, the decisionmaker or 
discourser must engage in a psychological self-analysis or self-calibration of 
the perspectives, viewpoints, dispositions, personal histories, and worldviews 
that one brings to these various types of legal endeavors. The decisionmaker or 
discourser must know what role in the social process they are playing, but 
they must also know how one’s values and identities relate to the process of 
inquiry about law. Only once these influencing factors are identified can the 
decisionmaker of discourser be unbiased in his or her approach to the legal 
problem to which they are tasked.143 Reisman states that the importance of 
the observational standpoint:  
arises from the injunction ‘know thyself.’ It addresses the need to examine one’s 
standpoint and commitments and, in particular, to scrutinize the psychological and 
emotional factors that operate on the self. In all social sciences, the ultimate tool for 
perception and evaluation is the self-system itself. That selfsystem is affected by culture, 
class, gender, national group, crisis experience, etc. In the diverse cross-cultural world we 
have just described, it is necessary for those who wish to operate with people who are 
animated by radically different perspectives to make sure they understand themselves 
and the forces operating on and shaping them.144  
 
4.3.2 The Focus of Inquiry 
The second goal criterion for a theory about law is to delimit the focus of 
inquiry. The New Haven school holds that:  
[t]he broadest reach of an appropriately contextual, configurative, policy-orientated 
jurisprudence must extend to the whole of the social and community processes in which 
authoritative decision is an interacting component; yet a viable theory must offer 
concepts and procedures which will facilitate a focus in whatever precision may be 
necessary upon particular decisions and particular flows of decisions. The principal 
emphases of a focus of the required comprehensiveness and selectivity are not difficult to 
formulate. The central spotlight in such a focus will be empirically and explicitly upon 
authoritative decision. Decision will be observed as effective choice, composed of both 
perspectives and operations. Perspectives will be seen to include expectations about both 
authority and control, and inquiry will be made about both patterns of authority and 
control in fact. Law will be regarded not merely as a set of rules or as isolated decision, 
but as a continuous process of authoritative decision, including both the constitutive and 
public order decisions by which a community’s policies are made and remade. This 
processes of authoritative decision in any particular community will be seen to be an 
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integral part, in an endless sequence of cause and effects, of the whole social process of 
the community. Every particular community will, finally, be observed to affect, and be 
affected by, a whole complex of parallel and concentric, interpenetrating communities, 
from local through regional to global.145  
To delimit such a focus of inquiry, the policy-orientated jurisprudence 
demands: 1) a balanced emphasis on perspectives (the subjectivities and 
viewpoints that attend choice about preferred claims to value) and operations 
(the choices actually made and enforced by threats or promises of high 
indulgence), 2) clarity in conception of both authority and control, 3) 
comprehensiveness in the conception of processes of authoritative decision 
(requiring a distinction between constitutive decision and public order 
decisions), 4) the relation of law to social process (requiring distinctions to be 
made between public order and civic order, and between minimum and 
optimum world order), and 5) the relation of law to its larger community 
context.146  
The delimitation of the focus of inquiry is important because:  
it affects the comprehensiveness and realism (contextuality) of inquiry, the manageability 
with which problems are formulated, and the effectiveness with which different 
intellectual tasks can be performed. In this perspective, all law is conceived not simply as 
traditional rules, but in more comprehensive terms, as decision, composed of both 
perspective and operations; as authoritative decision, combining elements of authority 
and control; and not as occasional choices, but as the continuous process of authoritative 
decision, both maintaining the constitutive features by which it is established and 
projecting a flow of public order decisions for shaping and sharing of community values 
[emphasis in original].147 
In focusing on decision and its relation to social process, the New Haven 
school requires a dissection of decision, which it divides into seven distinct 
functions that are present in all decisionmaking: 1) the intelligence function 
(the gathering and dissemination of information relevant to decision), 2) the 
promotion function (the active advocacy of policy alternatives), 3) the 
prescription function (the projection of community process that is both 
authoritative and controlling), 4) the invoking function (the provisional 
characterization of events in terms of a prescription), 5) the application 
function (the relation of community prescriptions to particular events, with 
sanctions), 6) the termination function (putting an end to prescriptions and 
arrangements made in accordance with prescriptions), and 7) the appraisal 
                                                            
145 Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 21 at pp. 24-25. 
146 Id. at pp. 25-32. 
147 Reisman, Wiessner, & Willard, supra note 138 at pp. 579-80. 
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function (the intelligence function focused upon past decision and decision 
process, including ascription of responsibility).148  
 
4.3.3 The Identification of Particular Problems 
The third goal criterion for a theory about law is the identification and 
formulation of particular problems for inquiry. According to Lasswell and 
McDougal:  
[i]n any community there may be observed a continuous flow of deprivations and 
nonfulfillments in the shaping and sharing of the values which constitute both the 
internal social process of that particular community and the larger, external processes of 
the more comprehensive global community. In consequence of this flow of deprivations 
and nonfulfillments, many different participants in such social process, in equal 
continuity, make claims to the established decision makers of the community for the 
minimization and amelioration of such deprivations and nonfulfillment and for the better 
securing and protection of their participation in such process.149 
The problems of any community and its individual members that requires 
authoritative decision consists of disparities and achievement in the shaping 
and sharing of all values.150  
A problem- and context-orientated jurisprudence such as the New Haven 
school requires that inquiry into particular problems ought to be formulated 
according to an anthropological view of global community social processes, 
which can analyze specific problems and contexts through seven phases: 1) 
participants (who acted in varying roles that culminated in a particular 
outcome?), 2) perspectives (what were the subjective expectations and value 
demands of participants and who did they identify with?), 3) situations (where 
and under what conditions were the participants interacting?), 4) base value 
(what effective means and resources were at the disposal of participants to 
achieve their objective?), 5) strategies (in what ways were these means 
manipulated?), 6) outcomes (what was the immediate result of this interaction 
for value allocation), and 7) effects (what are the effects, of differing duration, 
of the process and outcome).151 
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4.3.4 The Postulation of Public Order Goals 
The fourth goal criterion for a theory about law is the explicit postulation of 
public order goals. This fourth criterion is the goal- or policy-orientated aspect 
of the New Haven school of jurisprudence. It calls for law to be shaped by 
community values through the process of authoritative and controlling 
decision. The postulation and clarification of public order goals should be 
emphasized in contradistinction to their derivation. The comprehensive set of 
goal values that are recommended for clarification and implementation are 
those that are characterized as the basic values of human dignity.  
A public order of human dignity is defined as one which approximates the 
optimum access by all human beings to all things they cherish: 1) power, 2) 
wealth, 3) enlightenment, 4) skill, 5) well-being, 6) affection, 7) respect, and 8) 
rectitude.152 By postulating a universal goal of human dignity as the 
benchmark to which all policy goals should be measured, the New Haven 
school of jurisprudence postulates the values to which all goals and policy 
formulations should aim. By claiming that there are base values to which all 
public order goals in international law ought to aim, the New Haven school 
deviates from the position – common in many postmodern formulations of 
value subjectivity – that values cannot be accessed empirically as objective 
phenomena that ought to be pursued regardless of individual preference, self-
interest, or opinion.  
 
4.3.5 The Performance of Intellectual Tasks 
The final and fifth goal criterion for a theory about law according to the New 
Haven founders is the guidelines for the performance of intellectual tasks. It is 
a process of articulating how decisions ought to be made in the context of 
larger social phenomena. For understanding, describing, and evaluating the 
law, the New Haven school recommends five tasks: 1) the clarification of 
community policies, 2) the description of past trends in decision, 3) the 
analysis of factors affecting decision, 4) the projection of future trends, and 5) 
the invention and evaluation of policy alternatives.153 This fifth goal criterion:  
is a prescriptive framework for the performance of optimally rational decision-making . . . 
The rationale is that in making a decision of any importance one needs to take into 
account all available knowledge and probabilities and all possible alternatives before 
selecting that alternative which maximizes all the objectives of the decision-maker. This 
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ideal model was suggested by Dewey, among others, and it continues to characterize most 
systematic approaches to decision-making.154  
 
4.4 A Nonpositivist Jurisprudence 
With its four defining attributes and its five criteria for a theory about law, the 
New Haven school has many aspects in common with philosophic pragmatism. 
In the history of legal philosophy, the New Haven school is also located among 
theoretical orientations that can be broadly categorized as nonpositivist. A core 
critique of nonpositivist theories about law from positivist theorists is that 
values cannot always be articulated in a way that qualify as empirically 
observable and objective fact.155 Without an objective means for understanding 
human values and the goals to which they aim, nonpositivist theories about 
law are criticized (often crudely) as not be able to meet the objective mandate 
of law. These critiques hold that the purpose of the law is to overcome 
arbitrariness and power prerogative; and that this can only be achieved if law 
claims objectivity. The entire function of the law, these critiques state, is to 
avoid the problems of subjective self-interest. To overcome this problem, all 
nonpositivist frames of inquiry must be able to justify the use and application 
of subjective value goals156 in a way that meets the legal goals of objectivity. It 
is this process of conversion that presents the greatest challenge to all legal 
theory in the postmodern era.  
To address this challenge, the jurisprudence of the New Haven school adapts 
the methods of inquiry developed in the social sciences and applies them to 
the prescriptive purposes of the law. They use a multi-method approach for 
comprehensively mapping social choice. It seeks to develop intellectual tools 
for bringing about changes in the social process in a manner that will provide 
a world public order that most closely approximates the goals of a universal 
value of human dignity. As such, normative concerns are explicitly considered 
and included in the criteria of legal validity. To overcome the uncertainty (or 
subjectivity) that such an approach may yield, the New Haven school chose: 
                                                            
154 Fredrick Tipson (1973). The Lasswell-McDougal Enterprise: Toward a World Public Order of 
Human Dignity. Virginia Journal of International Law. Vol. 14, pp. 535, 574-75. 
155 According to Falk, “[t]o posit a comprehensive framework of the McDougal and Lasswell 
variety is to suppress difference, and to suppose that rational value categories can achieve 
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to focus, as the realists did, on what decisionmakers ought to do in response to legal 
rules, but New Haven scholars [also] proposed a unique approach to deciding what to do 
by taking into account basic values and not just self-interest.157  
As stated, the New Haven school defines law comprehensively as an ongoing 
process of authoritative and controlling decision. This includes both the 
constitutive process by which law is made and applied, and the flow of public 
order decisions for the shaping and sharing of all values. The constitutive 
process of a community refers to those decisions which identify and 
characterize the different authoritative decisionmakers, specify and clarify 
basic community policies, allocate bases of authority for sanctioning purposes, 
and authorize procedures for making decisions.158 The constitutive process 
may be analogized to the secondary rules in Hartian legal positivism. The 
constitutive process for the New Haven school is the process by which law is 
made, applied, interpreted, and changed by authoritative decisionmakers over 
time. 
All combined, the New Haven school of jurisprudence provide a comprehensive 
framework of inquiry for describing and evaluating legal decisions in 
community context. It is not a theory of adjudication but a theory about how 
to make effective choices about the right distribution of values that are shared 
by a particular legal community. This idea is based in a claim that knowledge, 
real knowledge, is produced through systematic approaches to knowledge and 
truth. While not explicitly a theory that is derived from the basic tenants of 
philosophic pragmatism, the New Haven school implicitly relies on a number 
of insights that were developed by Dewey, Pierce, and others in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. One of the major insights of the 
philosophical pragmatists was in the claim that knowledge, scientific or 
otherwise, required judgments to be made; and that these judgments could be 
accessed rationally. In other words, all knowledge is subjective, but that does 
not mean that it cannot be capable of objective reflection through rational 
processes.  
 
5. SHARED SUBJECTIVITY IN CONFIGURATIVE JURISPRUDENCE 
Knowledge about value subjectivity is particularly important for nonpositivist 
frames of inquiry because such frames hold that values can play a role in 
determining legal validity. This means that, in addition to verifying the source 
of a particular rule or law as authoritative, the legality of a particular entity is 
also determined according to whether or not such a legal entity is achieving 
the goal values it aims to secure and protect. This role for value inquiry in 
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legal thought is an important aspect of policy-orientated jurisprudence. 
Shared value subjectivity is a way of conceptually understanding knowledge 
about values as both subjective and objective. While value configurations will 
vary from individual from individual, they are also shared more often than not. 
Instead of calling these shared values as objective, the New Haven school 
prefers the term shared subjectivities. Why are these shared subjectivities 
important? Subjectivities are participant perspectives. Perspectives are all the 
demands, identities, and expectations that participants in a legal community 
have. These include claims to values. They are subjective because they are the 
subject who holds them. One of the goals of the New Haven school is to 
provide sophisticated methods for understanding these perspectives.  
One such method for improving understanding about perspective is Q 
methodology. Often perspectives manifest themselves as empirically 
observable phenomena such as speech acts, signs, symbols, and the like. 
However, just as often, one’s perspective is an empirically unobservable 
phenomenon hidden from view by human consciousness. It is these 
unobservable phenomena that Q methodology can make observable. It 
therefore may be a very useful method for understanding the law according to 
any frame of inquiry. However, the New Haven school is particularly well-
suited for projects that aim at improved knowledge about subjectivities. 
Additionally, a partial reason for proposing the integration of Q methodology 
into the framework of inquiry developed by the New Haven school is because it 
is an idea suggested by New Haven scholars themselves.159 There are four 
references in the literature to the application of Q methodology in international 
jurisprudential thought, but they come exclusively from two New Haven 
thinkers.160 This is not to say that the idea of improving knowledge about 
shared value subjectivities through a scientific and empirical methodology 
such as Q methodology could not be applied to many jurisprudential frames. It 
most certainly can. Perspective is important in any legal theory, and in this 
way, Q methodology could provide fresh insight into many areas of legal 
inquiry that traditional thinkers may exclude as being too ‘subjective.’ Q 
methodology allows the observer to look at these subjective aspects of inquiry 
in a manner that is objective and empirically observable.     
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CHAPTER 5 
A THEORY OF CONFIGURATIVE FAIRNESS 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A theory of configurative fairness is an application of Rawlsian political theory 
to jurisprudential thought as built on the framework of inquiry developed by 
the configurative jurisprudence of the New Haven school of international law. 
It is a theory for the construction and configuration of fair legal orders 
developed from the premise that law is the result of an ongoing communicative 
process of authoritative and controlling decision whereby values are shaped 
and shared in a manner that participants (both lawgivers and lawtakers) of a 
particular legal community do (or would) endorse or agree to. A theory of 
configurative fairness seeks to address the problem related to the development 
or evolution of legal regimes, and how legal regimes perceived as subjectively 
unfair can be remedied.  
Such a theory accepts the premise that perceptions of fairness matter in 
directing the way that the law develops, and that perceptions of fairness relate 
to the manner in which values are distributed and maximized in particular 
legal orders. It is posited that laws perceived as fair by its participants are 
more likely to be endorsed or accepted as legally binding, and are therefore 
more likely to comply with the processes and outcomes that such a legal order 
mandates. In the international system, where there is no single entity that has 
a monopoly on the mechanisms of violence, it is critical for the authority and 
control mechanisms of legal orders to require that – absent the application of 
naked power – the rules and principles that govern the resolution of 
international legal problems are considered as fair and legitimate by those 
subject to the rights and duties that a particular legal order compels.  
Up to this point, a foundation for a theory of configurative fairness has been 
laid by looking at: the structure of the distinctions made between fact and 
value in general philosophic inquiry,1 the importance of value judgments in 
both the descriptive and evaluative work of legal theories,2 and the difficulty of 
separating the political from the legal in the structure of international legal 
understanding.3 In doing this, it is also claimed that values matter in 
determining the developmental path that legal orders take, and that although 
subjective,4 value knowledge is the product of rational thought processes, and 
                                                            
1 See Chapter 2. 
2 See Chapter 3. 
3 See Chapter 4. 
4 Subjective in the sense in the sense that value perspectives emerge from the internal makeup 
of the individual, state, or institution espousing them. 
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that the outcomes of these value processes can be accessed in terms of the 
way that individual human beings share rational convictions and beliefs about 
particular value orientations in a particular community context.5 These shared 
subjectivities, through the use of Q methodology, can be made empirically 
observable and thus accessible for inquiry and analysis. This knowledge about 
shared value subjectivities can be obtained without any need to prove whether 
these shared values are metaphysically existent and true.6 This point concedes 
that even if definitive and objective truth claims about value are elusive, one 
can improve knowledge about values through empirical methodologies that 
aim at observing the shared subjectivities of the participants in a particular 
legal order.  
All of this is critical to a theory of configurative fairness because such a theory 
claims that if value perspectives (identities, demands, and expectations) are an 
important consideration for framing any viable theory about law, then one 
must be able to determine a method and theory for both understanding and 
taking value perspectives seriously. It is claimed that legal orders that are 
consistent and compatible with the value perspectives of the participants who 
use the regime, the more likely that they will be perceived as legitimate and 
fair. Such a theory claims that legal orders that are accepted as fair and 
legitimate are more likely to be accepted and complied with.  In other words, 
the only way that a legal order can be accessed in terms of its fairness is 
through an evaluation of the underlying value distribution that such laws 
support. 
In the postmodern era, there is deep skepticism that such subjectivities can 
ever be brought to light in a systematic and determinate manner; and yet, it is 
an empirically observable fact that legal orders – in their purpose as 
mechanisms for regulating social behavior – are built on a foundation about 
what members of a community or society claim to value. In this way, all law is 
a human construct, and although there is deep disagreement on the ways in 
which the law is constructed and configured in postmodern societies, law can 
                                                            
5 Shared value subjectivities are configured through community discourse as a form of public 
reason. This intersubjective discourse, combined with the rational capacity of the mind, will 
produce a finite number of shared worldviews and viewpoints. While this hypothesis can be 
empirically verified through the use of Q methodology (i.e. it can be verified that perspectives are 
shared despite their subjectivity), it cannot get us much closer to verify whether those shared 
perspectives actually exist as objective truths. However, to advance knowledge about shared 
perspectives, a full blown theory of justice does not need to be developed.  
6 A theory of configurative fairness focuses on the ability to measure shared value perspectives 
in the context of legal development. This is significantly narrower than theories attempting to 
prove the idea of justice. However, a theory of configurative fairness will work, if and only if: 1) it 
is assumed that value perspectives do actually exist (where and how they exist is of less 
concern), 2) it is assumed that what human beings value can be accessed internally with the 
human mind through processes of configuration and justification, and 3) it is assumed that 
community value goals can change over time through processes of external discourse and 
dialogue with other human beings (communicative action). In other words, value knowledge is 
the product of two processes: internal rationalism (communication with yourself) and external 
discourse (communication with others). 
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be seen as a tool for authoritatively guiding human behavior around values 
that are shared. If this underlying claim about the structural importance of 
value in any legal order is true, then a theoretical focus on the fairness of 
value distribution and value maximization becomes central in both evaluating 
the law as it is, and how it ought to be. However, by labeling values as 
subjective, there is an inherent skepticism as to whether values can ever be 
determined in a manner that fits within the mandate of legal objectivity.  
In a way then, gaining knowledge about those values that are shared among a 
group of human beings is a claim about the shared subjectivity of value as 
means of making value knowledge objective. This understanding of value 
theory is essential to an understanding of fairness in the context of legal 
inquiry. A theory of configurative fairness is agnostic about the metaphysics of 
value, but optimistic about the objectivity of value epistemology as shared 
subjectivity. The following section will look at why this conceptualization of 
value knowledge allows for a distinction between justice and fairness, and why 
a theory of configurative fairness is not a theory of configurative justice. 
According to the value theory endorsed in this work, the fairness of a 
particular rule, principle, or norm is one that comports with one’s own 
reflective configuration of the values that he or she deems important. These 
kinds of evaluations are sometimes observable, but just as likely they are 
empirically unobservable processes of the deliberating mind. The fairness of a 
legal order is an evaluative enterprise that requires inquiry into two aspects of 
knowledge: 1) it requires an evaluation of the actual distribution of value in a 
particular legal order, and 2) it requires a critical evaluation about how these 
actual distributions comport with the value perspectives held by those 
accepting that legal order as authoritative and binding. This knowledge will 
allow the observer to know what configuration of value is fair according to the 
finite population of participants of a particular legal order.  
At this point, however, one may be legitimately asking whether such value 
perspectives can ever be known given their nonfactual and subjective 
structure. To give value perspectives an objective character, empirical 
methodologies for gaining value knowledge must be employed. While there are 
various qualitative methods for describing and evaluating such subjective 
perspectives, this work claims that the use of Q methodology can significantly 
advance the process of epistemically objectifying value in jurisprudential 
thought. Q methodology, which will be described in detail in the following 
Chapter, allows for the scientific and objective measurement of first-person 
subjectivity.  
The objectivity is derived from the empirical mapping of perspectives and 
viewpoints as they relate to the underlying values that form the foundation of 
any legal order. While not able to determine the objective truth of values in the 
ontological or metaphysical sense, Q methodology allows for the empirical 
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measurement of value perspectives. The shared subjectivities that emerge from 
any Q method study will give a factual character to values in the empirical and 
epistemic sense of factual objectivity. Without making claims to the ontological 
truth about the particular values that are endorsed by participants and 
decisionmakers of a legal order, knowledge about shared subjectivities can 
permit the legal scholar to configure laws as subjectively fair, but not 
necessarily objectively just (metaphysically speaking). 
A theory of configurative fairness is a theory for creating and maintaining fair 
legal orders in the context of the development of international law. Achieving 
this theoretical goal requires that a distinction between justice and fairness be 
made. It also requires a definition of fairness in the context of value 
configuration, and an explanation as to why an agreement on the proper 
distribution of values in the context of legal order development is a critical 
component in achieving fairness and legitimacy. The following sections will 
seek to explain configurative fairness as distinct from more general theories of 
justice, and why fairness as overlapping value consensus is important in the 
context of evolving international legal orders. As a theory of configurative 
fairness is a theory in the constructivist tradition, the second major part of 
this Chapter will explain constructivism as understood in different disciplines. 
The final part of the Chapter will look specifically at how a theory of 
configurative fairness can work in legal practice and how the empirical 
improvement of value knowledge through the use of Q methodology can assist 
in configuring fair legal orders.    
 
2. FAIRNESS VERSUS JUSTICE 
Why fairness as opposed to justice? In everyday discourse, the ideas of justice 
and fairness have the capacity to be used in conjunction with each other, or 
even as interchangeable concepts. However, a theory of configurative fairness 
is not a theory of configurative justice because the former does not make 
ontological claims about the truthaptness of the good and the right, and the 
latter does. In other words, a key tenet of any theory of justice is a claim about 
knowing what is right or what is good.7 A theory of configurative fairness is not 
concerned with determining what is objectively right or good. Instead, a theory 
of configurative fairness is focused on the configuration of value claims and 
demands that users of a particular legal order consider to be fair. It is claimed 
that this can be done even if everybody using a particular legal order is 
theoretically wrong about what is right or good. In all likelihood, however, the 
values upon which fair laws are configured will approximate the ‘right’ 
                                                            
7 Nigel Simmonds (2008). Central Issues in Jurisprudence, Third Edition. London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, p. 10. 
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distribution,8 but a theory of configurative fairness cannot guarantee such a 
claim. This is because there are no metaphysical claims being made about 
what constitutes the right or the good. A fair legal order may not be a just one. 
A theory of configurative fairness is primarily concerned with the ordering of 
value claims, demands, and expectations in a manner that participants in a 
particular legal order would consider to be fair.  
 
2.1  Distinctions Between Fairness and Justice 
To understand fairness in this context, there are a few different ways that the 
distinction between fairness and justice can be conceptualized. One way is in 
claiming that a theory of justice is an attempt at determining how human 
beings ought to treat their own lives and the lives of others. It is a concept 
about what constitutes moral and ethical goodness (the correctness of values). 
A theory about fairness, on the other hand, is an attempt at determining the 
proper distribution of goods and values as they relate to human beings in their 
interaction with other human beings.9 In many ways, it is easy to see how 
these ideas can be used interchangeably. It is often the case that that which is 
just is fair, and that which is fair is just. However, under this type of 
definitional conceptualization of justice and fairness, a distinction can be 
drawn between these two ideas when a claim about the moral correctness or 
rightness of a value conflicts with a claim about the how that value should be 
properly distributed among members of a society. Such a situation could arise 
when an individual or society understands a particular value distribution as 
fair, but outsiders condemn the distribution as objectively and universally 
unjust.10 In this way, it is possible for a just law to fail to constitute a fair law; 
and vice versa.  
A second way to conceptualize the distinction between justice and fairness 
relates to the distinction between process and outcome in the context of legal 
theory. Justice and fairness in this way are divided into procedural fairness 
and substantive justice. Procedural fairness refers to the processes by which 
legal rules are determined; it is about making and applying the law in a 
                                                            
8 This is a prominent feature of many rationality-based justice theories. The main claim is to 
hold that all rational beings have the capacity to know the right and the good. This means that 
the sharing of a particular value configuration is not a coincidence, but is evidence of universal 
and objective norms or good that are produced through the rational faculty. 
9 These are primarily theories of distributive justice that focus on the fair allocation of resources 
among individuals in a particular community. Many distributive theories are based on the 
underlying value of equality. 
10 This situation suggests the problem with relative truth in political theory and community 
practices. If a community, through its traditions and histories, believe that a particular practice 
is fair, then it is also assumed to be right or good according to many postmodern social theories. 
However, this is more difficult to sustain philosophically when a particular community practice 
– while perceived as fair by those subjected to such practices – deviates from some claims about 
a universal standard of what constitutes an objectively just practice. 
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manner that is considered to meet a certain standard of legitimacy and 
fairness.11 The product of a fair process will normally produce just outcomes, 
but not necessarily. Substantive justice, on the other hand, is concerned with 
measuring the final outcome of a particular legal problem according to a 
certain standard of what is considered to be just. It is focused on how 
particular substantive outcomes comport with abstract or idealized and 
objective notions of justice. Theories of procedural fairness generally claim 
that so long as the process is right and fair, then the particular outcome need 
not meet any objective criteria for it to be considered an acceptable or fair 
result.12  
A third way of conceptualizing the distinction between justice and fairness is 
the one that is being utilized in this work. It is a claim about the idea of 
subjective justice as objectively observable fairness: a theoretical claim about 
fairness being the construction of a political or legal order around the values 
that members of a community or society would agree to under a set of 
conditions (a subjectively constructed – or configured – consensus). The idea of 
fairness – under the conceptualization used in this work – is only subjectively 
true in the ontological sense. In other words, it is true if the individual believes 
it to be so. However, this is only one part of the theory. To make the knowledge 
about value more than mere preference or feeling (subjectivity in the negative 
sense), a theory of configurative fairness requires that shared value 
subjectivities must become known.  
While still being subjective, such a notion requires an overlapping consensus 
about value. This brings value knowledge closer to objectivity (that is, all 
participants would agree to a particular configuration and thus making it 
appear to be objective). However, while this provides a sufficient basis for a fair 
configuration of value in a manner that users of a particular legal order would 
consider fair, it does not demonstrate that the values that are endorsed by a 
particular community are objectively true, right, or good. In practical terms, 
however, an identification of the values that are shared and endorsed by a 
community of actors will likely reflect not only a fair configuration, but a just 
one as well. The reasons why this is likely the case requires an understanding 
of the work of John Rawls and his construction of a theory of justice based on 
the capacity of human reason to know what is objectively just.  
                                                            
11 Normally, this standard is reflected in the ideas of due process and legitimacy (authority plus 
fairness and inclusivity). 
12 In Tom Tyler’s research, he has been able to show, through empirical research, that 
participants in a particular legal order want the procedures of the law to meet a certain 
standard of fairness more than they want the outcomes of the law to meet a certain standard of 
justice. See Tom Tyler (1990). Why People Obey the Law. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
p. 4. 
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2.2 Justice as Fairness 
John Rawls holds that his theory about justice13 (justice as fairness) is built 
not on a metaphysical conception of justice, but on a political conception.14 It 
is a theory of justice that claims that values can be determined through fair 
processes and distributions based on a minimal postulation of objective justice 
that all rational beings would endorse.15 He does this to bypass the problem 
that such a theory is based on value determinations that are merely the 
product of subjective preference or self-interest.16 Rawls holds that there are 
some basic ontological truths about value construction that all individuals 
would endorse using their rational faculties. He calls these values the basic 
structure of a just society17 and employs a thought experiment18 for 
determining such principles. He calls this limited approach his ‘thin theory of 
the good:’ it is a minimal claim about universal and objective moral truth 
based on human reason.19 It can demonstrate, he believes, why individuals 
would chose his two principles of justice in the original position, and that 
these two principles are objectively and universally true. 
Acknowledging that value distribution in societies and communities change 
over time, and that such a contextual and postmodern perspective makes an 
absolute and universal declaration about the metaphysical truth of moral and 
ethical values seem ill-founded, Rawls claims that human rationality would 
always choose his two basic principles of justice when behind the ‘veil of 
ignorance.’20 While this is an unprovable supposition about the metaphysical 
truth of such a claim, it serves a practical function. In many ways, Rawls idea 
about the foundation of his thin theory of the good mirrors the postulated 
values of human dignity in the New Haven jurisprudence.21 While both 
theories claim that justice and human dignity are objectively determinable, 
they do so based on assumptions, not absolute proof. While this has always 
been a source of criticism in both theories, it is necessary from a practical 
perspective in building a theory about what constitutes the ‘right’ distribution 
of value in a particular context. The alternative would be to develop a theory 
about justice or law that is built on a foundation of abstract notions of 
                                                            
13 John Rawls (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 
14 John Rawls & Erin Kelly (2001). Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, p. 7. 
15 Simmonds, supra note 7 at pp. 66-67. 
16 This is a reference to subjectivity as it is used in the negative sense: what conscious beings 
value are merely those entities which they desire through the motivation of rational self-interest. 
Rawls distinguishes between the ‘rational’ and the ‘reasonable’ in order to differentiate between 
values that could be rationally endorsed out of self-interests, but that would nonetheless be 
unreasonable when attempts at public justification are made. 
17 These are the two principles of justice that form the basis of his theory of justice as fairness. 
See Section 4.3.1 of this Chapter. 
18 This is the ‘veil of ignorance’ in the original position. See Section 4.3.1 of this Chapter. 
19 Simmonds, supra note 7 at pp. 66-69.  
20 Id. at pp. 81-85. 
21 See Chapter 4, Section 4.3.4. 
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injustice, unfairness, or human indignity. For good reasons, a theory about 
law or justice built on abstract notions of human dignity and justice seems a 
better course than the aforementioned alternative.22  
However, part of the rationale for developing a theory of configurative fairness 
is that it bypasses the necessity of even these kinds of idealizations or 
suppositions. A theory of configurative fairness is not as concerned with 
justice as it is with perceptions of fairness (which, however, in practical terms 
will often overlap). As stated, and in contrast to a theory of configurative 
fairness, the Rawlsian approach to justice is not completely agnostic about the 
ontological, objective, and universal truth about values. Instead, he claims 
that justice is a political and practical construct that rational and reasonable 
human agents in a liberal society would agree to.23 His theory attempts to 
chart a middle way between value skepticism and value universality. To do 
this, he formulates a theory of justice as fairness whereby fairness is the ‘right’ 
distribution of values in a particular society or community as determined by 
right (rational) thinking members of that society or community through an 
impartial process of value determination and distribution: justice is a fair 
starting point for determining public political values.24  
While such a theory is built at a high level of idealization, the basic idea is that 
there is a practical and political means by which a liberal society can 
determine the right distribution of values. In this way, it is a theory of justice 
as both objective and subjective justice (which he calls fairness). For Rawls, 
the subjectivness of justice is not akin to arbitrariness or some other form of 
emotivism or moral antirealism; rather, it is subjective in the sense that the 
just distribution of values is rooted in the rational capacity to make choices 
about the ways that particular values ought to be distributed in a society. It is 
an objective theory of justice because it is built on a foundation of two 
principles of justice that he believes are capable of being universally true. 
From this objective foundation, Rawls claims that individuals living in a 
diverse society can make choices about particular values and their distribution 
in that society.  
While highly influenced by the Rawlsian conceptualization of justice as 
fairness, a theory of configurative fairness does not go quite this far. It does 
not make any claims (even minimal) about the ontological truth of justice. 
Instead, it claims that fairness is the configuration of value distribution that 
human beings would agree to in the context of a particular legal order to 
which they are subject. It does not make any claims to whether or not the 
values that human beings choose are objectively and ontologically true, or 
                                                            
22 This is a major tenet of Amartya Sen (2011). The Idea of Justice. Cambridge, Belknap Press. 
23 Rawls believes that this can only be accomplished if there is a foundational claim (his two 
principles of justice) that sets out the criteria for a fair system of cooperation upon which 
particular values in a liberal society can be agreed.  
24 Rawls, supra note 14 at pp. 5-6. 
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whether they are morally right or wrong. In this way, it is a theory about 
fairness configured according to knowledge about shared value subjectivities 
in a particular context. A theory of configurative fairness is a theory of legal 
fairness that is defined as what value distribution and maximization a right 
thinking community of actors would agree to through the employ of an 
ongoing process of value discourse.  
 
3. WHY FAIRNESS MATTERS  
The previous section attempted to explain the parameters for a discourse on 
what constitutes the concept of fairness and justice, and where and how such 
ideas might exist in the context of human social understanding. The next 
question to ask is: why care about fairness in the context of legal orders? It 
would seem that if the description of legal validity is not contingent on moral 
or ethical value, then there would be no reason for considerations of justice or 
fairness to be something that forms an integral component of what is, or 
ought, to be considered the law. This type of legal understanding and its 
relation to justice and fairness is exclusively aimed at conceptual theories 
about what constitutes legal validity. It is the age old argument that validly 
recognized laws can be unjust and that the unjustness of the law does not 
make it any more or less valid as law. While this is a debatable issue, and 
forms one of the core debates in modern analytic legal philosophy, it is distinct 
in many ways to the description and evaluation of the content of legal, social, 
and political norms. The development or evolution of legal orders does not 
occur in a conceptual vacuum. The process of determining the fairness of legal 
rules and processes is thus concerned with the way that legal rules and 
processes are perceived by the participants to which the legal order aims. The 
issue then, in practical terms, and in terms of why fairness should or does 
matter, is in how such an idea can be used to configure the content of laws in 
a way that is acceptable to its participants.  
For most conceptual legal theorists, a legal rule is one that has been created 
by a legitimate authority and that such a rule is posited as intending to create 
a legal obligation. The actual content of the law is less important than knowing 
its pedigree or source. However, the purpose of making this distinction 
between legal concept and legal content is to place a theory of configurative 
fairness in the context of its purpose. It is not a conceptual theory for 
determining legal validity;25 it is rather a theory for determining legal content. 
Fairness thus matters in the context of legal inquiry in two important ways, 
both of which relate to the evaluation of the legal content that makes up the 
                                                            
25 However, as noted in the previous Chapter, there are subjective aspects even in the 
determination of legal validity (such as the sense of obligation) and it is these aspects that may 
also benefit from theoretical approaches that seek to improve subjectivity and value more 
generally in legal theory. 
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procedural and substantive rules of any legal order. First, fairness matters as 
a standard of evaluation for legal content (substance). Second, fairness 
matters as a standard of evaluation for the process by which legal content is 
determined (process). Knowing what users of a particular legal order consider 
to be fair legal content and fair legal process are important epistemic goals for 
a theory of configurative fairness. 
 
3.1 Thomas Franck’s Fairness 
In looking to determine how legal content and legal processes can be accessed 
in terms of their fairness, an exposition of Thomas Franck’s account of 
fairness in international law is warranted.26 His philosophical account27 of 
legal fairness is important in understanding why a theory of configurative 
fairness is concerned with the content and processes of legal rules, norms, 
and procedures; and why perceptions of fairness are especially important in 
the context of international legal development. His account of the international 
legal system focuses of its fairness and how the legitimacy and fairness of both 
legal process and content are essential to understanding how a legal order can 
make demands for both stability and change.28 He claims that at the 
international level, the lack of domestic-style enforcement mechanisms means 
that the law must be perceived as fair and legitimate by those to which the law 
is subjected. To do this, Franck focuses on a constructivist account of 
international law that contemplates a process by which fair legal systems can 
be developed. His theory, like that of the New Haven school, is normative in 
orientation. This means that, for Franck, the law must be accessed according 
to how well it comports with his notion of fairness.29  
According to Franck’s account, the description of any legal order must be done 
in the context of how the evaluation of the processes and substantive rules 
and principles comport with his standard of fairness. Frank holds that the 
fairness of any legal order requires an evaluation of two distinct components: 
1) fairness as procedural legitimacy and 2) fairness as distributive justice.30 
Combined, these components constitute fairness in the legal context. Franck 
claims that the importance of fairness in these two respects corresponds to the 
following needs:  
                                                            
26 Thomas Franck (1995). Fairness in International Law and Institutions. Oxford, OUP. 
27 Some scholars claim Franck’s theory about international law to fall within the constructivist 
tradition. See Richard Steinberg & Jonathan Zasloff (2006). Power and International Law. 
American Journal of International Law. Vol. 100, pp. 64, 82. Others have categorized Franck’s 
work as a ‘philosophical’ account of international law. See Harold Koh (1997). Why Do Nations 
Obey International Law? Yale Law Journal. Vol. 106, pp. 2599, 2637. 
28 Franck, supra note 26 at p. 7. 
29 For a critique of Franck’s notion of fairness, see John Tasioulas (2002). International Law and 
the Limits of Fairness. European Journal of International Law. Vol. 13, p. 993. 
30 Franck, supra note 26 at p. 7-9. 
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[t]he notion of ‘fairness’ encompasses two different and potentially adversary components: 
legitimacy and distributive justice. These components are indicators of law’s, and 
especially fair law’s primary objective: to achieve a negotiated balance between the need 
for order and the need for change.31  
Under this account of fairness, the fairness of any legal order is managed by 
the discursive process by which distributively (equitable) just rules and 
principles are agreed to through a legitimate and fair process.32 By focusing on 
the legitimacy of the process and how such a process of rulemaking and 
ruleapplying can be done in a fair manner, Franck holds that it is possible for 
rules and principles to change and evolve over time so as to reflect the 
legitimate expectations of the participants in a legal order.33 Such a view is in 
many ways similar to that of the New Haven school; it is focused on law as an 
ongoing process of communicative decision – not a stagnant order – whereby 
decisionmakers evaluate and secure participant value expectations over 
time.34 What both the New Haven school and Franck have in common is a 
feature in almost all postmodern constructivist frames of inquiry for 
determining and evaluating the making and applying of the law: a process for 
a process.  
The question for a theory of configurative fairness is just how such an ongoing 
discursive process should be constructed. All constructivist accounts of law, 
which will be discussed in more detail in the following section, are concerned 
with how the process of law operates in social context. By placing law in social 
context, there are also aspects of legal process and construction that appeal to 
psychological and social psychological inquiry. In terms of the development of 
legal orders over time, and in finding a means for creating laws that are both 
stable and adaptable, the manner in which institutions and individuals accept 
the legitimacy of a legal order relates directly to how those entities 
psychologically perceive the legal rules and processes as fair.35  
According to Thomas Franck’s account, the perceptions of fairness that are 
held by participants in a particular legal order pull them towards voluntary 
compliance.36 That is, if the law is perceived as fair, it is more likely to be 
complied with.37 This is where a theory of configurative fairness attempts to 
contribute. It claims that, in the context of evolving legal orders, fair laws can 
be configured through a process of determining convergences in value 
perspectives among its participants. Once determined, the rules and principles 
(both substantive and procedural) of any legal order can be constructed as 
                                                            
31 Id at p. 23. 
32 Thomas Franck (2001). Fairness in Fairness Discourse. American Society of International Law 
Proceedings. Vol. 85, p. 167. 
33 Franck, supra note 27 at pp. 14-15. 
34 See Chapter 4, Section 4. 
35 See generally Tyler, supra note 12. 
36 Franck, supra note 26 at p. 89. 
37 Id.  
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based on these convergences. Such a conceptualization of fairness requires 
some sensitivity to the psychology of fairness (that is, the internal 
endorsement of the law as fair: a perception of fairness), and to the purpose of 
the law as seen through the lens of social context (that is, law as the product 
of a fair intersubjective process of social interaction and choice). However, a 
theory of configurative fairness may be able to fill an empirical gap in Frank’s 
theory. Without a means for determining what participants in a particular 
legal order consider to be fair, Frank is left to configure fair laws according to 
his own conception of fairness (which may or may not be what actual 
participants consider to be fair). A theory of configurative fairness provides a 
methodology for determining not what the theorist considers to be fair, but 
what participants consider it to be. 
 
3.2 The Centrality of Participants in Legal Evolution 
By focusing on the actual participants of a particular legal order, a theory of 
configurative fairness seeks to evaluate participant perspectives about the 
values that inform, motivate, and shape the way that such individuals 
approach legal problems. Instead of focusing on what a just or fair society 
ought to look like, a theory of configurative fairness ask those with a stake in a 
particular legal order what they actually value. This shifts the analysis from 
the abstract to the actual. Take for example when one asks, in the context of 
any legal evaluation: is it fair? In this question, the ‘it’ refers to the rule, 
principle, norm, law, system, or regime being evaluated. And a determination 
of fairness falls to those individuals being subjected to ‘it.’ Fairness, thus, is a 
particularly subjective enterprise, requiring the viewpoints and perspectives of 
those participants actually being impacted or affected by ‘it.’ Yet, fairness is 
often analyzed against some objective or universal criterion – imposed on the 
subject according to the prevailing power dynamic, and with little regard to the 
views of the subjects being affected by ‘it.’  
What this question addresses is the problem of the participant in any theory of 
justice that seeks to know objectively what is fair. It often comes down to the 
theorist postulating what he or she divines as what a just or fair principle or 
rule would look like if derived from an idealized version of human agency and 
in an idealized set of circumstances and conditions (such as in Frank’s 
theory). While there are frequent claims as to what people ought to value, 
there is rarely any evidence to back up the notion that that a particular 
theorist has the capacity and omnipotence to know just what all individuals 
must value.  
Unlike most justice theories, which make claims to objective truth about what 
is right or what is good, a theory of configurative fairness cannot claim an 
objective or universal standard: the fairness of anything comes down to how 
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the idea, concept, or theory comports with one’s own subjective constitution 
and the values that he or she endorses. As a metaclaim about values, fairness 
requires an evaluation of values from the perspective of the person doing the 
valuing. This cannot be done without an understanding of the perspectives 
that participants in any legal order bring to bear on their understanding of 
fairness. In almost all of the social sciences, there is the realization in the 
postmodern era that values are constructed in the minds of individual 
conscious beings interacting with each other and the external world.  
In psychology, the advances in the cognitive sciences have advanced 
understanding about mental processes and how the mind constructs value 
knowledge; yet, there is a long ways to go. In many ways, theory is ahead of 
the method in this area of thought. By focusing on the actual perspectives of 
participants in a particular legal order, a theory of configurative fairness – 
through its employ of Q methodology – hopes to add insight into whether the 
question ‘is it fair?’ can be answered more concretely than in the past. The 
process for determining a more concrete answer to this question will come 
through an empirical understanding of shared value subjectivity, not as 
transcendental claims about what is objectively just.  
 
4. CONSTRUCTIVISM IN POLITICS AND ETHICS 
Theories of construction exist in many disciplines, and while they vary 
depending on the subject-matter being theorized about, they all contain an 
element of explaining truth and knowledge as something that is constructed 
by human beings through a process of interaction with their own minds, the 
minds of others, and with the external world.38 In the context of social theory, 
which includes constructivist theories in political, legal, and sociological 
thought, social reality and truth exists – not as some abstract entity – but as 
the way that human beings construct their reality through a process of 
interaction, choice, and deliberative inquiry. Some of these social 
constructivist theories attempt to provide a theoretical account for a 
metaphysically objective reality through an understanding of how human 
beings shape it.  
Others take a more pragmatic approach, focusing instead on how human 
beings shape and share their understanding through an ongoing process of 
communication and interaction that is subject to revision over time. These 
more pragmatic theories are less concerned with knowing a metaphysical 
                                                            
38 “Constructivism in ethics is the view that insofar as there are normative truths, for example, 
truths about what we ought to do, they are in some sense determined by an idealized process of 
rational deliberation, choice, or agreement.” Carla Bagnoli (2011). Constructivism in Metaethics. 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win 
2011/entries/constructivism-metaethics (last accessed 1 September 2013). 
173 
 
 
reality, and are more concerned with developing epistemic theories for 
knowing reality as human beings understand it. Both types of theorists believe 
that reality and truth are the result of a process of human interaction. Where 
they differ is in the potential for such a conceptualization to result in absolute 
truth and knowledge. Regardless of how one approaches the metaphysical 
question, constructivist and pragmatist theories seek to explain human value 
knowledge as mental processes of deliberation, justification, and argument 
that are shaped by the intersubjective discourse between human agents.  
 
4.1 Philosophic Constructivism 
The various types of social, political, ethical, and legal constructivism are built 
on more general philosophical inquiry about the nature of truth, knowledge, 
and morality. These types of constructivism can be seen throughout the 
history of philosophy, but have been greatly influenced in the postmodern era 
through the work of Kant and the philosophic pragmatists. Both the Kantian 
and pragmatic approaches to moral truth are based on the idea that the 
rational human mind is capable of deciphering truth and knowledge. A 
Kantian view on ethics holds that the autonomy and independence of reason 
has the capacity to produce metaphysically objective moral ends.39 For Kant, 
moral norms are authoritative only if they are generated by reason.40 He 
claims that skepticism can only be avoided if reason is autonomous and its 
authority does not derive from anything outside its domain.41 Accordingly, 
reason is self-legislating: the human mind alone can construct objective truth 
about what is right. What this picture of Kantian ethical theory claims is that 
the rational mind has the capacity to construct objective moral reality a priori.  
However, in an influential article, Kantian Constructivism and Moral Theory,42 
John Rawls offered a reinterpretation of Kant’s ethical theory. He claimed that 
Kant’s account of ethics fails to effectively address the problem of ethical 
disagreements because it adopts an inadequate standard of objectivity.43 This 
                                                            
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 The term ‘outside its domain’ is a reference to knowledge about morality that are attempted 
by appeals to experience and the natural world. Kant, and Rawls as well, believed that moral 
knowledge could be generated by reason alone. One of the criticisms launched against Kant in 
his own time by the idealists held that what human reason could understand was based not 
only on the mind constructing reality in isolation; rather, the idealists and the historicists held 
that while reason alone could understand morality, this knowledge must be seen as the product 
of a dialectical discourse between intersubjective selves existing in community context. 
Similarly, Rawls theory has been criticized for downplaying the role that social interaction and 
community histories play in the way that the human mind can reason about morality. For the 
communitarian response to Rawls, see Michael Sandel (1998). Liberalism and the Limits of 
Justice, Second Edition. Cambridge, CUP. 
42 John Rawls (1980). Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory. Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 77, p. 
515. 
43 Id at p. 570. 
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inadequate standard is metaphysical and appeals to the independent reality of 
truth and values. Rawls sought to show that a more realistic conception of 
objectivity is not metaphysical, but political.44 He was concerned with the 
coordination problems in pluralistic societies whereby individuals often hold 
different, and to some extent, incommensurable moral views.45 He believed 
that our need for objectivity (which this work would call shared subjectivity) is 
practical; it arises in context in which people disagree about what to value and 
need to reach an agreement about what to do.46 Rawls wanted to base his 
theory of justice on the idea that moral views could be determined by reason, 
but refused to adopt the Kantian metaphysical view that there is a single 
correct answer about the ‘right.’47  
Rawls conception of constructed moral reality has much in common with the 
tradition of the philosophic pragmatists.48 This is because, while accepting the 
rational turn in Kantian philosophy, the philosophical pragmatists hold out 
more skepticism about the likelihood that absolute truth can be generated by 
reason alone (Kant’s view). Instead, the pragmatists take a much more 
practical view: truth and knowledge are the product of inquiry and that the 
process of inquiry is a dialectic method focused on pragmatic consequences, 
and not as a body of philosophic doctrine. In terms of theoretical orientation, 
the pragmatic theory of truth can be seen to include two core features: 1) a 
reliance on the pragmatic maxim49 as a means of clarifying the meanings of 
difficult concepts, truth in particular; and 2) an emphasis on the fact that 
belief, certainty, knowledge, and truth is the result of a process, namely, 
inquiry.50  
                                                            
44 John Rawls (1985). Justice as Fairness: Political, not Metaphysical. Philosophy & Public 
Affairs. Vol. 14, p. 223. 
45 Rawls, supra note 13 at pp. 32-33. 
46 Id. at p. 36. 
47 Simmonds, supra note 7 at p. 64. 
48 Philosophic pragmatism historically is broken into two distinct periods: classical pragmatism, 
which prominently features the late nineteenth and early twentieth century work of Charles 
Pierce, William James, George Mead, and John Dewey; and neopragmatism, which is the middle 
to late twentieth century revival of pragmatic thought that recognizes the linguistic turn in 
postmodern philosophy generally and is exemplified through the work of an number of 
influential philosophers: Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam, Jacques Derrida, WVO Quine, and 
Stanley Fish (although none of these philosophers call themselves neopragmatists). 
49 The pragmatic maxim, a concept for inquiry developed by Charles Peirce can be summarized 
as: “the opinion that metaphysics is to be largely cleared up by the application of the following 
maxim for attaining clearness of apprehension: consider what effects, that might conceivably 
have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception 
of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.” Charles Peirce (1878). Second 
Paper: How to Make our Ideas Clear. Popular Science Monthly. Vol. 12, pp. 286, 293. 
50 For John Dewey, truth is related to inquiry, and regardless of whether such inquiry is 
sociological, ethical, philosophical, scientific, or legal, it is self-corrective over time if it is openly 
submitted for testing by a community of inquirers in order to justify, clarify, refine, and or refute 
proposed truths. See Elizabeth Anderson (2012). Dewey's Moral Philosophy. Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/ 
dewey-moral (last accessed 1 September 2013). 
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For William James, the Peircean pragmatic maxim is developed as an 
understanding of truth and knowledge that is often summarized by the 
statement “the ‘true’ is only the expedient in our way of thinking, just as the 
‘right’ is only the expedient in our way of behaving.”51 By this, James is saying 
that truth is that which is confirmed by its effectiveness when applying 
concepts to actual practice. He claims that the mind and the world jointly 
make truth. This idea of making truth holds that it is both mutable and 
relative. While the pragmatic understanding of truth and knowledge predates 
many of the constructivist and contractualist debates that have permeated the 
political and ethical discourse over the past fifty years, it is a definition of 
truth that is very similar to that which is used in a theory of configurative 
fairness: value knowledge is the product of a changeable, relative, and ongoing 
process of deliberative communicative interaction.  
From this brief introduction on the way that truth is conceived in pragmatic 
thought, a pattern of concepts emerge that resonate with many postmodern 
philosophical theories: contextualism, relativism, and (de)constructivism. Both 
pragmatism and constructivism can be seen to embrace at least some aspects 
of each of the following: 1) antifoundationalism,52 2) antireductivism,53 3) 
contextualism,54 4) relativism,55 5) proceduralism,56 6) perspectivism,57 7) 
instrumentalism,58 and 8) consequentialism.59 The point of dissecting some of 
the features of pragmatism and constructivism is to show their connection in 
general philosophic inquiry, but also to set the stage for examining the 
relationship between philosophic pragmatism and constructivism, and its 
influence on legal pragmatism, legal realism, and legal constructivism. There 
are close ties between all of these orientations, and regardless of whether or 
not specific theories make explicit reference to pragmatism and 
constructivism, almost all postmodern process-, context- and problem-
orientated approaches to knowledge can be seen to have been greatly 
influenced by a long tradition of constructivist thought in the history of 
philosophy.   
                                                            
51 William James (1907). Pragmatism. London, Longman, p. 222. 
52 Antifoundationalism is the terms given to any branch of philosophy that does not believe that 
there is some basic principle or ground upon which all inquiry and knowledge rests. 
53 Antireductionism is the idea that embraces holism: i.e. it is a view that complex phenomena 
cannot be reduced to simplistic and often ill-fitted models. 
54 Contextualism is a collection of views in philosophy that emphasizes context. It is a view that 
knowledge and truth is contingent on the context of particular inquiry.  
55 Relativism is the idea that knowledge and truth is relative to context.  
56 Proceduralism is the view in philosophic thought holding that knowledge and truth is the 
product of the process of inquiry. 
57 Perspectivism is the philosophic view that all ideas take place from particular perspectives. In 
other words, all knowledge is contingent on the viewpoint of the mind that is perceiving it. 
58 Instrumentalism is the philosophic view holding that concepts are instruments for 
understanding the world. It is a view that inquiry ought to be delineated as a means-end 
relationship.  
59 Consequentialism is the view that normativity ought to be assessed in terms of the 
consequences that would result from a particular course of action or judgment.  
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4.2 Constructivism Versus Configurativism 
Before turning to constructivism in law, it may be useful to look briefly at the 
moral philosophy of John Dewey as a means of demonstrating the link (and 
differences) between early twentieth century pragmatism and late twentieth 
century political and ethical constructivism (and philosophical 
neopragmatism). Dewy believed that neither traditional moral norms nor 
traditional philosophical ethics were up to the task of dealing with 
contemporary moral dilemmas. He claimed that traditional philosophic ethics 
sought to discover fixed moral standards through dogmatic methods:  
its preoccupation with reducing the diverse sources of moral insight to a single fixed 
principle subordinated practical service to ordinary people to the futile search for 
certainty, stability, and simplicity.60  
To address this inadequacy, Dewey’s ethics replaces the goal of identifying an 
ultimate end or supreme immutable principle with a goal of identifying a 
method for improving our value judgments through a process of inquiry.61 
Dewey argued that ethical inquiry was a piece of epistemic empirical inquiry 
more generally whereby reflective intelligence (reason) could be used as a 
means for revising one’s judgments in light of the consequences of acting on 
them.62 Judgments can be evaluated in instrumental terms of how successful 
they are in guiding conduct. These value judgments are tested by putting them 
into practice and determining:  
whether the results are satisfactory, whether they solve the problems they were designed 
to solve, whether we find their consequences acceptable, whether they enable successful 
responses to novel problems, whether living in accordance with alternative value 
judgments yields more satisfactory results.63 
For Dewey, moral progress is achieved when a method of inquiry for evaluating 
our value judgments is determined through a process of reflection, revision, 
argument, justification, and conviction.  
The type of pragmatic ethics that Dewey advocated continues to exert 
influence on political and ethical discourse in its focus on an epistemic 
process of inquiry for understanding how one knows and makes value 
judgments. However, the postmodern turn in philosophic inquiry, and its 
renewed emphasis on various forms of moral, epistemic, and ontological 
skepticism can be seen as drawing a line between theories of construction and 
theories of configuration. The distinction pertains to whether or not morality is 
invented (constructivism) or discovered (configurativism). In philosophic terms, 
                                                            
60 Anderson, supra note 50. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
177 
 
 
constructivism holds a skeptical view on the possibility of any sort of objective 
value knowledge (whether mind-dependent or mind-independent), while 
configurativism holds the view that objective value knowledge is possible.  
Classical pragmatists were of the belief that making truth in morality was the 
cognitive processes of inquiry relating to empirically discovering value. Under 
such a view, value knowledge is both possible and real. Neopragmatists, 
especially Richard Rorty, hold a more skeptical view about truth and 
knowledge (in either the moral or scientific world) in general.64 They claim that 
whatever views one holds about what is true is invented; truth is constructed 
from a practical reality. They are not however capable of truth.  
While the philosophic constructivists get pushed out of the debate when 
framed as a shift in understanding of moral reality between the pragmatists 
and neopragmatists, it does show the effect of postmodern philosophic thought 
on the way that the truthaptness of moral properties are conceived. Some 
constructivists are actually configurativists. That is, in terms of value 
knowledge and truth, constructivists and configurativists differ in whether 
values are invented (constructivist are skeptical about objective value 
knowledge) or discovered (configurativists are antiskepticism about objective 
value knowledge). 
True constructivists under this kind of categorization would hold a more 
skeptical view about the truth capacity of values at all. Since one cannot know 
truth about facts or values in any real sense, the way that one constructs 
reality is the manner in which human beings subjectively invent it. Under 
such a view, practices and beliefs are the product of habit and agreement 
among right thinking human agents interacting with each other and the world, 
but they are not possible of truth in any metaphysical sense. Configurativists 
on the other hand, hold that truth about morality, and value judgments more 
broadly, are possibly capable of truth; but that in practice, the best one can do 
is to improve our methods for empirically knowing values and to use that 
knowledge to configure a value system that is acceptable in the minds of all 
right thinking conscious beings. Most constructivists in social, political, and 
ethical thought are actually configurativists. 
It may be difficult to see how a theory of configurative fairness is not a theory 
of constructive fairness according to these aforementioned distinctions. It may 
also be difficult to reconcile the view of configurative fairness as ontologically 
agnostic and epistemically optimistic without also making the claim that the 
way that human beings configure their moral world will not necessarily 
produce any universal truths. However, being agnostic about the ontology of 
values is not a form of skepticism. Rather, it is a claim holding that at the 
present time, the human mind is not capable of discovering their truth value 
                                                            
64 See generally Richard Rorty (1989). Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge, CUP. 
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in an ontologically verifiable manner. This is not that different than the 
analogies that can be made with ontological truth in the natural world. 
Scientists are fairly certain that an entity that called ‘dark matter’ exists; and 
yet, the scientific world cannot say that it does. This does not prevent 
scientists from refining methods of inquiry for its discovery.  
In the fields of ethics and morality, there is the further problem of not knowing 
whether ethical or moral truths exist as naturalized phenomena ‘out there’ in 
the world or whether they are the product of the human mind exclusively. 
Given this further complication in ethical thought, it is not perverse to claim 
agnosticism ontologically, but at the same time, to continue to pursue 
methods of inquiry for knowing values. In practice, these need not be mutually 
exclusive enterprises. We know for example that torturing babies for fun is not 
a practice that any rational human being anywhere on the planet would find 
acceptable.65 There is something truthlike in these types of claims. It would 
appear that there is a metaphysical truth about the value that all conscious 
beings would place on rejecting such a practice. However, I am at odds in 
telling you definitively whether a value truth like this certainly exists or not 
(and if so where it does it exist). But at the same time, I am keen to believe 
that such a value does exist. This is what can be considered ontological 
agnosticism in a theory of configurative fairness.  
A theory of configurative fairness holds that value truths are possible, but that 
instead of focusing on where and how they exist, the practical expediency of 
attempting to discovery what systems of values a community can agree to as 
acceptable should be the focus of inquiry. Such a process of inquiry is not 
creating values from nothing; rather, it is the process of discovering what 
values a particular community of actors can live by.  
Two contemporary philosophers have been particularly decisive in this debate 
about how value knowledge is discovered, and therefore a brief explanation of 
their theoretical orientation may be helpful in understanding a theory of 
configurative fairness. These theorists are Ronald Dworkin and Hilary Putnam, 
and they are both skeptical about the mind-independence of values. However, 
they both embrace a form of moral realism. They hold that the entire corpus of 
knowledge and truth about value is constituted through the thought processes 
of the rational mind. While being skeptical about morals as naturalized 
entities (Dworkin likes to call such supposed entities as ‘morons’),66 they both 
hold that whatever truth about values and morality that exists (if at all) does 
so in the minds of conscious human beings. Both establish a framework of 
inquiry for understanding how the mind configures values. Putnam calls his 
theory one of internal realism, while Dworkin calls his a unitary theory of 
value.  
                                                            
65 Ronald Dworkin (2011). Justice for Hedgehogs. Cambridge, Belknap Press, p. 27. 
66 Id at p. 43. 
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4.2.1 Internal Unity of Value 
On Dworkin’s account, which he details in his book Justice for Hedgehogs,67 
there are no second-order or foundational claims about morality that are 
possible. Truth (as it can be known) exists in understanding and justifying 
moral claims through a process of acceptability. All moral knowledge is a 
unitary concept that gains or loses currency through the arguments that are 
made about moral values and their relation to other moral values. According 
to Dworkin:  
[t]he truth about living well and being good and what is wonderful is not only coherent 
and mutually supporting: what we think about any one of these things must stand up, 
eventually, to any argument we find compelling about the rest.68  
The core claim is that “ethical and moral values depend on one another.”69 
Dworkin believes that the way that our moral positions are justified requires 
reference to other moral values, and to reconcile these views in a manner that 
allows for the discovery of a unified moral position about our convictions. He 
claims that it is this process of argument and conviction about values that 
leads to an acceptable justification of first-order moralizing. First-order moral 
values comprise the corpus of moral positions that individuals hold. Second-
order moralizing is what is considered metaethical theorizing. Dworkin holds 
that metaethics is misguided because it rests on the assumption that there are 
real moral properties that are knowable about morality that are external to 
particular moral propositions.70 Instead, he claims that values only consist of 
first-order moral propositions, and that there are no second-order ones.71  
The point of Dworkin’s view is to demonstrate two important ideas in moral 
thought: 1) the possibility that, despite what appears as a plurality and 
diversity of seemingly incommensurable values, values are in fact mutually 
reinforcing and coherent when viewed as a unitary system of justification, and 
2) the possibility that we are looking for the wrong types of entities when 
attempting to show that values exist, and that it would be more advisable to 
view value truth as the ongoing process of argument and justification of one’s 
moral conviction.72 In essence, Dworkin is calling for a process of 
interpretation for discovering what moral values one can or should endorse in 
living a responsible and respectful life.73  
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68 Id at p. 1. 
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70 Id. at p. 67. 
71 Id. at pp. 30-31. 
72 Id. at pp. 1, 37. 
73 Id. at p. 6. 
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4.2.2 Internal Value Realism 
In a similar vein, but geared towards epistemology more generally, is the work 
of the contemporary pragmatist philosopher, Hilary Putnam. Putnam has 
focused a large amount of his career on trying to reconcile antiskepticism with 
fallibilism.74 In terms of epistemology and ontology, these two terms relate to 
how our concepts of the world are sometimes wrong or are in need of constant 
revision. Most philosophers see the fallibility of knowledge as an indication 
that one must then also be skeptical about the possibility of knowing truth. 
Putnam, and other pragmatists, take the opposite approach. Instead, they 
hold that the fallibility of our ideas is part of the truth.75 Putnam has 
developed a theory of internal realism that claims that despite one’s 
subjectivity, the mind can discover truths about the world.76  
In Reason, Truth, and History,77 Putnam identified truth with what he terms 
‘idealized rational acceptability.’78 While the exact parameters of Putnam’s 
internal realism are difficult to assess, there are a couple important points 
about this philosophical outlook that pertain to pragmatic and constructivist 
thought. The first point is that whatever truth exists about morality and value 
does so in the form of a relationship between the human mind and the 
external world.79 Such a view holds that the way that the human mind 
categorizes and constructs knowledge is integral to our understanding of both 
facts and values.80 Knowledge about facts (external truth) and values (internal 
truths) can only be known through the engagement of the human mind with 
the mind-independent external world.81 Such a conceptualization of truth and 
knowledge permits the possibility that truth is not a stagnant entity, but 
instead is a process of mind constructing the world and the world constructing 
the mind.82  
Another key point related to internal realism is the idea of reasonableness and 
acceptability.83 These two seemingly vague standards are common to most 
forms of philosophical constructivism, especially in regard to the formulation 
of ethical and political truth and knowledge. Reasonableness and 
                                                            
74 This is the view that truth is both possible and fallible. In other words, there is no 
metaphysical guarantee that what one calls ‘truth’ will not be subject to revision over time. See 
Hilary Putnam (1994). ‘Pragmatism and Moral Objectivity,’ in James Conant, ed. Words and 
Life. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, p. 152. 
75 Hilary Putnam (1986). Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Volume III. Cambridge, CUP, 
p. 19. 
76 See Hilary Putnam (1981). Reason, Truth, and History. Cambridge, CUP. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at pp. 49-50. 
79 Id. at p. xi. 
80 Hilary Putnam (2004). The Collapse of the Fact-Value Dichotomy and Other Essays. 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 
81 Putnam, supra note 76 at pp. 54-56. 
82 Id. at p. xi. 
83 Id at pp. 107, 135. 
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acceptability, which are also reoccurring themes in much of legal theory, deal 
with the role of (ideal) justification in the making and understanding of value 
knowledge and truth.84 Values, as subjective in that they exist ‘in there’ in the 
mind of conscious beings and not ‘out there’ as entities in the external world, 
are discovered through an ongoing process of justifying value positions.85 Such 
a theory of value truth holds that through this epistemic process of 
deliberating and ‘talking’ with one’s self in justifying what moral principles and 
rules are the best fit in terms of reasonableness and acceptability, the 
knowledge that one gains from such a process can provide the right answers 
to most moral dilemmas.86  
 
4.2.3 Idealization Versus Abstraction 
One of the criticism of constructive interpretation as a process for justifying 
the reasonableness and acceptability of one’s value positions is that it requires 
the postulation of ideal conditions or scenarios that create benchmarks for 
evaluating our moral positions against. This process of idealization can be 
found in most types of constructivist philosophies. It is also a prominent 
feature in most forms of nonpositivist theory as well. In social theory, Max 
Weber famously introduced the concept of ideal types;87 and in legal theory, 
John Finnis uses a form of idealization through what he terms the central 
case.88 In attempting to conceptualize ideal situations and ideal processes for 
judging actual practices, idealization allows the philosopher to make 
assumptions about how the evaluation of a value claim measures up to an 
idealized version.  
Idealization is also a common feature in developing theories about what 
choices human agents would make under ideal conditions. This idea deals 
with the assumption that human actors will act rationally when justifying 
preferences. Such a feature is dominant in Rawlsian thought and in various 
rational choice theories.89 The problem with idealization as a theoretical 
starting point is the observation that human agents never act perfectly 
rationally, and that often, they indeed act irrationally. This means that the 
starting point for the development of most theories that are based on the 
premise that human beings act rationally is demonstrably false.  
                                                            
84 Id. at p. 70. 
85 Putnam, supra note 80 at p. 127. 
86 This is very similar to the idea of a reflective equilibrium in Rawlsian thought. 
87 Max Weber [1904](1949). The Methodology of the Social Sciences, translated by Edward Shils 
& Henry Finch. New York, Free Press, pp. 89-105. 
88 John Finnis (1980). Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford, OUP, p. 15. The idea of the 
central case comes from Aristotle. 
89 Rawls theory is one of ideal theory. See Rawls, supra note 13 at p. 216. 
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Onora O’Neil, an influential justice theorist, holds that rational idealization in 
various constructivist theories of justice are potentially dangerous because 
they fail to understand the vulnerabilities and limitations of human thought 
processes.90 She prefers a form of abstraction as a starting point for inquiry, 
and explains it in the following way:  
[a]bstraction, taken straightforwardly, is a matter of bracketing, but not denying, 
predicates that are true of the matter under discussion . . . Idealization is another matter: 
it can easily lead to falsehood. An assumption, and derivatively a theory, idealizes when it 
ascribes predicates – often seen as enhanced, ‘ideal’ predicates – that are false of the case 
in hand, and so denies predicates that are true of that case. For example, if human 
beings are assumed to have capacities and capabilities for rational choice or self-
sufficiency or independence from others that are evidently not achieved by many or even 
by any actual human beings, the result is not mere abstraction; it is idealization.91 
Notwithstanding this important distinction between abstraction and 
idealization, the main premise relevant to constructivist theories is its reliance 
on some form of idealization in the conceptualization of how human agents 
make choices. It demonstrates that there is an inherent flaw in measuring 
actual human conduct against an idealized version of it. To do so, according to 
such a critique, can distort the process of inquiry that human beings engage 
in when attempting to either invent or discover moral principles. However, the 
alternative is even less attractive. In the same way that the postulation of 
principles of justice in Rawlsian theory seems an arbitrary starting point, they 
are more reasonable than starting from a position of injustice. Likewise, while 
an idealized version of rationality as a starting point may seem irrational 
(because human beings do not always act rationally), it is preferable to a 
starting point with an idealized version of irrationality. What all of this boils 
down to in moral theory is an attempt to bring some coherence to theorizing 
about values in a way that transforms the ideas that we hold as morally 
valuable (subjectively) and to transmit them out in a way that holds sway over 
most of humanity.  
For a theory of configurative fairness, many of the problems related to the 
issue of ideal types can be avoided. Instead of asking what principles would a 
plurality of agents acting perfectly rationally choose to live by; a theory of 
configurative fairness asks: what principles do a plurality of agents, with 
whatever rationality and capacities they actually have, actually choose to live 
by? Assumptions do not need to be made about what choices an ideal and 
perfectly rational set of agents would choose because a theory of configurative 
fairness is focused on what actual agents actually choose when subjected to a 
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91 Onora O’Neill (1996). Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructivist Account of Practical Reason. 
Cambridge, CUP, pp. 40-41. 
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set of conditions and stimuli in a Q methodology study. We do not have to 
idealize participants because we have actual participants to take their place.  
 
4.3 The Ideas of John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas 
This section will look at two of the most influential political and ethical 
thinkers of the twentieth century: John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. They 
can both be seen as philosophers in the tradition of constructivist 
epistemology. Their work focuses on how pluralistic contemporary 
democracies can make political choices that can accommodate a diversity of 
value claims while still being able to provide a stable social structure that can 
exist from generation to generation. For the purposes of this work, focus will 
center on the Rawlsian theory of justice and Habermasian theory of 
communicative action. In general, the type of constructivist ethics advanced 
by Rawls and Habermas focus less on philosophical notions of truth and 
knowledge and more on political questions that attempt to convert their 
idealized theoretical frames into a practical approach for determining what 
values a plural community could all accept to live by. However, neither 
theorist provides a mere approach to applied morality. Instead they sought to 
develop a philosophical frame for justifying how their theories can produce an 
objectively just society.  
 
4.3.1 John Rawls 
John Rawls is often credited with reviving social contract theory in political 
philosophy in a manner that builds on the tradition of Thomas Hobbes, John 
Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Unlike the early social contract theorists, 
especially Thomas Hobbes, Rawls considers the inherent nature of conscious 
beings as essentially cooperative, not completely self-interested and violent.92 
Rawls uses the concept of the social contract to justify how a participatory 
liberal democracy could remain stable across generations without having to 
dictate a singular worldview.93 He wanted to develop a theory that could 
balance between the values of liberty and equality by focusing on what 
processes could be established for choosing values that members of a diverse, 
pluralistic, and heterogeneous society could agree to as fair.94 By focusing on 
the rational capacity of citizens to choose the principles and values that they 
would like to live by, Rawls takes a starting point that is decidedly more 
optimistic about human nature than the Hobbesian position. Rawls did not 
                                                            
92 Leif Wenar (2012). John Rawls. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: http:// 
plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/rawls (last accessed 1 September 2013). 
93 Rawls, supra note 14 at p. 16. 
94 Id. at p. 14. 
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progress from the position that Hobbes was wrong however; instead, he 
wanted to demonstrate how utilitarian conceptions of justice and social 
ordering failed to demark the importance of the individual as an independent 
rational agent.95  
Rawls theory of justice takes the starting point “most reasonable principles of 
justice are those everyone would accept and agree to from a fair position.”96 To 
achieve this, he develops a number of concepts and thought experiments for 
justifying such a position. The starting point for his theory of justice as 
fairness is what he calls the original position.97 In the original position, 
autonomous individuals select principles that will determine the basic 
structure of the society they will live in.98 This choice is made behind a ‘veil of 
ignorance,’ which deprives participants of information about their particular 
position in society: for example, they will not know anything about their 
ethnicity, social status, wealth, gender, disabilities, or their own conception of 
the good.99 From behind this ‘veil of ignorance,’ impartial and rational human 
agents will choose the basic principles of justice upon which to order 
society.100 Rawls claims, that in this position, all such rational agents will 
choose two basic principles of justice: 
1) [e]ach person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic 
liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all [the liberty 
principle];101 and 
2) [s]ocial and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be 
attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity [the fair opportunity principle]; and second, they are to be the greatest benefit 
of the least-advantaged members of society [the difference principle].102  
Combined, these principles of justice form the foundation of a just society 
from which other values and principles can be constructed and pursued. Once 
these fair conditions of choice have been established, then individuals in the 
original position can go about the business of selecting what values they 
would choose to live by. While it appears that, while Rawls makes no claims 
about the particular values that must be chosen, the two most fundamental 
principles of justice are not open to negotiation. He supposes that all rational 
and reasonable human agents would choice such constitutive principles for 
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constructing a just society. However, it seems reasonable (and even rational) 
to ask how he knows that these two principles must constitute the basic 
structure of society. Why for example, is a more communitarian103 approach to 
justice not equally possible as a starting point for constructing a just society?  
Under such a concept of the basic structure of society, Rawls holds that 
individuals are not only free and equal, they are also reasonable and 
rational.104 Reasonable individuals have the capacity to abide by fair terms of 
cooperation, even at the expense of their own interests, provided that others 
are also willing to do so.105 This reasonableness is what Rawls calls the 
capacity of all human agents to have a ‘sense of justice.’106 Rawls also 
conceives of human agents as rational: they have the capacity to pursue and 
revise their own view of what is valuable in life.107 Rawls calls this the capacity 
for a ‘conception of the good.’108  
From the two principles of justice chosen behind the ‘veil of ignorance,’ 
reasonable and rational agents have the capacity to construct a just society. 
Under these conditions, which he considers a fair starting point, citizens of a 
particular liberal society can make choices about what public values (both 
political and ethical) they want to live by.109 While there are a number of 
assumptions about the inherent moral psychology of human beings in such a 
conception of justice, Rawls believes that inclusive opportunities to participate 
in choosing values that one wishes to live by can produce a stable liberal 
society that can persist from generation to generation despite a diversity of 
conflicting value claims.110 To justify such a position, however, he employs to 
additional ideas that have particular importance for a theory of configurative 
fairness: the idea of reflective equilibrium and the idea of an overlapping 
consensus.  
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4.3.1.1 Reflective Equilibrium 
The idea of a reflective equilibrium is a concept relating to how moral 
convictions are justified by rationally acting human beings. A reflective 
equilibrium is an unattainable ideal where one’s moral, ethic, and political 
values cohere perfectly with one another. Rawls holds that:  
all our judgments, whatever their level of generality – whether a particular judgment or a 
high-level general conviction – as capable of having for us, as reasonable and rational, a 
certain intrinsic reasonableness. Yet since we are of divided mind and our judgments 
conflict with those of other people, some of those judgments must eventually be revised, 
suspended, or withdrawn, if the practical aim of reaching reasonable agreement on 
matters of political justice is to be achieved.111  
He goes on to say: 
[c]onsidered judgments of all kinds and levels may have an intrinsic reasonableness, or 
acceptability, to reasonable persons that persists after due reflection. The most 
reasonable political conception [of justice] for us is the one that best fits all our 
considered convictions on reflection and organizes them into a coherent view. At any 
given time, we cannot do better than that.112  
A reflective equilibrium is essentially a method for articulating one’s 
perspective, worldview, or viewpoint in regard to moral and ethical convictions. 
The process for achieving a reflective equilibrium is the manner in which 
rational and reasonable agents justify their convictions about value as they 
relate to other valued judgments. Such a view is very similar to Dworkin’s 
theory of value unity whereby the only truth available in moral thought is that 
which comports with the way that all value judgments cohere with each 
other.113 Thomas Scanlon has said that: 
it seems to me that this method [a reflective equilibrium], properly understood, is in fact 
the best way of making up one’s mind about moral matters and about many other 
subjects. Indeed, it is the only defensible method: apparent alternatives to it are 
illusory.114  
An example of reflective equilibrium would be to claim that one’s specific 
political judgments, such as ‘slavery is unjust,’ supports more general political 
convictions, such as ‘all citizens have basic rights,’ which in turn rests on the 
most general and abstract beliefs that one holds – such as ‘all persons are free 
and equal.’115 When all of these judgments from the most basic values to the 
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most specific cohere, then one can be said to have achieved a reflective 
equilibrium.116  
This method, which is conceived from the first-person perspective is ideally 
situated as a foundational explanation for the empirical process of mapping 
one’s viewpoints and beliefs in Q methodology. Q methodology attempts to 
provide a method for empirically mirroring the process of reflective equilibrium 
that goes on in the mind of reasonable and rational agents. It is a method that 
forces the participant being measured to evaluate its subjective judgments in 
relation to other subjective judgments. In this way, the empirical data from a 
Q method study can provide a basis for configuring fairness. Such a theory 
claims that the process of reflective equilibrium as mapped empirically in Q 
methodology will evaluate one’s particular beliefs, not only in relation to one’s 
other more general beliefs, but also in relation to the other participants 
general and specific beliefs. If Q methodology is successful in articulating held 
beliefs and value positions, then that information can be used to empirically 
suggest what an overlapping consensus would look like. 
The basic idea about the work that Q methodology can do in mapping one’s 
reflective equilibrium and holding it still for evaluation is that particular 
perspectives about specific value positions and beliefs can be reconciled with 
participants more general beliefs. Even if participants’ specific value 
judgments on a particular topic (or legal problem) are conflicting, it may be 
that those same participants have a coherent view of their more basic value 
positions. It is the coherence about these more basic value positions that can 
be used as a starting point for configuring a legal order that is acceptable to all 
participants in that legal order because it reflects an agreement about the 
underlying values that inform more specific judgments.  
For example, even if there is intense disagreement about a legal rule such as 
the ‘the application of the principle of economic necessity requires that a state 
applies the least restrictive measure available,’ there may be less disagreement 
about a more general principle such as ‘the application of the principle of 
economic necessity is a part of a state’s sovereignty,’ and even less 
disagreement about the most general principle ‘sovereignty requires states to 
protect its citizens.’ In this case, the most specific rule in international law 
may not be able to achieve a consensus among states, but the more general 
principle may be able to. If it is true that all states believe that the principle of 
economic necessity is an essential component of their sovereignty, then a 
starting point for the fair configuration of more specific rules can be based on 
this more general principle. The question for a theory of configurative fairness 
is to provide a means for determining just what the most specific rule requires 
if it is to gain acceptance by all of the participants to which it is directed. The 
claim of this work is that the application of Q methodology to a theory of 
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configurative fairness can help determine what the content of these specific 
legal rules dictate. 
 
4.3.1.2 An Overlapping Consensus 
A second important concept that is central to Rawls justice as fairness and to 
a theory of configurative fairness is the idea of an overlapping consensus.117 
Such a concept is introduced in the Rawlsian theory of justice to deal with 
what he calls the fact of reasonable pluralism. He claims that:  
the diversity of religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines found in modern democratic 
societies is not a mere historical condition that may soon pass away. It is a permanent 
feature of the public culture of democracy. Under the political and social condition 
secured by the basic rights and liberties of free institutions, a diversity of conflicting and 
irreconcilable yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines will come about and persist, 
should it not already exist. This fact about free societies is what I call the fact of 
reasonable pluralism.118  
Given that there will never be a single comprehensive doctrine that will exist in 
minds of citizens in a pluralistic society, one needs a mechanism for 
understanding how a plurality of diverse comprehensive doctrines can coexist 
in a free society. This mechanism is the idea of an overlapping consensus. An 
overlapping consensus holds that the constitutive values that make up the 
basic building blocks of a particular social order can overlap among members 
of that order in a manner that allows for a diversity of opinions and viewpoints 
on particular claims to value.119 Members of such an order attempt to justify 
their particular outlook as in equilibrium with the more basic views of that 
society.120  
The idea of an overlapping consensus relates closely to the idea of the goal 
value in the New Haven school of jurisprudence that seeks to provide a basis 
for a minimum world order of human dignity.121 According to the New Haven 
account, a value-orientated jurisprudence can be configured in a manner that 
provides a minimum level of structure upon which particular value claims can 
be pursued in a reasonable discourse. The idea of an overlapping consensus in 
jurisprudential thought can be seen as a constitutive procedure that sets the 
baseline for developing legal rules that are acceptable to its participants 
despite the fact that the participants in a particular legal order represent a 
diversity of comprehensive doctrines, worldviews, perspectives, and 
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viewpoints. This is a feature that underscores most process-based legal theory 
whereby a system of procedural justice (fair process), if properly constructed 
or configured, can result in legal rules that are acceptable to participants 
using that legal order. Prominently, this is the claim of Thomas Franck who 
stated that: 
[w]hat the deep contextuality of all notions of fairness does tell us is that fairness is 
relative and subjective; not as St. Thomas Aquinas hoped, a divine ‘given’ inculcated into 
the nature of things to be intuited by right-thinking humans. It is, instead, a human, 
subjective, contingent quality which merely captures in one word a process of discourse, 
reasoning, and negotiation leading, if successful, to an agreed formula located at the 
conceptual intersection between various plausible formulas for allocation. Fairness 
discourse requires the reasoned pursuit of what John Rawls has identified as ‘the idea of 
an overlapping consensus.’122 
For a theory of configurative fairness, the idea of an overlapping consensus is 
not limited to the establishment of a fair process for determining legal rules as 
the end of legal inquiry. Rather, a theory of configurative fairness is also 
concerned with the actual substantive content of the legal rules, norms, and 
principles that are agreed to after entering into such a fair process. The idea of 
an overlapping consensus in a theory of configurative fairness is not an 
abstract theoretical tool for understanding how a diversity of participants can 
mutually agree to a chosen legal configuration according to their own 
worldview. Instead, it is a method for analyzing the actual choices that 
participants make according to their own perspective or outlook. The goal of 
such an analysis, which is the product of empirical data provided by a relevant 
Q methodology study, is to identify patterns of overlap among conflicting or 
competing perspectives on specific substantive rules, norms, or principles in a 
given legal order. The idea of an overlapping consensus according to such a 
goal is to identify when and if it is possible for a diversity of value claims to be 
configured in a manner that leads to a value distribution that is acceptable to 
all participants in that legal order despite seemingly conflicting value claims 
and orientations. 
 
4.3.2 Jürgen Habermas 
Another important political philosopher of the late twentieth century is Jürgen 
Habermas. In many ways, the ideas of Rawls and Habermas are compatible. 
They both orientate their philosophy in the context of the modern democratic 
state. They are both concerned with how a fair process can effectively deliver a 
just society. They both write from an idealized perspective, but at the same 
time gear such an idealization for practical application as a means for 
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addressing real problems. Both theorists believe that autonomous and rational 
human agents are capable of understanding moral and ethical truth as a 
process of justification, deliberation, reflection, contemplation, and 
argumentation. They are both largely indebted to the fundamental ideas of 
Kantian thought. Where these two thinkers begin to part course, however, 
relates to the level of social interaction and communication required to achieve 
their respective understandings of proper inquiry. For purposes of our inquiry 
here, it is Habermas’s theory of communicative action and his discourse ethics 
that are of most interest.  
Where Rawls is more concerned with the dialogue that one has with one’s self 
(that is, the deliberative process for achieving a reflective equilibrium), 
Habermas focuses on how the dialogue, discourse, and communication 
between rational agents can produce a justification for moral, ethical, political, 
and legal values that can be accepted by those participating in such a 
discourse.123 The major distinction here is that Rawls can be seen as 
endorsing the view that people are completely independent and form their 
belief and value systems more or less in isolation. When they arrive at the 
original position, they intuitively hold some values that are inherent in all 
human agents. From this position, rational agents deliberate and agree to 
what basic principles they could live by. Habermas on the other hand holds 
that it is the actual process of discourse and communication that constructs 
moral and ethical truth.124 This is a view that is compatible with a school of 
thought in social psychology called symbolic interactionism.125 Without going 
into much detail about such a view, its relevance for Habermas and for this 
work lies in the claim that moral epistemology is not gained through knowing 
a Kantian categorical imperative that is available a priori; rather, it is gained 
through an ongoing process of argumentation and deliberation with other 
rational agent in what Habermas calls a rational discourse.126  
His theory of communicative action is an attempt to conceptualize a 
description of cooperative actions based on mutual communication of 
deliberation and argumentation.127 Communicative action is possible given the 
human capacity to reason. However, he claims that this understanding of 
rationality is “no longer tied to, and limited by, the subjectivistic and 
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individualistic premises of modern philosophy and social theory.”128 Instead, 
he claims that our rationality is bound up in our ability to communicate, 
through language, and to engage in argumentation.129 He states that: 
we use the term argumentation for that type of speech in which participants thematize 
contested validity claims and attempt to vindicate or criticize them through 
argumentation.130  
Communicative action is the process whereby two or more individuals interact 
and coordinate their shared, intersubjective understandings of the 
interpretations of particular situations.131 The process for reaching agreement 
on moral and ethical claims is gained through communicative argumentation 
between rational agents.132 Instead of two or more individuals coming to a 
situation with their respective world view and comprehensive doctrines and 
then trying to sort out what principles they could agree to through some sort 
of compromise, a theory of communicative action claims that the actual views 
that one holds in regard to moral and ethical dilemmas is constructed by the 
process of argumentation and justification itself.133  
By conceptualizing moral epistemology in this way (as an ongoing process of 
communication), Habermas is able to situate himself within the traditions of 
moral psychology and social anthropology by holding that this ongoing process 
is the means by which human morality develops.134 Morality is not 
preordained; it is the outcome of identity formation that is rooted in mutual 
recognition.135 Knowledge is an inherently social enterprise that requires 
engagement with other human beings.136 Accordingly, Habermas is 
demonstrating through his theory of communicative action that value 
knowledge: 
requires participants to attend to the values and interests of each person as a unique 
individual; conversely, each individual conditions her judgment about the moral import of 
her values and interests on what all participants freely accept. Consequently, moral 
discourse is structured in a way that links moral validity with solidaristic concern for 
both the concrete individual and the morally formative communities on which her 
identity depends.137 
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Influenced by the work of George Mead,138 Habermas develops a theory called 
discourse ethics whereby moral and ethical knowledge is the process of 
practical discourse between rational agents.139 His discourse theory builds on 
his theory of communicative action and grounds ethical and moral knowledge 
as the product of ongoing social interaction and communication between 
rationally autonomous agents.140 To put such a concept into practice, he 
states his discourse principle as:  
only those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as 
participants in rational discourse.141  
In addition to the so-called discourse principle, Habermas articulates a 
dialogical principle of universalization, which he states as:  
a [moral] norm is valid if and only if the foreseeable consequences and side effects of its 
general observance for the interests and value-orientations of each individual could be 
freely and jointly accepted by all affected.142  
While this view is basically a consensus theory of truth, it is problematic in the 
same way that Rawlsian theory is. How do we know that uncoerced 
acceptance of a particular norm by all those who are affected by it will 
necessarily result in proof that such a consensus is ontologically true. Are we 
not sometime (often) mistaken in our views and that the process of social 
mimicking or social tradition could lead us to agree to a particular moral norm 
even though it may be false in the ontological sense? The answer that Kant, 
Habermas, and Rawls would all give to this skepticism is that it is the capacity 
of reason to know value truth that would prevent such a misguidance over 
time. This view is an unabashed optimism about the possibilities of human 
reason. 
It is not a view that a theory of configurative fairness necessarily supports, nor 
does it have to. As indicated in previous sections, the goal of a theory of 
configurative fairness is to gain knowledge about the norms that rational 
actors will accept, it does not need to prove that such an acceptance produces 
absolute truth about such norms. Regardless of the potential metaphysical 
instability of Rawlsian and Habermasian theory, the importance of their 
theories lies in an understanding of social stability that is not stagnant, but is 
constantly susceptible to change and revision over time. Both Rawls and 
                                                            
138 George Mead was a classic pragmatist and psychologist whose work anticipated much of the 
process-based thinking in philosophy and sociology that dominates contemporary thought. 
Habermas takes much of his insight on the universifiability of moral behavior from Mead. See 
Finlayson, supra note 132 at p. 83. 
139 Id. at pp. 79-80. 
140 Id. at p. 85. 
141 Jürgen Habermas (1996). Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of 
Law and Democracy, translated by William Rehg. Cambridge, MIT Press, p. 107. 
142 Habermas, supra note 123. 
193 
 
 
Habermas are able to accommodate such indeterminacy by focusing on the 
process and not the rules. It is for this reason that their theories are likely to 
remain influential so long as the ideas of postmodernity persist in the social 
sciences.  
 
5. CONSTRUCTIVISM IN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
As argued at earlier points in this Chapter and in earlier Chapters of this 
work, constructivism in law has strong roots in almost every process-based 
conceptualization of jurisprudence that has developed over the past half 
century. The basic claim of all of these theories – although they come in 
myriad iterations – is to hold that a proper jurisprudence must view law as a 
process. The law is then constructed through such a process. Debate among 
the various constructivist or process-based approaches often focuses on 
differences in just how this process ought to be understood and structured. 
For many, especially in the Anglo-American tradition, this process is geared 
specifically at how judiciaries ought to make decisions: they are theories of 
adjudication about the process that is appropriate for judges to interpret and 
make law through judicial decisions. One of the key features of legal 
constructivism, regardless of the specific subject-matter that a particular 
theory aims, is that law is a process of communication:  
law is communication and nothing but communication . . . [l]egal communications are 
the cognitive instruments by which the law as social discourse is able to ‘see’ the 
world.143 
In international law, constructivist theories are specifically tied to 
understandings of the law that are associated with this process of legal 
communication as a whole. This includes both the making and the 
adjudication of the law. Among these approaches, the New Haven school of 
jurisprudence was the first to conceptualize international law as an ongoing 
process of communication leading to authoritative and controlling decision. 
Much of Harold Laswell’s communication theory144 is evident in the New 
Haven school; and in the early 1980s, Michael Reisman further refined the 
New Haven school through the development of what he called a theory of law 
as a process of communication.145 In the 1990s, Harold Koh’s transnational 
legal process,146 Anne-Marie Slaughter’ liberal theory,147 and Thomas Franck’s 
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fairness discourse theory148 can all be seen as additions to a constructivist 
understanding of international law. However, one theory that is particularly 
impressive in this regard is the constructivist account of international law 
developed by Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope.149 Like other constructivist 
and process-based theories of law, they hold that law is an ongoing process of 
interaction. What is novel about their account is that it provides a descriptive 
understanding of such a process that does not turn exclusively on sovereign 
authority and control.150 
One of the additional components that is evident in postmodern legal 
constructivist approaches to international law is its influence on, and 
influence from, constructivist moves in international relations theory. 
Primarily marked as a reaction to various rational choice theories in 
international relations, constructivist theories have become a dominant force 
in international relations theory following a seminal article by Alexander 
Wendt in 1992.151 His theory of social construction holds that identity 
formation is just that; it is formed or constructed, and the way that such state 
identities are formed (and the choices that they make) is not exclusively tied to 
material interests.152 They are also formed by ideas and norms. Such a 
conceptualization of state behavior shifted the discourse on what constitutes 
an interest for states, and how international law and norms shape the way 
that their identities are actually formed. Instead of assuming, as the rational 
choice theorists do, that state identities are based on material capabilities 
exclusively (and that choices are made in rational self-interest), constructivist 
international relations theorist have been able to compellingly demonstrate 
that state identities are malleable, that they are shaped by norms and ideas, 
and that they are influenced by the social interaction of states over time.153  
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6. CONFIGURING FAIRNESS IN LEGAL DECISION AND DISCOURSE 
A theory of configurative fairness is a participant-orientated and 
communicative process of social interaction that, if successful, can lead to an 
overlapping consensus or agreement about the values and norms that 
constitute a particular international legal order. It is a theory that falls within 
the constructivist and pragmatist philosophical traditions. It attempts to 
provide a method for clarifying and grounding mutually agreed values that 
form the foundation of any legal order. It holds that the fairness of any law is a 
perception that is orientated towards its participants. To achieve fairness, the 
law must be configured in a manner that is built on values, norms, and 
principles (shared subjectivities) that are acceptable to all those to which the 
legal order is aimed.  
As a method for determining a proper value configuration, a theory of 
configurative fairness has practical implications through the application of Q 
methodology. The theory is built on the premise that, despite the subjectivity 
of value, perspectives can be analyzed and interpreted through the use of Q 
methodology (as shared perspectives); and that the results of a Q method 
study can provide sophisticated empirical insight into the value perspectives 
that participants in a particular legal order have. This empirical information 
will be able to show where there are divergences and convergences among the 
different subjective value perspectives that participants using the legal order 
have. Where there is some level of convergence among value perspectives, fair 
laws can be configured around these values that are representative of an 
overlapping consensus.  
In developing a theory of configurative fairness, a distinction between legal 
decision and legal discourse has been identified in order to clarify the purpose 
of each form of inquiry. This is very similar to the importance given to the 
observational standpoint in the New Haven school of jurisprudence whereby 
the role of the decisionmaker and the discourser (scholar in their parlance) are 
distinct and should be understood as such.154 For a theory of configurative 
fairness, the focus on the interactional understanding of social action and the 
discursive possibilities that the reflective communication of rational and 
reasonable perspectives can have on the development of the law remains the 
focus. The basic claim is that this ongoing communicative discourse 
influences and motivates the way that particular legal orders evolve over time.  
In order for laws to develop in a manner that are perceived as fair by the 
participant users of that regime, legal rules and procedures must comport 
with what these participants consider to be a fair. However, if such a 
conception is limited to mere self-interest, it could just as likely be considered 
unfair by similarly situated individuals. This is generally how hierarchical 
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systems of law develop. They give one-sided power to certain individuals and 
none to others. Under such a system, legal orders develop as one-sided and 
therefore, there is always a need to maintain support for such a system by 
reinforcing it through threats of coercion and violence by the powerful against 
the impotent. Since such a system is an ideal formula for creating revolutions, 
it is not a sustainable option in contemporary life. 
Instead, a theory of configurative fairness requires the constant discourse 
between the powerful and the powerless; it requires acceptance of both the 
lawmakers and the lawtakers of any given legal order in order for the law to be 
considered as fair. This is the best way to maintain the long-term stability of 
any legal regime. The way that laws are considered fair is if they are 
compatible with the value perspectives of those bound by the legal obligations 
that such a legal order creates. But because the law is constantly changing 
and evolving, a fair legal order at a specific point in time is not enough for 
long-term legal stability. Rather, a fair legal order must be able to evolve and 
develop over time. This requires a constant discourse among participants. 
Only if this inclusive communicative process is working can a fair, but 
evolving set of legal rules and procedures, be maintained. 
197 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
Q METHODOLOGY AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Q methodology is a theory and methodological technique developed for the 
empirical measurement of first-person, and thus subjective, viewpoints or 
perspectives. The connection between a theory of configurative fairness and Q 
methodology is derived from the capacity of this empirical methodology to shed 
light on subjective value perspectives in constituting what users of a particular 
legal order would consider to be a fair distribution of their value claims, 
demands, and expectations. A theory of configurative fairness is a 
nonpositivist theory about law that is rooted in the idea that legal orders that 
are perceived as fair, and are thus viewed as legitimate, require knowledge 
about the right distribution of the values that participants and decisionmakers 
endorse. A theory of configurative fairness holds that, from a regime-building 
perspective, evolving legal orders develop according to the underlying values 
that are endorsed by both the discoursers who shape and influence the legal 
rules of a particular legal system, and by the decisionmakers who have the 
authority and legitimacy to make and apply the law.  
Such a view holds that the law serves an object and purpose. It is a means to 
an end. However, this is not to say that the law is purely instrumental; rather, 
it is a claim that the legitimacy and authority of the law is derived from the 
service it provides in regulating human conduct. This regulation is a human 
choice that is encapsulated in the system of legal rules and procedures that 
legal decisionmakers create. These choices, if fair, are the product of the 
underlying value claims that a legal community (participants) would accept as 
binding. The development of any legal system is fair and legitimate if it 
appropriately reflects the values to which a particular legal community agrees. 
The problem, of course, for any nonpositivist or value-laden theory about law 
lies in explaining just how these value claims, demands, and expectations 
(perspectives) can ever be objectified given their subjective nature and 
structure. The particular challenge for a theory of configurative fairness is 
whether or not a method exists for converting subjective value knowledge into 
objective legal knowledge. Q methodology has the potential to be this tool. 
However, objectifying value knowledge in the context of legal knowledge has 
always been problematic. For example, if value knowledge cannot be 
empirically verified and objectified, it is quickly labeled subjective in its 
negative sense: arbitrary, biased, mere preference or opinion. To overcome this 
negative connotation, subjective claims about value preferences must carry an 
objective weight. One way to address this problem in legal philosophy is to 
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claim that particular values are capable of universal application and are thus 
considered objective. However, in both moral and legal philosophy, the 
universalization of moral, political, ethical, or cultural values is largely 
considered an inaccurate and outmoded means for objectifying the values that 
inform the development of any legal order. Such a view about an objective and 
universal set of values that all human beings must value is a project rooted 
primarily in a Newtonian or modernist worldview holding that truths are not 
only possible, but that they exist as universal mandates.  
For the last one hundred years, however, the quantum revolution and the 
move to postmodernism in the social sciences has transformed the basis for 
epistemic truths. Instead of holding that universal truths about value are 
inherently possible, the postmodern view is that value knowledge is subjective, 
contextual, and relative. To bring order to such subjective knowledge, the 
postmodern world requires a method for looking at value perspectives in a 
first-person, contextual, and relative frame of inquiry. It is claimed that Q 
methodology is ideally situated for transforming this kind of subjective value 
knowledge into objective legal knowledge. It does this by mapping individual 
perspectives and factor analyzing the results in a way that can provide 
objective knowledge about any type of subjective knowledge.  
From a regime-building perspective, a theory of configurative fairness focuses 
on the collection of subjective, first-person value knowledge from all of the 
participants subject to a particular legal order. In cases where it is easy to 
identify that there is a value consensus endorsing a legal rule, the work of a 
legal decisionmaker is relatively straightforward. Where there is considerable 
disagreement about the value claims of a particular legal community, the 
decision about which value claims become authoritative and controlling legal 
rules is considerably more difficult. It is these more difficult scenarios where it 
is claimed that Q methodology can contribute. Q methodology provides an 
empirical basis for understanding and analyzing the underlying values that 
inform and motivate various legal positions and doctrines.  
The idea that subjective perspectives, perceptions, and viewpoints about 
particular values can be measured with a strong degree of objective certitude 
will of course be viewed with some degree of skepticism. Yet, this is precisely 
what Q methodology can do. Q methodology is a composite of philosophical 
inquiry, empirical research procedures, and psychometric methods that yields 
perhaps the most sophisticated foundation for the examination of human 
subjectivity: a methodological approach for the systematic study of an 
individual’s viewpoints, perceptions, beliefs, perspectives, motivations, goals, 
orientation, attitudes, and preferences.1 Q methodology is a form of statistical 
                                                            
1 Stentor Danielson, et al. (1999). Using Q Method to Reveal Social Perspectives in Environmental 
Research, Social and Environmental Research Institute, available at: www.seri-us.org/pubs/ 
Qprimer.pdf (last accessed 1 September 2013). 
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analysis with roots in traditional factor analysis. The basic method combines 
the gathering of data (usually subjective statements on a particular topic) in 
the form of Q sorts and then correlates this data using a form of factor 
analysis. A well-conducted Q method study will provide quantitative data on 
the various subjective viewpoints that emerge from those participating in any 
particular Q method study. 
This Chapter aims at distilling the important features of the theoretical 
underpinnings of Q methodology as well as the technique employed in a Q 
methodological study. It also aims at identifying the linkages between Q 
methodology and legal theoretical frames that are nonpositivist in orientation. 
The basic claim is to identify how Q methodology can provide an empirical 
foundation and addendum to legal theories holding that value positions matter 
in understanding how legal orders develop, but nonetheless cannot meet the 
objective mandate of most positivist frames of legal inquiry and are thus 
marginalized as descriptively impotent in explaining law as law: that is, 
distinct from morality or any other form of valuation. Linking Q methodology 
to jurisprudential thought is aimed at overcoming this problem in legal 
theoretical outlooks.  
 
2. THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF Q METHODOLOGY 
Invented by William Stephenson in 1935 in the form of a short letter2 to the 
scientific journal, Nature, Q methodology developed out of Stephenson’s 
interest in using factor analysis to correlate people with the views they held in 
order to reveal the multiple points of view that could prevail in any situation. 
Stephenson was a British physicist-psychologist with doctorates in both 
disciplines, earning his degree in psychology while serving as the last graduate 
assistant to Charles Spearman, the inventor of factor analysis.3  His book, The 
                                                            
2 “Factor analysis is a subject upon which Prof. G. H. Thomson, Dr. Wm. Brown and others 
have frequently written letters to Nature. This analysis is concerned with a selected population 
of n individuals each of whom has been measured in m tests. The (m)(m - 1)/2 intercorrelations 
for these m variables are subjected to either a Spearman or other factor analysis. The technique, 
however, can also be inverted. We begin with a population of n different tests (or essays, 
pictures, traits or other measurable material), each of which is measured or scaled by m 
individuals. The (m)(m-1)/2 intercorrelations are then factorised in the usual way. This 
inversion has interesting practical applications. It brings the factor technique from group and 
fieldwork into the laboratory, and reaches into spheres of work hitherto untouched or not 
amenable to factorisation. It is especially valuable in experimental aesthetics and in educational 
psychology, no less than in pure psychology. It allows a completely new series of studies to be 
made on the Spearman ‘central intellective factor’ (g), and also allows tests to be made of the 
Two Factor Theorem under greatly improved experimental conditions. Data on these and other 
points are to be published in due course in the British Journal of Psychology.” William 
Stephenson (1935). Technique of Factor Analysis. Nature. 24 August 1935, p. 297. 
3 Spearman once referred to his protégé, William Stephenson, as the most creative statistician 
in psychology. However, Stephenson’s methodology, despite its creativity, was vigorously 
challenged in psychological circles for decades. Only in the last two decades has widespread use 
of his methodology entered the social sciences as a legitimate and accurate method for 
200 
 
 
Study of Behavior: Q-Technique and Its Methodology,4 is the most thorough 
statement on his innovation, and has been applied to a wide variety of 
disciplines: from psychology to political science, economics, public policy, 
marketing, and communication.5 Q methodology seeks to provide both a 
qualitative and quantifiable analysis of human subjectivity, with self-
referential meaning and interpretation being central.6 As will be explained in 
the subsequent Sections, it is this aspect of Q methodology that differentiates 
it from the other types of factor analysis being espoused.7  
Therefore, while Q methodology focuses on the qualitative (in the sense that it 
is individual perspectives that are the focus of inquiry) and not the 
quantitative (as in traditional factor analysis), some of the most statistically 
rigorous mathematics of factor analysis are operating in the background.8 Q 
methodology has been described as a method that “combines the strengths of 
both qualitative and quantitative research traditions.”9 It is a method that 
provides researchers with a systematically and rigorously quantitative means 
for examining human subjectivity.10 Human subjectivity is defined as, for the 
purpose of this methodology, a person’s perspective on a matter of social or 
personal importance or relevance.11  
A person’s subjective perspective or viewpoint is the cognitive representation 
that an individual makes of the external reality and his or her position in that 
reality.12 The corollary to this conception of subjectivity, which makes it 
amenable to analysis, is that subjective viewpoints or perceptions are 
communicable and are always advanced from a position of self-reference.13 Q 
methodology is a method that can lend an objective analysis to this kind of 
operant subjective communicability.14 In the process of Q sorting, the person 
                                                                                                                                                                              
measuring human subjectivity. See Steven Brown (1995). The History and Principles of Q 
Methodology in Psychology and the Social Sciences. British Psychological Society Symposium, ‘A 
Quest of for a Science of Subjectivity: The Lifework of William Stephenson.’ 12-14 December 
1997. London, University of London. 
4 William Stephenson (1953). The Study of Behavior: Q-Technique and Its Methodology. Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press. 
5 Stephen Brown (2007). ‘Q Methodology,’ in Lisa Given, ed. The Sage Encyclopedia of 
Qualitative Research Methods. London, Sage, p. 699. 
6 Id. 
7 Traditional factor analysis, called R methodology, correlates variables (tests). Q methodology, 
on the other hand, correlates persons. See Section 2.1 of this Chapter. 
8 Steven Brown (1993). A Primer on Q Methodology. Operant Subjectivity. Vol. 16, pp. 91, 94. 
9 Karen Dennis & Andrew Goldberg (1996). Weight Control Self-Efficacy Types and Transitions 
Affect Weight-loss Outcomes in Obese Women. Addictive Behaviors. Vol. 21, pp. 103, 104. 
10 Brown, supra note 5. 
11 Bruce McKeown & Dan Thomas (1993). Q Methodology: Quantitative Applications in the Social 
Sciences. London, Sage, p. 12. 
12 Thomas Metzinger (2004). The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationalist 
Analysis of the First-Person Perspective. Networks. Vol. 3, pp. 33, 38. 
13 McKeown & Thomas, supra note 11. 
14 The idea of operantcy “can be traced to Skinner [the American behaviorist], and before that to 
Spearman [inventor of factor analysis], who were on the trail of this idea even before it became a 
central principle in physics. Science deals with operations associated with confrontable events, 
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operates with statements or other measurable stimuli by ranking-ordering 
them under some experimental condition.15 This operation:  
is subjective inasmuch as it is me [first-person] rather than someone else [third-person] 
who is providing a measure of my point of view, and the factors which emerge are 
therefore categories of operant subjectivity [emphasis in original].16  
As such, Q methodology can be very helpful in exploring and understanding 
individual preferences, motivations, and perceptions; that part of human 
cognition, which has great influence on behavior, but often remains 
unobservable.17 Typically, in a Q methodology study, individuals are presented 
with a sample of statements about some topic, called the Q set.18 The 
individuals giving responses, called the P set, are asked to rank order the 
statements.19 The sorting of the statements is done from the individual’s own 
point of view, and it is this process that brings subjectivity into play.20 This 
method is called the Q sort, and the statements are always matters of so-
called subjective opinion, not objective fact.21 By giving their subjective 
meaning to the statements, the ranking of the Q sort statements can reveal 
individual subjective viewpoints on a topic.22 These individual rankings are 
then subject to factor analysis, called the Q analysis; and the resulting factors, 
in as much as they have arisen from individual subjectivities, indicate the 
convergence or divergence of themes that exist among these individuals.23  
Therefore, Q method differs from other forms of qualitative research methods, 
such as surveys or questionnaires, which often impose antecedent conditions 
on the respondent. For example: 
[s]tudies using surveys or questionnaires often use categories that the investigator 
imposes on the responses. Q, on the other hand, determines categories that are 
operant.24  
                                                                                                                                                                              
and in Q methodology self and subjectivity are rendered operational through Q technique. In the 
process of Q sorting, the person operates with statements or other measurable stimuli by rank-
ordering them under some experimental condition. The operation is subjective inasmuch as it is 
me rather than someone else who is providing a measure of my point of view, and the factors 
which emerge are therefore categories of operant subjectivity [emphasis in original].” See Brown, 
supra note 3 at p. 3. 
15 Job van Exel & Gjalt de Graaf (2005). Q Methodology: A Sneak Preview, available at: http:// 
qmethod.org/articles/vanExel.pdf (last accessed 1 September 2013). 
16 Brown, supra note 8 at p. 12; see also William Stephenson (1977). Factors as Operant 
Subjectivity. Operant Subjectivity. Vol. 1, p. 3.  
17 van Exel & de Graaf, supra note 15 at p. 2. 
18 McKeown & Thomas, supra note 11. 
19 Id. 
20 Brown, supra note 8 at pp. 93-94.  
21 Id. 
22 Danielson, supra note 1 at p. 9. 
23 Id. at pp. 10-11. 
24 van Exel & de Graaf, supra note 15 at p. 1. 
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A strength of the method is that it does not require shared perspectives, or 
groups of subjects that share them, to be known or hypothesized in advance:25  
[a] crucial premise of Q is that subjectivity is communicable, because only when 
subjectivity is communicated, when it is expressed operantly, it can be systematically 
analysed, just as any other behavior.26  
While there are other methods for evaluating perspectives and viewpoints on 
particular issue areas,27 Q methodology has emerged in the past few decades 
as the most scientifically rigorous method for measuring human subjectivity.28   
 
2.1 Q Methodology Versus R Methodology 
Statistically speaking, Q methodology is a form of factor analysis. However, its 
method differs in many ways from traditional factor analysis, called R 
methodology. R methodology is the term coined by William Stephenson to 
categorize all methods of factor analysis where variables or tests, not persons, 
are the subject of correlation.29 The R comes from Karl Pearson’s product-
moment correlation coefficient (called Pearson’s r), which is used to denote the 
measure of the correlation between two variables.30 On the other hand, the Q 
in Q methodology comes from GH Thompson, a British psychologist, who 
referred to the term Q for any form of factor analysis that attempted to derive 
correlations between persons, as opposed to tests or variables – as in R 
methodology.31 As will be described subsequently, it is this basic distinction 
that differentiates Q methodology from R methodology. R methodology 
correlates variables, while Q methodology correlates persons.  
Essentially, Q methodology is an inversion of R methodology in terms of what 
is the object of correlation.32 In Table 1 below, for example, the variables are in 
                                                            
25 G Raadgever, et al. (2008). Identification of Stakeholder Perspectives on Future Flood 
Management in the Rhine Basin Using Q Methodology, Hydrology & Earth System Sciences. Vol. 
5, pp. 437, 439. 
26 van Exel & de Graaf, supra note 15 at p. 2. 
27 These methods include, inter alia: surveys, focus groups, multiattribute utility analysis, 
repertory grid method, grounded theory method, and mental model mapping. See Toddi 
Steelman & Lynn Maguire (1999). Understanding Participant Perspectives: Q Methodology in 
National Forest Management. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. Vol. 18, pp. 361, 362; 
see also M Kolkman, et al. (2005). Mental Model Mapping as a New Tool to Analyze the Use of 
Information in Decision-Making in Integrated Water Management. Physics & Chemistry of the 
Earth. Vol. 30, p. 317. 
28 Brown, supra note 5. 
29 Stephenson, supra note 2. 
30 Steven Brown (1980). Political Subjectivity: Applications of Q methodology in Political Science. 
New Haven, Yale University Press, p. 9. 
31 Id. 
32 The inversion that Stephenson alludes to in this letter to Nature relates to his desired focus 
on the correlation of persons, not traits. He discovered very quickly that merely turning the data 
matrix on its side would produce statistically dubious results. See Stephenson, supra note 3. 
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the columns, while the persons tested make up the rows in the data matrix. 
This is the basic matrix for a R methodological study where the focus is on the 
variables in the columns. However, this data matrix can also be inverted.33 In 
such an instance, the persons are moved into the columns and the variables 
are presented as rows. Any methodological approach in correlation statistics 
that focuses on correlating the persons tested versus the variables themselves 
are referred to as Q.34  However, it is this distinction between Q and R that has 
led to a large amount of methodological confusion.35 This is because a simple 
inversion of the data matrix gives statistically dubious results, and therefore, 
the kind of Q methodology that Stephenson advocated is actually nothing like 
a basic inversion of R methodology.36 Instead, it envisions a complete retool of 
the data used in the analysis.37 Stephenson’s form of Q retains only the basic 
distinction: Q method focuses on correlations between persons, not tests or 
variables. 
 
Table 1: Data Matrix for R Factor Analysis 
Persons 
Variables (Tests) 
1 2 3 4 m 
a ax1 ax2 ax3 ax4 axm 
b bx1 bx2 bx3 bx4 bxm 
c cx1 cx2 cx3 cx4 cxm 
d dx1 dx2 dx3 dx4 dxm 
n nx1 nx2 nx3 nx4 nxm 
 
Traditional factor analysis – R methodology – is able to identify latent variables 
(called factors) that exist in the relationship between traits.38 Under traditional 
factor analysis of the type Spearman invented, correlations could be made 
between various tests. It is a method of correlation statistics. For example, say 
that a researcher has a set of data that consists of a series of tests (variables) 
that individuals have conducted relating to verbal ability, mathematical ability, 
and problem-solving ability.39 These tests can be standardized (explained in 
the following paragraph) and then correlated to see if there are any underlying 
latent factors that explains statistically significant similarities and differences 
between the scores.40 Under such an example, one might find that high scores 
on the verbal test would correlate with similarly high scores on the 
                                                            
33 Simon Watts & Paul Stenner (2012). Doing Q Methodological Research: Theory, Method, and 
Interpretation. London, Sage, p. 12. 
34 Brown, supra note 30 at p. 11. 
35 Watts & Stenner, supra note 33 at pp. 12-13. 
36 Brown, supra note 30 at p. 11. 
37 Watts & Stenner, supra note 33 at pp. 15-16. 
38 Brown, supra note 30 at p. 12. 
39 Watts & Stenner, supra note 33 at p. 10. 
40 Id. 
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mathematical and problem-solving tests.41 At the same time, one might also 
discover that a low score on one of the tests, also correlates with a low score 
on the other two tests.42  
In essence, factor analysis is a type of data reduction technique: 
that delivers on this reductive promise by isolating groups of variables – traits, abilities 
and so on – exhibiting measured scores that have varied proportionately (or covaried) 
across a population of persons.43  
In the example given, the variables given (the three tests) are likely to covary. 
In probability theory and statistics, covariance is a measure of how much 
random variables change together.44 If the greater value of one variable 
corresponds or correlates with a greater value of another variable, then the 
covariance is a positive number. Likewise, if a greater value of one variable 
corresponds or correlates with a lesser value of another variable, then the 
covariance is a negative number. Covariance shows the tendency of a linear 
relationship between two or more variables. In the case given:  
this covariation suggests that the three variables might, in fact, be better understood as 
alternative manifestations of a single underlying or latent factor.45 
An observed positive association or correlation between the scores of verbal, 
mathematical, and problem-solving aptitude tests may be understood on the 
basis of a single latent factor such as intelligence.46 As such, factor analysis is 
able to reduce a large set of variables down to a small number of factors that 
can explain the covariance.  
Under traditional factor analysis, a population of individuals are measured 
according to a set of multiple variables. It is these variables that are the 
primary focus in this type of factor analysis. To put the project of factor 
analysis into context, take a modified example drawn from Watts and 
Stenner:47 in Table 1 above, for example, Variable 1 could be a test for height, 
Variable 2 could be a test for weight, Variable 3 could be a test for age, and so 
on. The original problem for this traditional form of factor analysis lies in the 
need to standardize each of the variables so that they can make sense when 
being correlated.48 In the example given, height, weight, and age consist of 
                                                            
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Graham Upton & Ian Cook, eds. (2002). A Dictionary of Statistics. Oxford, OUP, p. 104. 
45 Watts & Stenner, supra note 33 at p. 10. 
46 Id. 
47 See id. at pp. 8-9. 
48 Id. at p. 9. 
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different units of measurement. Therefore, a question of whether person a is 
heavier than they are tall than they are old does not really make any sense.49  
In order to compare these variables, the units of measurement must be 
standardized.50 This standardization process, called standard scores or Z 
scores, allows for a direct comparison of the differing units of measurement. 
The Z score is a mathematical expression of the distance between a particular 
absolute score and the mean average score of the measured population. Z 
scores allow for tests using different units of measurement to be compared 
relative to each other. By this example, it may turn out that person a is 75 
percent heavier than all of the other samples, is 50 percent taller, and is 25 
percent older.51 Once this information is obtained, the researcher can see that 
in this case, that person a is in fact heavier than she is tall and old (at least in 
relation to the population tested).52  
As stated in the preceding Section, Stephenson believed that the innovation of 
factor analysis just described could be inverted. While this form of factor 
analysis envisions a method for correlating different tests (variables), 
Stephenson inquired as to whether or not there was a means to correlate the 
persons being tested, and not the tests themselves. The variables are moved 
along the rows of the data matrix in Table 1, and the persons are moved into 
the columns. However, it is exactly this type of inversion that led to a number 
of theoretical debates about the appropriateness and usefulness of such an 
inversion of the technique of factor analysis.53 This basic model of inversion, 
which is called the transposed matrix model, essentially turns the normal data 
matrix on its side.54  
From the very beginning, this idea about inverting the data matrix has caused 
widespread confusion about Q methodology and its practical import as 
compared to R methodology.55 When Stephenson wrote his letter to Nature in 
1935, his claim to an ‘inversion of the technique’56 was a reference to an 
inversion of the by-variable factor analysis into a by-person factor analysis. He 
was interested in creating a method of psychological significance that could 
correlate people, not variables.57 By the time that Stephenson penned this 
letter, the idea that traditional factor analysis could be inverted using the 
transposed matrix model was already being considered.58 Ultimately, this was 
                                                            
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at pp. 12-13. 
54 Id. at p. 13. 
55 Id. 
56 Stephenson, supra note 2. 
57 See Cyril Burt & William Stephenson (1939). Alternative Views of Correlations Between 
Persons. Psychometrika. Vol. 4, p. 347. 
58 Brown, supra note 8 at p. 11. 
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not the creativity and novelty that Stephenson added to the method of factor 
analysis. Stephenson realized very early on that a mere inversion of the 
technique would result in largely unhelpful and statistically questionable 
results.59  
The basic claim of the transposed matrix model was that a researcher could 
use the same R methodology data to measure and correlate individuals 
instead of variables. However, when the data matrix is inverted, the need to 
standardize the data remains.60 When using the same set of data as in an R 
methodology correlation of variables, a Q methodology correlation of persons 
needs the units of measurement for each person to be identical. Since this 
would almost never happen, and where this problem was solved through the 
standardization of variables through the process of determining Z scores in an 
R methodology analysis, the same process of standardization as applied to 
persons would only distort and confuse the correlations.61 When attempting to 
devise a means for standardizing by-person scores, Stephenson held that the 
factors it produced “can only be distorted, unreal or potential, with respect to 
any individual.”62  
However, it was this transposed or inverted matrix model version of Q 
methodology that was advanced by Cyril Burt, another prominent early factor 
analyst, and it is also the version of Q that has been produced in many 
textbooks in psychology.63 There is a significant difference between the version 
of Q advanced by Burt (and others), and that advanced by Stephenson.64 In 
Burt’s version, Q methodology uses the same set of data that has been 
gathered for R methodological purposes.65 It merely attempts to change the 
focus from by-variable analysis to by-person analysis. Stephenson, on the 
other hand, believed that by-person factor analysis could only succeed if a 
wholly new type of data could be devised. It is this new type of data – called 
the Q sort – that would solve all of the design problems facing the transposed 
matrix model.66 
This new form of Q methodology and the data it demanded is characterized by 
the type of holistic analysis of subjectivity that Stephenson was attempting to 
achieve. According to Brown:  
from this very first pronouncement, Stephenson made clear that R methodology referred 
to ‘a selected population of n individuals each of whom has been measured in m tests’ 
                                                            
59 Watts & Stenner, supra note 33 at p. 13. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 William Stephenson (1936). The Foundations of Psychometry: Four Factor Systems. 
Psychometrika. Vol. 1, pp. 195, 208. 
63 Brown, supra note 8 at p. 11. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at p. 15. 
66 Id. at pp. 15-17. 
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(note the passive verb has been measured), and that Q methodology referred to a ‘a 
population of n different tests (or essays, pictures, or other measurable material), each of 
which is measured or scaled by m individuals’ (note the active verb is measured). In the 
former case, something is done to the person, as when we take blood pressure or 
measure height: [t]his is the objective mode and the person’s stance relative to 
measurement is passive. In the latter case, the person actively does something, i.e., 
measures or scales a population of measurable material: [t]his is the subjective mode 
insofar as measurement is from the person’s standpoint.67  
To achieve this type of Q methodology data, Stephenson developed the 
innovation of the Q sort. The Q sort permits the individual being studied to 
rank-order or scale a number of statements from a first-person or subjective 
perspective and would result in a “‘new unit of quantification’ called 
‘psychological significance.’”68  
 
Figure 1: Q Sort Data Matrix 
← Most Disagree                                                                                                 Most Agree → 
- 4 - 3 - 2 - 1 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
 
With this new form of data collection, Stephenson was able to cleverly devise a 
means for standardizing the data in the same way as in R methodology. 
Instead of standardizing the scores among variables after the fact (as in R 
methodology), the Q sort standardizes the scores through the very process of Q 
sorting itself.69 In a typical Q sort, each individual being tested is given a set of 
heterogeneous statements on a given topic and is asked to rank order these 
statements relative to each other.70 Usually this is done under some condition 
of instruction such as ‘from most disagree to most agree’ or ‘from most 
characteristic to most uncharacteristic.’71 A typical Q sort data matrix is 
provided in Figure 1 above. In structuring the data in this way, each of the 
                                                            
67 Brown, supra note 3 at p. 2. 
68 Watts & Stenner, supra note 33 at p. 15. 
69 Id. at. p. 16. 
70 Steelman & Maguire, supra note 27 at p. 363. 
71 Watts & Stenner, supra note 33 at p. 16. 
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columns – for each individual Q sort – is amenable to the same kind of factor 
analysis used in R methodology. It allows for multiple Q sorts to be directly 
compared and correlated.  
Q methodology of this type gives information about the similarity or difference 
in viewpoint, or segments of subjectivity, that exist among a population of 
individuals participating in a Q sort procedure. Each person is given the same 
set of heterogeneous statements and is asked to rank order them relative to 
each other.72 Each person’s Q sort is a reflection of their viewpoint or 
perspective on a particular topic at that moment in time. It is able to take a 
subjective and ephemeral phenomenon such as one’s viewpoint and hold it 
steady in time and space for reflection. While each Q sort reflects each 
individuals unique perspective, Q methodology and its factor analysis 
procedures is able to reduce the many individual viewpoints down to a 
number of themes, which represent a shared way of thinking about a certain 
topic.73 Q methodology analyzes each individual’s subjective perspective as a 
whole, and does not aim to generate correlations between objective attributes 
that are abstracted from the individual – such as nationality, age, or gender.74 
As such, a Q sort can be used with a small, selected sample of individuals and 
is not intended to generalize the results to a larger population.75   
 
2.2 Operant Subjectivity and Concourse Theory 
While Q methodology has come to be a methodology rooted in the social 
sciences, it has its pedigree in psychology.76 As such, Stephenson originally 
viewed Q methodology as a means of measuring single individuals.77 In such a 
manifestation of Q methodology, a single person could conduct identical Q 
sorts according to different conditions of instructions.78 The correlations of 
these different individual Q sorts could provide psychologically significant 
information about that individual.79 Since Q methodology focuses on 
correlations about subjective aspects of the self, and not on objective 
attributes about people in general, the need for large sample sizes is reduced. 
However, Q methodology’s relationship with the factor analytic tools of R 
methodology (which generally needs large sample sizes) and the prominent use 
of multiple participant Q method studies in the social sciences means that 
most of the self-focused psychological (single participant) orientation has been 
lost.  
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One of the main terms of art in Q methodology is that of operant subjectivity.80 
This terms was coined by Stephenson to connote a challenge to the 
psychological behaviorists who used the term operant behavior (a term coined 
by BF Skinner) to describe the focus of psychological inquiry.81 John Watson, 
the founder of behaviorism, stated that “psychology as the behaviorist views it 
is a purely objective experimental branch of natural science.”82 The basic idea 
of the behaviorists was to reject psychological focus on the mind and ideas 
such as consciousness; and to instead focus purely on behaviors that could be 
observed and documented objectively.83 Behaviors are operant, and therefore 
amenable to objective empirical observation because they are expressed 
spontaneously and made meaningful by their relationship with the immediate 
environment.84 For example, a  person can be observed to respond in a 
particular way to some external stimuli. The behavior that is emitted can be 
objectively observed without recourse to any knowledge about the internal 
workings of the subjective human mind.85  
Despite the complete rejection of inquiry into the subjective mind by the 
behaviorists, Stephenson believed that subjectivity could be observed 
empirically with the same scientific and objective rigor claimed by the 
behaviorists.86 The idea of operant subjectivity is a claim about the possibility 
of reflecting on subjectivity – through the employ of Q technique – in the same 
manner as objectively observable behaviors.87 As Watts and Stenner point out:  
Stephenson’s The Study of Behavior: Q-Technique and its Methodology is sending a 
warning to the behaviorists that their rejection of mentalist terminology should not 
presage the abandonment of subjectivity or studies conducted from the first-person 
perspective. Q methodology allowed the latter to be studied reliably and ‘with full 
scientific sanction, satisfying every rule and procedure of scientific method.’ It offered the 
potential to deliver a first-person or subjective science of exactly the same standing and 
quality as third-person, objective science that the behaviorists were continuing to 
develop. To abandon subjectivity, Stephenson argued, was like throwing the baby out 
with the bathwater. This turned out to be very prescient warning, for the loss of this baby 
proved subsequently to be a key factor in the demise of behaviorism.88  
In deriving a technique for the measurement of operant subjectivity using the 
factor analytic tools developed in other branches of psychology in the early 
twentieth century, Stephenson held that there was no reason to foreclose on 
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the study of first-person perspectives as the behaviorists advocated.89 In a 
similar vein, Noam Chomsky’s critique of another prominent behaviorist, BF 
Skinner, is said to have been the beginning of the late twentieth century turn 
to the cognitive sciences and a return to the study of the mind as the object of 
psychological inquiry.90 Coming at the problem from varying angles, it appears 
that Stephenson and Chomsky both understood that a purely objective, or 
third-person, understanding of psychological events would only be able to 
identify a limited amount of cognitive or mental phenomena.  
To make subjectivity operant and empirically observable, Stephenson had to 
develop a means for identifying such operantcy. He does this through the 
innovation of the Q sort.91 However, in devising the Q sort, he needed a data 
set that could deliver on his promise of operant subjectivity. He does this 
through another of his innovations: the concourse theory of subjective 
communicability.92 In a similar vein to the behaviorists, Stephenson wanted to 
solve the problem of mentalist concepts (such as mind and consciousness) by 
abandoning them.93 Unlike the behaviorists, however, Stephenson held that 
subjective aspects of the mind could be observed through the process of 
consciring, or the ‘sharing of knowledge.’94 The possibility of observing such 
shared knowledge is reinforced by the interbehavioral psychology of JR 
Kantor,95 who Stephenson held in high esteem throughout his career.96 A Q 
method study, according to Stephenson, requires:  
preparing phenomena of mind, so-called, so that it can display its structure. The 
preparation involves two steps. One is to dispense with mind as ‘non-essential’ and [the 
other is] to replace it with what is observable, namely, communicability.97  
Communicability is the:  
observable domain of self-referent statements and opinion. It is an overall field of shared 
knowledge and meaning from which it is possible to extract an identifiable ‘universe of 
statements for [and about] any situation or context.’ Each identifiable universe is called a 
concourse.98  
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In practical terms, the concourse – or population of statements on any 
particular topic – is the subject-matter of the Q sort in a Q method study.99 
Participants in a Q method study take each of these statements and operate 
with them through the activity of rank-ordering, or sorting them, according to 
a matrix similar to the one drawn in Figure 1 above. According to Stephenson, 
the concourse itself is meaningless, but that it gains meaning through the 
activity of Q sorting.100 This Q sorting procedure is subjective in that it is me 
(and not another person) doing the sorting, and that the final positioning of 
the statements reflects my point of view or perspective at that moment in 
time.101 It is this process of Q sorting that is amenable to factor analysis and 
will be able to scientifically articulate shared ways of thinking on a particular 
topic. It is a means of converting subjective phenomena into objective 
phenomena. 
 
2.3 The Science of Subjectivity 
Using the concepts of operantcy and concourse theory, Q methodology is 
capable of delivering a method for empirically measuring human subjectivity. 
The subjectivity to which Q methodology refers is that which emanates from 
the first-person perspective. It focuses on the subjective self as opposed to the 
objective world; and while concepts of the subjective and the objective have 
multiple meanings, it is this primary distinction that is central. In terms of 
scientific knowledge (and legal knowledge for that matter), a strong dualism is 
created between knowledge that is subjective and knowledge that is objective. 
In most circles of scientific inquiry, that which is empirically observable is 
often given the label of objectivity, and that which is empirically unobservable 
is said to be subjective. However, this dualism breaks down if the kind of 
subjectivity of Q methodology is in fact amenable to empirical observation of 
the type that is normally reserved for observations considered to be objective.  
As has been noted in previous Chapters, the advantage of rejecting dualistic 
concepts such as mind-matter, value-fact, and subject-object is that one can 
begin to focus on the ways that these supposed dichotomies rely on one 
another for gaining knowledge. As the neopragmatist philosopher Hilary 
Putnam has argued, they are entangled.102 The identification of the collapse of 
the subject-object dualism is attributable to the pragmatists of the early 
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twentieth century; preeminently, John Dewey, Charles Pierce, George Mead, 
and William James.103  
In psychological circles, James has had the most lasting philosophic influence 
on the scientific study of psychology; and it is James that is mostly closely tied 
to the development of Q methodology.104 However, it appears that 
Stephenson’s attribution of James’s theoretical influence was noticed only in 
retrospect.105 Stephenson’s work developed early on as a reaction to the 
constraints of traditional factor analysis as Spearman and Burt had 
envisioned it. It was only in his later writings that he was able to appreciate 
that “the achievement of Q was largely due to two chapters in William James 
(1890) The Principles of Psychology.”106  
This understanding of the foundations of Q methodology provides an 
interesting corollary with the development of logical positivism in the natural 
sciences. Like the development of behaviorism in psychology, the logical 
positivists sought to deliver a purely objective method for the sciences more 
broadly.107 And where the behaviorists were defeated through the rise of the 
cognitive sciences in the latter part of the twentieth century, the demise of the 
logical positivists came with attacks from neopragmatist figures, such as WVO 
Quine, writing on the philosophy of science.108 It has been realized that the 
achievement of a purely objective science or psychology, as the positivists and 
behaviorists envisioned it, could not be sustained.109 The idea that all 
subjective modes of thought could be purged from scientific inquiry was a 
noble endeavor, but ultimately doomed due to the fact that all methods of 
inquiry require the observations and activities of a human subject. However, 
this insight was not a phenomenon that had it philosophic pedigree in late 
twentieth century thought; rather, it shares ideas that were central to the 
original pragmatists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  
The main problem presented to the logical positivists and the behaviorists was 
how to deal with mental knowledge that was not amenable to empirical 
discovery.  In short, their answer was to reject it as completely outside the 
scope of inquiry. The pragmatists had already preempted this problem by 
claiming that there was no reason to exclude mental entities from the scope of 
inquiry.110 However, they did not claim that the subjective mind was not 
amenable to objective verification.111 Rather, pragmatists such as James held 
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that ideas of consciousness and mind ought to be looked at, not as 
ontologically existent entities, but as a function or activity.112 If viewed in this 
manner, then neither subjectivity nor objectivity needed to be taken as 
primary.113 Instead, the focus turns on the empirical verification of both 
subjective and objective phenomena. James called this focus pure experience, 
and it was this pure experience that should be central to any type of 
inquiry.114  
In many ways, this is exactly the same project that Stephenson sought to 
achieve with Q methodology. He sought a method for making the subjective 
observable and amenable to scientific inquiry.115 He did not aim to do this by 
advancing a means for deriving objective answers to subjective entities such as 
mind, value, consciousness, or morality; rather, he sought to maintain the 
subjective as non-entities, but by making the subjective operant, he believed 
that these subjective non-entities could be held still long enough to make 
them amenable to objective analysis through the innovation of Q 
methodology.116 
 
2.4 Q Methodology and Quantum Theory 
In the history of philosophic thought, the pragmatists fell out of favor with the 
rise of the objectivist sciences and the behaviorist psychology of the early 
twentieth century.117 It is only in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
century that the flaws in a purely objective and value-free focus in philosophic 
thought has once again become apparent. This shift coincides in large ways 
with the quantum theoretical revolution in the physical sciences, where it has 
been described as the “most generally applicable of all theories.”118 According 
to Brown:  
[o]nce Einstein’s theories began penetrating the public’s thought, they were extended by 
analogy to human activity – as in cultural relativity, value relativity, and so forth – so that 
in virtually all matters nowadays anyone’s point of view is considered just as valid as 
anyone else’s, and this implicates even scientific theories (with obligatory bows to Thomas 
Kuhn). Now that quantum theory has reached popular levels, however, terms such as 
paradoxical, indeterminate, chaotic, and complementary are appearing with greater 
frequency and are increasingly nominated as descriptors of choice. Consequently, the 
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race is now on to determine how far this quantum principle can be taken into human 
reality.119  
The answer, in most cases, is not very far. However, interestingly, the 
mechanics of factor analysis are virtually identical mathematically to the 
matrix model of quantum mechanics devised by Werner Heisenberg, Max 
Born, and Pascual Jordon.120 And while factor analysis in psychology and 
quantum mechanics in physics apparently developed without any cross-
fertilization, it is remarkable that equivalent mathematical models were 
created for distinct purposes at just about the same time in human history.121 
Nonetheless, the difference between Newtonian or classic mechanics and 
quantum mechanics has been profound. In relation to general philosophic 
thought, the analogy between the two theoretical models has also been 
widespread.122 Where the Newtonian model correlates with the modernist view 
of world where objective truths – in all realms of the natural and human world 
– are possible, the quantum model shifts that reality to a postmodern view 
whereby the natural and human world are only knowable relatively and 
contextual – never absolutely.  
In quantum mechanics, “physicists realized that specific outcomes were the 
function of the method employed.”123 A prime example of this is the 
extraordinary discover that, depending on method, light is either a wave or 
particle phenomena. This counter-intuitive phenomenon is summarized by 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle.124 The uncertainty principle holds that one 
cannot know the present state of the world in full detail; and as such, marks a 
distinct break with the determinism associated with the classical view of the 
universe. This indeterminacy is especially relevant to subjective states of the 
mind. Subjective knowledge of the type that Q methodology attempts to 
measure is similar in structure to the problems of observational perspective in 
quantum age physics.125 Heisenberg states that science is a human enterprise, 
and that it is an interplay of the object and the subject; what science 
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“describes is not nature as such, but nature as exposed to man’s method of 
questioning.”126  
In this way, and as opposed to classical mechanics: 
quantum theory proper allows that physicist to ascertain the basic physical states or 
positions that are taken up by an ensemble of atoms in relation to a particular 
experimental setting and a particular act of measurement. Q methodology, on the other 
hand, understood in quantum fashion, might allow interested researchers to ascertain 
the basic psychological states or positions taken up by an ensemble of persons in relation 
to a particular object of enquiry under a particular condition or instruction. In short, 
physicists use quantum theory to study and understand a related series of observables 
(or objects), while Q methodology can be used to study and understand a related series of 
observers (or subjects).127 
 
3. THE TECHNIQUE OF Q METHODOLOGY 
Performing an actual Q method study requires an understanding of the 
technique and practices need to conduct such a study.  A Q method study 
consists of five steps, each of which are described below: 1) a collection of all 
possible statements concerning a particular issue or topic (called the 
concourse), 2) a selection of the most relevant statements (called the Q set), 3) 
a selection of the respondents (called the P set), 4) the process of ranking of 
statements by respondents according to how much they agree or disagree with 
each statement according to a specific condition of instruction (called the Q 
sort), and 5) an analysis and interpretation of the results. Before turning to 
the description of each step in a Q study, it may prove useful to provide a 
summary of the methodology from the leading authority on the use of Q 
methodology: 
[m]ost typically, a person is presented with a set of statements about some topic, and is 
asked to rank-order them (usually from ‘agree’ to ‘disagree’), an operation referred to as ‘Q 
sorting.’ The statements are matters of opinion only (not fact), and the fact that the Q 
sorter is ranking the statements from his or her own point of view is what brings 
subjectivity into the picture. There is obviously no right or wrong way to provide ‘my point 
of view’ about anything – health care, the Clarence Thomas nomination, the reasons 
people commit suicide, why Cleveland can’t field a decent baseball team, or anything else.  
Yet the rankings are subject to factor analysis, and the resulting factors, inasmuch as 
they have arisen from individual subjectivities, indicate segments of subjectivity which 
exist.  And since the interest of Q methodology is in the nature of the segments and the 
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extent to which they are similar or dissimilar, the issue of large numbers, so fundamental 
to most social research, is rendered relatively unimportant.128 
 
3.1 The Concourse 
Central to Q methodology is the concept of the concourse. The concourse is 
“the flow of communicability surrounding any topic”129 in the “ordinary 
conversation, commentary, and discourse of everyday life.”130 It is the starting 
point for any Q study, and requires that the researcher gather a representative 
sample of the concourse being evaluated. This could potentially include 
thousands and thousands of statements depending on the breadth of the 
subject-matter. It is therefore important to carefully design the specificity of 
the research question from which the concourse will be drawn. The concourse 
is a technical concept used in Q methodology to refer to all the possible 
statements that can be made about a particular topic.131 It is from this broad 
concourse that a representative sample will be drawn from to use in the actual 
Q method study.132 The concourse can be collected in a number of ways: 
interviewing people, participant observations, workshops, roundtable 
discussions, lectures, newspapers, academic papers, journal articles, books, 
magazines, and speeches.133 The gathered material represents all of the (as 
comprehensive a collection as possible) arguments, opinions, debates, 
conference proceedings, discussions, and spoken and written word, that 
individuals have to say about a particular topic.134 The concourse should be 
broad and contain elements from all persons discussing a particular topic. The 
statements in the concourse should also stay as close to their original wording 
as possible. 
 
3.2 The Q Set 
In order to conduct a Q methodology study, the concourse must be reduced to 
a manageable number of participant statements.135 This reduced number of 
statements is called the Q set and usually consists of 40 to 50 statements; but 
it can be more or less depending on the objectives of a particular Q method 
study.136 The selection of the most relevant statement from the concourse is a 
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crucial activity in Q methodology.137 According to Brown, the selection of 
statements from the concourse remains “more of an art than a science.”138 
However, this is not to say that a well-balanced Q set cannot be derived 
without injecting the researcher’s bias into the process.139  
The researcher can use a number of procedural structures for selecting a 
representative miniature of the concourse, and to hedge against any bias in 
the selection of statements. Such a structure may emerge from further 
examination of the statements in the concourse or the structure may be 
imposed on the concourse based on a specific method. One specific method is 
to filter the concourse through a matrix that assigns statements to a set of 
categories that represents the entire ‘opinion domain.’140 Under such a 
technique, “Q methodology models a universe, using the experimental design 
principles advanced by Ronald Fisher.”141 These experimental design 
principles are articulated through what Fisher calls the balanced-block 
approach.142 It is a procedure for creating a balanced and representative Q set 
from the concourse. Extensive examples of this process of experimental design 
are detailed in both the seminal works of Brown143 and Stephenson.144  
By providing a systematic design approach for establishing the Q set, the 
researcher is forced to select statements widely different from one another in 
order to make the Q set broadly representative. The aim is to arrive at a Q set 
that is representative of the wide range of existing opinions on a topic. 
However, according to experts on Q methodology, the exact constitution of the 
Q set can vary widely and still produce similar results.145 Different selection 
criteria may lead to differing Q sets from the same concourse. There have been 
a number of comparative studies that indicate that different sets of statements 
structured in different ways can nevertheless be expected to converge on the 
same conclusions.146  This is likely because it is the subject (participant) that 
gives meaning to the statements during the Q sort procedure, and therefore, 
the exact structure of the Q set is not critical so long as there are a wide array 
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of viewpoints present in the resulting Q set.147 Once a representative sample 
has been selected, each statement is edited, randomly numbered, and then 
placed on a card – for face-to-face Q sorting interviews – or included in an 
online Q sorting tool.148 
 
3.3 The P Set 
The P set is the number of individuals that are participating in the Q method 
study. One of the advantages of Q methodology is that only a limited number 
of respondents is needed in order to produce statistically relevant results.149 
Since Q methodology correlates persons instead of tests, a small number of 
participants are given a large number of test items instead of conventional 
factor analysis (R methodology), which requires a large number of participants 
being given a small number of tests.150 The results of a Q method study are 
used to describe a population of individual viewpoints, and not a population of 
traits (as in R methodology).151 This means that:  
Q [methodology] does not need a large number of subjects as does R [methodology], for it 
can reveal a characteristic independently of the distribution of that characteristic relative 
to other characteristics.152  
This means that so-called opportunity sampling is rarely a good strategy in 
selecting a P set for a Q method study.153 The reason for this is that since a Q 
method study is an inversion of an R method study, the Q set actually 
becomes the sample (as opposed to the sample being the population of 
participants in an R method study), and the P set actually becomes the 
variable. This observation: 
suggests the pressing need to select a participant group, or P set, with relative care and 
consideration. Studies that feature ill-considered or apparently random set of variables 
are obviously to be avoided. We want to discover relevant viewpoints using Q methodology 
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and that means finding participants who have a defined viewpoint to express, and even 
more importantly, participants whose viewpoints matters in relation to the subject at 
hand.154  
According to Brown, this means that the P set must always be more 
“theoretical . . . or dimensional . . . than random or accidental.”155 The P set is 
usually smaller than the Q set, and should be selected based on the subject-
matter being considered.156 Where the Q set typically comprises 40 to 50 
statements, the P set does not need to exceed 40.157 The aim is to have three 
or four participants defining each anticipated viewpoint. The P set is not a 
random sample. It is a structured sample of respondents who are theoretically 
relevant to the problem under consideration; for instance, persons who are 
expected to have a clear and distinct viewpoint regarding the particular 
problem under investigation.158 
 
3.4 The Q Sort 
Once the concourse has been reduced down to a manageable Q set, the P set 
will be asked to sort the statements from the Q set. This is called the Q sort, 
and it is this procedure that will reveal the common perspectives or viewpoints 
among the individuals participating in the study. The general procedure is as 
follows. The Q set is given to the participant in the form of a pack of randomly 
numbered cards, each card containing one of the statements from the Q set.159 
The participant is instructed to rank the statements according to some rule or 
question, called the condition of instruction.160 Typically, the rule of 
instruction is: please sort these statements according to your point of view or 
perspective on the topic or issue being discussed. The statements have to be 
ranked into score categories representing a sliding scale, usually from strong 
agreement to strong disagreement.  
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For most Q sorting data matrices, it is sufficient to use a distribution with a 
continuum ranging from -4 being strong disagreement with the statement to 
+4 being strong agreement with the statement (see Figure 1 above). However, 
the kurtosis161 of this distribution depends on the controversiality of the 
topic.162 For example, in cases where:  
the involvement, interest, or knowledge of the respondents is expected to be low, or a 
relatively small part of the statements is expected to be salient, the distribution should be 
steeper in order to leave room for ambiguity, indecisiveness or error in the middle of the 
distribution.163  
This would be an example of a deep distribution (see Figure 2 below). On the 
other hand, if the participants:  
are expected to have strong, or well-articulated opinions on the topic at issue, the 
distribution should be flatter in order to provide more room for strong (dis)agreement with 
the statements.164  
This would be an example of a shallow distribution (see Figure 3 below).  
The participant is asked to read through all of the statements carefully in 
order to get an impression of the type and range of viewpoints and opinions at 
issue.165 The participant is then instructed to begin with a rough sorting of the 
statements, by dividing the statements into three piles: 1) statements that the 
participant generally agrees with, 2) statements the participant disagrees with, 
and 3) statements with which the participant is neutral, uncertain, 
ambiguous, or undecided. This is called the pre-sort.166 Next, the participant 
refines the sort by placing the statements in the Q sort matrix in order from 
most disagree to most agree. This requires the participant to carefully compare 
the statements relative to each other. The results of the sort are then placed 
on a score card.167 Whether conducting the Q sort online or face-to-face, it is 
important to follow up the Q sorting procedure with a few questions about why 
the participant assigned certain statements to the most extreme categories.168 
This supports a valid and fast interpretation of factors in the last step of a Q 
method study.169 This process can range in time from fifteen minutes to one 
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hour depending on the number of statements and the exact procedures 
used.170  
 
Figure 2: Example of a Deep Q Sort Distribution 
← Most Disagree                                 Most Agree → 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
Figure 3: Example of a Shallow Q Sort Distribution 
← Most Disagree                                                                                                 Most Agree → 
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
 
Figure 4: Example of a Free Distribution Q Sort Matrix 
← Most Disagree                                                                                                 Most Agree → 
- 4 - 3 - 2 - 1 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 
         
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
 
In addition to decisions about the number of statements in the Q set, and the 
scope of the agree-disagree distribution, the Q study designer must make two 
additional decisions: 1) whether to conduct the Q sort using an online program 
or through a face-to-face interview, and 2) whether to require that the 
participant must place the statements within a fixed, forced (v-shaped) 
symmetrical distribution, or whether the participant is free to distribute 
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statements without prescribing the shape of the distribution.171 For the first 
issue, by using an online tool for the Q sorting procedure, participants are 
able to perform the sort at any convenient time, and it significantly reduces 
the time required to perform the procedure.172 A disadvantage of the online 
approach is that there is the potential for a lower response rate and there are 
limited possibilities for the researcher to explain to the participant how to 
perform the task. However, there is no apparent difference in the reliability 
and validity of the results, whether conducted online or face-to-face.173   
The final issue that must be addressed in the design of the Q sort is whether 
or not a forced distribution of the statements is used. A fixed distribution174 
forces the participants to spend more time reflecting on how each statement 
relates to one another.175 A so-called forced, or quasi-normal, distribution Q 
sort is given in Figures 1, 2, and 3 above. By limiting the number of 
statements that can be placed in each category, the respondent has to make 
judgments about where to place a particular statement in relation to the 
others.176 This process has been shown to decrease the risk of arbitrary or 
biased sorting.177 However, some Q study participants have complained that 
such a fixed distribution involves excessive time and effort, and that their 
perspective could not be expressed well given the static distribution.178 This 
problem can be solved by allowing participants to distribute statements freely 
without prescribing the shape of the distribution or by giving a distribution 
that is set more loosely than the typical quasi-normal (v-shaped) distribution. 
An example of a free distribution is given in Figure 4 above. While there is no 
consequence for the factor analysis, Q method experts warn: 
that when respondents are not at all stimulated to evaluate their agreement with one 
statement relatively to their agreement with another . . . [the] accuracy of the elicited 
perspectives will be less.179  
 
3.5 The Analysis 
Once all of the Q sorts have been completed, they must be subjected to factor 
analysis.180 The analysis of the Q sorts is a purely technical, objective 
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procedure – and is therefore sometimes referred to as the scientific basis of Q 
methodology.181 As has been described in early sections of this Chapter, factor 
analysis is a statistical data reduction technique used to explain as much of 
the variability among the observed Q sorts as possible in terms of a few 
unobserved scoring patterns, called factors.182 The purpose of a factor 
analysis:  
is to account for as much of th[e] study variance as is possible – i.e. to explain as much 
as we can about the relationships that hold between the many Q sorts in the group – 
through the identification of, and by reference to, and sizable portions of common or 
shared meaning that are present in the data. These portions or dimensions of shared 
meaning are our factors.183  
While this analysis is capable of being done by hand184 or with other statistical 
software such as SPSS,185 there is also a software tool called PQMethod that is 
specifically designed for analyzing and correlating Q sorts.186 PQMethod is 
freely available online and can support the analysis of the Q sorts using factor 
analysis.187  
First, PQMethod calculates the correlation matrix of all the Q sorts.188 This 
resulting correlation matrix represents the level of (dis)agreement between the 
individual Q sorts. Next, this correlation matrix is subjected to factor analysis. 
The program produces the seven factors with the highest explanatory value, 
and presents the ratio of the total variance between the Q sorts that each 
factor explains.189 These are called the unrotated factor loadings. Participants 
with similar views on the topic under investigation will share the same 
factor.190 A factor loading is determined for each Q sort, expressing the extent 
to which each Q sort is associated with each factor. The next step is for the 
analyst is to choose the number of factors to be included in the analysis. Often 
the number of factors to be selected must meet two criteria: 1) the factors 
should at least explain more of the total variance than a single Q sort,191 and 
2) a minimum of two Q sorts must load significantly on that factor.192  
Once the analyst has chosen the appropriate number of factors for further 
analysis, the next step in the analysis is to clarify and enhance the structure 
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of the unrotated factors by objectively maximizing variance between each of 
them through the process of factor rotation.193 There are a number of ways to 
conduct the factor rotation. Principally, the factor rotation can be done using a 
by-hand method or a varimax method.194 As the name suggests, varimax 
rotates the factors so that they explain the maximum variance that exists for 
each factor.195 The downside of this approach is that it is completely 
automated and operates statistically using Thurstone’s principle of simple 
structure.196 This means that in some cases a varimax rotation could skew the 
results or fail to provide certain nuances associated with the individual 
factors.  
An alternative method of factor rotation is the by-hand method, which allows 
the researcher to rotate the factors according to observations about the data 
as they exist in substantive reality.197 There may be circumstances, for 
example, “in which we want to focus attention on a specific Q sort or Q sorts 
during the analysis and interpretation.”198 This is not going to be possible 
under varimax rotation, but is certainly possible using the by-hand method. It 
is for this reason that both Brown and Stephenson advocate the use of the by-
hand method over the varimax method for factor rotation.199 Regardless of 
what method is employed, the factor rotation process is an essential 
component of the factor analytic process because without it, the unrotated 
factor loadings will not be able to clearly or best explain the distinctions 
between the various factors.200  
The final calculation for PQMethod is to produce the final factor estimate: the 
final factor estimate is an average of the defining Q sorts as weighted by their 
factor loadings.201 The factors that have been chosen and rotated must be 
further refined through a process of determining which individual Q sorts will 
define each factor.202 These are the factor-exemplifying or defining Q sorts, and 
are usually selected on the basis that they have a statistically significant and 
clean loadings on that factor.203 From this point, PQMethod will be able to 
produce the ultimate factor scores: the ultimate factor scores are an average of 
the Q sorts as weighted by their factor loadings.204 Each resulting final factor 
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represents a group of individual points of view that are highly correlated with 
each other and uncorrelated with others.205  
This process also produces a weighted score for each item (statement) in the 
factor estimate and is then converted into a Z (standard) score.206 Each 
resulting final factor score represents a group of individual points of view that 
are highly correlated with each other and uncorrelated with others.207 This 
enables cross-factor comparisons to be made, which is especially important in 
the context of Q methodology’s use in this work because it allows the 
researcher to identify areas of overlapping consensus and dissent across 
factors.208 The Z scores also allow the researcher to produce a factor array for 
each factor.209 The factor array is “no more or less than a single Q sort 
configured to represent the viewpoint of a particular factor [emphasis in 
original]”.210 Establishing a factor array for each factor provides the analyst 
with a Q sort configuration that best exemplifies a factor.211 The factor array 
for each factor is useful at the interpretation stage of a Q method study by 
providing a clear rank ordering of the statements that best explain a particular 
factor.212 
 
3.6 The Interpretation 
By translating the analysis of the Q sorts into factors, the researcher must still 
find a way to interpret what the factors mean. The final stage of any Q method 
study is to interpret the results of the quantitatively-derived factor analysis. It 
is at this stage that meaningful information can be understood. Once the Q 
sorts have been analyzed and the resulting factors have been delineated, the 
researcher must construct the narratives that each factor has come to 
represent. This can be difficult to do because: 
generating descriptions of social perspectives is something of an art. Experience helps 
immensely, as does familiarity with the topic. However, too much familiarity can also be 
dangerous because people can end up recreating what they believe rather than reflecting 
what is really in the data.213  
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The goal of this exercise is to write a narrative that accurately tells the story 
that each factor represents. One of the most intriguing aspects of Q 
methodology is its pursuit of holism. This holism can only be understood if the 
different factors are interpreted in their entirety: that is, the researcher must 
look at the entire configuration holistically.214 If the research merely looks at 
the statements in the factor that were most agreed with or most disagreed 
with, then there is not much to be gleaned from the information that is 
distinct from a survey or questionnaire. The uniqueness of Q methodology is 
drawn from the data that permits the researcher to look at all of the 
statements in relation to each other, and not in isolation.215 
Once the narratives have been drafted, the next step is to compare and 
contrast the distinct factors with each other.216 A good place to start is by 
looking for widespread agreement across all factors.217 These points of 
consensus may be essential to each factor. However, factors may also clash 
directly with one another or they may differ in non-confrontational ways.218 A 
strong attribute of Q method is that each perspective has an importance score 
for each Q statement as represented through standardized Z scores. This 
allows direct comparison of the salience of specific themes across 
perspectives.219 In the context of this work, it is the relationship between 
factors that is of most interest. In looking to find points of overlapping 
consensus, the researcher is looking to uncover surprising aspects of each 
factor that are consensually supported across some or all of the distinct 
factors.   
 
4. Q METHODOLOGY AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 
As a mode of empirical inquiry, Q methodology offers an interesting 
opportunity for studying those subjective aspects of legal decision and 
discourse that are so rarely amenable to the scientific method. The key insight 
of this lies in the claim that there are possibilities for linking the scientific 
study of subjectivity to jurisprudential thought. However, these possibilities 
are largely generated in the context of nonpostivistic theoretical frames 
because, for those jurisprudential outlooks that are strictly positivistic in the 
traditional sense, the subjective aspects of legal inquiry are purposefully 
marginalized. In all areas of positive thought, from the hard sciences to the 
social sciences and psychology, the merit of any theory is based on its ability 
to describe and explain objective phenomena from a third-person orientation.  
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Nonpositive frames of inquiry are generally less rigid in the scope of analysis, 
and instead focus on the fact that all theories are human artifacts created for 
explaining and describing particular phenomena. They are inescapably 
subjective. It is only the human mind – from a self-referent and first-person 
perspective – that is capable of generating theoretical outlooks. An 
understanding that all theories possess these subjective aspects, even so-
called objective scientific theories, is the hallmark of this work. This means 
that the study of subjectivity is relevant and salient for all theoretical outlooks, 
not just nonpositivist approaches.  
However, it is likely that the acceptance of Q methodology as a means for 
measuring subjectivity will generate more sympathy among those theoreticians 
who believe that the law can never be reduced to purely logical and 
mathematical formulae. What is extremely interesting about Q methodology is 
that, despite its subjective subject-matter, the outcomes of Q method studies 
produce objective results. This may seem a bit counterintuitive, but since Q 
methodology provides a scientifically objective and rigorous means for the 
study of human subjectivity, there is little reason to prevent both positivistic 
and nonpositivistic jurisprudential outlooks from incorporating the findings of 
a Q method study into their analysis of the law.  
 
4.1 Configurative Jurisprudence and Q Methodology 
Q methodology provides a means for measuring perspectives. These are the 
subjective worldviews, viewpoints, demands, expectations, and identifications 
that all human beings bring to their endeavors: whether they be the most 
common daily conversations about the weather or of the highest intellectual 
musings of philosophers and scientists.220 Perspectives are subjective in that 
they always arise from a position of self-reference, and this is what Q 
methodology is able to hold steady for empirical analysis.221  
In the policy-orientated jurisprudence of the New Haven school, perspectives – 
or subjectivities – are a critical aspect of legal understanding.222 According to 
such a view, law is a secular and human-made phenomenon that represents 
the means by which communities secures their common interest.223 It is a 
means for securing and protecting that which a particular community values. 
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Such a view about the law is rooted in the idea that law refers to those human 
desires or wants that the politically relevant members of a community have 
decided to authoritatively protect and promote.224 It is a process of 
communication whereby legal decisions in their authoritatively and controlling 
form are chosen. It is about the flow of human communication (discourse) and 
the decisions that those with the authority to make such decisions secure the 
values that are shaped and shared by the community members that are 
subject to the law.225  
Since values are subjective (in the sense that they emanate for a perspective of 
self-reference), an empirical means for measuring such self-referent values 
becomes a critical aspect of any nonpositivist jurisprudence; but is particular 
relevant among New Haven scholars. One of the ongoing challenges for New 
Haven scholars is convincing positivistic schools of thought that value 
perspectives are capable of objective inquiry.226 The main claim of this work is 
that Q methodology – or the scientific study of human subjectivity – provides a 
means for gaining objective knowledge about subjective perspectives. If 
correct, Q methodology provides a crucial addendum to the New Haven school 
by offering a rigorous means for inquiry about perspective.  
One of the main concerns of positive theories about law is that law – if 
permitted to include subjective perspectives about value –  can easily come to 
describe and reflect the values of those with the power to make such decisions 
about what the law is and what it is not. This charge against realist or 
nonpositivist orientations about the law is that such a view is essentially law-
denying in the objective sense as used in conventional positivism.227 Under 
such a view, law becomes the exclusive prerogative of the powerful. However, it 
is important to note that law and decision are not synonymous under an 
nonpositivist view of the law such as that of the New Haven school.228 If they 
were, law and power would be identical.229  
Instead, it is only: 
those decisions that are taken from a community-wide perspectives of authority that we 
characterize as law. Accordingly, ‘authoritative decision’ is the most precise empirical 
referent of the term ‘law;’ and, if one is unhappy with how authoritative decision is 
operating and has the resources to attempt to change it, the way to do so is to influence 
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the processes of human activity that shape the prevailing structure of authoritative 
decision.230  
Since authority is derived from community-wide expectations and perspectives 
about decision, it is these subjective community perspectives that become 
critical to one’s understanding of what is law and what is not; and what it 
should be and what it should not be. The key lies in determining just what 
these community-wide perspectives are. Legal decisions that are perceived as 
reflecting the values of these community-wide perspectives are more likely to 
be accepted as authoritative because they embody a fair configuration of that 
which the subjects of a particular legal order value. Considering that values – 
especially moral and ethical values – are subjective, the task of the legal 
decisionmaker is difficult. In most cases, history and tradition mitigate this 
difficulty by allowing the decisionmaker to make determinations based on 
conformity with prior decisions. However, the law never stands still, and the 
values that users of the law embrace are constantly changing or evolving. This 
means that in some cases, it is not sufficient to merely rely on the mandate of 
conformity with prior decisions (precedent).  
A more accurate theoretical frame of inquiry requires that the law be viewed as 
a process of subjective communication. As the eminent New Haven scholar 
Michael Reisman has described in a lecture titled International Lawmaking: A 
Process of Communication:231  
[a]ll communications involve the mediation of subjectivities . . . While much of general 
communications may . . . be relevant to law formation, what is distinctive about 
perspective or lawmaking communications is that rather than transmitting a single 
message, they carry simultaneously three coordinate communication flows in a fashion 
akin to the coaxial cable of modern telephonic communications. The three flows may be 
briefly referred to as the policy content, the authority signal, and the control intention. 
Unless each of these flows is present and effectively mediated to the relevant audience, a 
prescription will not result. Equally important, even if the three components are initially 
communicated, they must continue to be communicated for the prescription, as such, to 
endure; if one or more of the components should cease to be communicated, the 
prescription undergoes a type of desuetude and is terminated. Let us consider each of 
these communication flows in more detail. The content of a prescription, the norm – the 
injunction that one ought to do or refrain from doing something, or, writ large, the policy 
about the production and distribution of some value – is obviously an important 
component . . . The authority signal is much more complex that the communication of 
policy content. While the command of what to do is essentially unilinear, the 
communication of authority is more of a closed loop. It is the audience, whether or not its 
members realize it, that endows the prescriber with the authority that renders his 
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communication prescription. Hence the search for authority must be empirical in the 
broadest sense, rather than merely documentary. In many circumstances, authority may 
be subtle and diffuse. But its indispensability in prescription is clear. We now address the 
third communications flow. One of the sillier notions that surfaces in jurisprudence with 
an almost idiosyncratic regularity is that lawmaking is essentially a polite ethical 
conversation, a dialogue requiring only content and authority . . . If that were the case, 
we would maintain cadres of philosophers and rhetoricians instead of police, armies, and 
other specialists in violence. Plainly, lawmaking involves another component; power, the 
capacity and willingness to make a preferential expression effective. This third component 
. . . we prefer to call the communication of control intention.232   
What this theoretical outlook means for the application of Q methodology is its 
orientation towards an understanding of the law that is rooted in the 
communicability of various flows that are empirically observable. Although 
many of these perspectives are subjective – and not merely documentary as 
Reisman notes, they are amenable nonetheless to observation.233 It is these 
observable communication flows that can make up the concourse of any Q 
method study. The ongoing flow of communication about policy content, 
authority signal, and control intention that makes law law is a result of the 
various perspectives among both: 1) the political elites making the law, and 2) 
the subjects of that law interacting reciprocally in a tug of war about which 
values should be embodied in an prescription that becomes law. It is the 
subjective perspectives about these communications among lawmakers and 
lawtakers alike that ought to be the focus of any theoretical inquiry about the 
law. There are various empirical methods for gaining knowledge and insights 
about these perspectives, but Q methodology may be the most well suited for 
measuring these flows of communications that make up the legal process.  
 
4.2 Shared Subjectivity and Value Consensus 
For a theory of configurative fairness, which is built upon the theoretical 
foundation of the New Haven school of jurisprudence, gaining knowledge 
about subjective value perspectives is a critical component for the 
configuration of any legal order that is perceived as fair by both lawmakers 
and lawtakers. The discovery of these value perspectives is difficult to conduct 
empirically from a third-person or objective orientation because it forces the 
observer to make judgments about the first-person perspectives of others. 
Often this will result in empirical knowledge that is influenced by the person 
making the observations and not the observee themselves.  
Q methodology helps mitigate this problem by preserving first-person 
perspectives exactly as they have been reflected upon by the person actually 
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participating in the Q method study. This innovative aspect of Q methodology 
allows the person observing the results of a Q method study to see those first-
person perspectives in empirical form. What this means for legal theory is that 
the decisionmaker or scholar making inquiries about the law will have first-
person empirical knowledge about value perspectives and preferences that can 
be used to inform and shape the way in which the law develops.  
Values are subjective, but they are not idiosyncratic and unique. Often, value 
perspectives are shared. In a typical Q method study, perspectives on any 
particular topic tend to cluster around a small number of factors that 
represent shared ways of thinking. Despite the fact that the perspectives (as 
articulated through the process of completing a Q sort) of each individual in a 
Q method study have the potential to be unique, the viewpoints expressed – in 
actuality – are in most cases shared. It is these shared subjectivities that 
become empirically observable through Q methodology. Shared subjective 
perspectives when viewed through the lens of Q methodology may actually 
meet the test for objectivity, but will depend on the willingness of the legal 
community to embrace Q methodology as an empirical research tool.234  
A theory of configurative fairness holds that fair legal orders can be 
constructed, if and only if, its legal rules and procedures reflect a fair and 
acceptable distribution of the values its participants endorse. As a subjective 
phenomenon, value knowledge is difficult to pin down. However, with the use 
of Q methodology, there are new possibilities for gaining knowledge about 
what value preferences and claims are shared by users of a particular legal 
order. Despite their subjective nature, Q methodology can assist in uncovering 
areas of consensus among a population of individuals in regard to the value 
positions that they hold on a particular legal topic.  
The empirical insight that such data can provide will permit the legal 
decisionmaker or scholar to determine what values are most compatible with 
the common interest.235 While a pure value consensus is unlikely to ever occur 
in controversial areas of legal development, there is the possibility that the 
conflicting claims to value that individuals pursue will carry some degree of 
overlap. It is these areas of overlapping consensus that a theory of 
configurative fairness is most interested in discovering scientifically and 
empirically. Such a position is one holding that, from a legal regime-building 
perspective, conflicts between the diverse value claims and demands that will 
arise in the development of any legal order can be resolved by looking at the 
areas of overlapping consensus among conflicting parties. Such an 
overlapping consensus lays the groundwork for a fair configuration of any 
legal order because it establishes a foundation of agreed values that are 
acceptable to all users of a particular legal order. 
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CHAPTER 7 
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter will introduce a currently evolving international legal order 
whose specific subject-matter will be used in the application of Q methodology 
and a theory of configurative fairness: investment treaty arbitration. Since the 
theory and method for configuring evolving legal orders proposed in this work 
is necessarily general and abstract, it is important to apply it to a specific legal 
regime or system that is currently in a state of evolutionary flux. To do this, a 
survey of the value perspectives and choices that users of investment treaty 
arbitration currently endorse will be described and evaluated. Before turning 
to the Q method study on configuring fairness in investment treaty arbitration, 
which is the subject of the following Chapter, this Chapter will discuss the 
evolution of investment treaty arbitration in historical perspective with a 
special emphasis on the legitimacy and fairness discourse that has developed 
in the last decade. The purpose and object of such a Chapter is to bring 
attention to the particular design issues that evolving international legal 
orders face when attempting to distribute values across a global community of 
users with diverse interests, preferences, and expectations; and how these 
diverse perspectives manifest themselves as subjective claims about value.  
Since the development of any legal order is based on social choice and 
historical context, it is difficult to evaluate such development as a static set of 
objectively determined legal rules and procedures isolated from the value 
choices that human beings have made over time. Investment treaty arbitration 
is such a legal order whose development has ebbed and flowed in response to 
larger social and political events. However, by looking at the past and present 
choices about the distribution of values in investment treaty arbitration (as 
opposed to just positive rules and procedures), one may be able to identify 
some of the value choices that users of investment treaty arbitration want its 
legal rules and procedures to protect in the future. While the Q method study 
applied in this work is specifically designed to provide empirical data in this 
regard, a background description and evaluation of investment treaty 
arbitration is warranted. However, it is important to note that the scope of this 
Chapter is not intended to exhaustively analyze and discuss all of the 
substantive and procedural aspects of investment treaty arbitration; rather, 
the purpose of this Chapter will be exclusively focused on surveying the 
legitimacy and fairness discourse about investment treaty arbitration that has 
occurred in the literature. In other words, this Chapter will aim at examining 
and describing how the legitimacy and fairness discourse about investment 
treaty arbitration has developed over time. 
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Investment treaty arbitration is a specialized form of international adjudication 
that combines many aspects of both public and private international law. 
Investment treaty arbitration can be categorized as a specific regime or 
system;1 or as a part of a larger legal order typical called international 
investment law or the international law on foreign investment.2 International 
investment law, in historical context, has been concerned with the legal rules 
and procedure for the protection of foreign direct investment. However, while 
many aspects of international investment law have only developed in the past 
hundred years or so, its roots can be traced back centuries to the rules and 
principles of international law that deal with the general rights and obligations 
of foreign aliens.3  
The modern or contemporary international investment law regime is primarily 
a treaty-based legal order that is contained in a large number of bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs),4 plurilateral investment treaties,5 and free trade 
agreements (FTAs) with investment chapters.6 However, there remain 
constituent parts of international investment law outside of the treaty context. 
These include the customary international law rules on foreign direct 
investment, national laws on foreign investment, legal rules of international 
administrative bodies, and private international law rules for commercial 
arbitration and transnational contracts.  
International investment treaty law forms a significant part of international 
investment law, and investment treaty arbitration forms a significant part of 
                                                            
1 Jeswald Salacuse (2010). The Emerging Global Regime for Investment. Harvard International 
Law Journal. Vol. 51, p. 428. 
2 For a good overview of international investment law, see Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer 
(2012). Principles of International Investment Law, Second Edition. Oxford, OUP; José Alvarez 
(2011). The Public International Law Regime Governing International Investment. The Hague, 
Pocketbooks of the Hague Academy of International Law; Jeswald Salacuse (2010). The Law of 
International Investment Treaties. Oxford, OUP; Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah (2010). The 
International Law on Foreign Investment, Third Edition. Cambridge, CUP; Peter Cameron (2010). 
International Energy Investment Law: The Pursuit of Stability. Oxford, OUP; Zachary Douglas 
(2009). The International Law of Investment Claims. Cambridge, CUP; August Reinisch (2008). 
Standards of Protection in International Investment Law. Oxford, OUP; Campbell McLachlan, et 
al. (2007). International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles. Oxford, OUP. 
3 Sornarajah, supra note 2 at p.18. 
4 The United Nations (UN) Conference on Trade & Development (UNCTAD) maintains a database 
of all available BITS. See Investment Treaties Online, available at: http://www.unctadxi.org/ 
templates/DocSearch____779.aspx (last accessed 1 September 2013). 
5 A prominent example of this type is treaty includes: the Energy Charter Treaty & Its Protocol on 
Energy Efficiency & Related Environmental Aspects (ECT). 17 December 1994, 34 ILM 360 
(1995). 
6 Prominent examples of these types of treaties include: the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). 17 December 1992, 32 ILM 289 (1993); the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) Agreement for the Promotion & Protection of Investments. 15 December 1987, 27 
ILM 612 (1987); the Central America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA-DR). 4 August 2004, available at: http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text (last accessed 1 
September 2013); the Investment Agreement for the Common Market for Eastern & Southern 
Africa (COMESA) Common Investment Area, 23 May 2007. 
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international investment treaty law. The subject-matter focus of this work 
pertains specifically to the adjudicative design issues of investment treaty 
arbitration, and while broader considerations of international investment law 
will obviously be entangled, the primary focus is on the regime-design issues 
related to this very specific form of international adjudication. 
Investment treaty arbitration is a fairly recent phenomenon. It is only in the 
past fifty years that investment treaty arbitration has even been possible. 
While the first BIT was signed in 1959,7 the first BIT that permits investor-
state arbitration was not signed until 1969.8 Prior to this, there was no 
mechanism for investment treaty arbitration as it is currently practiced. While 
there have long been examples of dispute settlement provisions being 
embedded in various types of treaties signed by states, the specific type of 
adjudication permitted in BITs and FTA investment chapters is new. And not 
only is investment treaty arbitration new, it comprises a completely novel form 
of international adjudication.9  
Most typically, international dispute settlement mechanisms are in the state-
to-state context, whereby parties to a dispute are exclusively states or state 
entities. Investment treaty arbitration is different. It permits private 
individuals, companies, and shareholders of one state party to a BIT or FTA to 
bring a claim for breach of the BIT or FTA directly against another state party 
to the BIT or FTA. The only comparable international legal institutions 
currently in place that permits individual claimants are the regional human 
rights courts.10 While the jurisdiction of these courts permits nonstate entities 
as claimants against states, there are significant differences. Primarily, these 
courts are permanent bodies with tribunals consisting of permanent judges, 
and generally speaking, these judges only hear cases arising out of breaches to 
the treaty once local remedies have been exhausted.11  
Investment treaty arbitration on the other hand merely presents a foreign 
investor with a standing offer to arbitrate a dispute should a treaty breach 
                                                            
7 Treaty for Promotion & Protection of Investment Between West Germany & Pakistan (Pakistan-
Germany BIT). 25 November 1959, 457 UNTS 23 (1959). 
8 Chad-Italy Bilateral Investment Treaty (1969). See Andrew Newcombe & Luis Paradell (2009). 
The Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment. The Hague, Kluwer, p. 45. All of the 
BITs signed in the period between 1959 and 1968 included dispute settlement provisions, if at 
all, that resembled the provisions in early FCN treaties (i.e. mechanisms for diplomatic 
espousal). 
9 See generally Jan Paulsson (1995).  Arbitration Without Privity. ICSID Review. Vol. 10, p. 232. 
10 These include the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights. 
11 Article 35 § 1 of the [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms states: “[t]he Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic 
remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, 
and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.” See 
[European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms. 4 November 
1950, 213 UNTS 221 (1950). 
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occur;12 and often does not require an exhaustion of local remedies before 
initiating an action.13 The structure of such a system of adjudication means 
that arbitrations arising out of breaches of the underlying BIT or FTA will be 
composed on an ad hoc basis with relative autonomy from other disputes 
arising out of other treaties. So not only does investment treaty arbitration 
diverge from the tradition of international legal disputes only permitting state 
parties to make claims, it also diverges from the traditional concept of public 
judicial organization (that is, it allows for one-off, or ad hoc, arbitral tribunals 
to render decisions).   
It is this fundamental architecture of investment treaty arbitration that has 
generated both criticism and praise. However, with any new phenomenon, 
there is a significant period where the exact parameters or ‘rules of the game’ 
must be determined. Investment treaty arbitration is currently in this period. 
Due to the fact that investment treaty arbitration is both new and novel, 
opinions about its function, purpose, and applicability remain active. Since 
most of these questions about investment treaty arbitration are based on the 
specific preferences of individuals and states who espouse them, the nature of 
the discourse is necessarily subjective. There is no single right answer to the 
design of investment treaty arbitration in international law. The evolution or 
devolution of investment treaty arbitration over the next decades will reflect 
the discourse among users of this system of adjudication, and how the 
underlying values of these users are distributed through the ongoing process 
of legal decisionmaking.  
This Chapter will begin with a historical description of the international law on 
the protection of foreign aliens. It will then describe the contemporary 
investment treaty regime with emphasis on the dispute settlement 
mechanisms embedded in BITs and other international investment agreements 
(IIAs). The final part of the Chapter will discuss the waves of legitimacy and 
fairness discourse that have developed over the past decade.  
 
2. THE LAW ON THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN ALIENS 
As stated in the introduction, international investment law grew out of the 
broader category of international law relating to the treatment of foreign 
aliens. Typically, an alien residing in a foreign sovereign territory will be 
subject primarily to the laws and customs of the state in which he or she is 
residing. This hardly seems controversial given the dominance of the modern 
state system that governs the world today; and yet, it is common for specific 
                                                            
12 Paulsson, supra note 9. 
13 George Foster (2011). Striking a Balance Between Investor Protections and National 
Sovereignty: The Relevance of Local Remedies in Investment Treaty Arbitration. Columbia Journal 
of Transnational Law. Vol. 49, pp. 201, 211-12, 251. 
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issues to arise. Primarily, these issues pertain to the rules of international law 
that protect foreign aliens from domestic rules and procedures that fall below 
a minimum international standard of treatment.14 The default rule is that the 
foreign alien is subject to the law of the state where he or she is residing 
unless the applications of such laws fall below a minimum standard.15 
However, even if the foreign alien has been treated in a manner below the 
minimum standard, how does he or she gain recourse to the law if individuals 
or companies are not directly subject to international law?  
Until very recently, the customary international law on diplomatic protection 
has provided a good answer for this question. Diplomatic protection permits 
the home state of a foreign alien to espouse a claim against the state where the 
foreign alien was injured. In the past two hundred years, diplomatic protection 
claims have been espoused three ways: 1) directly between the governments of 
the home state of the foreign alien and the state where the injury occurred, 2) 
as legal proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ)16 and its 
predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ),17 and 3) 
through the establishment of international claims commissions.18  
                                                            
14 Elihu Root (1910). The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad. American Journal of 
International Law. Vol. 4, p. 517; Edwin Borchard (1940). The Minimum Standard of Treatment 
of Aliens. Michigan Law Review. Vol. 38, p. 445. 
15 In recent years, the international minimum standard has been pegged (at times, 
controversially) to the Neer Case, which stated: “[w]ithout attempting to announce a precise 
formula, it is in the opinion of the Commission possible to go a little further than the authors 
quoted, and to hold (first) that the propriety of governmental acts should be put to the test of 
international standards, and (second) that the treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an 
international  delinquency,  should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to willful neglect of duty, 
or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international standards that every 
reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency.” LFH Neer & Pauline 
Neer (US) v. United Mexican States. 15 October 1926, 4 UNRIAA 60 (1926); see also BE Chattin 
(US) v. United Mexican States. 23 July 1927, 4 UNRIAA 282 (1927) (Mexico-US General Claims 
Commission). 
16 These prominently include: the Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala). ICJ Reports 4 
(1955); the Interhandel Case (Switzerland v. US). ICJ Reports 176 (1957); the Barcelona Traction, 
Light, & Power Case (Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase. ICJ Reports 4 (1970); the Elettronica 
Sicula (ELSI) Case (US v. Italy). ICJ Reports 15 (1989); the La Grand Case (Germany v. US). ICJ 
Reports 263 (2001); the Avena & Other Mexican Nationals Case (Mexico v. US). ICJ Reports 12 
(2004); the Ahmadou Sadio Diallo Case (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo). 
ICJ Reports 639 (2010).  
17 These prominently include: the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case (Greece v. United 
Kingdom (UK)). PCIJ Series A, No. 2 (1924); the Case Concerning Certain German Interests in 
Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland). PCIJ Series A, No. 10 (1926); the Factory at Chorzów 
Case (Germany v. Poland). PCIJ Series. A, No. 17 (1928); the Case Concerning the Payment of 
Various Serbian Loans (France v. Serb-Croat-Slovene State). PCIJ Series A, Nos. 20/21 (1929); 
the Oscar Chinn Case (UK v. Belgium). PCIJ Series A/B, No. 63 (1934). 
18 “It is not far-fetched to say that international claims commissions served as the cradle of 
public international law as a professional practice; indeed, until the Jay Treaty arbitrations in 
the 1790s, public international law was largely an academic discipline, hardly distinguishable 
from political philosophy or diplomacy. The Jay Treaty arbitrations marked the beginning of a 
long line of development, which reached its ‘high noon’ around the year 1900 and continued 
until well after World War I. During this period, ad hoc inter-state arbitration became the 
dominant method of resolving international claims, and ad hoc arbitrations such as the 
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Diplomatic protection claims brought through judicial proceedings do not 
permit direct rights of action by injured aliens against the state where the 
injury occurred. Rather, the claim must be espoused by the home state of the 
foreign alien. This means that once the action is initiated by the home state of 
the injured alien, the claim is the exclusive claim of the state initiating the 
action. The PCIJ made this clear in its pronouncement on the nature of 
diplomatic protection in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case:  
[i]t is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled to protect its 
subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international law committed by another State, 
from whom they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through ordinary channels. By 
taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or 
international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own 
rights – its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of 
international law.19 
Diplomatic protection claims in international law can thus be seen as a 
derivative right of action for the foreign alien.20 An individual must first 
convince the government to which he or she is a national that a claim should 
be brought on his or her behalf against the state where the injury occurred. 
For these reasons, judicial proceedings based on diplomatic protection claims 
have been relatively rare. There are about a dozen cases that have been 
litigated before the ICJ21 or PCIJ,22 and while claims commissions were 
especially popular in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century 
(through the First World War), their use in the past fifty years has been more 
limited.23 While these types of derivative (diplomatic protection) claims can be 
seen as a progressive step away from earlier uses of so-called ‘gunboat 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Alabama arbitration and the many awards of international claims commissions such as the 
United States-Mexican Claims Commissions, the various claims commissions involving South 
American countries such as Venezuela, Peru, Chile, and Brazil, and the ‘Boxer Commission’ in 
China, became to be known as the early leading cases in international law. In a comprehensive 
survey, A.M. Sruyt has catalogued around 380 international arbitrations that were conducted 
during the period 1776-1925.” Veijo Heiskanen (2009). ‘Arbitrating Mass Investor Claims: 
Lessons of International Claims Commissions,’ in Belinda Macmahon, ed. Multiple Party Actions 
in International Arbitration: Consent, Procedure, and Enforcement. Oxford, OUP, pp. 297, 299. 
19 The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case, supra note 17. 
20 Zachary Douglas (2004). The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration. British 
Yearbook of International Law. Vol. 74, p. 151. 
21 See supra note 16. 
22 See supra note 17. 
23 These claims commissions have been almost exclusively been established as a judicial remedy 
for damages relating to acts of war or revolution. Generally speaking, these commissions 
include: the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), 
the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, the Claims Programs in Bosnia and Kosovo, Claims 
Resolution for Dormant Accounts in Switzerland, the Iraq Property Claims Commission, and the 
Property Claims Commission of the German Foundation. See Heiskanen, supra note 18 at pp. 
297-303. 
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diplomacy,’24 developments in the past fifty years have moved even further 
towards peaceful models of international adjudication as a substitute for 
threats of political or military violence as a means for resolving disputes 
involving injuries to foreign aliens (that is, through an increasing number of 
investment treaty arbitration cases).  
In this recent period, the traditional use of diplomatic protection or espousal 
for remedying injuries to foreign aliens has largely been replaced by the 
dispute settlement provisions in BITs and FTAs. Since the first BIT was signed, 
there have only been three cases involving diplomatic espousal cases related to 
foreign direct investment that have been brought before the ICJ.25 In 
contradistinction to the traditional model of diplomatic espousal, the current 
dispute settlement provisions in the modern BIT regime permit direct rights of 
action to be brought against states for breaches to the underlying treaty.26 
There is no requirement for the foreign alien or company to first seek the 
permission of the state to which it is a national before initiating a claim.27 As 
will be noted in the following section, the fundamental basis of modern 
investment treaty arbitration grew out of this shift away from the customary 
international law on diplomatic protection, and as such, investment treaty 
arbitration envisions an entirely new form of dispute resolution in 
international law. 
Before turning to the contemporary practice of investment treaty arbitration, it 
is relevant to mention the substantive rules that protected foreign aliens prior 
to the development of the modern investment treaty regime. Primarily, these 
are rules derived from customary international law, as well as, so-called 
friendship, commerce, and navigation (FCN) treaties.28 These types of rules are 
important because customary international law rules29 continue to apply in 
                                                            
24 See the section titled, ‘The End of Gunboat Diplomacy,’ in Santiago Montt (2009). State 
Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Global Constitutional and Administrative Law in the BIT 
Generation. Oxford, Hart Publishing, pp. 48-55. 
25 These include: the Barcelona Traction Case (Belgium v. Spain), the ELSI Case (US v. Italy), and 
the Ahmadou Sadio Diallo Case (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo). See 
supra note 16. 
26 Douglas, supra note 20 at pp. 167-83. 
27 Id. 
28 FCN treaties can be viewed as forerunners to the modern BIT regime. See Michael Reisman & 
Robert Sloane (2004). Indirect Expropriation and its Valuation in the BIT Generation. British 
Yearbook of International Law. Vol. 75, p. 116. 
29 Most prominently, these include: the rules of treaty interpretation; the principles of good 
faith, pacta sunt sevanda, rebus sic stantibus, and estoppel; rules on compensation for 
expropriation; the minimum standard of treatment; the exhaustion of local remedies; and the 
rules on state responsibility for international wrongs, including the doctrine of necessity. Of 
course there are other rules of customary international law applicable to investment treaty 
arbitration claims, but these aforementioned rules provide a good basic list of rules that have 
repeatedly played a role in the settlement of investor-state disputes. 
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investment treaty arbitrations, and many provisions found in the substantive 
rules of BITs can be traced to earlier provision provided in FCN treaties.30  
Unlike customary rules, the substantive provisions of FCN treaties have 
largely been replaced by the modern BIT and FTA regimes; and as such, they 
do not continue to play a prominent role in the settlement of investor-state 
disputes. However, many of the provisions in FCN treaties have been 
transplanted into the modern BIT regime and thus remain historically valid as 
a precursor to many of the rights granted in BITs.31 One of the main deficits in 
FCN treaties – and other earlier treaties relating to foreign economic relations – 
is that they did not contain dispute settlement provisions permitting direct 
rights of action. The invocation of the rights granted to foreign aliens under 
these types of treaties required recourse to traditional means of diplomatic 
protection. For example, one of the few modern diplomatic protection cases 
before the ICJ was the ELSI Case,32 which was based on provisions in the FCN 
treaty between the US and Italy.  
This brief introduction has described two fairly recent developments in the 
realm of the international law on the protection of foreign aliens. First, the 
modern BIT regime shifts away from the traditional derivative rights of action 
permitted under the customary rules of diplomatic protection, and instead 
moves to a right of direct action that permits foreign aliens to seek remedies 
for international wrongs without the need for governmental espousal. 
Secondly, the modern BIT regime shifts away from the traditional rules on the 
protection of foreign aliens generally, and instead focuses on the protection 
and promotion of foreign direct investment made by alien investors. Thus, the 
modern BIT regime has reduced protections from the broad category of foreign 
aliens to the narrower category of foreign investors, while at the same time 
greatly expanding the ability of foreign investors to bring claims arising out of 
international wrongs (that is, through direct access to investment treaty 
arbitration).  
 
3. THE MODERN INVESTMENT TREATY REGIME 
The modern investment treaty regime prominently includes dispute settlement 
provisions allowing for direct rights of action by a foreign investor against the 
state hosting such investments. In fact, it is such a prominent feature of the 
modern regime that one could hardly imagine that the recent proliferation of 
the discourse on BITs and FTA investment chapters would have emerged 
without the practice of investment treaty arbitration. However, investment 
                                                            
30 While FCNs were primarily developed by the US, it appears that many early BITs (not only US 
BITs) borrowed some of their language from US FCN treaties. 
31 See Soranrajah, supra note 2 at pp. 180-81. 
32 See the ELSI Case (US v. Italy), supra note 16. 
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treaty tribunals are a very recent phenomenon, only emerging significantly in 
the past twenty years. This mid-1990s starting point in the increase in 
investment treaty arbitrations coincides with the proliferations of BITs that 
began in the late 1980s. Up until the late 1980s, the cumulative number of 
BITs signed globally was less than 500.33 By the end of the 1990s, a decade 
later, that number had increased to over 2000.34  
While the number of BITs being signed has tapered off in the past decade, they 
do continue to be negotiated at a fairly rapid rate. The latest numbers from the 
UNCTAD World Investment Report 2013 claim that the universe of total BITs 
signed had reached 2857 by the end of 2012.35 This number does not count an 
additional 339 IIAs, which include the increasing number of FTAs with 
investment chapters (the total universe of investment agreements being 
3196).36 Most of these treaties include provisions for investor-state dispute 
settlement. However, the exact form of the dispute settlement provisions tends 
to differ from treaty to treaty. By the end of 2012, there were 512 known 
investment treaty arbitrations that had been initiated;37 and where BIT 
negotiations have slowed in number over the past decade, the number of 
investment treaty arbitrations has continued to increase, with approximately 
40 cases being initiated each year in the period between 2002 and 2011;38 and 
most notably, 58 investor-state claims were initiated in 2012, which 
constitutes the largest number of cases to date that have been filed in a single 
year.39   
 
3.1 The Beginnings 
As stated, the first BIT was signed in 1959 between Germany and Pakistan.40 
While this BIT is mostly remembered for being the first (in fact, it is no longer 
in force as it was replaced by a newer treaty in 2007), it is indicative of some of 
the debates that have developed in recent years. Most importantly, it is a 
treaty initiated by Germany. This is a trend that persisted in the early days of 
the BIT generation: the signing of BITs were primarily driven by capital-
exporting countries in an effort to protect foreign investors in the states where 
they are investing. The typical BIT calls for the ‘encouragement and reciprocal 
                                                            
33 James Zahn, et al. (2012). World Investment Report 2012. Geneva, UNCTAD, fig. III.2. 
34 Id. 
35 James Zahn, et al. (2013). World Investment Report 2013. Geneva, UNCTAD, p. 104. 
36 Id. However, these numbers do not include a large number of double taxation treaties (DTTs) 
that are sometimes included in the total number of IIAs. 
37 Id. at p. 110. 
38 Zahn, supra note 33 at p. 84; see also the ICSID website, available at: https://icsid. 
worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp (last accessed 1 September 2013). 
39 Zahn, supra note 37. 
40 Pakistan-Germany BIT, supra note 7. 
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protection of investment,’41 but it is the protection of foreign direct investment 
by citizens and companies residing in capital-exporting states that motivated 
the initial proliferation of BITs. Capital-importing states certainly saw the 
signing of BITs with capital-exporting states – at least theoretical – as 
signifying a desire to promote, support, and encourage foreign direct 
investment in their countries. However, the early negotiations of BITs appear 
to have been initiated by capital-exporting countries. While this unidirectional 
explanation of BIT negotiations no longer reflects the reality, it is a perception 
that continues to flourish, and with negative effects. Many critics of the 
investment regime continue to view the proliferation of BITs along north-south 
lines even though it is now common practice to see BIT negotiations between 
two traditionally capital-importing states.42 
Another reason why the Pakistan-Germany BIT is indicative of the overall BIT 
regime is that the treaties are bilateral in nature. There is a current trend to 
incorporate investment protection measures in plurilateral FTAs, but the 
majority of investment treaties are bilateral. It can be assumed that there are 
two main reasons why Germany was the first to embark on a BIT program in 
the years after the Second World War (although other European states also 
had early BIT programs).43 First, the experience of Germany losing two world 
wars in the span of three decades, and the reparations it had to make in the 
aftermath of such loses, could be seen as a key driver in its efforts to provide 
future security for its foreign investors. 
Secondly, Germany had no choice but to enter into bilateral treaties for the 
protection and promotion of foreign direct investment. In the aftermath of the 
Second World War, the Bretton Woods conference44 created new structures for 
global regimes to promote economic development (the World Bank), stabilize 
global financial systems (the International Monetary Fund (IMF)), and to 
liberalize global trade (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)).45 
Although there was an attempt at including some foreign direct investment 
provisions in the proposed International Trade Organization (ITO),46 it did not 
survive the conference. Coupled with other past failed attempts to develop a 
multilateral framework for the protection of foreign direct investment,47 states 
                                                            
41 See e.g. Agreement on Encouragement & Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands & the Republic of Venezuela (Netherlands-Venezuela BIT). 21 October 
1991. 
42 James Zahn, et al. (2005). South-South Cooperation in International Investment Arrangements. 
Geneva, UNCTAD; see also Lauge Poulsen (2010). The Significance of South-South BITs for the 
International Investment Regime: A Quantitative Analysis. Northwestern Journal of International 
Law & Business. Vol. 30, p. 101. 
43 See Newcombe & Paradell, supra note 8 at pp. 44-46. 
44 Bretton Woods Agreement. 22 July 1944. 
45 The General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade (GATT). 30 October 1947, 55 UNTS 187 (1947). 
46 The Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO). 24 March 1948, UN 
Conference on Trade & Employment, UN Doc. E/CONF.2/78 (1948). 
47 In addition to the ITO, there were a number of pre-BIT attempts at multilateralizing 
international investment law. See Responsibility of States for Damage Done in Their Territory to 
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were left with no choice but to ‘go it alone’ if they wanted an international legal 
mechanism for protecting their investors operating abroad.  
 
3.2 Decolonization and the New International Economic Order 
However, within the first decade after the signing of the first BIT, the process 
of decolonization had reached its apex; and the political movements in the 
decades following this process tempered the likelihood that newly independent 
countries would be clamoring to sign BITs. During the colonial era, the 
imperial powers were able to protect the investments of their citizens by 
extending their sovereign control over colonial territories. Foreign investment 
in the colonies was not really foreign at all (at least not foreign capital 
initiating in the imperial state of that colony). There was little need for 
international legal protections distinct from the legal protections already 
available to the foreign aliens (that is, citizens of the imperial state) operating 
within the territory of the colony.  
Obviously, this changed considerably when the colonial powers exited and 
these states gained independence. All of a sudden, newly independent states 
had a seemingly untenable dilemma. On the one hand, they almost universally 
wanted to denounce their historical oppression from colonial powers by 
declaring that foreigners residing or investing within the sovereign territory of 
these newly formed states would not be afforded any special rights 
independent of the rights granted to nationals. On the other hand, many of 
these newly formed governments believed that they needed outside capital and 
expertise to develop their economies; and that they needed to offer special 
incentives in order to entice foreign capital back into their countries. It is this 
struggle between state autonomy and the pursuit of foreign capital that 
continues to underlie many of the current debates surrounding the role of 
international law in regulating the economic policies of states.  
The initial response of these former colonies, beginning in the 1960s and 
culminating in the mid-1970s, was to assert a policy through the United 
Nations (UN) General Assembly (GA) declaring their ‘permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources’ (PSNR)48 in what later came to be described as the New 
                                                                                                                                                                              
the Person or Property of Foreigners. League of Nations, Report of the Subcommittee, Doc. C.196. 
M.70.1927.V (1929); Draft Statutes of the Arbitral Tribunal for Foreign Investment & the Foreign 
Investment Court. International Law Association (ILA) (1948); International Code of Fair 
Treatment of Foreign Investment. International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), ICC Pub. No. 129 
(1949). 
48 Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth & Resources. 21 December 1952, UNGA Resolution No. 
626; Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources (PSNR). 14 December 1962, UNGA 
Resolution No. 1803; Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources (PSNR). 17 December 1973, 
UNGA Resolution No. 3171. 
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International Economic Order (NIEO).49 What these declarations proposed, 
inter alia, was to assert that sovereign states had the autonomy to shape their 
own policies on how foreign investors would be treated within their territory. 
Many of the former colonies were (are) rich in resources, and they believed that 
– as newly independent states – those resources were exclusively theirs to 
exploit; and that the nationalization of natural resource operations was not 
only legal, but that such actions did not require compensation commensurate 
with the customary international law standard.50 
While the decolonization process was the primary driver in asserting such a 
NIEO, there were two earlier developments that led these newly independent 
states to assert their claims at the UN in the way that they did. The first 
development is traceable to the perspective that some Latin American states 
already had developed in the nineteenth century through the work of jurists 
such as Carlos Calvo.51 The so-called Calvo doctrine is a principle holding that 
foreign aliens would be granted the same protections as nationals; and that 
given this kind of non-discriminatory treatment, a foreign alien must waive 
diplomatic protection by the state to which he or she is a citizen.52  
The second development is attributable to the so-called Hull rule, which 
derives from a diplomatic exchange between US Secretary of State Cordell Hull 
and his Mexican counterpart in the 1930s.53 The Hull rule, which builds on 
the early jurisprudence of the PCIJ,54 has long been considered to state the 
customary international rule on compensation for expropriation, and requires 
that: 
no government is entitled to expropriate private property [of a foreign alien], for whatever 
purpose, without provision for prompt, adequate and effective payment therefore.55  
While neither the Calvo doctrine nor the Hull rule are explicitly mentioned in 
the resolutions of the NIEO, they played an underlying role in justifying the 
positions of many former colonial states. The NIEO envisioned a world of 
states where the Hull rule would be rejected and the Calvo doctrine endorsed. 
In other words, foreign investors would be subject to the rules of the state 
where they were residing and that international law and diplomatic 
intervention could not alter the choices that a sovereign state makes in 
structuring its economic development policies.  
                                                            
49 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). 1 May 1974. 
UNGA Resolution No. 3201. 
50 Id. 
51 Carlos Calvo (1869). Derecho Internacional Teorico y Practico de Europe y America. Paris, 
d’Amyot. 
52 See Montt, supra note 24 at pp. 55-62.  
53 Frank Dawson & Burns Weston (1962). Prompt, Adequate and Effective: A Universal Standard 
of Compensation? Fordham Law Review. Vol. 30, pp. 727, 733-34. 
54 Particularly, the jurisprudence of the Factory at Chorzów Case (Germany v. Poland), supra 
note 17.  
55 Reprinted in Green Hackworth (1942). Digest of International Law. Vol. 3, pp. 658-59. 
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3.3 ICSID, the Middle East Arbitrations, and the Iranian Revolution 
Unsurprisingly, few BITs were signed or negotiated during this decolonization 
period.56 However, there were a number of developments that evolved during 
the period of the NIEO that continue to play a role in investment treaty 
arbitration today. These include the signing of the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention (also known as the 
Washington Convention) in 1965,57 the Middle Eastern oil arbitrations, and the 
Iranian Revolution of 1979.  
The ICSID Convention, through the leadership of World Bank general counsel, 
Aron Broches, established the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes. The ICSID Convention provides a procedural mechanism 
for the arbitration of disputes arising between a state and a foreign investor.58 
The key purpose of the ICSID Convention is to provide an institution for the 
arbitration of investor-state disputes that would both internationalize 
contracts and be able to overcome many of the problems relating to the 
enforcement of arbitral awards against states.  
Contract-based commercial arbitration has always been an option for foreign 
investors doing business with states or state entities. However, when a 
contract-based dispute arises, the issue of enforcement against a state 
presents special problems. Even if a commercial arbitration award is rendered 
against a state party, it is still likely to be subject to one of the treaties on the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.59 As such, the fact that one 
party to the dispute is a sovereign state, there is always the possibility that 
sovereign immunity issues could arise, or that the local enforcing court would 
refuse to enforce award against its own government. The ICSID Convention 
attempted to remedy this situation by creating a binding international treaty 
that could produce final awards that were directly enforceable against states 
without recourse to domestic judiciaries.  
While the preparatory works of the ICSID Convention envisioned the possibility 
of BIT-based arbitrations, it primary focus was on contract-based arbitrations. 
The ICSID has had a very heavy caseload over the past decade, but in its first 
few decades of existence very few disputes were brought through the ICSID.60 
The first cases brought before ICSID tribunals were based on arbitration 
                                                            
56 See Zahn, supra note 35. 
57 The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States & Nationals of Other 
States (Washington Convention). 18 March 1965, 5 ILM 532 (1965). 
58 The definitive commentary on the ICSID Convention is: Christoph Schreuer, et al. (2009). The 
ICSID Convention: A Commentary, Second Edition. Cambridge, CUP. 
59 See UN Convention on the Recognition & Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York 
Convention). 10 June 1958, 330 UNTS 3 (1959); Inter-American Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration (Panama Convention). 30 January 1975, 14 ILM 336 (1975). 
60 In the first 20 years, the total number of registered ICSID cases was 20. 
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clauses in contracts that prescribed ICSID arbitration.61 Many of the first 
cases settled or were discontinued before reaching awards on the merits.62 The 
first merits award rendered by ICSID came in 1977 in Adriano Gardella v. Côte 
d’Ivoire.63 In 1984, the case of SPP v Egypt,64 marked the beginning of 
arbitrations based on non-contractual consent (so-called arbitration without 
privity65). However, this case was based on Egypt’s foreign investment law and 
not on a BIT. It was not until 1987, that the first true investment treaty 
arbitration claim was initiated. This was the case of Asian Agricultural Products 
v. Sri Lanka,66 and was based on a BIT signed between Sri Lanka and the 
United Kingdom (UK) in 1980.  
Both before and after the ratification of the ICSID Convention, there were a 
number of concession- or contract-based international arbitrations in the 
Middle East over the nationalization of petroleum operations. These occurred 
in Abu Dhabi,67 Saudi Arabia,68 Qatar,69 Kuwait,70 Iran,71 and most famously, 
Libya.72 While none of these arbitrations were treaty-based, there relevance in 
understanding the development of investment treaty arbitration is profound. 
These arbitrations stretched from the early 1950s through the early 1980s, 
and overlapped with both the process of decolonization and the NIEO.  
These cases were intertwined with the NIEO, especially the three Libyan 
arbitrations of the 1970s, because they turned on whether the concessions 
could be ‘internationalized’ in the face of nationalization.73 This was a 
significant issue because a typical commercial arbitration would demand an 
application of domestic law in the adjudication of the dispute. In these 
                                                            
61 See e.g. Alcoa Minerals of Jamaica Inc. v. Jamaica (ICSID Case No. ARB/74/2). 6 July 1975, 
Decision on Jurisdiction. This case was eventually settled. 
62 See e.g. Holiday Inns & Others v. Morocco (ICSID Case No. ARB/72/1). 17 October 1978, 
Settlement; Reynolds Jamaica Mines Ltd. & Reynolds Metals Co. v. Jamaica (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/74/4). 12 October 1977, Discontinued. 
63 Adriano Gardella v. Côte d'Ivoire (ICSID Case No. ARB/74/1). 29 August 1977, Award. The 
jurisdiction of this case was based on an ICSID arbitration clause in a contract. 
64 Southern Pacific Properties (SPP) (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/84/3). 20 May 1992, Award. The jurisdiction of this case was based on an ICSID dispute 
settlement provision in the Egyptian Law on Foreign Investment. 
65 Paulsson, supra note 9. 
66 Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka (ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3). 27 June 
1990, Award. The jurisdiction of this case was based on an ICSID dispute settlement provision 
in the Sri Lanka-UK BIT (1980). 
67 Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. v Sheik of Abu Dhabi (Ad Hoc Arbitration). 18 ILR 
144 (1951). 
68 Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Ad Hoc Arbitration). 27 ILR 117 (1958). 
69 Ruler of Qatar v. International Marine Oil Co. Ltd. (Ad Hoc Arbitration). 20 ILR 534 (1953). 
70 American Independent Oil Co. (Aminoil) v. Kuwait (Ad Hoc Arbitration). 21 ILM 976 (1976). 
71 Sapphire International Petroleum Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co. (Ad Hoc Arbitration). 35 ILR 
136 (1963). 
72 BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd. v. Libyan Arab Republic (Ad Hoc Arbitration). 10 October  1973, 
53 ILR 297 (1979); Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. & California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab 
Republic (Ad Hoc Arbitration). 53 ILR 389 (1979); Libyan American Oil Co. (Liamco) v. Libyan 
Arab Republic (Ad Hoc Arbitration). 12 April 1977, 20 ILM 1 (1981). 
73 See Soranrajah, supra note 2 at pp. 289-304. 
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arbitrations, however, the application of domestic law would have resulted in 
the application of an expropriation standard far below the international 
standard; and further, even if a viable argument for the internationalization of 
the concession was achieved, the party who had been nationalized would still 
have significant problems in enforcing such an award against the state where 
the investment was nationalized. The ICSID Convention was primarily aimed at 
providing a solution to these seemingly intractable issues relating to the 
nationalization of foreign assets.  
During this same period, there was a revolution in Iran that led to a large 
number of US investors in Iran whose investments became subject to the new 
governments’ orders for nationalizing foreign assets. This led to the signing of 
the Algiers Accord, which set up the US-Iran Claims Tribunal.74 This tribunal, 
which is subject to international law, provides binding arbitration for 
investments made by US investors during a specific period before the Iranian 
Revolution. The US-Iran Claims Tribunal permitted US investors to directly file 
claims against Iran for losses occurred as a direct result of the Iran Revolution 
of 1979. By permitting investors with direct claims against a sovereign state, 
the US-Iran Claims Tribunal foreshadowed many of the same issues that 
would arise in BIT-based investor-state arbitrations in the coming decades, 
and as such, the jurisprudence of the US-Iran Claims Tribunal has had a 
significant impact on the development of investment treaty arbitration, 
especially in regard to expropriation. 
 
3.4 The Fall of the Soviet Union and the Washington Consensus 
By the mid-1980s, a number of capital-exporting states were able to identify 
the potential benefits of treaty-based mechanisms (such as the Algiers Accord) 
for the adjudication of international investment disputes. As such, the US 
embarked on the development of a BIT program in the early 1980s, and issued 
a model BIT in 1984.75 By the end of the 1980s, the fall of the Soviet Union 
marked the beginning of a new era of market liberalization, and it was during 
this time that the signing of BITs exploded.76 The chants for a NIEO had 
largely waned, and capital-importing states that had been active in the 
development of the NIEO shifted course. For a variety of reasons, some of 
                                                            
74 Iran-US Claims Settlement Declaration (Algiers Accords). 19 January 1981. 
75 See Text of the U.S. Model Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of 
Investment of February 24, 1984 (1984 Model BIT). Berkeley Journal of International Law. Vol. 4, 
p. 136 (1986); see also Kenneth Vandevelde (2010). Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, 
Interpretation. Oxford, OUP; Kenneth Vandevelde (2009). US International Investment 
Agreements. Oxford, OUP. 
76 The upsurge in the signing of BITs during this period included the US, but a number of other 
capital-exporting countries also had significant BIT programs in place at this time. 
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which are still not fully understood (and which should not be assumed to be 
purely economic), capital-importing states signed BITs at a rapid pace.77  
The BITs signed during this period, although bilateral in nature, feature a 
number of similarities. They are fairly brief documents, usually not more than 
six pages, and many permit dispute settlement provisions allowing for the 
invocation of investor-state arbitration. They also provide a set of standards on 
the protection of foreign investment, which create binding obligations on states 
hosting the investment.78 However, it is important to note that the exact 
wording of these standards ranges considerably from treaty to treaty; and 
such differences commonly mandate that arbitrators interpret these provisions 
as they are given in the specific treaty and not as they may be generalized by 
scholars and commentators. This can, and has, caused significant 
fragmentation and consistency issues; but it can also be said that BITs signed 
during this period were intended to remedy many of the problems that capital-
exporting countries faced in the post-colonial era. As any breach of the treaty 
would, by its very nature, be an international dispute, these early BITs 
provided a robust set of protections that could avoid many of the shortcomings 
identified in typical ad hoc contract-based commercial arbitration.    
By the mid-1990s, a significant number of countries had BIT programs, and 
were actively engaged in promoting them. Two important plurilateral 
agreements were also signed during this period. In 1994, the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force.79 This was one of the first 
FTAs to incorporate BIT-like provisions through the inclusion of an investment 
chapter as part of the larger trade liberalizations in the agreement.80 Further, 
it was one of the first treaties that would provide treaty-based investment 
protections between two capital-exporting states (the US and Canada). Around 
the same time, the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) was also negotiated and 
entered into force.81 The ECT, like the NAFTA, provides, inter alia, for the 
protection of foreign investors through substantive provisions that can be 
arbitrated if the state hosting the investment fails to meet its treaty 
obligations. Unlike the majority of BITs and FTAs that have been signed, 
however, the ECT is sector-specific, and provides protections only for energy-
related foreign direct investment.  
                                                            
77 An early and influential explanation is Andrew Guzmán (1998). Why LDCs Sign Treaties That 
Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties. Virginia Journal of 
International Law. Vol. 38, p. 639. However, Guzmán’s approach has been criticized, inter alia, 
for attempting to explain BIT signing in game theoretical and rational choice terms exclusively.  
78 Most commonly, BITs include standards on most-favored nation (MFN) treatment, national 
treatment, nondiscrimination, expropriation, transfer of funds, full protection and security 
(FPS), and fair and equitable treatment (FET). Less commonly, BITs include provisions on pre-
establishment rights, denial of benefits, preservation of rights, non-precluded measures, access 
to justice, performance requirements, and pacta sunt servanda (the so-called umbrella clause). 
See Dolzer & Schreuer, supra note 2. 
79 The NAFTA, supra note 6. 
80 See Chapter 11 of the NAFTA.  
81 The ECT, supra note 5. 
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These developments also coincided with transformational changes in in the 
area of international trade. In 1994, the World Trade Organization (WTO) came 
into existence.82 Unlike the GATT, the WTO provides for a standing 
international tribunal for the settlement of WTO-related disputes.83 All of this 
was occurring in the post-Soviet glow of the West, who rightly or wrongly, was 
strongly supporting a new era of globalization through the implementation of 
the so-called Washington consensus.84  
 
3.5 Antiglobalization and the Backlash 
By the end of the 1990s, however, there was significant civil society pushback 
on what was being termed by many as a new form of economic colonialism 
whereby the developed countries of the world were imposing policies of 
liberalization upon the developing world to their detriment. This led to a 
number of antiglobalization movements that stalled the development of the 
WTO and also thwarted a late 1990s attempt by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) to negotiate a multilateral agreement on 
investment.85 Despite these setbacks, both the WTO and BIT legal orders 
would enter the new millennium intact. While the WTO began to develop a 
jurisprudence through its dispute settlement mechanism, treaty-based 
arbitrations based on dispute settlement provisions in BITs and FTAs 
dramatically increased. There were a number of disputes during this period 
brought under the investment protections of the NAFTA; and as importantly, a 
large number of arbitrations against Argentina following its economic crisis in 
2000 and 2001.  
                                                            
82 The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). 15 April 1994, 
1867 UNTS 154 (1994). 
83 The Understanding on Rules & Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2. 15 April 1994, 33 
ILM 1226 (1994). 
84 The term Washington Consensus was coined by economist John Williamson in 1989 to 
connote policies pursued by Washington-based institutions, such as the World Bank, in the late 
1980s and throughout the 1990s. Some of these policy objectives included recommendations for 
states to liberalize trade, privatize state enterprises, reduce subsidies, deregulate markets, and 
provide legal security for property rights. 
85 Draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment (Draft MAI). 12 February 1998, Organization for 
Economic Cooperation & Development (OECD), DAFFE/MAI/NM(98); see also Peter Muchlinski 
(2000). The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Where Now? Washington, 
American Bar Association. Additional attempts at multilateralizing international investment law 
in the late twentieth century include: Singapore Ministerial Declaration. 18 December 1996, 
WT/MIN(96)/DEC. World Trade Organization (WTO) (1996); World Bank Guidelines on the 
Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment. Washington, World Bank, 31 ILM 1379 (1992); Draft 
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property. Paris, OECD (1967); Harvard Draft Convention 
on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens. Louis Sohn & Richard Baxter. 
Cambridge, Harvard Law School (1961); Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investments 
Abroad. Herman Abs & Hartley Shawcross (1959). American Journal of International Law. Vol. 
55, p. 545. 
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Throughout the first decade of the new millennium states continued to sign 
BITs and FTAs at a rapid clip, and the increase in investor-state arbitrations 
as based on these treaties spawned a large amount of commentary. While 
most of the discourse during this period was constructive and related to many 
of the substantive and procedural issues pertaining to this new form of 
international adjudication, the rapid increase in the use of investor-state 
arbitration quickly attracted an inordinate number of detractors who 
proclaimed that investment treaty arbitration was (and continues to be) in the 
midst of a legitimacy crisis and that this ‘backlash’ against the practice 
requires international legal decisionmakers and scholars to reassess whether 
or not investment treaty arbitration is a form of global legal governance worthy 
of support.  
Alongside this first generation of legitimacy literature, however, the US 
reevaluated its model BIT in the early 2000s in light of the fact that it had 
been subject to a significant number of disputes under the NAFTA in its first 
decade of existence.86 This resulted in a 2004 model BIT,87 and the more 
recent 2012 model BIT,88 that were significantly more detailed than previous 
models, and provided for a number of concessions away from a highly investor 
protective model to a more modest one that was cognizant of the need to 
protect a sovereign states’ right to regulate in the public interest (even if such 
actions negatively affected its foreign investors).89 This is a trend that has 
persisted ever since, and a number of developed countries have endorsed 
models that give states much more latitude in avoiding liability where investor 
rights have been negatively affected. While no developed state has renounced 
any of its prior BITs (although Australia has recently decided to exclude 
investor-state dispute settlement options in future treaties90), a few states in 
                                                            
86 See e.g. Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America, NAFTA (ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/99/2), 11 October 2002, Award; ADF Group Inc. v. United States of America, NAFTA 
(ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1), 9 January 2003, Award; Loewen Group Inc. & Raymond L. 
Loewen v. United States of America, NAFTA (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3), 26 June 2003, 
Award. See also Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William Park (2003). The New Face of Investment 
Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11.  Yale Journal of International Law. Vol. 28, p. 365. 
87 Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America & the Government of [Country] 
concerning the Encouragement & Reciprocal Protection of Investment (2004 Model BIT). 
Washington, US Department of State (2004), available at: http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/117601.pdf (last accessed 1 September 2013). 
88 Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America & the Government of [Country] 
concerning the Encouragement & Reciprocal Protection of Investment (2012 Model BIT). 
Washington, US Department of State (2012), available at: http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/188371.pdf (last accessed 1 September 2013). 
89 See Kenneth Vandevelde (2009). ‘A Comparison of the 2004 and 1984 US Model BITs: 
Rebalancing Investor and Host Country Interests,’ in Karl Sauvant, ed. The Yearbook on 
International Investment Law & Policy, 2009-2010. Oxford, OUP, p. 7. 
90 Gillard Government Trade Policy Statement: Trading Our Way to More Jobs & Prosperity. 
November 2011, Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade, available at: 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/trade/trading-our-way-to-more-jobs-and-prosperity.pdf 
(last accessed 1 September 2013). 
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Latin America have recently taken the action of denouncing some of their 
BITs91 and exiting from the ICSID Convention.92  
This general overview of the contemporary investment treaty regime has 
attempted to show both how the regime has developed, but also how its 
historical pedigree is rooted in public international law.93 While the public 
nature of the regime has always been understood by those who have been 
familiar with this historical narrative, many have criticized investment treaty 
arbitration as a mode of private adjudication. And while there is good reason 
for correlating investment treaty arbitration with international commercial 
arbitration, there are significant differences.  
The reality is that investment treaty arbitration is a hybrid of the two, which 
makes the evaluation of the dispute settlement provisions in BITs and FTAs 
difficult to categorize through an exclusively public-private dichotomy.94 While 
the procedures of investment treaty arbitration resemble those of international 
commercial arbitration, the disputes to which arbitrators are called upon to 
arbitrate are distinctly public in nature. From a regime-design perspective, 
this hybridization of dispute settlement is both counterintuitive and 
contradictory to those who believe that the resolution of disputes can only find 
acceptance if they meet criteria to which they are familiar. Investment treaty 
arbitration challenges this approach, but that does not mean that it cannot 
evolve into, or is not already, a fair and legitimate form of international 
adjudication.  
 
4. THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 
A vast amount of literature over the past decade has claimed that there is, 
alternatively, a backlash against investment treaty arbitration or that it is in 
the midst of a legitimacy crisis.95 When describing a crisis, it is usually a 
                                                            
91 These include Venezuela and Ecuador. However, Argentina is contemplating withdrawal from 
a number of their BITs as well. 
92 These include Venezuela (24 January 2012), Ecuador (6 July 2009), and Bolivia (2 May 2007). 
93 See Alvarez, supra note 2; Stephan Schill, ed. (2010). International Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law. Oxford, OUP. 
94 See Alex Mills (2011). Antinomies of Public and Private at the Foundations of International 
Investment Law and Arbitration. Journal of International Economic Law. Vol. 14, pp. 469, 476; 
Julie Maupin (2012). Public and Private in International Investment Law: An Integrated Systems 
Approach. Duke University School of Law, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144019 (last accessed 1 September 2013); William Park (2005). 
Emerging Dilemmas in International Economic Arbitration – Private Disputes and the Public Good: 
Explaining Arbitration Law. American University International Law Review. Vol. 20, p. 903. 
95 Devashish Krishan (2011). ‘Thinking about BITs and BIT Arbitration: The Legitimacy Crisis 
that Never Was,’ in Stephan Schill, ed. International Investment Law and Comparative Public 
Law. Oxford, OUP; Michael Waibel, et al. (2010). The Backlash against Investment Arbitration. 
The Hague, Kluwer; David Caron (2009). Investor-State Arbitration: Strategic and Tactical 
Perspectives on Legitimacy. Suffolk Transnational Law Review. Vol. 32, p. 513; Noemi Gal-Or 
(2009). The Investor and Civil Society as Twin Global Citizens: Proposing a New Interpretation in 
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phenomenon constrained by a particular event. With investment treaty 
arbitration, however, the crisis is not identifiable as a single event. Rather, 
there appear to be multiple legitimacy crises that have come in waves of 
discursive response to particular decisions or sets of decisions rendered by 
investment treaty tribunals. As such, these critiques about the legitimacy of 
the dispute settlement mechanisms found in most BITs and FTA investment 
chapters have evolved and changed over time as more and more tribunals 
issue awards.  
However, while there are some commentators who believe that the entire 
regime is so structurally flawed as to call for its dismantlement,96 others 
believe that many of the issues concerning the regime’s fairness and legitimacy 
can be resolved as the regime evolves.97 Regardless, it is evident that states 
have the ability to respond to the perceived inadequacies of investment treaty 
arbitration through the modification (and occasional denunciation) of the 
treaties that grant jurisdiction to arbitral tribunals; and there are good signals 
that states are exercising this power.98  
It is also evident that arbitrators themselves – rightly or wrongly – can, and 
are, responding to perceived issues of legitimacy and fairness through their 
decisions. It appears that many early tribunals viewed BITs primarily as one-
                                                                                                                                                                              
the Legitimacy Debate. Suffolk Transnational Law Review. Vol. 32, p. 271; Jason Webb Yackee 
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252 
 
 
way agreements that compelled arbitrators to protect investment to the 
exclusion of other obligations and defenses that the state may have. This trend 
appears to be reversing as arbitral tribunals are becoming more sensitive to 
the public nature of investment treaty arbitration, and are reflecting this shift 
in providing more deference to state decisionmaking.99  
What this means for the future of evolving legal orders is that lawshaping and 
lawinfluencing discourse does indeed matter. Many of the issues originally 
challenged by critiques of the regime are being addressed, or time has 
demonstrated that the original fears were unwarranted. When looking at the 
history of these legitimacy events over the past decade, it is apparent that they 
are largely a moving target with detractors latching on to new crises as the old 
ones fade away. This is a good thing. Some issues currently under discussion 
in investment treaty arbitration will likely be old news in five to ten years. This 
is an indication that the discourse is not only important, but that it is 
working. Decisionmakers involved in the development of the investment treaty 
arbitration regime are responding to the discourse.    
 
4.1 A Summary of the Issues 
Before turning to a description and evaluation of the discursive waves relating 
to legitimacy issues in investment treaty arbitration, it is perhaps useful to 
distinguish what are the reoccurring themes and what is meant by legitimacy 
in the context of investment treaty arbitration. Legitimacy, like fairness and 
justice, is a normative metavalue that defies precise meaning. However, there 
are a number of ways that the word legitimacy has been used in the literature 
on investment treaty arbitration. Primarily, legitimacy refers to the 
authoritativeness of a particular legal order to take action in a particular way. 
For investment treaty arbitration, a reference to legitimacy has manifest itself 
a as a reference to three major types or categories.  
The first use of legitimacy refers to whether or not arbitral tribunals are using 
their authority in a manner that is acceptable to those affected by their 
decisions. When that authority is perceived to have been exceeded, it can be 
seen as illegitimate. The second use of legitimacy refers to the distribution of 
power among states entering into agreements that allow for investor-state 
dispute settlement. Any agreement procured along traditional north-south 
lines, and perceived as an agreement of adhesion, can be viewed as 
illegitimate.100 In investment treaty arbitration, this generally means that any 
BIT between a powerful state and a less powerful state will be perceived as an 
                                                            
99 José Alvarez (2011). The Return of the State. Minnesota Journal of International Law. Vol. 20, 
p. 223. 
100 José Alvarez (2009). A BIT on Custom. New York University Journal of International Law & 
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illegitimate legal instrument. And finally, for investment treaty arbitration, a 
third use of legitimacy refers to the legal order itself. That is, does it reflect the 
rule of law? Are decisions of tribunals consistent, coherent, procedurally fair, 
and reasonable? If they are not able to meet certain criteria, the legal order 
itself can be said to be illegitimate.  
In a recent article,101 José Alvarez and Gustavo Topalian distilled the current 
legitimacy issues in investment treaty law broadly to include the following six 
major issues. First, investment treaty arbitral tribunals produce inconsistent 
decisions over time and that this defeats the primary objective of the regime in 
producing a stable and predictable legal environment for foreign direct 
investment. Second, investment treaty arbitration awards are a threat to 
national sovereignty and that they are insufficiently deferential to national law 
and the need for sovereign states to be able to regulate in the public interest. 
Third, investment treaty arbitral tribunals fail to respect the rights of states to 
take national emergency action in response to a fundamental national security 
threat. Fourth, investment treaty arbitration awards are skewed in favor of 
investors and that investment treaty arbitration is essentially a ‘one trick pony’ 
that protects investment at the expense of all other policy goals. Fifth, 
investment treaty arbitration falls on the wrong side of the public-private 
divide and that these arbitral awards erroneously privatize disputes that 
should only be heard in public forums. And sixth, investment treaty 
arbitration awards are a species of global administrative law that fails to 
reflect the rule of law values found in national administrative and 
constitutional law. He goes on to say that all of these six legitimacy critiques 
can be reduced to an underlying singularity: “the investment regime is the 
enemy of the state.”102  
Even if all of these critiques can be taken prima facie as true (which Alvarez 
emphatically disputes), where did they come from and how have these issues 
evolved over time? Prior to the year 2000, investment treaty arbitrations 
attracted little scrutiny. There had only been a handful of decisions rendered 
up to that point and there were few in the international legal community who 
had specialized knowledge in this emerging field of practice.  
Perhaps ironically however, the initial contemporary legitimacy crisis in 
international investment law had very little to do with investment treaty 
arbitration itself. The key event can be traced to the establishment of the WTO 
in 1994. This is because the antiglobalization movement that was aimed at 
dismantling the global trade regime had spillover effects on an attempt by the 
OECD to negotiate a Draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment (Draft MAI) in 
1998.103 The timing by the OECD could not have been worse, and even if the 
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timing had been better, the OECD – as an organization of the most developed 
states in the world – was the wrong institution to pursue such an agreement. 
Predictably, the Draft MAI negotiations failed when advocacy groups claiming 
to represent the interests of developing countries intervened in the process.104 
These groups held that the de jure multilateralization of international 
investment law would parallel the negative predictions being made about the 
further multilateralization of international trade law. False prophecies aside, 
the failed negotiations of the Draft MAI can be seen as the starting point for 
successive legitimacy crises claimed against investment treaty arbitration up 
to the present.  
 
4.2 The First Wave 
In the early to mid-2000s, there were a number of investor-state arbitrations 
that generated the first wave of legitimacy crisis literature. Up until this point, 
there were only a small number of investment treaty awards that had been 
rendered; and the cases, while interesting to particular specialists in 
international dispute settlement, attracted limited attention by legal academics 
and were completely absent from the public discourse at large. This all 
changed in the early 2000s with a number of cases that included, inter alia, 
the early NAFTA cases – especially the Loewen case, the two SGS cases, and 
the Lauder-CME cases.  
 
4.2.1  The Loewen Case and the Perceived Threat to Sovereignty 
It is believed that the negotiation of the NAFTA investment chapter was 
primarily geared towards protecting investments in Mexico, and while claims 
against Mexico by US and Canadian investors have occurred, it is the claims 
by US investors against Canada and Canadian investors against the US that 
has had the largest direct impact on the development of investment treaty 
arbitration. While there are now a few cases in Europe where investors from 
developed countries are initiating claims against other developed states,105 the 
Canada-US and US-Canada disputes were the first of their kind for investment 
treaty arbitration. These disputes alerted both the US and Canada to the fact 
that IIAs actually flow both ways. While the reciprocal nature of BITs and FTA 
investment chapters is clearly spelled out in the treaties, few developed states 
every thought that they would have to be defending claims.  
                                                            
104 See Muchlinski, supra note 85. 
105 See Charanne (the Netherlands) and Construction Investments (Luxembourg) v. Spain, ECT 
(SCC Arbitration). Case Filed 1 May 2013; Vattenfall & Others (Sweden) v. Federal Republic of 
Germany, ECT (ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12). Case Filed 31 May 2012; PV Investors v. Spain, 
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Loewen v. United States106 was a claim for denial of justice107 brought by a 
Canadian investor against the US. Although the claimant, Loewen, did not 
prevail on his claim for denial of justice, this case represents a line of cases 
where Canadian investors have filed suit against the US.108 The Loewen case 
did not involve a claim against the US that was readily cognizable to 
commercial arbitrators and lawyers. Rather, the case claimed that a 
Mississippi court had denied justice (as a rule of customary international law 
reflected in Article 1105 of the NAFTA) to a Canadian investor in US judicial 
proceedings.109 It was a claim that the justice system of the US had 
embarrassing shortcomings, and that these shortcomings could be remedied 
under international law.110 When this NAFTA claim reached a level of 
consciousness among lawmakers in Washington, few could understand how 
such a ‘secret tribunal’111 could ever have been constituted in the first place. 
Even Bill Moyers entered the fray, claiming that the NAFTA tribunal was 
undermining fundamental processes of democratic rule.112 It is claimed that 
these early NAFTA cases against the US (the US has still not lost a claim 
under the NAFTA) shifted US policy towards its BIT program.113  
 
                                                            
106 Loewen Group Inc. &  Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, NAFTA (ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/98/3). 5 January 2001, Decision on Jurisdiction; Loewen Group Inc. & Raymond L. 
Loewen v. United States of America, NAFTA (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3). 26 June 2003, 
Award.  
107 See generally Jan Paulsson (2005). Denial of Justice in International Law. Cambridge, CUP.  
108 See Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America, NAFTA (ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/99/2). 11 October 2002, Award; ADF Group Inc. v. United States of America, NAFTA 
(ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1). 9 January 2003, Award; Loewen Group Inc. & Raymond L. 
Loewen v. United States of America, NAFTA (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3). 26 June 2003, 
Award; Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, NAFTA (UNCITRAL Ad Hoc Arbitration). 2 
September 2005, Award; Softwood Lumber Consolidated Proceedings v. United States of America, 
NAFTA (UNCITRAL Ad Hoc Arbitration). 6 June 2006, Decision on Preliminary Questions; Grand 
River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd. v. United States of America, NAFTA (UNCITRAL Ad Hoc 
Arbitration). 20 July 2006, Decision on Jurisdiction; Canadian Cattlemen for Fair Trade v. 
United States of America, NAFTA (UNCITRAL Ad Hoc Arbitration). 28 January 2008, Decision on 
Jurisdiction; Glamis Gold v. United States of America, NAFTA (UNCITRAL Ad Hoc Arbitration). 8 
June 2009, Award. 
109 Andrea Björklund (2005). Reconciling State Sovereignty and Investor Protection in Denial of 
Justice Claims. Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 45, p. 809. 
110 See Noah Rubins (2005). Loewen v. United States: The Burial of an Investor-State Arbitration 
Claim. Arbitration International. Vol. 21, p. 1; William Dodge (2002). Loewen v. United States: 
Trials and Errors Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven. DePaul Law Review. Vol. 52, p. 563. 
111 Anthony DePalma (2001). NAFTA’s Powerful Little Secret; Obscure Tribunals Settle Disputes, 
But Go Too Far, Critics Say. New York Times, 11 March. 
112 Bill Moyers (2004). Trading Democracy. Films for the Humanities and Sciences. Princeton, 
Video Recording. 
113 In 2004, the US issued a new model BIT that included significant changes, which introduced 
more sovereign protective standards than earlier US model BITs. 
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4.2.2 The SGS Cases and the Problems of Precedent and Consistency 
The SGS cases were not quite as politically dramatic as that of the Loewen 
case, but were nonetheless important to early claims that investment treaty 
arbitration was not going to work as a system of adjudication. The SGS cases 
comprised of two tribunals, SGS v. Pakistan114 and SGS v. Philippines,115 that 
came to different interpretations of the umbrella clauses in the relevant BITs. 
Generally speaking, umbrella clauses internationalize the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda in regard to specific obligations that a state may make with 
private entities.116 In other words, an umbrella clause in a treaty has the 
potential to elevate a contract breach into a treaty breach. In both cases, the 
umbrella clause and the underlying contract breach were very similar and yet 
the tribunals understood the resulting obligations of the state as distinct.117  
Essentially, the Pakistan tribunal held that the umbrella clause in the BIT is 
to be read restrictively as to preclude almost any instance where it would be 
applicable. The Philippines tribunal, on the other hand, held that the umbrella 
clause in the BIT must be given full meaning and that such a clause is 
intended to include obligations on the state. While the Philippines tribunal 
found that a forum selection clause in the contract would prevent the 
application in that particular instance, these two cases were among the first to 
highlight the possibility that two tribunals evaluating similar treaty provisions 
over similar factual claims could come to diametrically opposed 
interpretations.118  
These two cases also highlighted an issue that remains active in investment 
treaty arbitration through the present: the issue of precedent and obiter dicta. 
From its very inception, and building on the format of awards issued by claims 
commissions and the US-Iran Claims Tribunal, investment treaty arbitration 
awards have never reflected international commercial arbitration awards. 
Rather, investment tribunals go to great lengths to explain why they have 
decided in the way that they have and where their decision fits into the 
jurisprudence of prior awards. While it is arguable that this approach results 
                                                            
114 Société Générale de Surveillance (SGS) v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/13). 6 August 2003, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction. 
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from investment tribunal arbitrators’ viewing their decisions as part of the 
development of international law, it can also cause problems.  
The SGS v. Philippines decision on jurisdiction, for example, did not have to 
rule on the scope of umbrella clauses in order to render its decision. Yet, it 
did; creating a self-imposed interpretive controversy in the process. In many 
ways this is not wholly problematic, and it is something that public tribunals – 
both domestic and international – frequently engage in. More problematic is 
the claim that tribunal are not, or should not be, engaging in this type of 
activity because investment tribunals are ad hoc in nature and do not have a 
formal mechanism appellate review or the application of precedent.  
The hybrid structure of investment treaty tribunals creates a difficult 
predicament: on the one hand, arbitrators will be criticized if their awards are 
unreasoned and brief; and on the other hand, arbitrators will be criticized if 
their awards are excessive long, full of obiter dicta, and permissive of dissents. 
While this tension about the role of arbitrators as public or private 
adjudicators was identified very early in the discourse, attempts at finding the 
proper balance continues challenge arbitrators in investment treaty disputes 
through the present.    
To that end, a very recent arbitral award highlights this tension on the role of 
investment arbitration adjudicators that emerged very early in the 
discourse.119 In the event, three of the most eminent and prolific arbitrators in 
this field of law demonstrated how there continues to be a debate about how 
arbitral awards ought to be interpreted. This discourse relates to how prior 
awards can be considered in present cases, but is also about how arbitrators 
feel about their duty to produce a consistent jurisprudence over time: a 
jurisprudence constante. The tribunal was composed of Gabrielle Kaufmann-
Kohler, Brigitte Stern, and Francisco Vicuña. In their decision on liability, they 
held the following:  
[t]he Tribunal considers that it is not bound by previous decisions. Nevertheless, the 
majority [Kaufmann-Kohler and Vicuña] considers that it must pay due regard to earlier 
decisions of international courts and tribunals. It believes that, subject to compelling 
contrary grounds, it has a duty to adopt solutions established in a series of consistent 
cases. It further believes that, subject to the specifics of a given treaty and of the 
circumstances of the actual case, it has a duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious 
development of investment law, and thereby to meet the legitimate expectations of the 
community of States and investors towards the certainty of the rule of law. Arbitrator 
Stern does not analyze the arbitrator's role in the same manner, as she considers it her 
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duty to decide each case on its own merits, independently of any apparent jurisprudential 
trend.120  
Both views are correct, and yet, they represent perspectives that could wholly 
affect the outcome of cases.121 The correct view, it is posited in the context of 
this work, is the subjective perspective that reflects the proper distribution of 
value as endorsed by the community of users using this legal order.  
 
4.2.3 The Lauder Cases and the Problem of Multiple Proceedings 
Like the SGS cases, the Lauder cases (Lauder v. Czech Republic122 and CME v. 
Czech Republic123) attracted considerable criticism of the early jurisprudence 
developing in investment treaty arbitration. In these cases, two awards were 
issued on essentially the same subject matter in which the tribunals came to 
very different conclusions. CME, a company incorporated in the Netherlands 
brought a claim against the Czech Republic under the Czech Republic-
Netherlands BIT, and the tribunal found in favor of CME. Lauder, on the other 
hand, was a shareholder in CME and a US national. He brought a claim 
against the Czech Republic under the Czech Republic-US BIT, and the tribunal 
found in favor of the Czech Republic by denying all claims against it. The 
subject-matter of the claims were essentially the same.  
These two cases brought a number of novel issues to the discourse that 
continues to hold relevance for the development of investment treaty 
arbitration. First, like the SGS cases, the Lauder cases identified the potential 
problems that could arise from the largely bilateral nature of investment 
treaties. That is, it became apparent that similar claims brought under 
different BITs could potentially reach very diverse conclusions. Second, it 
solidified the issue of whether a private model of adjudication – such as 
international commercial arbitration and its ad hoc, one-off nature – could 
ever provide consistency and stability across decisions.124 While the ad hoc 
nature of international commercial arbitration is suitable for contractual 
disputes among private parties, the investment arbitration community began 
to question whether this private model was appropriate for the types of 
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disputes being arbitrated under BITs and FTA investment chapters.125 Third, 
the Lauder cases brought the issue of res judicata and parallel proceedings to 
the fore. Could investment treaty arbitrations potentially lead to multiple 
claimants bringing multiple disputes under multiple treaties that resulted in 
multiple levels of compensation for the same claim? So far, the answer is no; 
but the possibility persists. 
While these cases are no longer featured prominently in the new literature on 
the backlash against investment treaty arbitration, the underlying issues that 
they identified still exist.126 During this initial period, one begins to see a 
discourse developing on how the multitude of BITs and their calls for dispute 
settlement procedures modeled on commercial arbitration practices could 
produce consistent decisions across time.127 While the issue of a multilateral 
investment treaty is not prominently discussed, a discourse on whether 
investment treaty arbitrations should be subject to some kind of appellate 
mechanism emerges at the end of this period.128  
In contraposition to the Loewen case, which was perceived as a threat to US 
sovereignty, the mid-2000s also saw a number of cases awarding significant 
damages to investors. Some commentators began to claim that the public 
administrative nature of the disputes being arbitrated (by having to rule on the 
consistency of regulatory measures with international rules embodied in BITs) 
resulted in overly one-sided decisions tilted towards investor protection at the 
expense of the state’s ability to regulate in the public interest.129 While such a 
claim about regulatory autonomy was not at issue in Loewen, it parallels an 
underlying fear that was developing and would progress throughout the 
decade: investment treaty arbitration is unbalanced and needs to be 
readjusted towards a more discretionary model of sovereign authority given 
that the disputes being adjudicated could have an impact far beyond the facts 
of a particular dispute. 
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4.3 The Second Wave 
The second wave of legitimacy crises discourse came in the mid- to late-2000s. 
Whereas the first wave of legitimacy discourse was tied to early jurisprudence 
in the context of the NAFTA, the second wave was dominated by the awards 
rendered as a result of the Argentinian economic crisis of 2000-2001. It is 
difficult to lump all of these awards together, as they were not all connected to 
the measures taken by Argentina in response to its economic crisis (in fact, 
Argentina continues to generate new claims against it130); but there were a 
number of cases resulting in awards on the merits that came early in the 
second wave and produced a large amount of commentary.131  
 
4.3.1 The Argentinian Economic Crisis 
The most controversial of the Argentina disputes arose out of the emergency 
measures taken in the wake of a major downturn in its economy.132 These 
measures had a detrimental effect on major foreign investment projects in the 
gas, electricity, and water sectors. All of the investment treaty disputes that 
arose from this crisis came from Europe or the US; and the most commonly 
invoked treaty was the US-Argentina BIT.133 As many of the cases arose out of 
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a similar set of events, and were based on the same treaty, it was thought that 
the tribunal decisions would be fairly consistent even though they were 
constituted independently. And for the most part they did.134 However, the 
original cases (not the annulment committees) generally found that Argentina 
had not been able to show that their customary defense of necessity precluded 
wrongfulness.135  
Although the customary defense of necessity arguably would have only 
precluded the wrongfulness of Argentina’s acts under the international law of 
state responsibility and would not have allowed Argentina to avoid paying 
damages,136 the early decisions exacerbated the claims that a state should be 
allowed to protect a vital national interest (such as their economy) during a 
time of crisis even if this meant disadvantaging foreign investors. Argentina 
has sought to have some of these awards annulled under the ICSID’s internal 
procedures for annulment, and the results of these annulment decisions have 
spawned a new legitimacy crisis for investment treaty arbitration that will be 
discussed in the next section.  
 
4.3.2 A Pro-Investor Bias? 
While the commentary on the Argentinian decisions largely focused on the 
customary defense of necessity and how that defense operates in the context 
of international investment law, it also provided evidence for a debate that had 
been percolating: the perception that investment treaty arbitration favors 
investor and that the awards reflect this bias.137 As many of the investment 
tribunals in the Argentinian cases rejected Argentina’s pleas for precluded 
                                                            
134 There have been approximately 45 cases brought against Argentina. Some were brought 
before the economic crisis, and a few were brought after the economic crisis. Of these 45 cases, 
33 have rendered decisions on jurisdiction and 17 have issued awards on the merits. There 
have been an additional seven requests for annulment. See id. at pp. 496-97. 
135 For the customary defense of necessity, see Article 25, ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. November 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), 
chp.IV.E.1, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ddb8f804.html (last accessed 
1 September 2013). 
136 Id. at Article 27. 
137 “Awards issued by international arbitrators against states have in numerous cases 
incorporated overly expansive interpretations of language in investment treaties. These 
interpretations have prioritized the protection of the property and economic interests of 
transnational corporations over the right to regulate of states and the right to self-determination 
of peoples. This is especially evident in the approach adopted by many arbitration tribunals to 
investment treaty concepts of corporate nationality, expropriation, most-favoured-nation 
treatment, non-discrimination, and fair and equitable treatment, all of which have been given 
unduly pro-investor interpretations at the expense of states, their governments, and those on 
whose behalf they act. This has constituted a major reorientation of the balance between 
investor protection and public regulation in international law.” Public Statement on the 
International Investment Regime. 31 August 2010, available at: http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/ 
public-statement/documents/Public%20Statement%20%28June%20201129.pdf (last accessed 
1 September 2013). 
262 
 
 
liability on the basis of economic necessity, these cases came to be identified 
with the argument that investment tribunals disproportionately favor investor 
claims to the detriment of legitimate state policy goals. By the mid-2000s, 
critiques of the regime focused not only on the procedure of investment treaty 
tribunals and its tendency to privatize public disputes through the practices of 
commercial arbitration, but they also began to focus on the claim that 
investment treaty tribunals only placed obligations on states, not investors; 
and that this kind of one-sided structure could only result in claims that 
would vindicate investors in the majority of cases.  
These critiques also came at the same time that there was a large upsurge in 
the number of awards being rendered, and this fact produced a large academic 
literature relating directly to the body of jurisprudence that was developing, 
both substantively and procedural. In addition to the issues about the 
procedures of investment treaty arbitration and whether it should reflect 
private or public models of adjudication, a literature on the substantive scope 
of standards of protections in BITs also grew during this period (especially 
relating to the fair and equitable treatment standard and the standard on 
compensation for expropriation).138  
 
4.3.3 The Backlash Against the Backlash 
What also came to prominence during this period is what could be described 
as the backlash against the backlash. Prominent experts in the field of 
investment treaty arbitration, both scholars and practitioners, put forth 
arguments as to why the criticisms of investment treaty arbitration were 
largely unwarranted. In response to the problem of bilateralism, scholars such 
as Stephen Schill argued that the proliferation of BITs and the growing 
jurisprudence from investor-state arbitrations constituted a de facto 
multilateralization of international investment law; and that tribunals were in 
fact coming to more or less coherent decisions.139 Under such a theory, a 
jurisprudence constante was emerging, and that investment treaty tribunals 
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were relying on the past decisions of other tribunals in rendering their 
awards.140 In many ways, this meant that arbitrators were not adhering in 
practice to a purely commercial arbitration model of rendering awards. That is, 
unlike commercial arbitration, most investment tribunal awards (especially 
those constituted under the ICSID) were available to the public, they gave 
expansive reasons for their decisions, and they paid sufficient notice to other 
decisions made by investment treaty arbitrators.  
Eminent international lawyers, such as Stephen Schwebel, have taken this 
multilateralization argument one step further by claiming that the universe of 
BITs and FTA investment chapters have come to reflect the customary 
international law on foreign investment.141 Likewise, scholars such as Susan 
Franck developed studies empirically demonstrating that investment treaty 
arbitrations did not reflect the pro-investor bias in reality, and that the 
outcomes of investment treaty arbitrations were in fact more favorable to state 
parties than previously assumed.142 
 
4.3.4 Human Rights and the Environment 
Against this backdrop, and opposing the arguments made in favor of the 
investment regime, a number of civil society groups and scholars latched onto 
the idea that investment treaty arbitration was not only a bad idea for 
developing states143 in regard to their sovereignty,144 it was a bad idea in 
regard to other areas of international law as well – especially in terms of 
human rights145 and environmental146 obligations. They argued that the 
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fulfillment of obligations under BITs and FTA investment chapters would 
prevent states from fulfilling their other obligations under international law 
and domestic law;147 especially in the fields of public health law,148 
environmental law, climate change law, and human rights law. These critics 
also argue that BITs only place obligations on states, and that if investors are 
given rights under BITs, they should also have obligations. This issue has led 
to discussions about the possibility of states bringing counterclaims against 
investors for violations of international human rights and environmental 
obligations.149 However, the language of most BITs – as they are currently 
framed – would not provide grounds for such actions; and therefore, any 
reforms in this regard will require changes to the language of future BITs.  
While the issue of investor obligations has not made much headway, a number 
of reformers have convinced tribunals that, given the public nature of the 
disputes, they should be able to submit amicus curiae briefs. These briefs 
have been filed almost exclusively in support of the state respondent in 
investment treaty cases. Commonly, they ask the tribunal to consider the 
public interests of citizens in developing states that could be negatively 
impacted by the claims being made against that state.150 While no tribunals 
have allowed third parties to formally enjoin the proceedings, amicus curiae 
submissions are now a common feature in many investment treaty 
arbitrations. During this period, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such 
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as the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD)151 also 
entered the discourse on the reform of standards of protection in investment 
treaties by calling for stronger balancing in favor of sustainable development 
objectives.152  
This emerging focus on sustainable development can be seen as developing 
from two problems in international law generally: the increasing fragmentation 
of international law and the proliferation of international tribunals on the one 
hand, and the difficulty international law faces in regard to the enforcement of 
environmental law and the law on business and human rights.153 For 
investment treaty arbitration, the fragmentation discourse calls on arbitrators 
to look for ways that the interpretation of investment treaties can systemically 
integrate and harmonize other areas of international law when rendering 
decisions in investment disputes. The problem with this argument in general 
is that such an integration would compel investment treaty arbitrators to 
become general courts of international law. A bit ironically perhaps, 
investment law reformers are asking tribunals to restrict their interpretations 
over treaty provisions that they actually have jurisdiction over, while at the 
same time expanding their jurisdiction over other areas of international law 
that arguably fall outside the jurisdictional mandate of BITs and FTA 
investment chapters. 
 
4.3.5 A Democratic Deficit?  
Amidst the calls for a more deferential role in favor of state sovereignty were a 
number of academic works seeking to highlight how a private system of 
adjudication for public disputes would lead (or indeed had already led) to a 
democratic deficit.154 The essential claim is that by delegating the adjudication 
of BIT-based disputes (and the vague, imprecise standards embodied in these 
treaties) to a tribunal of unelected private adjudicators unaccountable to any 
structural or institutional oversight is a violation of a core tenet of a 
democratic rule of law. These scholars hold that investment treaties are 
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actually a form of constitutional law that requires adjudicators to decide cases 
in a manner comparable to domestic constitutional law. And because of this, 
any form of ad hoc arbitration with party-appointed arbitrators is ill suited for 
the types of disputes they are asked to decide upon.155 Instead, it is important 
for adjudicators to hold permanent positions and to sit before a permanent 
court that can develop a cohesive line of jurisprudence on the rights and 
obligations found in investment treaties.156 They further hold that even if 
investment treaties are not analogous to national constitutions, they are 
certainly a form of administrative law.157  
 
4.4 The Third Wave 
For investment treaty arbitration specifically, and as described in the previous 
section, the second wave of literature on investment treaty arbitration 
identified many of the main issues that continue to challenge investment 
treaty arbitration through to the present. However, a third wave of discourse 
over the past two or three years is identifiable by: 1) new shifts in state policy 
towards investment treaties, and the impact that such a shift will have on the 
arbitration of investor-state disputes, 2) an increasing sophistication and 
specialization of the practitioners and scholars with expertise in this area of 
international law, and 3) the continued proliferation of decisions available for 
legal analysis.  
 
4.4.1 The Return of the State 
By the end of the first decade of the new millennium, the discourse and 
practice of investment treaty arbitration had produced a number of shifts in 
sovereign state policy towards the regime, and this trend continues to manifest 
itself through the present. There are indicators that some states are 
dissatisfied with their BIT policies, and states are proving that they indeed 
have the power to influence the treaties that they sign by using their exit and 
voice options, or by renegotiating treaties with perceived deficiencies.158 One of 
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the major trends being evidenced is that some traditionally capital-exporting 
states are increasingly becoming the recipients of foreign direct investment, 
and likewise, a number of traditionally capital-importing states, especially the 
so-called BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) are becoming capital-
exporters.  
In many ways, these shifts in the overall political economy of states are 
impacting the way that states approach their BIT and FTA programs. Notably, 
the US, Australia,159 and Canada have shifted their BIT and FTA policy 
towards the inclusion of more sovereign protective provisions in future 
agreements.160 China, on the other hand, and possibly reflecting its emerging 
status as a capital-exporting state, is becoming more open to the inclusion of 
stronger investment protections in its BITs as Chinese investors increasingly 
enter global markets.161 South Africa, which has traditionally been both a 
capital-exporting and capital-importing state is in the process of revamping its 
BIT program by pursuing distinguishing policies between agreements with 
capital-exporting and capital-importing states.162 And member states of the 
European Union (EU) are currently in the midst of a policy overhaul as a 
result of the Treaty of Lisbon,163 which grants exclusive competence to the 
European Commission (EC) over the regulation of foreign direct investment.164 
While the details on how this will shift member state authority over its BIT 
programs remains blurry, it will nonetheless require all member states to 
address their policies towards foreign direct investment in the coming years.165 
There are indications that, while continuing to pursue investor protective 
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agreements, the EC is exploring ways that it can bind arbitrators to more 
exacting standards of treatment.166  
The most radical recent shift in policy, however, has come in the denunciation 
of the ICSID Convention from a few Latin American states.167 These include 
Bolivia, Ecuador,168 and most recently Venezuela.169 Likewise, and in the wake 
of huge liabilities resulting from a number of investor-state awards (of which it 
has refused to pay), Argentina is currently considering withdrawal from the 
ICSID Convention as well.170  
 
4.4.2 The Continued Development of the Investment Regime 
Despite the perceptions that investment treaty arbitration is being developed 
by a cadre of international lawyers who favor investor-claimants, the end of 
the 2000s indicate that states still largely endorse an international regime on 
the protection of foreign direct investment. While high-profile examples of 
dissatisfaction with the regime may provide some evidence that the regime is 
under strain, they remain fairly isolated in reality. Countries continue to sign 
BITs; and even more interesting is the current upsurge in the negotiation of 
FTAs from all types of states: small, large, developed, developing, capital-
exporting, and capital-importing.  
There were 11 FTAs and 33 BITs signed in 2011,171 and 10 FTAs and 20 BITs 
signed in 2012.172 There also remain active negotiations on treaties that would 
provide protections for significant portions of global foreign direct investment 
flows currently unprotected by the regime. Notable is the ongoing negotiation 
of the US-China BIT.173 As two of the world’s largest exporters and importers 
of foreign capital, the final version of this treaty will be an important signal to 
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the investment treaty regime as it is likely to reflect the balanced or 
recalibrated BIT that opponents of the BIT regime desire; and it may even 
prove to be a template for a future attempt at negotiating a multilateral 
investment treaty.174 With that said, a multilateral investment treaty akin to 
that of the global trading regime remains unlikely in the near future: while the 
approximately 3000 BITs and FTAs creates a significant regime on its face, 
closer inspection reveals that states would have to sign an approximately 9000 
more bilateral treaties to reach the same amount of coverage as the basic WTO 
agreement with its 147 member state signatories.  
In this recent period, the negotiation of BITs has tapered off compared to its 
apex in the 1990s, but the number of awards rendered has not. According to 
Alvarez, 73 percent of the total number of awards rendered in investment 
treaty arbitrations have come in the last five years.175 Combined with both an 
increasing number of legal scholars and academics working specifically on 
investment treaty arbitration issues and many global law firms developing 
large practices for investor-state disputes, the discursive scrutiny of 
investment treaty arbitration is rapidly expanding. The increase in the number 
of cases, the large amounts of money at dispute, and a few high profile cases 
(such as the Chevron v. Ecuador case176) have also brought investment treaty 
arbitration to the attention of a wider array of civil society actors as well.  
While it would be generous to claim that investment treaty arbitration has 
entered an era of general public discourse, it certainly now receives nearly as 
much attention (if not more) as any other area of international law. However, 
while it is true that the number of cases has expanded greatly in the past 
decade, there are indications that this number could certainly continue to rise 
exponentially in the coming decade. There are currently about 350 investor-
state cases that have been resolved with about 100 currently pending.177 While 
this may seem like a large caseload, it pales in comparison to the number of 
potential claims. According to Michael Reisman, a simple calculation of the 
global number of registered multinationals and their subsidiaries is at least 
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180,000.178 This means that the 512 cases to date may be a mere small 
fraction of future claims. This fact may foster additional instability for the 
regime as investor-state arbitration becomes more popular and well-known as 
a means for adjudicating international disputes.  
 
4.4.3 The Annulment of Argentine ICSID Decisions 
However, at this current stage in the development of the regime, the Argentina 
cases continue to stand in the fairness and legitimacy discourse with many of 
the cases decided in the 2000s now moving their way through the ICSID’s 
annulment process.179 Where there was some inconsistency in the early 
awards, the ICSID annulment process180 has produced a wide array of 
decisions that have muddled and confused the jurisprudence considerably.181 
From the perspective of consistency across decisions, the Argentine cases do 
not help the perception that arbitration is an ill-suited dispute settlement 
mechanism for the types of cases these arbitral tribunals are tasked with 
adjudicating. While the annulment process is not an appeals mechanism, it 
appears that annulment committees have nonetheless tried to act as appellate 
bodies in some cases. Famously, the CMS v. Argentine Republic decision on 
annulment criticized much of the original award, but refused to annul it. This 
leaves Argentina having to contemplate paying on an award that is valid, but 
which has been severely undermined by the annulment committee.  
What is more curious, however, is the fact that a number of the annulment 
committees have decided to annul or uphold the original awards according to 
very different reasoning than that which was used in many of the original 
tribunals. This is especially the case in regard to the defense of necessity. 
What is quite astonishing is that, while not all of the early Argentinian awards 
were annulled (and the ones that were annulled gave disparate reasons for 
their decisions), they are fairly consistent in taking a much more sympathetic 
view of the Argentinian position and how it responded to its economic crisis. It 
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appears that the investment arbitration community, and especially the 
arbitrators themselves, are engaged in a form of self-regulating behavior. Why 
is it that the initial awards against Argentina found one way, and five to seven 
years later (and in the midst of a global recession) they found differently? 
While this is an oversimplification of the jurisprudence, it is perhaps a bit 
surprising that so-called ad hoc arbitrators would be concerned with shaping 
and stabilizing the investment regime at all. If these arbitrators saw their role 
as truly one-off and ad hoc adjudicators, it is unlikely that they would be so 
driven to produce a consistent body of jurisprudence over time. And while this 
is not always a clean and tidy process in any adjudicative system, investment 
treaty arbitrators do appear to be engaged in just such a process.  
For critics of the investment treaty regime, the problem with this approach is 
that it is unclear whether states have delegated this authority to arbitrators. 
Detractors of the regime oppose the view about the wide authority of 
arbitrators to develop the regime overall. However, it could be tacitly assumed 
that the underdeveloped and broadly worded protection standards in BITs 
meant that states were not looking for a strictly proscribed principal-agent 
relationship between state parties and arbitrators, but that they were 
proscribing a delegation relationship whereby arbitrators would be entrusted 
to develop and clarify the imprecise standards in BITs.182 A delegation theory 
is helpful for explaining arbitral practice in investor-state cases, but it does 
not explain whether or not this is the approach that states actually endorsed 
when agreeing to dispute settlement mechanisms in BITs and FTA investment 
chapters.  
 
4.4.4 The Focus on Substantive Standards 
In addition to the controversies surrounding the Argentina cases, there are 
also a number of new cases that have drawn scrutiny on the interpretation of 
specific standards of protection in BITs.183 Most typically, one sees recurrent 
focus on most-favored nation (MFN) treatment,184 the standard for analyzing 
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indirect expropriations, the scope of the fair and equitable treatment (FET) 
standard, and the definition of investors and investments under applicable 
BITs.185 What all of these debates have in common are that they relate to an 
underlying ideology about the intended scope of BITs and whether these 
provisions should be read narrowly or expansively.186 Arbitrators have 
addressed the scope of these standards in a variety of ways, fueling the 
discourse about proper interpretation of these provisions under international 
law. With limited exception, arbitrators are increasingly aware of the close 
scrutiny that their awards will receive and therefore provide extensive 
reasoning in their awards. Since the scope of these provisions are rarely 
defined in explicit and specific terms, the interpretations tend to be driven by a 
set of underlying values that arbitrators wish to endorse when rendering their 
decisions. This means that decisions are almost never objectively right or 
wrong, but rather they reflect ideological preferences.  
Take for example the issue of what constitutes an investor. First, it is 
important to note that every BIT is unique. Yes, there are vast similarities in 
standards and language among the BITs, but one must look at the specific 
wording of each BIT and not make far reaching generalizations. The debate 
about what constitutes an investor has been an important topic in the overall 
legitimacy debate because depending on how arbitrators interpret this 
threshold issue will determine whether the tribunal has jurisdiction to hear 
the case at all. A very narrow definition of what constitutes an investor and an 
investment is likely to preclude a large number of claims from being heard. 
This is precisely the goal intended by those who believe that investment treaty 
arbitration should be much more curtailed than its current practice. However, 
investment arbitration appears to be going the opposite direction. In the recent 
case of Abaclat v. Argentina, the tribunal granted jurisdiction over a dispute 
relating to 60,000 Italian bondholders who invested in Argentinian bonds.187 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Investment Treaties. Asian Journal of WTO & International Health Law & Policy. Vol. 3, p. 171; 
Scott Vesel (2007). Clearing a Path Through a Tangled Jurisprudence: Most-Favored-Nation in 
Bilateral Investment Treaties. Yale Journal of International Law. Vol. 32, p. 125. 
185 The definition of investment in BITs has created a large literature. See e.g. Daniella Strik 
(2012). Investment Protection of Sovereign Debt and Its Implications on the Future of Investment 
Law in the EU. Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 29, p. 183; Govert Coppens (2011). 
‘Treaty Definitions of Investment and the Role of Economic Development: A Critical Analysis of 
the Malaysian Historical Salvors Cases,’ in Vivienne Bath & Luke Nottage, eds. Foreign 
Investment and Dispute Resolution Law and Practice in Asia. London, Routledge; Julian 
Mortenson (2010). The Meaning of ‘Investment:’ ICSID's Travaux and the Domain of International 
Investment Law. Harvard International Law Journal Vol. 51, p. 257; Patrick Dumberry (2010). 
The Legal Standing of Shareholders before Arbitral Tribunals: Has Any Rule of Customary 
International Law Crystalised? Michigan State Journal of International Law. Vol. 18, p. 353; 
Mahnoush Arsanjani & Michael Reisman (2010). Interpreting Treaties for the Benefit of Third 
Parties. American Journal of International Law. Vol. 104, p. 597. 
186 August Reinisch (2011). How Narrow are Narrow Dispute Settlement Clauses in Investment 
Treaties? Journal of International Dispute Settlement. Vol. 2, p. 115. 
187 Abaclat & Others v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5). 4 August 2011. Decision 
on Jurisdiction & Admissibility; see also Stacie Strong (2012). Mass Procedures in Abaclat v. 
Argentine Republic: Are They Consistent with the International Investment Regime? University of 
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Not only was there not direct investment in this case, it is the first investment 
treaty case to grant jurisdiction to a mass claim.   
 
4.4.6 The Need for a Standard of Review? 
In addition to the analysis of specific standards, the overall interpretive scope 
granted to arbitrators also continues to be debated. The issue about the public 
nature of the regime and its parallels to administrative law has produced a 
number of scholarly articles and discussions about whether investment treaty 
arbitrators should adopt a formal or informal standard of review.188 In what 
has been described as the next battleground investment treaty arbitration, the 
applicable standard of review used by investment tribunals has varied, and as 
such, a significant discourse on the appropriate standard of review has been 
under discussion for a number of years.  
There are two initial hurdles, however. First, no investment treaties specify a 
standard of review; and second, even if they did, such a standard would have 
to be included in all BITs and FTA investment chapters in order to be 
cohesively applied across thousands of bilateral or plurilateral agreements. 
There are still a number of options available. For example, the US Supreme 
Court has developed a sophisticated standard of review for cases deriving from 
the fourteenth amendment of the US Constitution despite the fact that the 
wording of the amendment is silent on an applicable standard of review. 
Likewise, and more directly applicable to investment treaty arbitration, the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has developed a margin of 
appreciation doctrine as its standard of review through its jurisprudence 
alone.189  
                                                                                                                                                                              
Missouri School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2012-17, available at:  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2083219 (last accessed 1 September 
2013). 
188 Stephen Schill (2012). Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Re-conceptualizing the 
Standard of Review. Journal of International Dispute Settlement. Vol. 3, p. 577; Rahim Moloo & 
Justin Jacinto (2012). ‘Standards of Review and Reviewing Standards: Public Interest 
Regulation in International Investment Law,’ in Karl Sauvant, ed. The Yearbook on International 
Investment Law & Policy, 2011-2012. Oxford, OUP; Carline Foster (2012). Adjudication, 
Arbitration and the Turn to Public Law ‘Standards of Review:’ Putting the Precautionary Principle 
in the Crucible. Journal of International Dispute Settlement. Vol. 3, p. 525; Caroline Henckels 
(2013). Balancing Investment Protection and the Public Interest: The Role of the Standard of 
Review and the Importance of Deference in Investor–State Arbitration. Journal of International 
Dispute Settlement. Vol. 4, p. 197; Anthea Roberts (2011). The Next Battleground: Standards of 
Review in Investment Treaty Arbitration. International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA) 
Series. Vol. 16, p. 170; William Burke-White & Andreas von Staden (2010). Private Litigation in a 
Public Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations. Yale Journal of 
International Law. Vol. 35, p. 1; Alec Stone Sweet (2010). Investor-State Arbitration: 
Proportionality’s New Frontier. Law & Ethics of Human Rights. Vol. 4, p. 1. 
189 Andrew Legg (2012). The Margin of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law: Deference 
and Proportionality. Oxford, OUP. 
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While it is clearly possible for courts to establish and develop standards of 
review, the problem for investment treaty arbitration is the fact that it lacks a 
standing court with authoritative precedent. Absent such an authority, it may 
be difficult to get all investment arbitrators to agree to a specific standard of 
review for ad hoc investment treaty arbitrations that require the interpretation 
of the varied and non-unitary bilateral agreements upon which they must 
render decisions. 
 
4.4.7 The Rise of the System Destroyers 
While the debate among scholars and practitioners on the interpretive scope of 
investment treaties continues, the increasing number of actual awards 
available for analytical reflection is also giving rise to commentators who 
oppose investor-state dispute settlement in all its forms. For these critics, 
viewing the evolution of the investment regime as an increasingly consistent 
rules-based legal order is irrelevant because the very fact that investment 
claims are capable of international adjudication is an untenable premise. 
While some scholars, most notably Jason Webb Yackee,190 have advocated a 
minimalist version of international investment law that would revert to (the 
good old days of?) custom, contracts, and diplomatic protection to manage 
investment disputes, others go much further. In 2010, a large group of 
important international lawyers and academics issued a public statement on 
the international investment regime holding that, inter alia,  
[t]here is a strong moral as well as policy case for governments to withdraw from 
investment treaties and to oppose investor-state arbitration, including by refusal to pay 
arbitration awards against them where an award for compensation has followed from a 
good faith measure that was introduced for a legitimate purpose.191  
While this approach seems to be hypercritical of an international rule of law, it 
specifically targets BITs and investment treaty arbitration. For these scholars, 
investment treaty arbitration is the enemy of the state, and this kind of statist 
perspective is gaining more support, not less, in the current literature from 
both insiders and outsiders. The problem with such a destructive viewpoint is 
that it presents difficulties for any kind of consensus-building. If the entire 
regime is unsalvageable, then there are no reforms or concessions that will be 
tolerated.  
Another prominent stream of criticism about the regime stems from 
accusations that investment treaty arbitration is a regime driven by 
opportunist international lawyers who have sought to build up investment 
treaty arbitration purely as a means of generating profit. A recent report titled 
                                                            
190 Webb Yackee, supra notes 95. 
191 Public Statement on the International Investment Regime, supra note 137. 
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Profiting from Injustice192 claims that investment treaty arbitration is both 
unfair and illegitimate because it is bias in favor of investor-claimants. This is 
nothing new, however. What is new in the report is the evidence showing just 
how dominant a small number of firms and a small number of arbitrators 
have been in shaping this burgeoning field of legal practice. It accuses law 
firms of chasing cases and then charging exorbitant fees to litigate them. The 
report also accuses investment treaty arbitration as being so slanted towards 
investors that it affects the neutrality and independence of arbitrators as well. 
Such a view holds that, since only investor can initiate claims under BITs, 
arbitrators have a vested interest in supporting a pro-investor perspective. 
Because arbitrators want future appointments, they are likely to favor the 
claimant’s position.193  
While the claims in this particular report are hyperbolic and not an accurate 
reflection of the goals that investment treaty arbitration seeks to achieve, it 
nonetheless summarizes many of the ongoing criticisms against the regime. 
However, in attempting to show that the regime is apparently biased, these 
authors have issued a report that is actually biased. All absurdity aside, it is 
important that those with a vested interest in investment treaty arbitration 
world respond to, and take seriously, many of its criticizers if it is to flourish 
as a legitimate form of international adjudication in the coming decades.194  
 
5. SOLVING THE FAIRNESS DEBATE 
Given all of the claims being hurdled against investment treaty arbitration, the 
next question to ask is: what can be done to remedy its perceived 
inadequacies? This is an extremely difficult question given many of the 
structural limitations in the current regime. It is unlikely that any minor 
tweaks will alter current perceptions. There are essentially three broad 
options: 1) make minor reforms but leave the same structure in place, 2) 
completely tear down the regime and eliminate the possibility for investor-state 
disputes, or 3) develop a framework for a multilateral agreement on 
investment that supersedes all of the bilateral agreements currently in place. 
The first option is most likely given the diversity of global interests involved 
and the fact that the largely bilateral structure of investment treaty law would 
be difficult to dismantle completely.  
                                                            
192 Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet (2012). Profiting from Injustice: How Law Firms, Arbitrators, 
and Financiers are Fueling an Investment Arbitration Boom. Brussels, Transnational Institute. 
193 For a counter-position based on empirical research, see Daphna Kapeliuk (2012). Collegial 
Games: Analyzing the Effect of Panel Composition on Outcome in Investment Arbitration. Review of 
Litigation. Vol. 31, p. 267; Daphna Kapeliuk (2010). The Repeat Appointment Factor: Exploring 
Decision Patterns of Elite Investment Arbitrators. Cornell Law Review. Vol. 96, p. 47. 
194 See Toby Landau (2011). Saving Investment Arbitration from Itself. London, Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer Arbitration Lecture, 30 November. 
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To facilitate this first option (or any of the three options for that matter), the 
value perspectives of those knowledgeable about the regime are important. 
While many of the values embedded in the regime are being shaped by the 
discourse already, it is the claim of a theory of configurative fairness that a 
systematic approach to gaining knowledge about the values supported by 
participants in the regime can assist in further refining the fairness discourse 
in investment treaty arbitration. The following Chapter will demonstrate how Q 
methodology can be utilized in the context of the fairness discourse in 
investment treaty arbitration. While this first attempt at analyzing the fairness 
discourse through Q methodology is likely to be viewed as incomplete and not 
definitive, it is hoped that future Q method studies on the value discourse in 
investment treaty arbitration can provide strong empirical evidence about the 
way that decisionmakers ought to develop the rules and principles governing 
investment treaty arbitration in the future.  
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CHAPTER 8 
CONFIGURING FAIRNESS IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBTRATION 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The primary function of a theory of configurative fairness is to generate a 
theoretical frame of inquiry for evaluating subjective value choices in the 
context of evolving legal orders. Such an orientation presupposes that fairness 
can be configured according to what lawmaker and lawtakers of a particular 
legal order consensually value. It also presupposes that the development of the 
law is essentially a process whereby legal principles, norms, and rules are 
dynamic, not static. In this context, a theory of configurative fairness is a vital 
frame of inquiry for organizing developing or evolving legal orders as based on 
considerations of fairness: that is, what participants consider to be fair, not 
what one claims to be objectively just. A legal order achieves fairness if its 
legal rules, principles, procedures, and norms conform with an overlapping 
consensus of the values that its users would endorse.  
However, determining which values should (or do) inform the development of 
legal rules can be a tricky endeavor. As explained in depth in previous 
Chapters, the pursuit of value knowledge is complicated by its subjectivity. 
The goal of a theory of configurative fairness is not in the justification of a set 
of objective values, but in the discovery of shared value subjectivities. The 
fundamental claim of a theory of configurative fairness is that a legal order can 
only be configured fairly once these shared value subjectivities are discovered; 
and discovery of these shared subjectivities requires an empirical methodology 
for uncovering the often unobservable claims, demands, and expectations 
(perspectives) about value that participants and users of a particular legal 
order hold. Since this proposed theory and method for configuring evolving 
legal orders is necessarily general and abstract, it is important to apply it to a 
specific legal regime or system that is currently in a state of evolutionary flux. 
To do this, international investment treaty arbitration has been selected as a 
case for the application of a theory of configurative fairness in practice.  
Investment treaty arbitration is a relatively simple concept, and yet it has been 
one of the more controversial developments in international law over the past 
fifty years. The controversial nature of investment treaty arbitration relates to 
the procedures for its use, the types of claimants and claims that can be 
arbitrated, the scope of the substantive provisions in bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) and free trade agreements (FTAs) with investment chapters that 
can be breached by states, and whether or not investor-state disputes of the 
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type allowed in BITs and FTAs should even be permitted at all.1 As such, 
regime-design2 issues debated in the discourse run the gamut: from very 
specific technical rules about the procedure of investment treaty arbitration to 
broad claims about the overall fairness and legitimacy of the regime in general. 
As a rapidly changing or evolving international legal order, these regime-design 
issues are ideal for the application of Q methodology and a theory of 
configurative fairness. The focus of the Q method study analyzed in this 
Chapter relates to these systemic questions about how such a form of 
international dispute settlement ought to be configured − or designed − as 
perceived through the subjective discourse.  
It is this discursive process about subjective value claims that is focus of this 
work. From a consensus-building perspective, the claims, demands, and 
expectations that legal participants have about the right distribution of value 
are central. However, given the subjective nature of value knowledge, a 
scientific determination of what both lawmakers and lawtakers involved with 
this legal order value can be difficult to ascertain. This is where Q methodology 
studies have the potential to add significant insight. While some objective 
knowledge about investment treaty arbitration can be evaluated in terms of 
actual past practice, making predictions about the future development of the 
investment treaty arbitration legal order requires knowledge about the 
subjective value preferences that decisionmakers and discoursers actually 
endorse. Since these underlying worldviews and perspectives about the 
appropriate distribution of value are often unobservable, a means of making 
this empirically unobservable knowledge observable is the main contribution 
of this work. Through the use of Q methodology, subjective phenomenon can 
be made observable through the discovery of shared subjectivities. By asking 
decisionmakers and discoursers how they believe the rules, norms, principles, 
and procedures of the investment treaty arbitration legal order ought to be 
configured, Q methodology can analyze and map what users of this legal order 
actually value.   
Q methodology can provide a holistic map of individual perspective. In the 
context of investment treaty arbitration, these perspectives influence and 
shape the way that legal problems are approached in both the discourse and 
in legal decisionmaking. Subjective perceptions, whether right or wrong, will 
have a tremendous impact on how one views the way that values ought to be 
configured and distributed. The goal of the Q method study highlighted in this 
                                                            
1 See Chapter 7. 
2 The term regime is being used to differentiate it from a system. It will be used throughout this 
work to refer to particular international legal orders. A legal order described as a regime may be 
less comprehensive and cohesive than a legal order conceived as a system of law. A regime, as 
used in this work, is taken from Stephen Krasner who defines an international regime as: 
“[i]mplicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which 
actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” Stephen Krasner (1983). 
‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,’ in Stephen 
Krasner, ed. International Regimes. Ithaca, Cornell University Press. 
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Chapter is to identify where perspectives on the fairness debates in investment 
treaty arbitration converge and diverge among participants in the study. This 
information will lend insight into how both discoursers and decisionmakers 
view the world holistically in relation to the many issues in investment treaty 
arbitration; and will help develop knowledge about what users of this legal 
order value – and thus consider as fair. Such a purpose presupposes that, 
despite divergent viewpoints and perspectives, there are specific values that 
are endorsed across these perspectives that form an overlapping consensus.3  
It is these overlapping value claims that are most likely to be considered fair 
by all participants and therefore can be used as a foundation for tracking the 
future evolution of the regime. Q methodology, as distinct from surveys or 
questionnaires, requires that participants rank-order subjective statements 
about a topic in relation to each other. When a consensus emerges, it is not a 
reflection of a statement to which participants agreed with in isolation from 
the other statements, but is a reflection of consensus about that statement in 
the context of its relation to other statements in the Q study (a form of 
prioritization). In this way, Q method is a unique methodology that can both 
qualify a statement in terms of agreement or disagreement, but also in terms 
of its priority in relation to other statements.  
While the Q method study will be discussed in detail below, a quick example 
may help set the stage. In the Q method study conducted, the following 
statement situated itself in a similar location on the Q sort matrix across all 
the perspectives that emerged:  
[c]ollegiality demands that arbitrators sitting on three member tribunals reach a 
common view as to how the case should be resolved. Dissenting opinions should always 
be avoided.4  
Across all the diverse perspectives that formed factors in the Q method study, 
this statement was rejected by all the participants and almost exclusively 
placed at the strongly disagree end of the Q sort spectrum. Among those who 
participated in the study, there is a significant overlapping consensus on this 
issue. The questions that will arise in interpreting the results of this Q method 
study will include: what does this mean in terms of value configuration and 
fairness, what is the value that such a statement represents, and does 
reflecting on how to interpret this statement require that the researcher or 
interpreter impose her own subjective perspective on its meaning? Since there 
is a significant interpretive element in any Q method study, these questions 
can only be answered subjectively. However, one of the assets of Q 
methodology is that it provides empirical data that has been suspended in 
time for all to reflect upon. Even if the interpretation that the researcher gives 
                                                            
3 See Chapter 5, Section 4.3.1.2. 
4 See Annex I, Table 2, Statement 3. 
280 
 
 
merely reflects her opinion, the raw data can be viewed by anyone interested 
in looking. The overlapping consensus contained in the statement identified 
above is a scientific reduction of the multiple opinions of the participants 
conducting the study. It is pure subjectivity: that is, the Q sorts used to 
analyze the data in the Q study are a snapshot of each individual’s opinions 
about the subject upon which they were asked to reflect. It is their opinion, 
not the researchers. Therefore, this work has gone to great lengths to provide 
as much of the raw data as possible from the study itself. Even if one 
disagrees with the interpretive analysis, the information can be inspected on 
its own terms, and anybody wishing to look can draw their own conclusions as 
to what the data means.  
The aforementioned statement on collegiality provides a good example of the 
type of work that Q methodology and a theory of configurative fairness seeks 
to accomplish. Yet, it is but one of many ‘surprising facts’5 that emerges from 
the study. The Q method study, titled: Measuring the Immeasurable: Fairness 
Discourse in Investment Treaty Arbitration,6 asks participants knowledgeable 
about investment treaty arbitration to rank-order a set of subjective 
statements about the regime from most agree to most disagree, and in relation 
to each other. This Q sort procedure was conducted according to the following 
condition of instruction:  
[i]n looking to the future of investment treaty arbitration, sort the following statements 
from most agree to most disagree according to your perspective on how a fair legal order 
of this type ought to be configured.7 
The study asked participants to reflect upon forty subjective statements about 
investment treaty arbitration and to place them accordingly in a Q sort matrix.  
The Q sort was conducted through an online tool for the application of Q 
methodology.8 The statements are all subjective in nature and were taken from 
over 10,000 pages of highly-ranked journal articles over a two year period 
between mid-2009 and mid-2011.9 The results of the study produced six 
distinct factors or perspectives that represent shared ways of thinking on the 
topic of fairness in investment treaty arbitration. While it was predicted that a 
                                                            
5 Q Method studies are based on the logic of abduction, and “[a]bduction always begins with the 
detection of a surprising empirical fact.” Simon Watts & Paul Stenner (2012). Doing Q 
Methodological Research: Theory, Method, and Interpretation. London, Sage, p. 39. Abduction, 
which was first formalized by Charles Peirce, “consists in studying the facts and devising a 
theory to explain them.” Charles Peirce (1931 & 1958). Collected Papers, Volume 1 through 8. 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, p. 90. 
6 Measuring the Immeasurable: Fairness Discourse in Investment Treaty Arbitration, available at: 
www.fairnessdiscourse.org (last accessed 1 September 2013). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 The journals selected all ranked highly according to the journal ranking project at the 
Washington and Lee University Law Library. See Law Journals: Submissions & Rankings, 2005-
2012, available at: http://lawlib.wlu.edu/lj (last accessed 1 September 2013). 
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pro-investment treaty arbitration and an anti-investment treaty arbitration 
perspective would emerge, the six perspectives are actually much more 
nuanced and reflect a deep understanding of the regime and its most 
controversial issues. In addition to the six factors or perspectives, the Q 
method study also uncovered a number of additional empirical phenomena 
about the amount of agreement and disagreement across factors. Each of the 
six perspectives will be described, including points of consensus and 
disagreement that emerged across factors.  
This Chapter will proceed as follows. The first section will present a brief 
overview of regime-building or design issues as they relate to investment treaty 
arbitration. This section will attempt to incorporate and synthesize the 
fairness and legitimacy debate highlighted in the previous Chapter, and to 
relate this debate to its role in determining how a legal order such as 
investment treaty arbitration is (or should be) constructed over time. The 
second section will introduce the Q method study and the experimental 
design, including a discussion of the categories from which the study 
statements were selected. The third section will interpret the results of the 
study by providing a distilled narrative of each of the six perspectives that 
emerged. This section will also include a discussion of the points of consensus 
and disagreement across factors and how such knowledge can be used to 
configure fairness in investment treaty arbitration. While the Q method study 
provides very interesting results, this work is intended to present an idea 
about how subjective perceptions can be measured in a manner that permits 
analytical and empirical insight in jurisprudential thought. Therefore, while 
the outcomes of this Q method study may provide useful empirical knowledge 
about the fairness discourse in investment treaty arbitration, humility requires 
that the outcomes of the Q method study should not be taken as definitive 
answers about the questions posed, but rather, as a first try at the 
advancement of social scientific knowledge in this area.  
 
2. REGIME-BUILDING AND INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 
The purpose of this application of a theory of configurative fairness is aimed at 
the design issues relating to the development of investment treaty arbitration, 
and how value knowledge can be used to build consensus on many of 
investment treaty arbitrations most difficult issues. To do this, one must be 
able to reflect on the values endorsed by the procedural mechanisms of 
investment treaty arbitration, but also on the substantive laws that are eligible 
for arbitration under investment treaties. In addition to the provisions 
provided in BITs, this also includes broader principles of general international 
law and customary international law. It also, in many cases, requires 
arbitrators to make inquiries into the compatibility of national law with that of 
international law. The subject-matter derived from the substantive provisions 
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in specific investment treaties therefore often requires both a vertical and 
horizontal extension of scope outward from these treaties: vertically, between 
the relationship of international law and national law, and horizontally, 
between the relationship of international investment law and other areas of 
international law.  
The question for a theory of configurative fairness is how best to configure the 
scope and operation of investment treaty arbitration in the so-called BIT 
generation.10 Most, but not all, BITs and FTAs with investment chapters, 
include dispute settlement provisions; and these dispute settlement 
provisions, while not uniform, generally grant an investor with home state 
nationality with a standing offer to arbitrate a dispute against the state 
hosting the investment. Normally, and unlike traditional diplomatic espousal 
cases, the home state is not involved at all in the dispute. Once initiated, 
arbitrators are selected, and are called upon to decide upon both the 
jurisdictional and substantive claims against the host state.  
In looking to design an international adjudicative regime, a number of 
important issues arise: 1) should arbitrators, as opposed to judges, be vested 
with the power to decide cases arising out of investment treaties, 2) are 
investor-state arbitrations a better model of international dispute settlement 
than that of diplomatic protection, 3) how ought arbitrators decide the case 
before them, 4) what is the interpretive scope of their mandate, 5) should 
international adjudicative mechanisms be permitted to pierce the veil of a 
sovereign state in order to reflect on the regulatory choices that states make, 
and 6)are their better procedures for resolving these types of disputes?  
Answers to these questions all turn on the perspectives of value distribution 
(and hence fairness) that human beings involved in this legal order hold. These 
value perspectives, in turn, influence and motivate the way that human 
decisionmakers approach these adjudicative design issues. Some of these 
value considerations are moral or ethical, some are political, and some are 
merely cognitive or epistemic. They are all subjective. A theory of configurative 
fairness seeks to understand where these subjectivities are shared, and to 
configure legal orders according to the subjective value distribution claims 
that its users would endorse.  
Someone who holds a particular vision of the political value of democracy in 
high esteem may also hold that the delegation of dispute resolution to a panel 
of unelected arbitrators is a derogation of a value that they strongly believe in. 
Likewise, someone who believes in the cognitive values of consistency and 
coherence as a fundamental value for any system of law may want these 
values to take precedence in designing any system of adjudication, even if it is 
                                                            
10 See Michael Reisman & Robert Sloane (2004). Indirect Expropriation and its Valuation in the 
BIT Generation. British Yearbook of International Law. Vol. 75, p. 115. 
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to the detriment of other values. And the list goes on and on. The first step for 
a theory of configurative fairness is to identify these value choices and to 
determine where and when they are shared. Sometimes these value positions 
will become intractable situations that are unresolvable. But it is the basic 
claim of a theory of configurative fairness that value claims, while subjective, 
are identifiable, and that once they are identified, they can be used to build 
consensus on many of the most complicated and difficult design issues in 
jurisprudential thought.  
All of the major structural issues listed above present many challenges for how 
the rules and procedures of investment treaty arbitration ought to be 
configured. And yet, there is no simple formula that would provide the correct 
answer. In seeking a consensus that would result in a fair configuration of 
investment treaty arbitration, the subjective voices of its proponents and 
opponents must be amenable to empirical analysis. Looking at the discourse 
without the assistance of Q methodology may produce claims that the various 
ideological positions of the discoursers would prevent a consensus from ever 
forming. For example, the discoursers who believe that the investment treaty 
regime is ‘rigged’ against the interests of developing states and that such a 
system only reinforces neocolonial imperialism, it is difficult to see how an 
underlying value consensus about the regime’s future could ever develop. 
However, this is precisely where the scientific study of subjectivity can 
advance knowledge about legal regime consensus. It may be that these 
dissenters about the investment treaty arbitration regime are mere outliers, or 
that contrary to even their own beliefs, they have compatible and overlapping 
value preferences with the most ardent supporters of the regime. In fact, the 
analysis of the Q method study described below does indicate that such latent, 
possible unconscious, value perspectives do exist in the discourse.  
The policy-orientated perspective of the New Haven school tells us that law, as 
the ongoing process of legal decisionmaking, is a reflection of the subjective 
value distribution in any given legal context.11 In order to be both authoritative 
and controlling, this means that power alone is usually not enough to compel 
action. Consensus-building requires that the value claims made by both 
lawmakers and lawtakers of any evolving legal order must reflect an 
overlapping consensus or balance about the distribution of value; and that if 
this can be achieved, there is a great likelihood that the legal order will be 
viewed as legitimate and fair by decisionmakers and discoursers alike. 
  
                                                            
11 See Chapter 4, Section 4. 
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3. THE Q METHOD STUDY ON INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 
The Q method study on configuring fairness in investment treaty arbitration 
attempts to distill the multiple issues under debate in regard to the overall 
regime-design in a way that permits participants in the study to reflect 
comprehensively and holistically about how they believe the future investment 
treaty regime ought to be configured. So while a participant may have 
dedicated views on, say for example, the theoretical scope of most favored 
nation (MFN) clauses found in BITs, this study asks participants to announce 
that view in the context of all of the other issues also under debate. This will 
permit the researcher to evaluate where such a theoretical orientation fits in 
with one’s overall viewpoint or perspective about the appropriate value 
distribution for the regime as a whole. Q methodology allows for a holistic view 
of a participant’s opinion by focusing on the priorities that one gives to a 
statement in a Q sort as relative to all of the other statements in the Q sort. 
These individual Q sorts can then be correlated to determine where, and if, a 
consensus across Q sorts is determinable after subjecting these Q sorts to 
factor analysis.12 The shared perspectives that emerge are called the factors. 
These factors describe where statements placed in Q sorts cluster across 
individuals.  
In this study, 45 participants completed the Q sort. After factor analyzing 
these Q sorts collectively, six perspectives or factors emerged that constitute 
49 percent of the total study variance.13 As a tool of data reduction,14 it is 
apparent then that this Q methodology study effectively reduced the 45 
individual perspectives down to six collective perspectives or factors that 
reflect shared thinking on this particular topic. For the purposes of this study, 
the most interesting data that emerged relates to the consensus across factors 
or perspectives.15 So while each perspective constitutes a shared subjective, or 
consensual, way of thinking about regime-building issues in investment 
treaty, the Q method study also identified shared or consensual thinking 
across factors or perspectives.  
All of this information is particularly useful in determining how the future 
design of investment treaty arbitration can reflect ideas and values endorsed 
by both decisionmakers and discoursers knowledgeable about the regime. In 
the following sections, each of the component parts of a Q method study will 
be described. This will culminate in an interpretive exercise that summarize 
each of the six perspectives, and how each perspective can be seen as 
representing a particular value orientation. While the six perspectives provide 
interesting results on their own, the primary purpose of the study is to 
                                                            
12 For a description of the process of factor analyzing the data for a Q sort study, see Chapter 6, 
Section 3.4. 
13 See Table 2 of this Chapter. 
14 See Chapter 6, Section 3.4. 
15 See Section 3.4.8 of this Chapter. 
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determine if there is an overlapping value consensus that emerges across 
perspectives. If there is agreement across perspectives on particular issues 
(and the value claims, demands, and expectations that they represent), then it 
is proposed that these points of consensus can provide a way forward on 
determine how investment treaty arbitration ought to develop into the future. 
 
3.1 The Participants in the Study 
The study includes 45 participants (the P set) with knowledge and expertise in 
investment treaty arbitration. While the identification of the participants 
remains anonymous,16 they are primarily drawn from individual requests to 
participate and from a general invitation submitted to the OGEMID listserv.17 
Not all of the participants volunteered demographic information, but a vast 
majority did. The exact demographic breakdown of the participants is included 
in Annex I,18 but a summary is included here.  
The gender of the 45 participants in the study includes the following: 30 male 
and 15 female. The age of the participants breaks down as follows: 7 
participants are under 30, 29 participants are between 30 and 45, six 
participants are between 45 and 60, and three participants are over 60.19 The 
participants come from the following professions: two are arbitrators, eight are 
academics, 17 are practitioners, seven are doctor of philosophy (PhD) 
candidates, and 11 did not state a profession.20 The participants hail from the 
following geographic locales: ten from North America, three from Latin 
America, six from Europe, one from the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), two from Africa, three from Australasia, five from South-East Asia, one 
from South Asia, and eight participants did not state a location.21 All 
participants have expertise in international law, 30 have expertise in 
international investment law and investor-state arbitration, 29 have expertise 
in international commercial arbitration, seven are knowledgeable about 
international trade law, and five have expertise in human rights and 
environmental law.22  
While 45 participants is a significant number of respondents for a Q method 
study, it is important to note that in this particular Q method study the 
number of participants was not ideal. The majority of the participants come 
                                                            
16 See the confidentiality agreement required for participation in the Q method study, available 
at: www.fairnessdiscourse.org (last accessed 1 September 2013). 
17 The OGEMID (Oil, Gas, Energy, Mining, & Investment Disputes) listserv, founded by over ten 
years ago by the late Thomas Wälde, is a discussion group of more than 700 practitioners and 
academics focused in the area of international and transnational dispute resolution. 
18 See Annex I, Table 1. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
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from academic or legal practice backgrounds.23 There is a dearth of 
participants from government and the business community. These two sectors 
are particularly important in investment treaty arbitration because they 
constitute the actual litigants in the process. There are also a limited number 
of arbitrators who participated in the study, and none of the prominent 
investment treaty arbitrators participated.  
It would have been preferable if there had been a balance among participants 
that included arbitrators, governments, and business in addition to academics 
and practitioners. Given this shortcoming, it is possible that the results of the 
Q method study primarily reflect the views of academics and practitioners. 
There is always an element of self-interest involved in the evaluation of 
perspectives. This means that it is likely that the outlook, concerning the 
regime-building questions in investment treaty arbitration, is distinct among 
these different groups. However, with that said, it is interesting to note that 
there is no apparent correlation between academics and practitioners and the 
way that they configured the individual Q sorts in the study. That is, while it 
may have been predicted that academics would have particular perspectives 
distinct from those of practitioners, the study did not reflect such assumed 
distinctions. None of the six factors (perspectives) uncovered in the Q method 
study were dominated by a particular group of professionals. This is a good 
indication that the views about investment treaty arbitration cannot be based 
on the particular profession that an expert in this area of law comes from. 
 
3.2 The Concourse and the Q Set 
The 45 participants were given 40 statements (the Q set) on issues in 
investment treaty arbitration to rank-order according to the condition of 
instruction highlighted in the introductory section of this Chapter.24 The 
statements were selected verbatim from over 10,000 pages of journal articles 
published between mid-2009 and mid-2011.25 The 40 statements chosen 
constitute the Q set, and these statements were selected from a concourse of 
over 1000 statements taken from the aforementioned journal articles.26 The 40 
statements reflect most, but not all, of the issues under debate in investment 
treaty arbitration. Many deal with fairness and legitimacy directly, but some 
deal with debates about more technical issues in the regime.27  
Since the selection of statements is in and of itself a subjective enterprise, the 
experimental design technique employed assists in reducing the possibility for 
                                                            
23 Id. 
24 See supra note 7. 
25 See Law Journals: Submissions & Rankings, 2005-2012, supra note 9. 
26 The list of the 1000 statements is on file with the author. 
27 See Section 3.2.1 through Section 3.2.8 below. 
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a one-sided or unbalanced selection of statements.28 While some critics of Q 
methodology may hold that the selection of statements can skew the results, it 
is a fundamental premise of the theory underling Q methodology that the 
concourse itself is meaningless.29 What is of interest for Q methodology is the 
way that the statements are given meaning through the process of sorting 
them.30 When looking to analyze the results of a Q method study, the first 
instinct is to gravitate to where participants have placed certain statements in 
the Q sort matrix. This is absolutely the wrong approach. If this were the 
correct approach, there would be nothing to distinguish Q methodology from 
that of questionnaires or surveys. Q method holds that the most important 
aspect of the study rests on how the individual Q sorter gives meaning to the 
statements in the context of the other statements. This requires that the 
interpretation of the factor arrays for each perspective is approached 
holistically as a comprehensive viewpoint about the statements as a whole.  
The statements selected attempt to provide a balanced and comprehensive 
universe of viewpoints and perspectives about a wide array of issues relating 
to investment treaty arbitration, and the value distribution claims that each 
statement represents. They have been divided into eight categories, with five 
statements allocated to each category. The eight categories include the 
following: public or private, investors versus states, arbitrators versus judges, 
evolution or devolution, bilateral versus multilateral, types of claims and 
claimants, interpretive scope, and substantive issues. The complete list of the 
statements used in the study are given in the following eight sub-sections 
below. 
 
3.2.1 Public or Private 
(Statement 4) The Argentine government has rightly pondered the domestic 
political viability of paying on an award that an annulment committee has 
delegitimized. If the annulment committee did not intend to kill the CMS 
award, it should not have wounded it so severely.31 
                                                            
28 For a discussion of the experimental design issues relating to the selection of statements in Q 
method studies, see Chapter 6, Section 3.2; see also Steven Brown (1980). Political Subjectivity: 
Applications of Q methodology in Political Science. New Haven, Yale University Press, pp. 186-91. 
29 William Stephenson (1988). The Quantumization of Psychological Events. Operant Subjectivity. 
Vol. 12, pp. 1, 9. 
30 See Chapter 6, Section 2.1. 
31 Dohyun Kim (2011). The Annulment Committee's Role in Multiplying Inconsistency in ICSID 
Arbitration: The Need to Move Away from an Annulment-Based System. New York University Law 
Review. Vol. 86, pp. 242, 275. 
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(Statement 10) Increasing transparency and opening the doors to third-party 
amicus interveners in investor-state arbitration could potentially ‘re-politicize’ 
disputes and lead to the arbitration becoming a ‘court of public opinion.’32 
(Statement 31) The search for predictability and coherence in any legal system 
can quickly start one down a very short road to a loss of legitimacy if it results 
in a lack of attention to the fundamental economic and political purposes and 
social values used to justify the system.33 
(Statement 36) Litigants in investor-state disputes want fairness much less 
than they want victory.34 
(Statement 37) When investment tribunals get it wrong, neither states nor 
investors have any meaningful recourse to a review mechanism. Investment 
treaty arbitration needs a permanent appellate body with a broader scope of 
review than the current ICSID [International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes] annulment process.35 
 
3.2.2 Investors Versus States 
(Statement 5) Although the exhaustion of local remedies rule is well 
established in the context of diplomatic protection, investment treaties are 
different, and arbitrators have rightly interpreted most of them as eliminating 
the rule. The decision to do away with the rule in investor-state arbitration 
was made consciously and for good reasons.36 
(Statement 16) Umbrella clauses in BITs should be recast to place strong 
reciprocal obligations on investors that requiring them to observe 
commitments made to the host state. These clauses should be structured to 
allow the host state to invoke the clause as a counterclaim or even to initiate a 
BIT arbitration against the investor.37 
                                                            
32 Eugenia Levine (2011). Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: The Implications 
of an Increase in Third-Party Participation. Berkeley Journal of International Law. Vol. 29, pp. 
200, 220. 
33 Alan Sawn (2010). NAFTA Chapter 11 – ‘Direct Effect’ and Interpretive Method: Lessons from 
Methanex v. United States. University of Miami Law Review. Vol. 21, pp. 21, 34. 
34 Jan Paulsson (2010). The Power of States to Make Meaningful Promises to Foreigners. Journal 
of International Dispute Settlement. Vol. 1, pp. 341, 349. 
35 William Park (2009). Arbitrator Integrity: The Transient and the Permanent. San Diego Law 
Review. Vol. 46, pp. 629, 661. 
36 George Foster (2011). Striking a Balance Between Investor Protections and National 
Sovereignty: The Relevance of Local Remedies in Investment Treaty Arbitration. Columbia Journal 
of Transnational Law. Vol. 49, pp. 201, 211-12, 251. 
37 Megan Shaffer (2011). Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Friend or Foe to Human Rights? Denver 
Journal of International Law & Policy. Vol. 39, pp. 483, 511.  
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(Statement 17) A state should be entitled to adopt precautionary regulations to 
protect against potential health or environmental threats, but where there is 
only limited scientific evidence supporting a health or environmental measure, 
the state – and not the investor – should bear the costs of adopting that 
measure.38 
(Statement 18) A state’s decision to invoke ‘essential security’ to justify a 
measure, even if detrimental to a foreign investor’s rights, should be a self-
judging action that renders an investor’s arbitration claim inadmissible.39 
(Statement 34) Those who challenge the legitimacy of international 
adjudication aim at the wrong target. They criticize the principle of the 
supremacy of international law when their real complaint has to do with the 
political choices of their own government in making the bargains reflected in 
international treaties.40 
 
3.2.3 Arbitrators or Judges 
(Statement 3) Collegiality demands that arbitrators sitting on three member 
tribunals reach a common view as to how the case should be resolved. 
Dissenting opinions should always be avoided.41 
(Statement 7) Conflicting precedent is part of the system building exercise that 
investor-state tribunals engage in; divergence in awards does not need to be 
seen as defying the concept of a coherent and uniform system, but rather is 
part of the evolution towards a jurisprudence constante.42 
(Statement 15) The range of important issues in international investment law 
on which academics disagree, and on which arbitrations have reached 
conflicting decisions, are not the temporary ‘growing pains’ of a system rapidly 
approaching coherence, but are the product of a much deeper conflict of 
interests.43 
                                                            
38 Rahim Moloo & Justin Jacinto (2011). Environmental and Health Regulation: Assessing 
Liability Under Investment Treaties. Berkeley Journal of International Law. Vol. 29, pp. 1, 30.  
39 Jose Alvarez (2011). The Return of the State. Minnesota Journal of International Law. Vol. 20, 
pp. 223, 237. 
40 Paulsson, supra note 34 at p. 349. 
41 David Schneiderman (2010) Judicial Politics and International Investment Arbitration: Seeking 
an Explanation for Conflicting Outcomes. Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business. 
Vol. 30, pp. 383, 406. 
42 Stephan Schill (2011). System-Building in Investment Treaty Arbitration and Lawmaking. 
German Law Journal. Vol. 12, pp. 1083, 1105. 
43 Alex Mills (2011). Antinomies of Public and Private at the Foundations of International 
Investment Law and Arbitration. Journal of International Economic Law. Vol. 14, pp. 469, 476. 
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(Statement 35) It is far from clear that the fear of arbitrator bias derives from 
governments and investors as opposed to pundits and academics.44 
(Statement 40) The awards of many investor-state tribunals indicate that 
ideological preferences drive decision-making, rather than treaty text or legal 
norms.45 
 
3.2.4 Evolution or Devolution 
(Statement 11) The rejection of ICSID is a phenomenon that seems to be 
limited to a minority of states and can be explained more by the countries’ 
internal political situation rather than a more widespread view of a lack of 
legitimacy.46 
(Statement 22) A shift to a default ‘loser pays’ rule in investor-state 
arbitrations that awards costs to victorious respondents could only be seen as 
foreclosing access to this type of justice for smaller companies.47 
(Statement 28) When BITs prescribe treating the foreign investor in accordance 
with customary international law, they should be understood to mean the 
standard of international law embodied in the terms of some two thousand 
concordant BITs.48 
(Statement 33) There is a strong moral as well as policy case for governments 
to withdraw from investment treaties and to oppose investor-state arbitration, 
including a refusal to pay arbitration awards against them.49 
(Statement 39) The ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard in BITs is an 
independent treaty standard that does more than merely restate customary 
international law. If states wanted the international minimum standard to be 
applied to their investment treaties, they would have opted to incorporate that 
standard expressis verbis.50 
                                                            
44 Park, supra note 35 at p. 634. 
45 Schneiderman, supra note 41 at p. 402. 
46 Susan Franck (2011). The ICSID Effect? Considering Potential Variations in Arbitration Awards. 
Virginia Journal of International Law. Vol. 51, pp. 825, 848. 
47 David Smith (2011). Shifting Sands: Cost-and-Fee Allocation in International Investment 
Arbitration. Virginia Journal of International Law. Vol. 51, pp. 749, 760. 
48 Patrick Dumberry (2010). Are BITs Representing the ‘New’ Customary International Law in 
International Investment Law? Penn State International Law Review. Vol. 28, pp. 675, 681. 
49 Franck, supra note 46 at pp. 825, 847. 
50 Candice Wyllie (2010). A Comparative Analysis of Nondiscrimination in Multilateral 
Agreements; North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), and 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Willamette Journal of International Law & 
Dispute Resolution. Vol. 18, pp. 64, 99. 
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3.2.5 Bilateral Versus Multilateral 
(Statement 2) BIT partners turn to the US Model BIT with the equivalent of an 
IMF gun pointed at their heads. For many, a BIT relationship is hardly a 
voluntary, uncoerced transaction.51 
(Statement 13) New proposals for a comprehensive multilateral investment 
agreement would likely succumb to the same shortcomings that thwarted 
previous efforts.52 
(Statement 24) An MFN clause in a basic treaty cannot be relied upon by the 
investor to expand the jurisdiction of an international tribunal. Jurisdiction in 
the basic treaty cannot be rewritten before the commencement of proceedings 
by reference to the provisions of a third treaty.53 
(Statement 32) The term ‘treatment’ in MFN clauses is in itself wide enough to 
be applicable to procedural matters such as dispute settlement.54 
(Statement 38) Rightly or wrongly, arbitral tribunals and MFN clauses are 
developing the aggregate of bilateral investment treaties into a functional 
substitute for a multilateral investment instrument.55 
 
3.2.6 Types of Claims and Claimants 
(Statement 6) An ‘objective’ test for defining an investment under the ICSID 
Convention is the correct approach. There is an objective limitation to ICSID 
jurisdiction separate from that to which the parties have consented.56 
(Statement 20) The dissenting opinion on jurisdiction in Tokios Tokelės was 
correct. The ICSID Convention should protect all genuinely international 
investments but, by the same token, only genuinely international investments. 
This was actually a domestic dispute between the Ukrainian state and a 
Ukrainian investor.57 
                                                            
51 José Alvarez (2011). Book Review of the Multilateralization of International Investment Law by 
Stephan W. Schill. American Journal of International Law. Vol. 105, pp. 377, 381. 
52 Kate Supnik (2009). Making Amends: Amending the ICSID Convention to Reconcile Competing 
Interests in International Investment Law. Duke Law Journal. Vol. 59, pp. 343, 345-46. 
53 Zachary Douglas (2011). The MFN Clause in Investment Arbitration: Treaty Interpretation Off 
the Rails? Journal of International Dispute Settlement. Vol. 2, pp. 97, 100. 
54 August Reinisch (2011). How Narrow are Narrow Dispute Settlement Clauses in Investment 
Treaties? Journal of International Dispute Settlement. Vol. 2, pp. 115, 145. 
55 Schill, supra note 42 at p. 1109. 
56 Kim, supra note 31 at p. 265. 
57 James Crawford (2010). Ten Investment Arbitration Awards that Shook the World: Introduction 
and Overview. Dispute Resolution International. Vol. 4, pp. 71, 83. 
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(Statement 21) It is beyond doubt that shareholders do, and should, have 
standing in ICSID disputes to submit claims separate and independent from 
the claims of the corporation. This principle applies to all shareholders, no 
matter whether or not they own the majority of the shares or control the 
corporation.58 
(Statement 25) For all practical purposes, the ‘investment’ screen of the ICSID 
Convention should have no bite. There is not a single pending or concluded 
case that should be – or should have been – excluded on this ground.59 
(Statement 29) The rise of the restrictive approach to the definition of 
investment may well be related to the broader backlash against investment 
arbitration – certainly the timing of the two developments overlaps rather 
neatly.60 
 
3.2.7 Interpretive Scope 
(Statement 1) A teleological method of interpretation of a BIT provision that 
would result in the implementation of a treaty’s purpose in a manner not 
contemplated by the parties must always be rejected as contrary to the parties’ 
intention.61 
(Statement 9) If umbrella clauses truly were intended to have such significant 
scope to protect investors, it seems suspicious that no investor had sought the 
protection of one for five decades.62 
(Statement 19) Investors should never expect that the circumstances 
prevailing at the time the investment is made will remain totally unchanged. 
To determine whether frustration of the investor’s expectations was justified, 
the host state’s right to subsequently regulate domestic matters in the public 
interest must also be taken into consideration.63 
                                                            
58 Patrick Dumberry (2010). The Legal Standing of Shareholders before Arbitral Tribunals: Has 
any Rule of Customary International Law Crystallised? Michigan State Journal of International 
Law. Vol. 18, pp. 353, 354. 
59 Julian Mortenson (2010). The Meaning of ‘Investment:’ ICSID's Travaux and the Domain of 
International Investment Law. Harvard International Law Journal Vol. 51, pp. 257, 261. 
60 Id. at p. 313. 
61 Shaffer, supra note 37 at p. 503. 
62 Jonathan Potts (2011). Stabilizing the Role of Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment 
Treaties: Intent, Reliance, and Internationalization. Virginia Journal of International Law. Vol. 51, 
pp. 1005, 1032. 
63 Mills, supra note 43 at p. 493. 
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(Statement 23) Every international convention must be deemed tacitly to refer 
to general principles of international law for all questions which it does not 
itself resolve in express terms and in a different way.64 
(Statement 26) Human rights law and investment law have many similarities; 
they are both aimed at legal protection of individual rights by means of legal 
and judicial restraints on government powers.65 
 
3.2.8 Substantive Issues 
(Statement 8) An investor cannot establish an investment treaty breach based 
on a denial of justice claim if there exists any available domestic legal 
mechanism for having such conduct reviewed and corrected, which the 
investor failed to invoke.66 
(Statement 12) While an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons 
may be classified as a taking for a public purpose, and thus may be legitimate 
and legal, the fact that the property was taken for this reason does not affect 
either its nature or the measure of the compensation to be paid for the 
taking.67 
(Statement 14) The level of due diligence required under the ‘full protection 
and security’ standard in BITs should depend on the host state’s development 
and stability. The availability of resources may have a decisive impact on a 
state’s ability to provide protection and security.68 
(Statement 27) Umbrella clauses were not designed to produce a thin sliver of 
security, akin to a friendly reminder of the host state’s other obligations under 
the treaty. Rather, the intent was to create a system where at least certain 
straightforward breaches of contract could be redressed in an international 
forum.69 
(Statement 30) Fork-in-the-road clauses should always be interpreted 
narrowly, so as to only preclude attempts to re-litigate the exact same claim 
against the exact same opponent.70 
                                                            
64 Douglas, supra note 58 at p. 100. 
65 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (2009). International Rule of Law and Constitutional Justice in 
International Investment Law and Arbitration. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies. Vol. 16, 
pp. 513, 523. 
66 Foster, supra note 36 at p. 238. 
67 Moloo & Jacinto, supra note 30 at p. 30. 
68 Christoph Schreuer (2010). Full Protection and Security. Journal of International Dispute 
Settlement. Vol. 1, pp. 353, 367. 
69 Potts, supra note 62 at p. 1033. 
70 Foster, supra note 36 at p. 207. 
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3.3 The Analysis of the Study 
The Q method study on configuring fairness in investment treaty arbitration 
asked the 45 participants to sort 40 statements according to the condition of 
instruction highlighted in a previous section of this Chapter. Each participant 
was asked to sort these statements and place them in a single box in the Q 
sort matrix according to the condition of instruction. A copy of the Q sort 
matrix is reproduced in Figure 1 below. The configuration of the matrix 
includes a spectrum of seven columns: from the statements that the 
participant most disagreed with on the far left (-3) to statements that the 
participant most agreed with at the far right (+3). Each statement is given a 
number. Where that number is placed in the Q sort then determines how it 
will be analyzed through the factor analytical process. Each statement is given 
a score within each individual Q sort. That score corresponds with the 
numbers in the columns in Figure 1 below.71 These scores for each of the 40 
statements are then correlated with the way that all other participants 
configured the statements in their individual Q sorts. Q methodology uses 
factor analysis to look for patterns among the participants in the study. In 
other words, each of the six perspectives produced in this study are a 
reflection of six similar patterns of statement configurations among 
participants in the study.  
The 45 participants in the Q method study completed the individual Q sorts 
online.72 The data from these Q sorts was compiled on a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet and then entered into the statistical program specifically designed 
for analysis of Q method studies, PQMethod.73 This program factor analyzes 
the individual Q sorts and produces output files that correlate all the 
information provided in the individual Q sorts. The outcome file generated a 
six factor solution for the Q study.74 These six factors explained 49 percent of 
the total study variance.75 All six factors have an eigenvalue above one, which 
means that the factor correlates with more than one individual Q sort.76 
Hence, all six factors represent shared perspectives among the individual Q 
                                                            
71 Two statements will be given a score of -3, six statements will be given a score of -2, and so 
on. 
72 See Measuring the Immeasurable: Fairness Discourse in Investment Treaty Arbitration, supra 
note 6. 
73 PQMethod, available at: http://schmolck.userweb.mwn.de/qmethod (last accessed 1 
September 2013). 
74 The outcome data is on file with the author. 
75 “Statistically speaking, [the sum of all the Q sorts in the study is] 100% – the full range of 
meaning and variability in the study – [and] is known as the study variance. [emphasis in 
original].” See Watts & Stenner, supra note 5 at p. 98. In this study, the six factors explain 49 
percent of that total universe of variability.  
76 The eigenvalue is the sum of squared factor loadings for each factor. It signifies the amount of 
variance among Q sorts that a particular factor represents. Generally speaking, a factor with an 
eigenvalue below one is considered insignificant because such a factor would represent less 
variance than is contained in a single individual Q sort. Since Q methodology looks for shared 
patterns of thought across participants, a factor with an eigenvalue below one are normally 
discarded. 
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sorts. All of the factors represent configurations of the individual Q sort data 
by more than one individual Q sort.  
Below, in Table 1, the Q sorts that loaded on each of the factors are 
delineated.77 For example, Factor (Perspective) 1 explains individual Q sort 
numbers 1, 2, 7, 14, 21, 29, 36, and 42. All of these Q sorts correlated with 
Factor 1 in a statistically significant manner. That is, a statistically significant 
correlation for this Q sort is one that correlates at 41 percent.78  The Q sorts 
marked in bold are individual Q sorts that highly correlated with Factor 1. A 
highly correlated Q sort (marked in bold) is one that correlates with this factor 
above 60 percent.79 These highly correlated factors were used in creating the 
factor estimate for each factor.80 The factor estimate is an average of all of the 
items in the individual Q sorts that highly correlated with that factor. These 
factor estimates allow the researcher to reproduce a single Q sort 
configuration that exemplifies the factor.81  
 
Figure 1: Q Sort Configuration 
← Most Disagree                                                                                                 Most Agree →       
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
The factor array “is not more or less than a single Q sort configured to 
represent the viewpoint of a particular factor [emphasis in original].”82 Each of 
the factor arrays for the six factors is reproduced in Table 6 of Annex I. The 
factor array for each factor shows where that factor placed each of the 
statements in the Q sort matrix. In addition, each of the factor arrays is given 
                                                            
77 This Table is also included in Annex I, Table 3. The Table provided in Annex I provides 
additional information that is not included in the Table provided in this Chapter. 
78 Each number in the matrix represents the percentage that the configuration of each 
individual Q sort correlates with each of the six defined factors that have been extracted. The 
calculation for determining whether an individual Q sort significantly correlates with one or 
more of the factors is the following: 2.58 x (1/√number of items in the Q set). For this study, 
this equates to 2.58 x (1/√40) = 0.41. 
79 Any individual Q sort with a percentage above 60 percent indicates a highly correlated sort. 
These sorts, denoted in bold, are the sorts used in constructing the factor estimates and factor 
arrays for each of the six factors. 
80 See Chapter 6, Section 3.4. 
81 This is called the factor array. See Chapter 6, Section 3.4.  
82 Watts & Stenner, supra note 5 at p. 139. 
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individually in Tables 8 through 13 of Annex I. These tables give the relative 
position of each statement along the +3 to -3 spectrum. It also includes the 
standardized or Z scores for each statement in the factor array. The Z scores 
show how much weight the correlated individual Q sorts gave to each 
statement in the factor array.83 These Z scores allow the data to be compiled 
from most agreed to least agreed among all 40 statements.84 Tables 8 through 
13 in Annex I provide the raw data from which the perspective narratives in 
the following section were developed. 
In Table 2 below, one can see that Factors 1 and 2 had the highest number of 
individual Q sorts that correlate with these particular factors. These two 
factors also explain the highest percent of variance among all the Q sorts. For 
example, of all the data compiled through the 45 Q sorts, Factor 1 explains 12 
percent of the total variability. In plain terms, this means that Factor 1 is 
indicative of the perspective of a significant number of individuals who 
completed the Q sort in this study. Factor 5, on the other hand, explains 
much less of the total variance (six percent), and only two individual Q sorts 
loaded significantly on that factor.85 In Q methodology, the numbers are 
important because not all factors will have equal weight or importance. If one 
is looking to determine shared perspectives – or shared modes of thought – on 
a particular topic, it should be apparent that Factor 1 is indicative of more 
sharing than Factor 5.  
In addition to the six factors, Table 1 below also highlights two additional 
categories: 1) Q sorts that are confounded and 2) Q sorts that did not load 
significantly on any factor. A confounded Q sort means that that it loaded 
significantly on more than two factors. Normally, these Q sorts are not used in 
the creating the factor estimate or factor arrays for each of the perspective.86 
However, these Q sorts should not be considered as unique or necessarily 
atypical. The individual Q sorts that did not load significantly on any of the 
factors (the not significant category in Table 2 below) is indicative of an 
individual Q sort that is unique or atypical. They do not share perspectives 
with any of the other individuals who completed the study. 
A generous amount of data is provided in Annex I. The Tables in Annex I 
provide detailed information derived from the output files generated by 
PQMethod. Table 4 of Annex I provides the correlation matrix of the final 
rotated six factor solution. As explained in the Chapter on Q methodology, the 
data from the individual Q sorts are first produced as unrotated factors.87 This 
                                                            
83 Id. 
84 E.g. Table 8 in Annex I shows the factor array for Factor 1 with Statement 34 being in the 
most agreed position and Statement 33 being in the least agreed position. All of the other 
statements are ranked in descending order between the two extremes (Statements 34 and 33, 
respectively). 
85 See Annex I, Table 3. 
86 Watts & Stenner, supra note 5 at p. 129. 
87 See Chapter 6, Section 3.4. 
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is data that shows all of the correlations between the individual Q sorts. It 
fixes the position of all the correlations. However, this data must be rotated in 
order to bring it into focus.88 In this study, the unrotated factors were 
subjected to a varimax rotation,89 and the output after rotation is produced in 
Table 4 of Annex I.  
 
Table 1: Q Sort Factors for Q Methodology Study 
Factor Defining Q Sort Total 
Q Sorts 
Cumulative 
Total 
Eigenvalue Variance 
1 1, 2, 7, 14, 21, 27, 
(28), 29, 36, 42 
10 10 5.40 12% 
2 3,  5, 11, 19, 24, 31, 
34, 38 
8 18 4.47 11% 
3 4, 10, 23, 35, 43 5 23 4.05 9% 
4 13, 33, 37, 40 4 28 3.60 8% 
5 17, 25 2 30 2.70 6% 
6 6, 8, 15 3 33 2.25 5% 
Confounded 12, 18, 20, 22, 32, 41 6 38   
Not 
Significant 
9, 16, 26, 30, 39, 44, 
45 
7 45   
 
In Table 4 of Annex I and in Table 1 above, each of the highly correlated 
correlations are denoted in bold. As one can observe, some of the factors 
correlate above the minimum 41 percent mark on more than one factor. These 
are confounded Q sorts. Additionally, the individual Q sorts whose correlations 
all fall below the 41 percent mark are the Q sorts labeled as not significant in 
Table 4 of Annex I and in Table 1 above. Negative numbers in the correlation 
matrix signify correlations that are the polar opposite of the correlations 
connoted by positive numbers.90 In this study, there were not a lot of 
statistically significant negative loadings on any of the factors. However, as 
denoted by parentheses in Table 1 above, individual Q sort 28 correlated in a 
statistically significant manner (54 percent) that reflects a perspective that is 
the polar opposite of the factor array for Factor 1.91  
Table 5 of Annex I shows the correlations between the factors. That is, it 
provides data showing how similar each of the extracted factors are with each 
other. Methodologically speaking, it is advisable to have none of the factors 
correlate with each other in a statistically significant way (that is, in this case, 
a correlation above 41 percent). One of the goals of Q methodology is to 
                                                            
88 Watts & Stenner, supra note 5 at pp. 113-28. 
89 Varimax rotation rotates the factors in any type of factor analytical study in a way that 
statistically maximizes the amount of study variance of all the factors. See Watts & Stenner, 
supra note 5 at p. 122. 
90 See section on bi-polar Q sorts. Watts & Stenner, supra note 5 at pp. 133-34. 
91 Id. 
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provide data about distinct perspectives, and if the factors actually have a lot 
in common with each other, then there is good reason to see if too many 
factors have been extracted.92 In this study for example, Table 4 of Annex I 
shows that there are a number of correlations between factors. This means 
that there are points of commonality among some of the factors. For the 
purposes of this study, this is not very problematic because the overall goal is 
not to focus on the differences among perspectives, but to focus on the 
commonalities in order to determine consensual overlaps. The data in Table 5 
of Annex I show similarities among the following factors: between Factor 1 and 
4, between Factor 3 and 4, between Factor 2 and 3, and between Factor 2 and 
5. When describing the factors (perspectives) in the next section, it will become 
apparent that these factors have a lot in common.  
In terms of commonality across perspectives, and across individual Q sorts, 
two additional tables in Annex I are important. Table 6 of Annex I shows the 
level of consensus across all of the six factors for each statement in the Q 
sorts. For example, the statement that had the highest level of consensus 
among all the extracted factors is Statement 31.93 However, this does not 
mean that all factors agreed with this statement. Instead, it shows that this 
statement was placed in almost the same position by all of the participants in 
the study.94  
Statement 31, for example, states: 
[t]he search for predictability and coherence in any legal system can quickly start one 
down a very short road to a loss of legitimacy if it results in a lack of attention to the 
fundamental economic and political purposes and social values used to justify the 
system.95  
None of the factors placed this statement in the most agreed position, nor did 
any of the factors place this statement in any of the negative positions. In 
general, all of the factors agreed with this statement. For a theory of 
configurative fairness, Table 6 of Annex I represents a most promising piece of 
data. It is exactly the kind of data that is needed to determine where there is 
an overlapping consensus among diverse individual viewpoints. Statement 31 
above connotes shared subjectivity. It is a viewpoint or perspective – at least 
among the particular participants in this study – that is subjectively shared.  
Another output from PQMethod is a set of data that shows the cumulative 
correlation between individual Q sorts. This data is provided in Table 14 of 
Annex I. What this data shows is the level of correlation between an individual 
                                                            
92 Watts & Stenner, supra note 5 at pp. 141, 212. 
93 See Annex I, Table 14. 
94 This Statement was placed in the following position for each of the six factors: the 0 position 
for Factor 1, the +2 position for Factor 2, the +1 position for Factor 3, the 0 position for Factor 
4, the +2 position for Factor 5, and the +1 position for Factor 6. 
95 Statement 31, Annex I, Table 2. 
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Q sort and all of the other individual Q sorts in the study. For example, Q 
number sort 18 (a middle-aged female legal consultant from North America) 
correlates with 78 percent of all of the other Q sorts in the study.96 This Q sort 
exemplifies the most typical configuration of the data among all the individual 
Q sorts. Q sort number 30 (a thirty-something male attorney from Europe), on 
the other hand, correlates the least with any of the other individual Q sorts in 
the study. Q sort number 30 only correlates with 14 percent of all the other Q 
sorts in the study.97 This Q sort can be considered to be the most unique or 
atypical Q sort among all the Q sorts in the study. It is likely that the 
configuration of the statements in this Q sort has very little in common with 
all of the other Q sorts. Tables 15 and 16 of Annex I provide the Q sort data for 
Q sort numbers 30 and 18, respectively. 
 
3.4 An Interpretation of the Results 
Overall, the data from this Q method study showed that, despite the 
perception that all viewpoints or opinions about subjective phenomenon are 
unique and distinct; there is a great amount of this kind of knowledge that is 
shared across individuals. The basic thesis of a theory of configurative fairness 
is that, once this knowledge is empirically observable, it can be used to 
configure legal orders that are subjectively fair. This Q method study, although 
not perfect in its design, can significant contribute to empirical knowledge 
about subjective phenomenon: both inside and outside the law.  
This Q method study also showed that there is considerable consensus on 
many of the main regime-design issues in investment treaty arbitration. 
Although there were a considerable number of individual Q sorts that can be 
considered unique, there were also six prominent factors or perspectives that 
were shared among participants in the study. In this section, each of these six 
perspectives will be interpreted and described in a holistic fashion.98 The goal 
of such an exercise is to get an idea for how the individuals attributed with 
each of these factors thinks about the future of investment treaty arbitration. 
Once these perspectives have been described, the focus will turn to where 
there is consensus across these factors in the hopes of understanding where 
there are points of overlapping consensus among viewpoints. The identification 
of these points of overlapping consensus may then provide a basis for 
proposals as to how investment treaty arbitration can be configured in a 
                                                            
96 See Annex I, Table 14. 
97 Id. 
98 The raw data for this Q method study also includes participant responses to the statements 
that they most agreed with and most disagreed with. For confidentiality reasons, these 
responses have not been cited. However, these comments were used in giving additional support 
for the narratives on each of the six perspectives described below. These participant responses 
remain on file with the author.  
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manner that is considered as fair by the vast majority of those using this legal 
order. 
While there were six distinct factors that were extracted, there were a number 
of similarities between the factors that may be helpful in understanding the 
interpretation of the results below. Factor 1 and 4 have a number of 
similarities; Factor 2 and 5 have a number of similarities; and Factor 3 has a 
number of similarities between Factors 2 and 4.99 Overall, it is likely that there 
are four factors and three major themes embedded in the six factors. That is, 
Factor 1 and 4 represent a single perspective; Factors 2 and 5 represent a 
single perspective; Factor 3 represents a perspective that is an amalgamation 
of Factors 1 and 4 and Factors 2 and 5; and Factor 6 does not correlate with 
any other factors in the study. So while, this Q method study has been broken 
down into six perspectives, closer inspection of the results indicates that there 
are really three major themes that the study produced. These are primarily 
evidenced in Factors 1, 2, and 6. Factor 3 is a mix of Factors 1 and 2 (which in 
reality is its own unique perspective). Factor 4 and 5 are variations of Factors 
1 and 2 respectively; and Factor 6 is distinct.100  
 
3.4.1 Perspective 1: A Robust International Rule of Law 
Factor 1101 has an eigenvalue of 5.40 and explains 12 percent of the total study 
variance. Nine participants are significantly associated with this factor. One 
participant is significantly associated with the polar opposite of this factor (Q 
sort number 28: a female PhD candidate from South-East Asia).102 This factor 
has a number of similarities with Factor 4. Although each factor is distinct, this 
means that Factors 1 and 4 could possibly reflect a single factor that accounts a 
larger percentage of the total study variance. Seven participants are male and 
two are female. None are under 30 years of age, and most are between 45 and 
60. Two are academics, two are consultants, one is a PhD candidate, one is an 
arbitrator, one is a practicing attorney, and two did not state their profession. 
Four participants are from North America, two are from Europe, one is from 
South-East Asia, and two did not disclose their location. All participants have 
expertise in international law, and all but one have specific expertise in 
investment treaty arbitration. None claimed to have specific expertise in other 
                                                            
99 See Annex I, Table 5. 
100 However, Factor 6 accounts for only a small percentage of the overall study variance and this 
perspective is only attributable to three participants (which is significant, but not as profound in 
terms of the number of participants that loaded on the other factors). 
101 See Annex I, Table 8. 
102 This Q sort correlated with Factor 1 at -54 percent. This is a significant loading on this 
factor, but given that it is a negative number, it demonstrates that this Q sort is the polar 
opposite of Perspective 1. In general, Q sort 28 is likely to hold a very skeptical view about the 
utility of international law in general, and international investment law specifically. 
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specializations in international law (such as environmental law, human rights 
law, or international trade law).103 
This perspective is the dominant perspective among academics and 
practitioners that support a robust international rule of law in general, and a 
robust investment treaty regime specifically.104 Those who hold this 
perspective believe that international law and international dispute settlement 
is a positive force in the world; and it should continue to develop and be 
promoted. The views held by this perspective are also indicative of those who, 
according to their critics, hold a pro-investor bias.  
According to this view, investment treaties should be read expansively so as to 
provide the strongest possible protections for investors when treaty breaches 
arise from alleged state malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance. They 
strongly believe that international adjudication is not illegitimate and that if 
states do not want to delegate the resolution of international disputes to 
international adjudicators, they should not have entered into such 
agreements.105 It is a political choice that states make to enter into BITs, but 
once they have agreed to the terms of an international treaty (including 
dispute settlement), they are bound by these commitments.106 They also 
strongly believe that the criticism lobed against the international investment 
treaty regime is largely hyperbolic and exaggerated.107 They do not believe that 
the rejection of ICSID by a few Latin American states is indicative of a regime 
on the precipice of failure;108 nor do they believe that the claims of arbitrator 
bias stem from claimants and respondents in investment disputes. Rather, 
they believe that such criticism comes largely from academics and pundits.109 
While they believe that states have latitude to regulate in the public interest 
and that investors should never expect conditions to remain unchanged,110 
they likewise believe that states have a duty to pay damages where an investor 
has legitimate expectations to a stable and predictable investment climate.111  
In terms of the public-private divide, this perspective endorses the status quo 
in terms of procedures of private adjudication currently practiced by arbitral 
tribunals.112 This perspective is also skeptical about the utility of third party 
interveners in investment disputes, and tacitly holds that increasing 
                                                            
103 See Annex I, Table 1. 
104 This factor represents the Q sort completed by the researcher. My Q sort (Q sort no. 1) 
correlated with this factor at 50 percent.  
105 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 34 (+3). 
106 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 2 (-3). 
107 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 33 (-3). 
108 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 11 (+3). 
109 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 35 (+1). 
110 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 19 (+1). 
111 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 17 (+2). 
112 i.e. this perspective does not believe that there are any fundamental problems with using 
arbitration to solve investment treaty disputes.  
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transparency in investment disputes risks the (re)politicization of disputes.113 
They are likewise skeptical that the issues under debate in investment treaty 
law are not resolvable over time as the jurisprudence develops.114 This 
perspective believes that there is no need for major reforms to the system as it 
currently stands (such as the negotiation of a multilateral investment treaty115 
or the development of a permanent appellate mechanism116). They also hold 
that the current regime is developing a consistent and coherent jurisprudence 
through the decisions of arbitral tribunals,117 that the number of BITs and 
FTA investment chapters are restating customary international law on this 
subject,118 and that the thousands of BITs signed across the globe are 
producing a functional equivalent to a multilateral investment treaty.119  
In line with their position about the importance of an international rule of law, 
this perspective holds that there is no excuse for Argentina to refuse 
compliance with ICSID awards against it, even in the case where an 
annulment committee delegitimized the award through its obiter dicta.120 
Likewise, they strongly disagree with the statement claiming that investment 
treaty arbitration is so illegitimate that there are moral grounds for states to 
withdraw from investment treaties and to refuse payment on investment 
awards rendered against them.121  
Overall, this perspective holds that states are not above the law, and that 
where they have entered into binding treaties, they are obligated to respect the 
international rule of law. As supporters of a robust international rule of law, 
this perspective also tends to endorse expansive interpretations of treaty 
provisions by arbitrators. They believe that the MFN clause in BITs is wide 
enough to include dispute settlement provisions;122 that the FET standard has 
evolved well beyond the customary minimum standard of treatment;123 that 
there is no need to exhaust all local remedies in before bringing a denial of 
justice claim under a relevant BIT;124 that shareholders do (and should) have 
standing in investment disputes;125 that the majority who granted jurisdiction 
in the Tokios Tokelės was correct;126 that ‘essential security’ clauses should 
never be self-judging;127 and that fork-in-the-road clauses should be 
                                                            
113 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 10 (0). 
114 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 15 (-2). 
115 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 13 (0). 
116 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 37 (-1). 
117 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 7 (+1). 
118 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 28 (0). 
119 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 38 (0). 
120 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 4 (-1). 
121 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 33 (-3). 
122 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 32 (+2). 
123 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 39 (+2). 
124 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 8 (-2), Statement 5 (+1). 
125 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 21 (+2). 
126 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 20 (-1). 
127 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 18 (-2). 
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interpreted narrowly.128 Perhaps a bit surprisingly, this viewpoint also holds 
that the full protection and security standard should be based on the level of 
development in a particular state,129 and that umbrella clauses could be used 
to place reciprocal obligations on investors for obligations that they have made 
with the states hosting their investment.130 
 
3.4.2 Perspective 2: A Wider Discretion in Favor of State Sovereignty 
Factor 2131 has an eigenvalue of 4.47 and explains 11 percent of the study 
variance. Eight participants are significantly associated with this factor. This 
factor has a number of similarities with Factor 5. Although each factor is 
distinct, this means that Factors 2 and 5 could possible reflect a single factor 
that accounts for a larger percentage of the total study variance. Four 
participants are male and four are female. Six participants are aged between 30 
and 45, and two participants are under 30. Two are academics, three are 
practicing attorneys, one is a PhD candidate, and one did not identify a 
profession. Three participants are from North America, one is from Latin 
America, one is from the CIS, one is from Australasia, one is from South-East 
Asia, and one did not disclose geographical information. All participants have 
expertise in international law. Six have expertise in investment treaty 
arbitration. Three have expertise in international trade law. Four have expertise 
in international commercial arbitration; and one has expertise in international 
environmental law. 
This is the dominant perspective among academics and practitioners who hold 
that investment treaty arbitration has exceeded its mandate and that more 
discretion needs to be given to state in regard to the decisions they make 
within their sovereign authority. This perspective is the classical pro-state 
position held by those who see international law as overly interventionist in 
regard to the regulatory and political policy choices that a state makes. While 
not anti-international law, this perspective favors a restrictive approach to 
international adjudication.  
Those who endorse this perspective strongly believe that investors should 
never expect circumstances at the time an investment was made to remain 
unchanged, and that states should be given wide discretion to make 
regulatory changes in the public interest even if those changes negatively 
affect foreign investors;132 and not only do they believe that states should have 
this kind of regulatory autonomy, they should not have to compensation 
                                                            
128 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 30 (+1). 
129 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 14 (-1). 
130 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 16 (0). 
131 See Annex I, Table 9. 
132 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 19 (+3). 
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foreign investors when these changes were made in good faith and for 
legitimate reasons.133 For example, this perspective strongly endorses the view 
that states should not be liable to foreign investors when invoking 
precautionary measures to protect against potential threats to the 
environment or public health.134  
As to the interpretive scope of specific protections included in BITs, this 
perspective believes strongly that the assessment of a breach of the full 
protection and security standard should always be deferential to the state’s 
level of development and stability;135 that the MFN clause in the basic treaty 
can never be relied on to expand the jurisdiction of a tribunal by reference to 
the provision in a third treaty;136 that umbrella causes should be interpreted 
narrowly137 and that fork-in-the road clauses should be interpreted widely;138 
that the FET standard should reflect the customary minimum standard;139 
that a denial of justice claim cannot be brought unless all domestic remedies 
have been exhausted;140 and that the admissibility of a claim ought to be 
restricted to a narrowly defined definition of what is an investor and an 
investment.141 All of these interpretive questions reflect the need for 
investment arbitral tribunals to heavily restrict the scope of BIT protections in 
favor of states.  
Along the same lines, this perspective disagrees that shareholders ought to 
have standing in investment disputes;142 that the umbrella clause (even 
though they believe that it does not provide substantive protections for 
investors) ought to include reciprocal obligations to which the state can rely 
upon in the form of counterclaims;143 that the exhaustion of local remedies 
rule ought to be jurisdictional hurdle to bringing a treaty claim;144 and that 
the investment screen in the ICSID Convention ought to place a high threshold 
for the admissibility of claims above and beyond that of the BIT that confers 
jurisdiction.145 All of this indicates that this perspective would configure 
investment treaty arbitration in a manner that would preclude many of the 
claims currently granted jurisdiction in investment treaty arbitration cases.  
While this perspective is critical of many of the trends in investment treaty 
arbitration, and is clearly a perspective that favors more deference to states, it 
                                                            
133 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 12 (-2). 
134 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 17 (-3). 
135 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 14 (+3). 
136 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 24 (+2). 
137 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 9 (+1), Statement 27 (0). 
138 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 30 (-2). 
139 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 39 (-2). 
140 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 8 (+2). 
141 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 6 (+2), Statement 25 (-2). 
142 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 21 (-1). 
143 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 16 (0). 
144 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 5 (-1). 
145 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 25 (-2). 
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is not a wholly radical perspective. This perspective does not want to 
dismantle the possibility of investment treaty arbitration, it just would like to 
severely restrict it. For example, this perspective does not go so far as to claim 
that ‘essential security’ clauses should ever be self-judging;146 nor does it 
believe that Argentina – or any other state for that matter – has the right to 
refuse to pay on an award rendered against it.147 In terms of the public-private 
divide, this perspective believes that the public nature of the subject-matter in 
investment treaty arbitration demands that arbitral tribunals ought to model 
public judiciaries. Arbitral tribunals should have recourse to appellate 
mechanisms,148 dissents ought to be encouraged,149 and transparency and 
third party interventions ought to be expanded and promoted.150    
 
3.4.3 Perspective 3: A Teleological-Doctrinal Focus 
Factor 3151 has an eigenvalue of 4.05 and explains nine percent of the total 
study variance. Five participants are significantly associated with this factor. 
Five participants are significantly associated with this factor. This factor has a 
number of similarities with Factors 2 and 4. This means that this factor may be 
an amalgamation of Factors 2 and 4. Four participants are male and one is 
female. Four participants are aged between 30 and 45; and one participant is 
under 30. One participant is an academic, two are PhD candidates, and two to 
not state their profession. Two participants are from Africa, one participant is 
from South-East Asia, and one participant did not disclose geographical 
information. All participants have expertise in international law. Three 
participants have expertise in international commercial arbitration, two 
participants have expertise in investment treaty arbitration, and one participant 
has expertise in international trade law.  
This perspective appears to be a balanced amalgamation of Factors 2 and 4. It 
is neither pro-investor nor pro-state. While it endorses the utility of an 
international rule of law, it does not believe that the investment treaty 
arbitration regime is without flaws. This perspective believes that, while useful 
as a form of international dispute resolution, it is in need of reform, and that it 
may have exceeded its mandate by excessive intruding on sovereign 
prerogatives through overly expansive readings of treaty standards. While this 
perspective believes that the object and purpose of investment treaties ought 
to inform interpretation of treaty standards, it is also important that 
interpretations do not derogate too far from the original intent of the state 
                                                            
146 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 18 (-2). 
147 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 33 (-1). 
148 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 37 (+1). 
149 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 3 (-3). 
150 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 10 (+2). 
151 See Annex I, Table 10. 
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parties who signed the treaties. For example, they believe that Prosper Weil’s 
dissent in the jurisdiction phase of the Tokio Tokeles case was correct.152 That 
is, arbitrators need to look at what the object and purpose of the treaty when 
assessing whether jurisdiction ought to be granted or whether a treaty 
standard has been breached.  
This perspective also holds that a failure to look to the fundamental political 
and economic purposes and social values of investment treaty arbitration can 
quickly lead to a loss of legitimacy.153 This view believes that, while treaties 
protecting foreign investment must be interpreted teleological, there are limits 
on the scope of the mandate that arbitrators have in interpreting protection 
standards in particular disputes; and that if arbitrators are not conscious of 
the underlying objects and purposes of international investment law, the 
regime can quickly be undermined. In order to prevent a loss of legitimacy, 
this perspective believes that arbitrators must adhere to the specific mandate 
they are given in a particular dispute and to not expand interpretations of 
treaty standards beyond what the parties originally intended.154 Such a view 
requires that arbitrators use textual or doctrinal approaches of treaty texts to 
reduce the possibility that a teleological approach goes beyond that envisioned 
by the parties.155 To this end, this perspective does not believe that arbitrators 
are (or should) be driven in their decisionmaking by ideological preferences.156  
Like the international rule of law perspective identified by Factor 1, this 
perspective holds that arbitrators must understand that all international 
treaties tacitly refer to general principles of law where the treaty does not 
resolve a particular issue in express terms.157 As to the specific substantive 
standards in investment treaties, this viewpoint believes that arbitrators must 
set textual boundaries to their interpretations. For example, they believe that 
the lack of a exhaustion of local remedies rule in most BITs means that such a 
rule cannot and should not be tacitly assumed where a BIT has expressly and 
purposeful deviated from such a rule.158 Likewise, and very much in tune with 
a teleological-textual hybrid approach that adheres to party intent, this 
perspective believes that umbrella clauses in treaties were purposeful included 
in such treaties and they cannot be assumed to have no meaning in cases 
where a state has breached a contractual obligation.159  
In the same way, this perspective strongly disagrees with the notion that an 
‘essential security’ clause in a treaty should be interpreted as self-judging 
where there is no basis to assume that this is what the parties originally 
                                                            
152 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 20 (+1). 
153 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 31 (+1). 
154 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 1 (-1). 
155 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 5 (+2), Statement 39 (+1). 
156 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 40 (-2). 
157 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 23 (+2). 
158 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 5 (+2). 
159 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 9 (-1), Statement 27 (+2). 
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intended.160 As to the public-private divide, this perspective holds that 
investment treaty arbitration does ask arbitrators to decide on the consistency 
of public regulatory decisions of a state with international obligations, and 
therefore ought to follow a public model of adjudication: that is, to encourage 
dissent161 and third party amicus curiae submissions,162 to improve 
transparency163 and to reform the regime so as to include a strong appellate 
mechanism for review of arbitral awards.164  
 
3.4.4 Perspective 4: A Lex Specialis Legal Order  
Factor 4165 has an eigenvalue of 3.60 and explains eight percent of the total 
study variance. Four participants are significantly associated with this factor. 
Two participants are male and two are female. Two participants are aged 
between 30 and 45; and two participants are under 30. All participants are 
practicing attorneys. Two are from North America, one is from Australasia, and 
one did not disclose his geographical location. All participants have expertise in 
international law. Three participants have expertise in investment treaty 
arbitration, and one has expertise in international commercial arbitration.  
This perspective has many similarities with the international rule of law 
perspective evidenced by Factor 1. However, there are some differences. Where 
Factor 1 can be viewed as largely endorsing a status quo in investment treaty 
arbitration (that is, the development of investment treaty arbitration reflects 
the legal order that parties desire), this perspective supports a more 
evolutionary approach that can adapt to the changing needs of users of this 
legal order over time. For example, this perspective strongly believes that the 
FET standard in BITs does not merely state the customary minimum standard 
of treatment in international law,166 and that FET should be understand as an 
independent standard that has evolved through its application in investment 
disputes.167  
Likewise, this perspective believes that umbrella clauses provide meaningful 
obligations on states,168 and that the deviation from the exhaustion of local 
remedies rule in most BITs was done consciously and for good reasons.169 In 
many ways, this view is similar to the textual-teleological approach of Factor 
3. That is, BIT standards of protection should be accessed in terms of the 
                                                            
160 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 18 (-2). 
161 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 3 (-1). 
162 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 10 (-2). 
163 Id. 
164 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 37 (+3). 
165 See Annex I, Table 11. 
166 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 39 (+3). 
167 Id. 
168 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 27 (+2). 
169 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 5 (+2). 
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bargain struck between two consenting state parties;170 and that while general 
principles of international law should inform the interpretation of treaty 
standards, they should not override the specific commitments that parties to 
the treaty have made.171 This perspective does not believe that the culmination 
of thousands of BITs should reflect a de facto multilateral treaty,172 and that 
the standards applied in disputes ought to be limited to, and pay close 
attention to, the provisions of the particular treaty.173  
This perspective does not believe that BITs reflect a coerced relationship 
between developed and developing states,174 and is in favor of the largely 
bilateral nature of investment treaties.175 It does not believe that a 
comprehensive multilateral investment treaty is desirable or possible.176 At the 
same time, this perspective, like Factor 1, is not skeptical of the authority of 
investment treaty arbitrators. This perspective believes that international law 
is subject to broader rule of law principles, and that there is no excuse for a 
state to refuse compliance with an award rendered against it.177 It holds that, 
not only are these arbitrations legitimate, they provide a system of 
adjudication that can provide consistency and coherence over time without the 
need for a judicial system that models that of domestic judiciaries.178  
This perspective strongly believes that conflicting precedent in investment 
tribunals is not problematic and that divergence in awards is not evidence of a 
system under strain, but that is rather a reflection of the evolutionary dialectic 
moving towards a jurisprudence constante.179 While this perspective does not 
see the need for an appellate mechanism for investment treat arbitration,180 it 
is in favor of investment arbitration reflecting a unique form of adjudication 
that is a hybrid of public and private adjudicative practices. That is, this 
perspective does not believe that dissenting opinions in awards are 
problematic,181 nor does it believe that confidentiality of proceedings should be 
encouraged or endorsed.182 Overall, this perspective is highly supportive of 
investment treaty arbitration and believes that it is a legal order that is 
positively evolving over time;183 yet, it does not believe that this evolution 
should reflect an uniformity.184 Rather, investment treaty arbitration is, and 
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should, continue to interpret BITs as reflecting particular bargains struck 
between two states.185 
 
3.4.5 Perspective 5: Investment Treaties are the Enemy of the State 
Factor 5186 has an eigenvalue of 2.70 and explains six percent of the total study 
variance. Two participants are significantly associated with this factor. One 
participant is male and one is female. One participant is under 30 and one is 
aged between 30 and 45. Neither participants disclosed their geographical 
location or their profession. Both participants have expertise in international 
law. Both have expertise in investment treaty arbitration, and one has expertise 
in human rights law.  
This perspective is perhaps the most radical of all the perspectives. It has 
many similarities with Factor 2, and believes that investment treaty arbitration 
is biased against states. Where Factor 2 can be seen as a strong perspective in 
favor of reforms to investment treaty arbitration that give much wider latitude 
to sovereign policies, this perspective believes that investment treaty 
arbitration is the enemy of the state and that it should be dismantled. This 
perspective believes that the conflicting values in investment treaty arbitration 
are not resolvable through reformatory measures.187 They are not ‘growing 
pains,’ but are a reflection of much deeper fundamental conflicts between 
developed and developing states, and between corporate investors and 
developing state.188 This perspective believes that BITs are not a reflection of 
voluntary, uncoerced transactions, but that they are treaties that reflect 
north-south power dynamics aimed at the neocolonial subjugation of 
developing states.189 They further believe that there are strong moral grounds 
for states to withdraw from BITs and to refuse payment on arbitral awards 
rendered against them.190  
This perspective is deeply skeptical of investor-claimants and believes that 
they want victory much more than they want a fair legal order that is balanced 
proportionately between state rights and investor rights.191 In terms of the 
substantive standards of protection, this perspective takes the position that 
they have all been overly expanded in favor of investor-claimants and that they 
should all be reinterpreted to restrict their application in favor of states. For 
example, this perspective believes that MFN clauses should never be 
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applicable to dispute settlement provisions;192 that the FET standard should 
merely restate the customary minimum standard;193 that an exhaustion of 
local remedies rule should be included in all investment treaties;194 that 
umbrella clause should be recast so as to include strong reciprocal obligations 
on investors;195 that there should be a strong ‘objective’ test under the ICSID 
Convention that filters out most claims;196 and that ‘essential security’ clauses 
should be self-judging.197  
Overall, this perspective would like to see investment treaty arbitration fade 
away, or in the alternative, that investment treaties provide a very limited 
basis for bringing claims against states; and that when claims do meet 
jurisdictional and admissibility hurdles, arbitrators should allow a wide 
margin of appreciation to state parties. Of all the viewpoints in the study, this 
perspective is the most skeptical and antagonistic about the utility of 
investment treaty arbitration. This perspective believes that BITs and FTA 
investment chapters create undue burdens on states and that a minimalist 
version of international investment law should be endorsed:198 that is, one that 
does away with treaty-based arbitration.  
 
3.4.6 Perspective 6: Arbitrators are the Problem 
Factor 6199 has an eigenvalue of 2.25 and explains five percent of the total study 
variance. Three participants are significantly associated with this factor. All 
three participants are male. Two participants are aged between 30 and 45; and 
one participant is over 60. Two participants are practicing attorneys, and one 
did not disclose a profession. One participant is from Europe, one is from Latin 
America, and one did not disclose a geographical location. All participants have 
expertise in international law. Two participants have expertise in international 
commercial arbitration, and one has expertise in international trade law.  
This perspective placed less focus on the substantive standards applied by 
investment treaty arbitration tribunals than any other perspective. Instead, 
this perspective gravitated towards the statements that discuss many of the 
overall regime-design issues relating to the procedures of investment treaty 
arbitration. This perspective is not skeptical of international law;200 nor does it 
endorse a view that is particularly in favor of state discretion. Rather, this 
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perspective is skeptical, absent serious reforms, that investment treaty 
arbitration can ever function as a legitimate form of international 
adjudication.201  
In terms of the public-private divide, this perspective strongly believes that 
investors should never expect circumstances to remain unchanged in the state 
hosting the investment, and that states should always have the latitude to 
regulate in the public interest.202 Given the need for states to regulate, and 
that the subject-matter of many investment disputes calls upon arbitrators to 
make decisions similar to that of administrative judges, this perspective 
strongly believes that investment treaty arbitration should institute reforms 
that allow it to function as a standing body of judges with a permanent 
appellate process.203  
Furthermore, this perspective believes that the procedural standards of 
investment treaty arbitration should shift so as to reflect a public model of 
adjudication with transparent, open processes subject to public oversight and 
accountability.204 This perspective is skeptical of international arbitrators and 
believes that they are driven in their decisionmaking by ideological 
preferences,205 and that they evidence a strong bias in favor of investor-
claimants.206 
Surprisingly, this perspective is not a pro-state or statist perspective. In fact it 
is quite sympathetic to investors with legitimate claim – such as 
expropriation;207 and that investors should be given protections under 
international law.208 With that said, however, it is very apparent that this 
perspective is does not trust arbitrators to perform their function as 
independent and neutral international adjudicators.209 This perspective 
believes that absent major structural reforms, investment treaty arbitration is 
in the midst of a real legitimacy crisis.210  
This perspective also believes that the inconsistency of awards rendered under 
the current regime are fueling this legitimacy crisis;211 and that the procedures 
of investment treaty arbitration will never be able to produce a jurisprudence 
constante over time.212 This perspective also believes that there are strong 
moral grounds for states to withdraw from BITs and to refuse payments on 
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illegitimate awards rendered against them.213 This is particularly the case for 
Argentina who has experienced directly the problem of delegitimized awards as 
a result of the inadequacy and structural flaws in the ICSID annulment 
process.214 In line with these views, this perspective does not believe that the 
rejection of ICSID by a few Latin American states is an anomaly; rather, it is 
indicative of a larger – and growing – systemic flaw in the process of 
investment treaty arbitration overall.215  
 
3.4.7 A Note on Confounded and Not Significant Q Sorts 
In this Q study, there were six confounded Q sorts. This means that these 
individual Q sorts loaded significantly (above 41 percent of correlation) with 
more than one of six perspectives detailed above. However, upon closer 
inspection, each of the confounded Q sorts loaded on two factors that had a 
number of similarities (save one). For example, Q sort number 20 loaded 
significantly on Factors 1 and 4; Q sort number 32 loaded on Factors 2 and 5; 
Q sort number 41 loaded on Factors 3 and 4; and Q sort numbers 12 and 22 
loaded on Factors 2 and 3.216  
Only Q sort number 18 is less understandable. This Q sort loaded significantly 
on Factors 2 and 4.217 These two perspectives have very little in common. 
However, it is interesting to note that Q sort number 18 is the individual Q 
sort that had the highest cumulative correlation among all the Q sorts in the 
study (that is, Q sort number 18 has 78 percent in common with all of the Q 
sorts in the study).218 This certainly explains why it loaded significantly on two 
factors that appear to be diametrically opposed in their perspectives on 
investment treaty arbitration. The other five confounded Q sorts are 
explainable as Q sorts that loaded significantly on factors with many 
commonalities.219 
The Q sorts that did not load significantly on any of the six distinct factors are 
more problematic. There are seven Q sorts that fit into the ‘not significant’ 
category.220 Out of a total universe of 45 Q sorts, the fact that seven of them 
did not associate with any of the six factors is a bit surprising. However, there 
are a number of reasons why this may have occurred. First, the number of 
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participants that did not load on any factor could be attributable to the fact 
that there are so many difficult issues in investment treaty arbitration and 
that given such a diversity of positions, it is no wonder that there are a high 
number of unique or idiosyncratic perspectives. Under such a view, it may be 
considered odd that so many of the participants’ Q sorts (33 out of 45) loaded 
on any of the six factors at all.  
A second reason as to why there were seven Q sorts that did not correlate with 
any other Q sorts in the study could be attributable to the overall experimental 
design of the study. This Q method study is intended to provide a 
comprehensive overview of the entire regime as opposed to a particular or 
narrowly defined aspect of the regime. The breadth of the subject-matter in the 
Q study could explain why there are a high number of Q sorts that did not 
correlate with any of the six study factors. A third reason that may explain the 
seven ‘not significant’ Q sorts is that of study error, or it could be attributable 
to the fact that the participants who did not share perspectives with other 
participants are limited to those who are not experts in investment treaty 
arbitration. It is also possible that some of the statements were not clear, or 
that they were given alternative meanings by those seven Q sorters who did 
not correlate with the six dominant study perspectives. 
 
3.4.8 Consensus Across Perspectives 
For a theory of configurative fairness, the most important aspect of the Q 
method study lies in the identification of where there is an overlapping 
consensus across factors.221 Often, Q method studies are designed to identify 
where there are differences across perspectives. Clearly, the six study factors 
(detailed above) demonstrate distinct points of view on how investment treaty 
arbitration ought to be configured. The outlooks that these six perspectives 
represent are indicative of many of the critiques and commendations of the 
regime that have been documented in the literature.222 In fact, there is very 
little that is surprising about the various perspectives that emerged. They are 
all positions that have been identified in both the scholarly discourse and in 
the decisionmaking of arbitral tribunals. The novelty of the study is in its 
ability to distil points of consensus across factors that would be unobservable 
through the discourse and decisionmaking alone. The basis of a theory of 
configurative fairness is to identify value consensus among the distinct 
viewpoints and perspectives (claims, demands, and expectations) that exist in 
the discourse on investment treaty arbitration.   
Table 7 in Annex I shows the consensus across factors for all of the 
statements in the Q study. There are a number of statements that, despite the 
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different overall perspectives that emerged in the study, tended to be placed in 
nearly identical positions across the six factors. This is not conclusive 
evidence that these statements produce an overlapping consensus among all 
of the distinct perspectives, but it is demonstrative of the type of knowledge 
about value distribution that could be useful in configuring fair legal orders. 
While any reader of this text can look at Table 7 in Annex I to assess the level 
of agreement and disagreement of each statement across the six study factors, 
a few prominent examples will be discussed as to explain how the empirical 
knowledge extracted from a Q method study can be used in justifying a theory 
of configurative fairness.  
One of the most interesting examples of an overlapping consensus comes from 
Statement 3 in the Q method study. This statement states that: 
[c]ollegiality demands that arbitrators sitting on three member tribunals reach a 
common view as to how the case should be resolved. Dissenting opinions should always 
be avoided.223  
Across all the six study factors, this statement was roundly criticized.224 All of 
the study factors placed this statement on the disagree to strongly disagree 
end of the Q sort spectrum.225 While this may be considered a surprising fact, 
the question then for the researcher is to try to interpret what this means in 
terms of value distribution.  
Firstly, it is interesting because there appears to be little motivation in 
disagreeing with this statement purely because it is perceived to be the 
‘correct’ position. It is a very subjective statement that clearly has no right or 
wrong answer. Further, whether one is skeptical or not about investment 
treaty arbitration, this statement is not indicative of a particular ideological 
position. It might be assumed that this statement would have been agreed to 
by those supportive of the current regime, and disagreed to by those 
reformatory positions that are challenging the status quo. However, all the six 
study perspective disagreed with this statement.  
In terms of value distribution, it could be that the endorsement of dissenting 
opinions means that users with knowledge of the rules of investment treaty 
arbitration believe that dissenting opinions foster knowledge and 
transparency. It could also be that the participants in the Q method study 
believe that investment treaty arbitration should reflect public models of 
adjudication, and that dissenting opinions in the judicial context of national 
and international courts are a mainstay feature. Such an explanation could be 
that all of the six study factors do not see investment treaty arbitration as 
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arbitration at all; but rather, they view the regime as one that does (or should 
reflect) rules and procedures that follow the methods of court systems.  
Another interesting feature of this statement and its consensus across study 
factors is that it potentially shows that advocates of this position, such as the 
eminent arbitrator Albert van den Berg, are mere outliers.226 Van den Berg, on 
this issue, may be grossly out of step with what users of this legal order 
actually desire or value.227 The idea of collegiality across arbitrators is a 
position that is very much rooted in the practice of international commercial 
arbitration. It is believed that in that context, litigants in arbitral cases do not 
want dissenting opinions.228 They want the arbitrators to all come to a mutual 
understanding of the case; and that this practice is good for both ongoing 
business relationships and for enforcing awards in domestic courts.  
Investment treaty arbitration is different, however. For good or bad reasons, 
investment treaty arbitrators generally do not view their role as commercial 
arbitrators. Instead, they view their job as one that must assist in providing 
stability to the regime through a consistent and coherent jurisprudence akin 
to a domestic constitutional court.229 Dissenting opinions are valued in this 
context because they can assist in the development of legal orders over time.230 
Sometimes the dissenting opinion evolves into the majority opinion. If all of 
this is true, then it might be claimed that the rejection of Statement 3 by the 
participants in the Q method study says more about the regime than its mere 
endorsement of dissenting opinions in awards. It means that there is value in 
the discourse that dissents produce, that there is value in a stable regime that 
produces consistent and coherent awards over time, and that there is value in 
configuring investment treaty arbitration as a mode of public adjudication. 
Another interesting statement that is evidence of an overlapping consensus is 
that of Statement 25. It states: 
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[f]or all practical purposes, the ‘investment’ screen of the ICSID Convention should have 
no bite. There is not a single pending or concluded case that should be – or should have 
been – excluded on this ground.231  
This statement is about how arbitral tribunals define investment when 
interpreting BIT-based arbitrations under the ICSID Convention. Arbitral 
practice has demanded that arbitrators evaluate the jurisdictional and 
admissibility hurdles to a claim under both the relevant BIT and the ICSID 
Convention in these circumstances.232  
However, in an influential article in 2010 (from where Statement 25 is taken), 
a scholar claimed that there was not ‘objective’ definition of investment 
required by the ICSID Convention and that the preparatory works to the 
Convention shows that this was a deliberate move on the part of the treaty 
negotiators.233 The definition of an investment was to be left to states to 
determine, in the legal instruments that they sign, which investments could be 
arbitrated.234 However, this position has been controversial. When the ICSID 
Convention was negotiated, there was no treaty-based arbitration practice. The 
ICSID Convention was primarily set up for contract-based claims or claims 
deriving from national investment laws.235 In these cases, states were free to 
define investors and investments as they please (either through exclusions in 
national investment laws or by merely not signing contracts).  
BIT-based practice changed this due to the fact that BITs themselves are the 
consenting document.236 This creates a situation where it becomes unclear 
who is the gatekeeper; and what investors and investments the state parties to 
BITs actually intended to protect. One way that arbitrators have limited 
jurisdiction over BIT-based claim is by inferring an ‘objective’ definition of 
investment in the ICSID Convention.237 Since there is nothing in the 
Convention that defines investment, it is something that has been developed 
exclusively through arbitrator-made law.  
One of the interesting facts is that Statement 25 was roundly disagreed with 
across all the six study factors. This is surprising for two reasons. First, it 
might be assumed that at least some of the factors in the study (probably 
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Factors 1 and 4, which can be seen as highly supportive of investment treaty 
arbitration) would have agreed with this statement. In fact, the evidence 
provided in the 2010 article is very compelling.238 It would seem quite 
uncontroversial for avid supporters of the regime to endorse the position of 
Statement 25; and yet they did not.  
Second, it is surprising that those who would predictably disagree with this 
statement (probably Factors 2 and 5, which are highly critical of the expansive 
scope of investment treaty arbitration jurisdiction) are actually endorsing the 
position that arbitrators should be the gatekeepers, and that they should be 
providing a teleological interpretation of the definition of investment in the 
ICSID Convention. It is assumed that those critical of the regime would like to 
see the interpretive scope of arbitrators to be curtailed, and yet in this 
situation, they are tacitly agreeing to an expansive understanding of an 
arbitrator’s interpretive powers (that is, requiring an ‘objective’ definition of 
investment where none is required by the text of the ICSID Convention).  
In terms of value distribution, what does disagreement with this statement 
mean? First, it shows that, like the statement on dissenting opinions, the 
position taken by a few scholars are likely outliers. It is not a position 
endorsed by users of the regime (or at least those that participated in the 
study). Second, it might show that the participants of the study value an 
interpretation of investment treaty arbitration jurisdiction from an 
evolutionary and teleological perspective. It might also show that participants 
in the study value a restrictive approach to the definition of investment overall; 
and that arbitrator-made law about an ‘objective’ definition of investment in 
the ICSID Convention, while not ideal, is a means for limiting claims where 
there is no ‘real’ foreign direct investment by a ‘real’ foreign investor.239  
This position would be highly supportive of the value that arbitrators, when 
making decisions, ought to be very sensitive to the object and purpose of the 
treaties that confer their power. This view is supported by another statement 
that had a high level or consensus across the study factors. It states: 
[t]he search for predictability and coherence in any legal system can quickly start down a 
very short road to a loss of legitimacy if it results in a lack of attention to the fundamental 
economic and political purposes and social values used to justify the system.240  
All of the six study factors agreed with this statement. There appears to be a 
consensus among those who both endorse and criticize the regime that a key 
element or value underlying the fair configuration of a legal order such as 
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investment treaty arbitration is through deep analysis and understanding of 
its object and purpose. This would seem to suggest that the participants in the 
Q method study all value value. This means that the pursuit of a purely 
objective mandate for arbitrators is an illusion. It can be said, that in 
configuring a fair investment treaty arbitration regime, the underlying values 
that justify it must be adhered to. This is a bit of a metaclaim because it does 
not tell us what those values are. However, it does tell us that they are 
important. This is view that has been endorsed throughout this work. 
Another set of statements that generated a high level of agreement across 
factors are the following two statements:  
[i]nvestors should never expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time the 
investment is made will remain unchanged. To determine whether frustration of the 
investor’s expectations was justified, the host state’s right to subsequently regulate 
domestic matters in the public interest must also be taken into consideration.241 
[t]he level of due diligence required under the ‘full protection and security’ standard in 
BITs should depend on the host state’s development and stability. The availability of 
resources may have a decisive impact on a state’s ability to provide protection and 
security.242 
Combined, the endorsement of these two statements can be seen as denoting 
the importance of contextual inquiry in legal analysis. Under such a view, the 
value given to context would allow arbitrators to access state liability on a 
case-by-case basis after the specific facts and situations have been addressed. 
This sounds very similar to the method of legal inquiry that the New Haven 
school demands.243 What is slightly surprising about the fact that all of the 
study factors strongly agreed with these two statements is that it reflects a 
need for investment treaty arbitration to reject an interpretive standard that is 
universal and objective.  
Rather, such a view would hold that the assessment of state liability for 
international wrongs to a foreign investor in the context of investment treaty 
arbitration must be accessed in a very subjective manner. For example, the 
duty to provide protection and security to an investment would be different, in 
say the United States (US) than it would be in Somalia. Such a differentiation 
might be seen as objectionable to those who support a universal and objective 
international rule of law; and yet all of the study factors (perspectives) would 
indicate otherwise. But what exactly is the value being endorsed here? And 
can knowledge of this value assist in configuring a fair legal order? It could be 
that the position held by the six study factors in relation to these statements is 
reflective of the legitimacy crisis in investment treaty arbitration, and that by 
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agreeing to these statements, participants are making concessions and 
acknowledging the need for arbitrators to be more deferential to the needs and 
capacities of host states. If this is accurate, then there is value in how legal 
regimes are perceived as fair and legitimate, even if such perceptions cause 
adjudicators to apply legal standards on a sliding scale according to context. 
This is essentially José Alvarez’s position: perceptions matter, and that 
sometimes concessions must be made in order to maintain the more important 
metavalues of legitimacy and fairness.244  
What this section attempted to show is that Q methodology is a quite amazing 
tool for gaining empirical knowledge about value in the context of evolving 
legal orders. While there were a number of statements that demonstrate an 
overlapping consensus across the study factors, the statement highlighted 
above were intended to show how such a consensus might be interpreted and 
what that interpretation means about the values that users of the regime 
endorse. This is a difficult and speculative enterprise in this case. The Q 
method study could have been designed so as to more clearly reflect on 
particular values that users of the regime endorse. The idea that the 
endorsement of dissenting opinions is indicative of a particular value choice is 
difficult, though not impossible, to interpret.  
However, in terms of configuring fairness, the practical implications of the 
study results might be more far-reaching. According to the examples of 
overlapping consensus in this section, it would not be speculative to hold that 
a fair investment treaty arbitration regime ought to pay very close attention to 
the object and purpose of the regime as a whole; it ought to allow arbitrators 
to evolve the jurisprudence according to this sensitivity to its overall object 
and purpose; and that discourse and the exchange of ideas (such as through 
dissenting opinions) is a valuable asset for any evolving legal order.  
In terms of reforming the regime, the consensus statements might call for 
investment treaty arbitration to become akin to an international investment 
court, and it might call for reform of the actual treaties that confer jurisdiction 
to arbitrators so that the intent of the parties is more clearly delineated. 
Absent such reforms, a fairly configured investment treaty regime might call 
for arbitrators to curtail their mandate by giving more discretion to state 
parties to regulate in the public interest. It might also demand that arbitrators 
be more sensitive to the particular capacity of a host state and to determine 
liability according to its contextual and relative capacity.  
                                                            
244 “As was said at the recent annual meeting of the American Society of International Law, in 
the end, perceptions probably matter more than facts do. Governments may need to react to 
what influential elites and NGOs believe, even if it is not true. On those days when I think of the 
public relations challenges facing the investment regime, the new US model appears to be a wise 
concession to real politick.” José Alvarez (2010). ‘The Evolving BIT,’ in Ian Laird & Todd Weiler, 
eds. Investment Treaty Arbitration and International Law: Volume III. New York, Juris Publishing, 
p. 16. 
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4. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
One of the tricky aspects relating to the extrapolation of the underlying values 
that are used to inform the fairness and legitimacy of any legal order is that 
the issues under debate in any legal order rarely focus on values per se. The 
positions that discoursers and decisionmakers take are often related to very 
technical requirements and interpretations of particular laws in particular 
situations. This means that there has to be an interpretation of what a 
particular position means in terms of value distribution. For example, what 
does the following statement mean in terms of value distribution?  
The ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard in BITs is an independent treaty standard 
that does more than merely restate customary international law. If states wanted the 
international minimum standard to be applied to their investment treaties, they would 
have opted to incorporate that standard expressis verbis.245 
This could mean that endorsers of this view value a dynamic, evolutionary, 
and process-based approach to international law. It could also be an indicator 
of the value of state autonomy and consent as the basis of legality and 
legitimacy in international law. Or, for those who disagree with this statement, 
it may be indicative of support for the value of state’s rights, and the value in 
limiting or restricting state liability for its actions under international law (as 
the minimum standard is considered a much high bar for state liability than 
the FET standard in BITs). On its face, however, there is no explicit or express 
value claim being made by this statement. The value must be extrapolated 
through interpretation (which in itself is a subjective enterprise).  
However, the goal of most positivist theories about law would claim that 
agreeing or disagreeing with this statement does not require any value 
orientation; rather, an analysis of the FET standard can be understood in a 
value-free and objective manner. However, if the positive analysis can provide 
an answer for the correct understanding of the FET standard, it seems curious 
that there is any debate on this issue at all. Is there a definitively objective and 
correct position about what the FET standard is? Or is it a matter of subjective 
discourse and preference? The positivist would not claim to be able to 
understand what the FET standard ought to be (as that imposes subjective 
values), but she would claim to describe and know what it is. However, it is 
the claim of a theory of configurative fairness that even an analysis of what a 
rule is requires value knowledge. The statement on the FET standard provides 
a good example of exactly how difficult it is to gain objective knowledge about 
the correct or right understanding of the law.  
The question then becomes what Q methodology can do in assisting the legal 
scholar and the legal decisionmaker in determining both what the FET 
                                                            
245 Annex I, Table 6, Statement 39. 
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standard is, and what it ought to be. The Q method study described in this 
Chapter does seem to indicate that it can advance value knowledge and that 
the science of the subjective in the context of legal inquiry is moved forward 
through such an empirical methodology. However, there still is a lot of work to 
be done in refining the studies so that they more accurately reflect the values 
that users of a particular legal order endorse.  
From this study, there are some broad insights and generalizations that can 
be made about what users of this legal order value. However, the Q method 
study was not able to provide definitive answers on how particular rules and 
principles and procedures ought to be configured so as to produce a fair legal 
order that its users endorse. This is likely not a flaw in Q methodology though. 
It may be possible to derive precise answers about value configuration on 
specific issues in investment treaty arbitration through Q method studies that 
are more focused (as opposed to this Q method study that chose to look at the 
regime as a whole). 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE WAY FORWARD 
 
 
While the Q method study on configuring fairness in investment treaty 
arbitration does provide sound empirical knowledge about perspectives and 
value distribution, it is far from perfect. As a theoretical frame, a theory of 
configurative fairness is a useful way for gaining understanding about the way 
that legal orders develop and the way that legal decisions are made. However, 
one of the initial questions that might be worth asking is whether or not Q 
methodology is able to provide the right type of empirical evidence needed for a 
theory of configurative fairness to work as an applied theory in practice?  
A theory of configurative fairness was developed as a means for explaining the 
subjective elements of legal understanding that are not amenable to objective 
analysis, but that nonetheless play a significant role in determining the way 
that legal orders develop and evolve. The theory makes a simple claim: legal 
orders will be accepted as fair if they reflect a configuration of the underlying 
value claims, demands, expectations (perspectives) that participants in a 
particular legal order actually endorse.  
The difficulty arises in attempting to determine what participants in a 
particular legal order actually value. This requires subjective knowledge that is 
not always empirically observable or amenable to understanding or analysis. 
This is where Q methodology is thought to contribute. As a method, it is well 
suited (maybe the most well suited) for the derivation of unobservable 
subjective phenomenon that are shared among a population of participants. 
The difficulty for the application of Q methodology as an empirical means in 
support of a theory of configurative fairness lies in the ability of Q methodology 
to transform shared perspectives into shared values. However, this is likely to 
be overcome through the experimental design of the Q method study and not a 
flaw in the method itself.  
One of the major shortcomings in this Q method study is not in the lack of 
participants (45 participants is a sufficient number for any Q methodology 
study),1 but in the lack of different types of participants. It was very difficult to 
gain participation in the Q method study and only those with a particular 
interest in this research participated. This, in and of itself, could skew the 
results. It may be that all of the perspectives in this study are the result of 
those with a particular fascination with empirical legal studies as opposed to 
those with an interest in the development of investment treaty arbitration. 
This could mean that most of the perspectives extracted from the study are 
                                                            
1 See Simon Watts & Paul Stenner (2012). Doing Q Methodological Research: Theory, Method, 
and Interpretation. London, Sage, pp. 71-73. 
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those that have a scholarly bent to them, and are therefore not reflections of 
those who are actually impacted by the regime itself (that is, the actual 
claimants and respondents in investment treaty arbitrations).  
An ideal participant design for a Q method study on investment treaty 
arbitration would seek out a balanced number of key interest groups as 
participants. For example, an ideal situation would be to have arbitrators, 
academics, practitioners, capital-exporting state officials, capital-importing 
state officials, civil society actors, and institutional actors (such as ICSID 
officials). It would also seek the participation of actual litigants in investor-
state disputes, including both respondents and claimants.  
A diversity of this type would be able to make more sweeping claims 
(generalizations) about the community of users than the present study can 
(which is primarily academics and practitioners). The problem with garnering 
participation of this kind lies in convincing very busy people, often with 
confidentiality issues relating to their jobs, to participate in a study that may 
uncover subjective information that is not in their best interest to disclose.  
Another problem relating to participants lies in the fact that those affected by 
a particular regime may not know or understand many of the issues being 
debated. For example, the president of a company that has litigated claims 
before investment treaty tribunals may be able to comment generally on the 
utility of investment treaty arbitration as a dispute settlement system, but will 
not be able to provide opinions about the value distribution embedded in 
particular legal rules and principles. Likewise, investment treaty arbitration 
and its link to economic development more generally means that the policies 
surrounding the protection and promotion of foreign direct investment may 
have both direct and indirect effects on persons (primarily the citizens of the 
state hosting a foreign direct investment) with no direct relationship with 
investment treaty arbitration per se. In other words, investment treaty 
arbitration may have an impact on public citizens who actually know nothing 
about investment treaty law.2  
This problem with the type of participants to be included in a Q methodology 
study on investment treaty arbitration is further exacerbated when attempting 
to define who are the users of this legal order. Defining a legal community 
within a finite geographical region can be difficult, defining a legal community 
at the global level can be near impossible. This appears to be the case with 
investment treaty arbitration. Its reach is truly global, and because of this, its 
users potentially come from a wide array of cultures and backgrounds. For Q 
methodology to really gain traction as a tool for configuring fair legal orders, it 
must be able to: 1) identify the relevant legal community, and 2) include 
                                                            
2 These citizens could be considered participants with a voice in determining who investment 
treaty arbitration ought to develop, but they may not be able to participate in Q method studies 
relating to the technical configuration of its rules and practices. 
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participants from every type of actor within that community. In the case of 
investment treaty arbitration, for the reasons given above, this may be quite 
difficult to do.  
However, even if a Q method study can get a perfect balance that is 
representative of all the different types of interests who use investment treaty 
arbitration, there will still be further design issues that will need to be dealt 
with. There were a number of issues that arose in the context of this pilot Q 
method study that could be improved on in future applications.  
The first issue relates to the selection of the statements, and to how the 
statements are phrased. It may be that the selection of the statements in this 
Q method study attempted to be too comprehensive. As such, it covered a wide 
array of subjects relating to investment treaty arbitration, but the subjects 
themselves may not have had much to do with each other. One way to 
overcome this problem is to limit the subject-matter of a Q method study to a 
very specific area of focus. It may be that specific legal issues could be 
addressed in separate studies. One may conduct a Q method study on the 
scope and meaning of MFN provisions in investment treaties, for example. This 
would allow the researcher to design a study that could provide a number of 
statements that are all directly related to MFN clauses and their 
interpretation. With such a specified study, it is likely that very nuanced and 
sophisticated subjective viewpoints could be discovered.  
A second issue relates to the phrasing of the statements. Some of the 
statements in this Q method study created compound statements where a 
participant might agree with one part of the statement and disagree with 
another part of the statement.3 This should be avoided.4 A third issue relates 
to the Q sort distribution. As identified in Chapter 6, deep or shallow 
distributions can be used.5 In our Q method study, a relatively deep 
distribution was used (see Table 1 above). It would have been much better to 
have used a shallow distribution that included a larger range of agree-disagree 
categories. In the case of this Q method study, there were 7 columns in which 
to place the statements (-3 at the right to +3 at the left). However, it is possible 
to use a distribution with as many as 13 columns (-6 at the right to +6 at the 
left). This would have allowed for much more detailed and refined points of 
consensus and disagreement to have emerged. 
A final suggestion relating to the design of future Q method studies attempting 
to apply a theory of configurative fairness would be to conduct two separate 
                                                            
3 E.g. Statement 37 states “[w]hen investment tribunals get it wrong, neither states nor 
investors have meaningful recourse to a review mechanism. Investment treaty arbitration needs 
a permanent appellate body with a broader scope of review than the current annulment 
process.” It is possible, according to this statement, for a participant to agree with the first part, 
but to disagree with the second part. See Statement 37, Annex I, Table 5. 
4 See Watts & Stenner, supra note 1 at p. 62. 
5 See Chapter 6, Section 3.4. 
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studies that the same set of participants would complete. The first study 
would ask the participants to rank-order a set of statements that asks very 
general questions about the values that they endorse in any given legal order. 
This would provide evidence of what participants value in the configuration of 
legal orders in general. The second study would then ask the participants 
specific questions about the issues under debate in a particular legal order 
such as investment treaty arbitration. Once the two studies are complete, a 
second-order correlation of the two studies could be conducted.6 This would 
show how one’s general outlook or worldview relates to how one views specific 
issues in a particular legal order. This could assist in reducing the amount of 
interpretation and speculation that the researcher has to do in translating a 
participants’ view about a particular legal rule and what that means in terms 
of that participant’s view about the value distribution that such a view might 
endorse. While this might produce more exacting knowledge about what 
values are endorsed according to the problems faced by a particular legal 
order, it would also be quite time consuming for the participant, and might 
exacerbate the already present difficulty in soliciting participation. 
The application of Q methodology as it is used in the context of this work is 
novel. Such an application has not been attempted before. The main focus of 
this work was to demonstrate the utility of Q methodology in providing 
empirical evidence about subjective phenomenon in a manner that could allow 
for a theory of configurative fairness to be applied to particular evolving legal 
orders. There is good evidence that Q methodology, if properly utilized, is up to 
the task. Q methodology has the ability to reduce subjective data in a way that 
can be objectively and scientifically evaluated. Through refinements in the way 
that Q methodology studies are conducted in the future, this method is 
capable of bridging the gap between the subjective and the objective in 
jurisprudential thought in a way that can facilitate the configuration of fair 
legal orders. 
                                                            
6 See Watts & Stenner, supra note 1 at pp. 53-54. 
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ANNEX I 
 
 
Table 1: Socio-Demographic Information of Participants 
No. Gender Age Locale Profession Expertise* 
1 Male 30 – 45 North America PhD Candidate 1, 2, 3, 4, 11 
2 Female 45 – 60 North America Academic 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 
3 Female 30 – 45 Latin America PhD Candidate 1, 2, 3, 8 
4 Male 30 – 45 Africa Academic 1, 4, 5 
5 Male Under 30 CIS Institution Attorney 1, 4, 5, 6, 11 
6 Male 30 – 45 Europe Small Firm Attorney 1, 4, 5 
7 Male 45 – 60 North America Arbitrator 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 12 
8 Male 30 – 45 Latin America Gov. Attorney 1, 2, 3, 8 
9 Male 30 – 45 SE Asia Academic 1, 2, 3, 7 
10 Male 30 – 45 SE Asia PhD Candidate 1, 2, 3 
11 Female Under 30 SE Asia Academic 1, 10, 11 
12 Female 30 – 45 SE Asia PhD Candidate 1 
13 Male Under 30  Large Firm Attorney 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 
14 Male Over 60 North America Consultant 1, 2, 3, 4 
15 Male Over 60   1 
16 Male 30 – 45 Australasia Academic 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 11 
17 Male 30 – 45   1, 2, 3, 9, 12 
18 Female 30 – 45 North America Consultant 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 11 
19 Male 30 – 45 Australasia Academic 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 12 
20 Male 30 – 45   1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 
21 Female 45 – 60 SE Asia Consultant 1, 8, 12 
22 Female Under 30 Europe PhD Candidate 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 10 
23 Male 30 – 45   1, 4 
24 Female 30 – 45   1, 2, 3, 4, 7 
25 Female Under 30   1, 4, 8 
26 Male 30 – 45 North America Large Firm Attorney 1, 4 
27 Male 45 – 60 Europe Academic 1, 2, 3 
28 Female 30 – 45 South Asia PhD Candidate 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
29 Male Over 60   1, 2, 3 
30 Male 30 – 45 Europe Small Firm Attorney 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 11 
31 Male 30 – 45 North America Large Firm Attorney 1, 2, 3, 4 
32 Male 30 – 45 Latin America Gov. Attorney 1, 2, 3, 4 
33 Male 30 – 45 Australasia Large Firm Attorney 1, 4, 7 
34 Female 30 – 45 North America Small Firm Attorney 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
35 Male 30 – 45   1 
36 Male 30 – 45   1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 12 
37 Female Under 30 North America Large Firm Attorney 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 12 
38 Male 30 – 45 North America Large Firm Attorney 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 12 
39 Male 30 – 45  Academic 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 12 
40 Female 30 – 45 North America Large Firm Attorney 1, 2, 3, 4 
41 Male 30 – 45   1, 2, 3, 4, 7 
42 Male 45 – 60 Europe Small Firm Attorney 1, 4 
43 Female Under 30 Africa PhD Candidate 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9 
44 Female 45 – 60 Europe Arbitrator 1, 4, 5, 11, 12 
45 Male 30 – 45   4, 5, 7 
All of the socio-demographic data submitted in the Q method study was self-accessed and 
voluntary. The individual identity of the participants remains anonymous.  
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* Code for Expertise 
1 – International Law 
2 – Investment Law 
3 – Investor-State Arbitration 
4 – International Arbitration 
5 – Trade Law 
6 – Treaty Law 
7 – Conflicts of Law 
8 – Public Law 
9 – Human Rights Law 
10 – Environmental Law 
11 – Legal Theory 
12 – International Relations 
 
Table 2: List of Statements (Q Set) 
No. Statement Category 
1 A teleological method of interpretation of a BIT provision that would 
result in the implementation of a treaty’s purpose in a manner not 
contemplated by the parties must always be rejected as contrary to the 
parties’ intention. 
Interpretive 
Scope 
2 BIT partners turn to the US Model BIT with the equivalent of an IMF 
gun pointed at their heads. For many, a BIT relationship is hardly a 
voluntary, uncoerced transaction. 
Bilateral 
Versus 
Multilateral 
3 Collegiality demands that arbitrators sitting on three member tribunals 
reach a common view as to how the case should be resolved. 
Dissenting opinions should always be avoided. 
Arbitrators or 
Judges 
4 The Argentine government has rightly pondered the domestic political 
viability of paying on an award that an annulment committee has 
delegitimized. If the annulment committee did not intend to kill the 
CMS award, it should not have wounded it so severely. 
Public or 
Private 
5 Although the exhaustion of local remedies rule is well established in 
the context of diplomatic protection, investment treaties are different, 
and arbitrators have rightly interpreted most of them as eliminating the 
rule. The decision to do away with the rule in investor-state arbitration 
was made consciously and for good reasons. 
Investors 
Versus 
States 
6 An ‘objective’ test for defining an investment under the ICSID 
Convention is the correct approach. There is an objective limitation to 
ICSID jurisdiction separate from that to which the parties have 
consented. 
Types of 
Claims and 
Claimants 
7 Conflicting precedent is part of the system building exercise that 
investor-state tribunals engage in; divergence in awards does not need 
to be seen as defying the concept of a coherent and uniform system, 
but rather is part of the evolution towards a jurisprudence constante. 
Arbitrators or 
Judges 
8 An investor cannot establish an investment treaty breach based on a 
denial of justice claim if there exists any available domestic legal 
mechanism for having such conduct reviewed and corrected, which the 
investor failed to invoke. 
Substantive 
Issues 
9 If umbrella clauses truly were intended to have such significant scope 
to protect investors, it seems suspicious that no investor had sought 
the protection of one for five decades.  
Interpretive 
Scope 
10 Increasing transparency and opening the doors to third-party amicus 
interveners in investor-state arbitration could potentially ‘re-politicize’ 
disputes and lead to the arbitration becoming a ‘court of public 
opinion.’ 
Public or 
Private 
11 The rejection of ICSID is a phenomenon that seems to be limited to a 
minority of states and can be explained more by the countries’ internal 
Evolution or 
Devolution 
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political situation rather than a more widespread view of a lack of 
legitimacy. 
12 While an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons may be 
classified as a taking for a public purpose, and thus may be legitimate 
and legal, the fact that the property was taken for this reason does not 
affect either its nature or the measure of the compensation to be paid 
for the taking. 
Substantive 
Issues 
13 New proposals for a comprehensive multilateral investment agreement 
would likely succumb to the same shortcomings that thwarted previous 
efforts. 
Bilateral 
versus 
Multilateral 
14 The level of due diligence required under the ‘full protection and 
security’ standard in BITs should depend on the host state’s 
development and stability. The availability of resources may have a 
decisive impact on a state’s ability to provide protection and security. 
Substantive 
Issues 
15 The range of important issues in international investment law on which 
academics disagree, and on which arbitrations have reached conflicting 
decisions, are not the temporary ‘growing pains’ of a system rapidly 
approaching coherence, but are the product of a much deeper conflict 
of interests. 
Arbitrators or 
Judges 
16 Umbrella clauses in BITs should be recast to place strong reciprocal 
obligations on investors that requiring them to observe commitments 
made to the host state. These clauses should be structured to allow the 
host state to invoke the clause as a counterclaim or even to initiate a 
BIT arbitration against the investor. 
Investors 
Versus 
States 
17 A state should be entitled to adopt precautionary regulations to protect 
against potential health or environmental threats, but where there is 
only limited scientific evidence supporting a health or environmental 
measure, the state – and not the investor – should bear the costs of 
adopting that measure. 
Investors 
Versus 
States 
18 A state’s decision to invoke ‘essential security’ to justify a measure, 
even if detrimental to a foreign investor’s rights, should be a self-
judging action that renders an investor’s arbitration claim 
inadmissible. 
Investors 
Versus 
States 
19 Investors should never expect that the circumstances prevailing at the 
time the investment is made will remain totally unchanged. To 
determine whether frustration of the investor’s expectations was 
justified, the host state’s right to subsequently regulate domestic 
matters in the public interest must also be taken into consideration. 
Interpretive 
Scope 
20 The dissenting opinion on jurisdiction in Tokios Tokelės  was correct. 
The ICSID Convention should protect all genuinely international 
investments but, by the same token, only genuinely international 
investments. This was actually a domestic dispute between the 
Ukrainian state and a Ukrainian investor. 
Types of 
Claims and 
Claimants 
21 It is beyond doubt that shareholders do, and should, have standing in 
ICSID disputes to submit claims separate and independent from the 
claims of the corporation. This principle applies to all shareholders, no 
matter whether or not they own the majority of the shares or control 
the corporation. 
Types of 
Claims and 
Claimants 
22 A shift to a default ‘loser pays’ rule in investor-state arbitrations that 
awards costs to victorious respondents could only be seen as 
foreclosing access to this type of justice for smaller companies. 
Evolution or 
Devolution 
23 Every international convention must be deemed tacitly to refer to 
general principles of international law for all questions which it does 
not itself resolve in express terms and in a different way. 
Interpretive 
Scope 
24 An MFN clause in a basic treaty cannot be relied upon by the investor 
to expand the jurisdiction of an international tribunal. Jurisdiction in 
the basic treaty cannot be rewritten before the commencement of 
proceedings by reference to the provisions of a third treaty. 
Bilateral 
Versus 
Multilateral 
25 For all practical purposes, the ‘investment’ screen of the ICSID Types of 
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Convention should have no bite. There is not a single pending or 
concluded case that should be – or should have been – excluded on this 
ground. 
Claims and 
Claimants 
26 Human rights law and investment law have many similarities; they are 
both aimed at legal protection of individual rights by means of legal and 
judicial restraints on government powers. 
Interpretive 
Scope 
27 Umbrella clauses were not designed to produce a thin sliver of security, 
akin to a friendly reminder of the host state’s other obligations under 
the treaty. Rather, the intent was to create a system where at least 
certain straightforward breaches of contract could be redressed in an 
international forum. 
Substantive 
Issues 
28 When BITs prescribe treating the foreign investor in accordance with 
customary international law, they should be understood to mean the 
standard of international law embodied in the terms of some two 
thousand concordant BITs. 
Evolution or 
Devolution 
29 The rise of the restrictive approach to the definition of investment may 
well be related to the broader backlash against investment arbitration – 
certainly the timing of the two developments overlaps rather neatly. 
Types of 
Claims and 
Claimants 
30 Fork-in-the-road clauses should always be interpreted narrowly, so as 
to only preclude attempts to re-litigate the exact same claim against the 
exact same opponent. 
Substantive 
Issues 
31 The search for predictability and coherence in any legal system can 
quickly start one down a very short road to a loss of legitimacy if it 
results in a lack of attention to the fundamental economic and political 
purposes and social values used to justify the system. 
Public or 
Private 
32 The term ‘treatment’ in MFN clauses is in itself wide enough to be 
applicable to procedural matters such as dispute settlement. 
Bilateral 
Versus 
Multilateral 
33 There is a strong moral as well as policy case for governments to 
withdraw from investment treaties and to oppose investor-state 
arbitration, including a refusal to pay arbitration awards against them. 
Evolution or 
Devolution 
34 Those who challenge the legitimacy of international adjudication aim at 
the wrong target. They criticize the principle of the supremacy of 
international law when their real complaint has to do with the political 
choices of their own government in making the bargains reflected in 
international treaties. 
Investors 
Versus 
States 
35 It is far from clear that the fear of arbitrator bias derives from 
governments and investors as opposed to pundits and academics. 
Arbitrators or 
Judges 
36 Litigants in investor-state disputes want fairness much less than they 
want victory. 
Public or 
Private 
37 When investment tribunals get it wrong, neither states nor investors 
have any meaningful recourse to a review mechanism. Investment 
treaty arbitration needs a permanent appellate body with a broader 
scope of review than the current ICSID annulment process. 
Public or 
Private 
38 Rightly or wrongly, arbitral tribunals and MFN clauses are developing 
the aggregate of bilateral investment treaties into a functional 
substitute for a multilateral investment instrument. 
Bilateral 
Versus 
Multilateral 
39 The ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard in BITs is an independent 
treaty standard that does more than merely restate customary 
international law. If states wanted the international minimum standard 
to be applied to their investment treaties, they would have opted to 
incorporate that standard expressis verbis. 
Evolution or 
Devolution 
40 The awards of many investor-state tribunals indicate that ideological 
preferences drive decision-making, rather than treaty text or legal 
norms. 
Arbitrators or 
Judges 
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Table 3: Defining Q Sorts for All Six Factors  
Factor Defining Q Sort Total Q 
Sorts 
Cumulative 
Total 
Eigenvalue Variance 
1 1, 2, 7, 14, 21, 27, 
(28)*, 29, 36, 42 
10 10 5.40 12% 
2 3,  5, 11, 19, 24, 31, 
34, 38 
8 18 4.47 11% 
3 4, 10, 23, 35, 43 5 23 4.05 9% 
4 13, 33, 37, 40 4 28 3.60 8% 
5 17, 25 2 30 2.70 6% 
6 6, 8, 15 3 33 2.25 5% 
Confounded** 12, 18, 20, 22, 32, 41 6 38   
Not 
Significant*** 
9, 16, 26, 30, 39, 44, 
45 
7 45   
The Q sorts marked as bold are those whose correlations with that factor exceed 60 percent. 
These are defining Q sorts for that factor and were used to create the factor estimate and factor 
arrays for that factor.  
All Q sorts attributed to a factor correlated at a level above 41 percent. This level connotes a 
statistically significant correlation between the individual Q sort and the factor to which it is 
attributed.  
* A Q sort marked in parentheses connotes a bipolar factor loading for that Q sort. These Q 
sorts represent a configuration of the Q sort data that is the polar opposite for that factor.  
** A confounded Q sort is one that had a statistically significant correlation on more than one 
factor. These Q sorts did not contribute to the factor estimates for any of the six factors. 
*** A not significant Q sort is one that did not correlate with any of the six factors in a 
statistically significant way. This means that these seven Q sorts did not correlate with any of 
the other Q sorts in a statistically significant way. This is an indication that these Q sorts are 
unique or idiosyncratic. In general, these Q sorts represent limited shared thinking between 
other study participants.  
 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix for All Six Factors  
No.*   Factors 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 50 -23 25 17 -15 5 
2 54 -7 31 35 17 10 
3 -10 46 35 27 14 -16 
4 -5 10 59 15 -22 18 
5 -10 45 35 23 14 -10 
6 -4 -8 5 13 2 71 
7 72 3 8 13 -12 20 
8 -1 14 3 17 9 46 
9 19 29 40 17 -6 -3 
10 27 20 47 -1 -35 -19 
11 -5 69 26 -7 -11 -13 
12 -2 45 47 31 1 0 
13 18 5 -9 59 -12 27 
14 62 14 13 26 -6 5 
15 -15 11 21 -29 0 62 
16 6 16 38 28 -1 -33 
17 -12 10 0 27 50 24 
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18 32 44 12 56 -20 35 
19 -3 67 7 8 14 21 
20 55 -3 18 48 -2 -6 
21 59 -33 -12 20 -48 -7 
22 15 52 56 -7 29 2 
23 25 -8 44 -15 1 24 
24 8 55 4 -15 29 -7 
25 10 24 13 3 51 15 
26 6 -7 11 33 -33 -11 
27 63 -4 34 3 24 -13 
28 -54 -33 4 -1 13 32 
29 55 -17 7 13 -35 -35 
30 13 6 7 3 -32 13 
31 21 63 9 33 8 2 
32 -28 52 -7 -15 58 -12 
33 30 9 34 43 -23 8 
34 -20 69 5 -3 21 33 
35 30 20 59 18 16 7 
36 55 7 5 -2 -30 4 
37 11 16 29 56 25 -1 
38 27 58 27 12 -19 20 
39 38 30 24 29 -3 -2 
40 37 11 4 49 0 -15 
41 16 -6 41 57 3 7 
42 60 -15 1 15 -1 -22 
43 14 19 81 11 -2 9 
44 40 18 4 -24 19 -1 
45 38 23 27 24 -5 -18 
 
** 5.40 4.75 4.05 3.60 2.70 2.25 
*** 12% 11% 9% 8% 6% 5% 
* The rows represent each of the 45 individual Q sorts used in this study. 
Each number in the matrix represents the percentage that the configuration of each individual 
Q sort correlates with each of the six defined factors that have been extracted. The calculation 
for determining whether an individual Q sort significantly correlates with one or more of the 
factors is the following: 2.58 x (1/√number of items in the Q set). For this study, this equates to 
2.58 x (1/√40) = 0.41  
Any individual Q sort with a percentage above 41 percent indicates a statistically significant 
factor loading for that Q sort. A negative factor loading in excess of 41 percent indicates a Q sort 
is the polar opposite of the positive correlation.  
Any individual Q sort with a percentage above 60 percent indicates a highly correlated sort. 
These sorts, denoted in bold, are the sorts used in constructing the factor estimates and factor 
arrays for each of the six factors.  
** Eigenvalues. The eigenvalue is the sum of squared factor loadings for each factor. It signifies 
the amount of variance among Q sorts that a particular factor represents. Generally speaking, a 
factor with an eigenvalue below one is considered insignificant because such a factor would 
represent less variance than is contained in a single individual Q sort. Since Q methodology 
looks for shared patterns of thought across participants, a factor with an eigenvalue below one 
are normally discarded. 
*** Variance percentage. Combined, the six factors analyzed explain 49 percent of the total 
variance of all the Q sorts. 
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Table 5: Correlations Between Factors 
Factors Factors 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 100 -1 38 61 30 -8 
2 -1 100 54 33 47 16 
3 38 54 100 52 15 16 
4 61 33 52 100 -2 10 
5 -30 47 15 -2 100 14 
6 -8 16 16 10 14 100 
This table shows the correlations between factors. A factor with a percentage above 41 percent 
indicates a statistically significant correlation between factors.  
 
Table 6: Factor Arrays for All Six Factors 
No. Statement Factors 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 A teleological method of interpretation of a BIT provision 
that would result in the implementation of a treaty’s 
purpose in a manner not contemplated by the parties 
must always be rejected as contrary to the parties’ 
intention. 
-2 -1 -1 1 2 -2 
2 BIT partners turn to the US Model BIT with the 
equivalent of an IMF gun pointed at their heads. For 
many, a BIT relationship is hardly a voluntary, 
uncoerced transaction. 
-3 1 -1 -2 1 -1 
3 Collegiality demands that arbitrators sitting on three 
member tribunals reach a common view as to how the 
case should be resolved. Dissenting opinions should 
always be avoided. 
-2 -3 -3 -2 -2 -1 
4 The Argentine government has rightly pondered the 
domestic political viability of paying on an award that an 
annulment committee has delegitimized. If the 
annulment committee did not intend to kill the CMS 
award, it should not have wounded it so severely. 
-1 -1 0 -1 -2 1 
5 Although the exhaustion of local remedies rule is well 
established in the context of diplomatic protection, 
investment treaties are different, and arbitrators have 
rightly interpreted most of them as eliminating the rule. 
The decision to do away with the rule in investor-state 
arbitration was made consciously and for good reasons. 
1 -1 2 2 -2 0 
6 An ‘objective’ test for defining an investment under the 
ICSID Convention is the correct approach. There is an 
objective limitation to ICSID jurisdiction separate from 
that to which the parties have consented. 
-1 2 1 0 3 -2 
7 Conflicting precedent is part of the system building 
exercise that investor-state tribunals engage in; 
divergence in awards does not need to be seen as defying 
the concept of a coherent and uniform system, but 
rather is part of the evolution towards a jurisprudence 
constante. 
1 0 1 2 -1 -3 
8 An investor cannot establish an investment treaty 
breach based on a denial of justice claim if there exists 
any available domestic legal mechanism for having such 
conduct reviewed and corrected, which the investor 
failed to invoke. 
-2 2 0 2 1 0 
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9 If umbrella clauses truly were intended to have such 
significant scope to protect investors, it seems 
suspicious that no investor had sought the protection of 
one for five decades.  
-1 1 -1 -2 0 0 
10 Increasing transparency and opening the doors to third-
party amicus interveners in investor-state arbitration 
could potentially ‘re-politicize’ disputes and lead to the 
arbitration becoming a ‘court of public opinion.’ 
0 -2 -2 -1 -1 -1 
11 The rejection of ICSID is a phenomenon that seems to be 
limited to a minority of states and can be explained more 
by the countries’ internal political situation rather than a 
more widespread view of a lack of legitimacy. 
3 0 0 1 -1 -1 
12 While an expropriation or taking for environmental 
reasons may be classified as a taking for a public 
purpose, and thus may be legitimate and legal, the fact 
that the property was taken for this reason does not 
affect either its nature or the measure of the 
compensation to be paid for the taking. 
-1 -2 -2 0 1 3 
13 New proposals for a comprehensive multilateral 
investment agreement would likely succumb to the same 
shortcomings that thwarted previous efforts. 
0 2 0 2 0 0 
14 The level of due diligence required under the ‘full 
protection and security’ standard in BITs should depend 
on the host state’s development and stability. The 
availability of resources may have a decisive impact on a 
state’s ability to provide protection and security. 
1 3 2 1 1 1 
15 The range of important issues in international 
investment law on which academics disagree, and on 
which arbitrations have reached conflicting decisions, 
are not the temporary ‘growing pains’ of a system rapidly 
approaching coherence, but are the product of a much 
deeper conflict of interests. 
-2 1 1 -1 1 2 
16 Umbrella clauses in BITs should be recast to place 
strong reciprocal obligations on investors that requiring 
them to observe commitments made to the host state. 
These clauses should be structured to allow the host 
state to invoke the clause as a counterclaim or even to 
initiate a BIT arbitration against the investor. 
0 0 0 -2 2 1 
17 A state should be entitled to adopt precautionary 
regulations to protect against potential health or 
environmental threats, but where there is only limited 
scientific evidence supporting a health or environmental 
measure, the state – and not the investor – should bear 
the costs of adopting that measure. 
2 -3 -1 1 0 0 
18 A state’s decision to invoke ‘essential security’ to justify a 
measure, even if detrimental to a foreign investor’s 
rights, should be a self-judging action that renders an 
investor’s arbitration claim inadmissible. 
-2 -2 -2 -3 2 -1 
19 Investors should never expect that the circumstances 
prevailing at the time the investment is made will remain 
totally unchanged. To determine whether frustration of 
the investor’s expectations was justified, the host state’s 
right to subsequently regulate domestic matters in the 
public interest must also be taken into consideration. 
1 3 3 3 2 3 
20 The dissenting opinion on jurisdiction in Tokios Tokelės  
was correct. The ICSID Convention should protect all 
genuinely international investments but, by the same 
token, only genuinely international investments. This 
was actually a domestic dispute between the Ukrainian 
-1 1 1 -1 1 2 
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state and a Ukrainian investor. 
21 It is beyond doubt that shareholders do, and should, 
have standing in ICSID disputes to submit claims 
separate and independent from the claims of the 
corporation. This principle applies to all shareholders, no 
matter whether or not they own the majority of the 
shares or control the corporation. 
2 -1 -1 2 0 1 
22 A shift to a default ‘loser pays’ rule in investor-state 
arbitrations that awards costs to victorious respondents 
could only be seen as foreclosing access to this type of 
justice for smaller companies. 
-2 0 0 -2 -1 -2 
23 Every international convention must be deemed tacitly to 
refer to general principles of international law for all 
questions which it does not itself resolve in express 
terms and in a different way. 
1 2 2 0 -1 -2 
24 An MFN clause in a basic treaty cannot be relied upon 
by the investor to expand the jurisdiction of an 
international tribunal. Jurisdiction in the basic treaty 
cannot be rewritten before the commencement of 
proceedings by reference to the provisions of a third 
treaty. 
0 2 1 1 1 -1 
25 For all practical purposes, the ‘investment’ screen of the 
ICSID Convention should have no bite. There is not a 
single pending or concluded case that should be – or 
should have been – excluded on this ground. 
-1 -2 -1 -1 -2 -1 
26 Human rights law and investment law have many 
similarities; they are both aimed at legal protection of 
individual rights by means of legal and judicial restraints 
on government powers. 
2 0 2 1 -3 -1 
27 Umbrella clauses were not designed to produce a thin 
sliver of security, akin to a friendly reminder of the host 
state’s other obligations under the treaty. Rather, the 
intent was to create a system where at least certain 
straightforward breaches of contract could be redressed 
in an international forum. 
1 0 2 2 0 1 
28 When BITs prescribe treating the foreign investor in 
accordance with customary international law, they 
should be understood to mean the standard of 
international law embodied in the terms of some two 
thousand concordant BITs. 
0 -1 -2 -2 -2 -2 
29 The rise of the restrictive approach to the definition of 
investment may well be related to the broader backlash 
against investment arbitration – certainly the timing of 
the two developments overlaps rather neatly. 
0 1 0 0 0 2 
30 Fork-in-the-road clauses should always be interpreted 
narrowly, so as to only preclude attempts to re-litigate 
the exact same claim against the exact same opponent. 
1 -2 2 0 0 0 
31 The search for predictability and coherence in any legal 
system can quickly start one down a very short road to a 
loss of legitimacy if it results in a lack of attention to the 
fundamental economic and political purposes and social 
values used to justify the system. 
0 2 1 0 2 1 
32 The term ‘treatment’ in MFN clauses is in itself wide 
enough to be applicable to procedural matters such as 
dispute settlement. 
2 -1 -1 0 -3 0 
33 There is a strong moral as well as policy case for 
governments to withdraw from investment treaties and 
to oppose investor-state arbitration, including a refusal 
to pay arbitration awards against them. 
-3 -1 -3 -3 1 1 
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34 Those who challenge the legitimacy of international 
adjudication aim at the wrong target. They criticize the 
principle of the supremacy of international law when 
their real complaint has to do with the political choices 
of their own government in making the bargains reflected 
in international treaties. 
3 -1 -1 -1 -2 0 
35 It is far from clear that the fear of arbitrator bias derives 
from governments and investors as opposed to pundits 
and academics. 
1 0 0 0 -1 -2 
36 Litigants in investor-state disputes want fairness much 
less than they want victory. 
2 1 -2 1 3 -3 
37 When investment tribunals get it wrong, neither states 
nor investors have any meaningful recourse to a review 
mechanism. Investment treaty arbitration needs a 
permanent appellate body with a broader scope of review 
than the current ICSID annulment process. 
-1 1 3 -1 2 2 
38 Rightly or wrongly, arbitral tribunals and MFN clauses 
are developing the aggregate of bilateral investment 
treaties into a functional substitute for a multilateral 
investment instrument. 
0 0 1 -1 0 0 
39 The ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard in BITs is an 
independent treaty standard that does more than merely 
restate customary international law. If states wanted the 
international minimum standard to be applied to their 
investment treaties, they would have opted to 
incorporate that standard expressis verbis. 
2 -2 1 3 -2 2 
40 The awards of many investor-state tribunals indicate 
that ideological preferences drive decision-making, 
rather than treaty text or legal norms. 
-1 1 -2 1 -1 -1 
 
Table 7: Consensus Across Factors Matrix (Most to Least) 
No. Statements Factors 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
31 The search for predictability and coherence in any legal 
system can quickly start one down a very short road to a 
loss of legitimacy if it results in a lack of attention to the 
fundamental economic and political purposes and social 
values used to justify the system. 
0 2 1 0 2 1 
25 For all practical purposes, the ‘investment’ screen of the 
ICSID Convention should have no bite. There is not a 
single pending or concluded case that should be – or 
should have been – excluded on this ground. 
-1 -2 -1 -1 -2 -1 
13 New proposals for a comprehensive multilateral 
investment agreement would likely succumb to the same 
shortcomings that thwarted previous efforts. 
0 2 0 2 0 0 
22 A shift to a default ‘loser pays’ rule in investor-state 
arbitrations that awards costs to victorious respondents 
could only be seen as foreclosing access to this type of 
justice for smaller companies. 
-2 0 0 -2 -1 -2 
3 Collegiality demands that arbitrators sitting on three 
member tribunals reach a common view as to how the 
case should be resolved. Dissenting opinions should 
always be avoided. 
-2 -3 -3 -2 -2 -1 
10 Increasing transparency and opening the doors to third-
party amicus interveners in investor-state arbitration 
could potentially ‘re-politicize’ disputes and lead to the 
0 -2 -2 -1 -1 -1 
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arbitration becoming a ‘court of public opinion.’ 
29 The rise of the restrictive approach to the definition of 
investment may well be related to the broader backlash 
against investment arbitration – certainly the timing of 
the two developments overlaps rather neatly. 
0 1 0 0 0 2 
38 Rightly or wrongly, arbitral tribunals and MFN clauses 
are developing the aggregate of bilateral investment 
treaties into a functional substitute for a multilateral 
investment instrument. 
0 0 1 -1 0 2 
14 The level of due diligence required under the ‘full 
protection and security’ standard in BITs should depend 
on the host state’s development and stability. The 
availability of resources may have a decisive impact on a 
state’s ability to provide protection and security. 
1 3 2 1 1 1 
9 If umbrella clauses truly were intended to have such 
significant scope to protect investors, it seems suspicious 
that no investor had sought the protection of one for five 
decades.  
-1 1 -1 -2 0 0 
35 It is far from clear that the fear of arbitrator bias derives 
from governments and investors as opposed to pundits 
and academics. 
1 0 0 0 -1 -2 
4 The Argentine government has rightly pondered the 
domestic political viability of paying on an award that an 
annulment committee has delegitimized. If the 
annulment committee did not intend to kill the CMS 
award, it should not have wounded it so severely. 
-1 -1 0 -1 -2 1 
27 Umbrella clauses were not designed to produce a thin 
sliver of security, akin to a friendly reminder of the host 
state’s other obligations under the treaty. Rather, the 
intent was to create a system where at least certain 
straightforward breaches of contract could be redressed 
in an international forum. 
1 0 2 2 0 1 
19 Investors should never expect that the circumstances 
prevailing at the time the investment is made will remain 
totally unchanged. To determine whether frustration of 
the investor’s expectations was justified, the host state’s 
right to subsequently regulate domestic matters in the 
public interest must also be taken into consideration. 
1 3 3 3 2 3 
28 When BITs prescribe treating the foreign investor in 
accordance with customary international law, they 
should be understood to mean the standard of 
international law embodied in the terms of some two 
thousand concordant BITs. 
0 -1 -2 -2 -2 -2 
30 Fork-in-the-road clauses should always be interpreted 
narrowly, so as to only preclude attempts to re-litigate 
the exact same claim against the exact same opponent. 
1 -2 2 0 0 0 
21 It is beyond doubt that shareholders do, and should, 
have standing in ICSID disputes to submit claims 
separate and independent from the claims of the 
corporation. This principle applies to all shareholders, no 
matter whether or not they own the majority of the 
shares or control the corporation. 
2 -1 -1 2 0 1 
24 An MFN clause in a basic treaty cannot be relied upon by 
the investor to expand the jurisdiction of an 
international tribunal. Jurisdiction in the basic treaty 
cannot be rewritten before the commencement of 
proceedings by reference to the provisions of a third 
treaty. 
0 2 1 1 1 -1 
20 The dissenting opinion on jurisdiction in Tokios Tokelės  -1 1 1 -1 1 2 
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was correct. The ICSID Convention should protect all 
genuinely international investments but, by the same 
token, only genuinely international investments. This 
was actually a domestic dispute between the Ukrainian 
state and a Ukrainian investor. 
8 An investor cannot establish an investment treaty breach 
based on a denial of justice claim if there exists any 
available domestic legal mechanism for having such 
conduct reviewed and corrected, which the investor 
failed to invoke. 
-2 2 0 2 1 0 
16 Umbrella clauses in BITs should be recast to place 
strong reciprocal obligations on investors that requiring 
them to observe commitments made to the host state. 
These clauses should be structured to allow the host 
state to invoke the clause as a counterclaim or even to 
initiate a BIT arbitration against the investor. 
0 0 0 -2 2 1 
15 The range of important issues in international 
investment law on which academics disagree, and on 
which arbitrations have reached conflicting decisions, 
are not the temporary ‘growing pains’ of a system rapidly 
approaching coherence, but are the product of a much 
deeper conflict of interests. 
-2 1 1 -1 1 2 
37 When investment tribunals get it wrong, neither states 
nor investors have any meaningful recourse to a review 
mechanism. Investment treaty arbitration needs a 
permanent appellate body with a broader scope of review 
than the current ICSID annulment process. 
-1 1 3 -1 2 2 
2 BIT partners turn to the US Model BIT with the 
equivalent of an IMF gun pointed at their heads. For 
many, a BIT relationship is hardly a voluntary, 
uncoerced transaction. 
-3 1 -1 -2 1 -1 
5 Although the exhaustion of local remedies rule is well 
established in the context of diplomatic protection, 
investment treaties are different, and arbitrators have 
rightly interpreted most of them as eliminating the rule. 
The decision to do away with the rule in investor-state 
arbitration was made consciously and for good reasons. 
1 -1 2 2 -2 0 
1 A teleological method of interpretation of a BIT provision 
that would result in the implementation of a treaty’s 
purpose in a manner not contemplated by the parties 
must always be rejected as contrary to the parties’ 
intention. 
-2 -1 -1 1 2 -2 
34 Those who challenge the legitimacy of international 
adjudication aim at the wrong target. They criticize the 
principle of the supremacy of international law when 
their real complaint has to do with the political choices 
of their own government in making the bargains reflected 
in international treaties. 
3 -1 -1 -1 -2 0 
11 The rejection of ICSID is a phenomenon that seems to be 
limited to a minority of states and can be explained more 
by the countries’ internal political situation rather than a 
more widespread view of a lack of legitimacy. 
3 0 0 1 -1 -1 
17 A state should be entitled to adopt precautionary 
regulations to protect against potential health or 
environmental threats, but where there is only limited 
scientific evidence supporting a health or environmental 
measure, the state – and not the investor – should bear 
the costs of adopting that measure. 
2 -3 -1 1 0 0 
40 The awards of many investor-state tribunals indicate -1 1 -2 1 -1 2 
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that ideological preferences drive decision-making, rather 
than treaty text or legal norms. 
23 Every international convention must be deemed tacitly to 
refer to general principles of international law for all 
questions which it does not itself resolve in express 
terms and in a different way. 
1 2 2 0 -1 -2 
32 The term ‘treatment’ in MFN clauses is in itself wide 
enough to be applicable to procedural matters such as 
dispute settlement. 
2 -1 -1 0 -3 0 
6 An ‘objective’ test for defining an investment under the 
ICSID Convention is the correct approach. There is an 
objective limitation to ICSID jurisdiction separate from 
that to which the parties have consented. 
-1 2 1 0 3 -2 
7 Conflicting precedent is part of the system building 
exercise that investor-state tribunals engage in; 
divergence in awards does not need to be seen as defying 
the concept of a coherent and uniform system, but 
rather is part of the evolution towards a jurisprudence 
constante. 
1 0 1 2 -1 -3 
12 While an expropriation or taking for environmental 
reasons may be classified as a taking for a public 
purpose, and thus may be legitimate and legal, the fact 
that the property was taken for this reason does not 
affect either its nature or the measure of the 
compensation to be paid for the taking. 
-1 -2 -2 0 1 3 
39 The ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard in BITs is an 
independent treaty standard that does more than merely 
restate customary international law. If states wanted the 
international minimum standard to be applied to their 
investment treaties, they would have opted to 
incorporate that standard expressis verbis. 
2 -2 1 3 -2 1 
26 Human rights law and investment law have many 
similarities; they are both aimed at legal protection of 
individual rights by means of legal and judicial restraints 
on government powers. 
2 0 2 1 -3 -1 
18 A state’s decision to invoke ‘essential security’ to justify a 
measure, even if detrimental to a foreign investor’s 
rights, should be a self-judging action that renders an 
investor’s arbitration claim inadmissible. 
-2 -2 -2 -3 2 -1 
33 There is a strong moral as well as policy case for 
governments to withdraw from investment treaties and to 
oppose investor-state arbitration, including a refusal to 
pay arbitration awards against them. 
-3 -1 -3 -3 1 1 
36 Litigants in investor-state disputes want fairness much 
less than they want victory. 
2 1 -2 1 3 -3 
 
Table 8: Z Scores for Factor 1 
No. Statement Q Sort 
Position 
Z Score 
34 It is far from clear that the fear of arbitrator bias derives from 
governments and investors as opposed to pundits and 
academics. 
3 1.9 
11 The rejection of ICSID is a phenomenon that seems to be 
limited to a minority of states and can be explained more by 
the countries’ internal political situation rather than a more 
widespread view of a lack of legitimacy. 
3 1.8 
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26 Human rights law and investment law have many similarities; 
they are both aimed at legal protection of individual rights by 
means of legal and judicial restraints on government powers. 
2 1.3 
17 A state should be entitled to adopt precautionary regulations 
to protect against potential health or environmental threats, 
but where there is only limited scientific evidence supporting 
a health or environmental measure, the state – and not the 
investor – should bear the costs of adopting that measure. 
2 1.1 
21 It is beyond doubt that shareholders do, and should, have 
standing in ICSID disputes to submit claims separate and 
independent from the claims of the corporation. This principle 
applies to all shareholders, no matter whether or not they 
own the majority of the shares or control the corporation. 
2 1.0 
32 The term ‘treatment’ in MFN clauses is in itself wide enough 
to be applicable to procedural matters such as dispute 
settlement. 
2 1.0 
36 Litigants in investor-state disputes want fairness much less 
than they want victory. 
2 0.9 
39 The ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard in BITs is an 
independent treaty standard that does more than merely 
restate customary international law. If states wanted the 
international minimum standard to be applied to their 
investment treaties, they would have opted to incorporate that 
standard expressis verbis. 
2 0.9 
5 Although the exhaustion of local remedies rule is well 
established in the context of diplomatic protection, investment 
treaties are different, and arbitrators have rightly interpreted 
most of them as eliminating the rule. The decision to do away 
with the rule in investor-state arbitration was made 
consciously and for good reasons. 
1 0.8 
7 Conflicting precedent is part of the system building exercise 
that investor-state tribunals engage in; divergence in awards 
does not need to be seen as defying the concept of a coherent 
and uniform system, but rather is part of the evolution 
towards a jurisprudence constante. 
1 0.8 
30 Fork-in-the-road clauses should always be interpreted 
narrowly, so as to only preclude attempts to re-litigate the 
exact same claim against the exact same opponent. 
1 0.8 
23 Every international convention must be deemed tacitly to refer 
to general principles of international law for all questions 
which it does not itself resolve in express terms and in a 
different way. 
1 0.8 
35 It is far from clear that the fear of arbitrator bias derives from 
governments and investors as opposed to pundits and 
academics. 
1 0.7 
19 Investors should never expect that the circumstances 
prevailing at the time the investment is made will remain 
totally unchanged. To determine whether frustration of the 
investor’s expectations was justified, the host state’s right to 
subsequently regulate domestic matters in the public interest 
must also be taken into consideration. 
1 0.7 
27 Umbrella clauses were not designed to produce a thin sliver of 
security, akin to a friendly reminder of the host state’s other 
obligations under the treaty. Rather, the intent was to create 
a system where at least certain straightforward breaches of 
contract could be redressed in an international forum. 
1 0.3 
14 The level of due diligence required under the ‘full protection 
and security’ standard in BITs should depend on the host 
state’s development and stability. The availability of resources 
1 0.3 
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may have a decisive impact on a state’s ability to provide 
protection and security. 
10 Increasing transparency and opening the doors to third-party 
amicus interveners in investor-state arbitration could 
potentially ‘re-politicize’ disputes and lead to the arbitration 
becoming a ‘court of public opinion.’ 
0 0.3 
28 When BITs prescribe treating the foreign investor in 
accordance with customary international law, they should be 
understood to mean the standard of international law 
embodied in the terms of some two thousand concordant 
BITs. 
0 0.3 
38 Rightly or wrongly, arbitral tribunals and MFN clauses are 
developing the aggregate of bilateral investment treaties into a 
functional substitute for a multilateral investment 
instrument. 
0 0.3 
16 Umbrella clauses in BITs should be recast to place strong 
reciprocal obligations on investors that requiring them to 
observe commitments made to the host state. These clauses 
should be structured to allow the host state to invoke the 
clause as a counterclaim or even to initiate a BIT arbitration 
against the investor. 
0 0.1 
31 The search for predictability and coherence in any legal 
system can quickly start one down a very short road to a loss 
of legitimacy if it results in a lack of attention to the 
fundamental economic and political purposes and social 
values used to justify the system. 
0 0.1 
29 The rise of the restrictive approach to the definition of 
investment may well be related to the broader backlash 
against investment arbitration – certainly the timing of the 
two developments overlaps rather neatly. 
0 0.1 
13 New proposals for a comprehensive multilateral investment 
agreement would likely succumb to the same shortcomings 
that thwarted previous efforts. 
0 0.0 
24 An MFN clause in a basic treaty cannot be relied upon by the 
investor to expand the jurisdiction of an international 
tribunal. Jurisdiction in the basic treaty cannot be rewritten 
before the commencement of proceedings by reference to the 
provisions of a third treaty. 
0 -0.1 
12 While an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons 
may be classified as a taking for a public purpose, and thus 
may be legitimate and legal, the fact that the property was 
taken for this reason does not affect either its nature or the 
measure of the compensation to be paid for the taking. 
-1 -0.1 
4 The Argentine government has rightly pondered the domestic 
political viability of paying on an award that an annulment 
committee has delegitimized. If the annulment committee did 
not intend to kill the CMS award, it should not have wounded 
it so severely. 
-1 -0.4 
6 An ‘objective’ test for defining an investment under the ICSID 
Convention is the correct approach. There is an objective 
limitation to ICSID jurisdiction separate from that to which 
the parties have consented. 
-1 -0.5 
37 When investment tribunals get it wrong, neither states nor 
investors have any meaningful recourse to a review 
mechanism. Investment treaty arbitration needs a permanent 
appellate body with a broader scope of review than the 
current ICSID annulment process. 
-1 -0.5 
20 The dissenting opinion on jurisdiction in Tokios Tokelės  was 
correct. The ICSID Convention should protect all genuinely 
-1 -0.6 
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international investments but, by the same token, only 
genuinely international investments. This was actually a 
domestic dispute between the Ukrainian state and a 
Ukrainian investor. 
40 The awards of many investor-state tribunals indicate that 
ideological preferences drive decision-making, rather than 
treaty text or legal norms. 
-1 -0.6 
25 For all practical purposes, the ‘investment’ screen of the 
ICSID Convention should have no bite. There is not a single 
pending or concluded case that should be – or should have 
been – excluded on this ground. 
-1 -0.6 
9 If umbrella clauses truly were intended to have such 
significant scope to protect investors, it seems suspicious that 
no investor had sought the protection of one for five decades. 
-1 -0.8 
1 A teleological method of interpretation of a BIT provision that 
would result in the implementation of a treaty’s purpose in a 
manner not contemplated by the parties must always be 
rejected as contrary to the parties’ intention. 
-2 -0.9 
22 A shift to a default ‘loser pays’ rule in investor-state 
arbitrations that awards costs to victorious respondents could 
only be seen as foreclosing access to this type of justice for 
smaller companies. 
-2 -1.0 
8 An investor cannot establish an investment treaty breach 
based on a denial of justice claim if there exists any available 
domestic legal mechanism for having such conduct reviewed 
and corrected, which the investor failed to invoke. 
-2 -1.1 
15 The range of important issues in international investment law 
on which academics disagree, and on which arbitrations have 
reached conflicting decisions, are not the temporary ‘growing 
pains’ of a system rapidly approaching coherence, but are the 
product of a much deeper conflict of interests. 
-2 -1.1 
3 Collegiality demands that arbitrators sitting on three member 
tribunals reach a common view as to how the case should be 
resolved. Dissenting opinions should always be avoided. 
-2 -1.2 
18 A state’s decision to invoke ‘essential security’ to justify a 
measure, even if detrimental to a foreign investor’s rights, 
should be a self-judging action that renders an investor’s 
arbitration claim inadmissible. 
-2 -1.8 
2 BIT partners turn to the US Model BIT with the equivalent of 
an IMF gun pointed at their heads. For many, a BIT 
relationship is hardly a voluntary, uncoerced transaction. 
-3 -2.0 
33 There is a strong moral as well as policy case for governments 
to withdraw from investment treaties and to oppose investor-
state arbitration, including a refusal to pay arbitration awards 
against them. 
-3 -2.5 
 
Table 9: Z Scores for Factor 2 
No. Statement Q Sort 
Position 
Z Score 
19 Investors should never expect that the circumstances 
prevailing at the time the investment is made will remain 
totally unchanged. To determine whether frustration of the 
investor’s expectations was justified, the host state’s right to 
subsequently regulate domestic matters in the public interest 
must also be taken into consideration. 
3 2.5 
14 The level of due diligence required under the ‘full protection 3 1.7 
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and security’ standard in BITs should depend on the host 
state’s development and stability. The availability of resources 
may have a decisive impact on a state’s ability to provide 
protection and security. 
24 An MFN clause in a basic treaty cannot be relied upon by the 
investor to expand the jurisdiction of an international 
tribunal. Jurisdiction in the basic treaty cannot be rewritten 
before the commencement of proceedings by reference to the 
provisions of a third treaty. 
2 1.5 
23 Every international convention must be deemed tacitly to 
refer to general principles of international law for all 
questions which it does not itself resolve in express terms and 
in a different way. 
2 1.4 
13 New proposals for a comprehensive multilateral investment 
agreement would likely succumb to the same shortcomings 
that thwarted previous efforts. 
2 1.1 
6 An ‘objective’ test for defining an investment under the ICSID 
Convention is the correct approach. There is an objective 
limitation to ICSID jurisdiction separate from that to which 
the parties have consented. 
2 1.0 
8 An investor cannot establish an investment treaty breach 
based on a denial of justice claim if there exists any available 
domestic legal mechanism for having such conduct reviewed 
and corrected, which the investor failed to invoke. 
2 1.0 
31 The search for predictability and coherence in any legal 
system can quickly start one down a very short road to a loss 
of legitimacy if it results in a lack of attention to the 
fundamental economic and political purposes and social 
values used to justify the system. 
2 1.0 
20 The dissenting opinion on jurisdiction in Tokios Tokelės  was 
correct. The ICSID Convention should protect all genuinely 
international investments but, by the same token, only 
genuinely international investments. This was actually a 
domestic dispute between the Ukrainian state and a 
Ukrainian investor. 
1 1.0 
15 The range of important issues in international investment law 
on which academics disagree, and on which arbitrations have 
reached conflicting decisions, are not the temporary ‘growing 
pains’ of a system rapidly approaching coherence, but are the 
product of a much deeper conflict of interests. 
1 0.9 
29 The rise of the restrictive approach to the definition of 
investment may well be related to the broader backlash 
against investment arbitration – certainly the timing of the 
two developments overlaps rather neatly. 
1 0.7 
40 The awards of many investor-state tribunals indicate that 
ideological preferences drive decision-making, rather than 
treaty text or legal norms. 
1 0.7 
36 Litigants in investor-state disputes want fairness much less 
than they want victory. 
1 0.5 
37 When investment tribunals get it wrong, neither states nor 
investors have any meaningful recourse to a review 
mechanism. Investment treaty arbitration needs a permanent 
appellate body with a broader scope of review than the 
current ICSID annulment process. 
1 0.5 
9 If umbrella clauses truly were intended to have such 
significant scope to protect investors, it seems suspicious that 
no investor had sought the protection of one for five decades.  
1 0.3 
2 BIT partners turn to the US Model BIT with the equivalent of 
an IMF gun pointed at their heads. For many, a BIT 
1 0.2 
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relationship is hardly a voluntary, uncoerced transaction. 
7 Conflicting precedent is part of the system building exercise 
that investor-state tribunals engage in; divergence in awards 
does not need to be seen as defying the concept of a coherent 
and uniform system, but rather is part of the evolution 
towards a jurisprudence constante. 
0 0.1 
26 Human rights law and investment law have many similarities; 
they are both aimed at legal protection of individual rights by 
means of legal and judicial restraints on government powers. 
0 0.0 
35 It is far from clear that the fear of arbitrator bias derives from 
governments and investors as opposed to pundits and 
academics. 
0 -0.1 
38 Rightly or wrongly, arbitral tribunals and MFN clauses are 
developing the aggregate of bilateral investment treaties into a 
functional substitute for a multilateral investment 
instrument. 
0 -0.1 
16 Umbrella clauses in BITs should be recast to place strong 
reciprocal obligations on investors that requiring them to 
observe commitments made to the host state. These clauses 
should be structured to allow the host state to invoke the 
clause as a counterclaim or even to initiate a BIT arbitration 
against the investor. 
0 -0.2 
22 A shift to a default ‘loser pays’ rule in investor-state 
arbitrations that awards costs to victorious respondents could 
only be seen as foreclosing access to this type of justice for 
smaller companies. 
0 -0.3 
27 Umbrella clauses were not designed to produce a thin sliver of 
security, akin to a friendly reminder of the host state’s other 
obligations under the treaty. Rather, the intent was to create 
a system where at least certain straightforward breaches of 
contract could be redressed in an international forum. 
0 -0.4 
11 The rejection of ICSID is a phenomenon that seems to be 
limited to a minority of states and can be explained more by 
the countries’ internal political situation rather than a more 
widespread view of a lack of legitimacy. 
0 -0.4 
33 There is a strong moral as well as policy case for governments 
to withdraw from investment treaties and to oppose investor-
state arbitration, including a refusal to pay arbitration 
awards against them. 
-1 -0.4 
1 A teleological method of interpretation of a BIT provision that 
would result in the implementation of a treaty’s purpose in a 
manner not contemplated by the parties must always be 
rejected as contrary to the parties’ intention. 
-1 -0.4 
34 Those who challenge the legitimacy of international 
adjudication aim at the wrong target. They criticize the 
principle of the supremacy of international law when their 
real complaint has to do with the political choices of their own 
government in making the bargains reflected in international 
treaties. 
-1 -0.5 
21 It is beyond doubt that shareholders do, and should, have 
standing in ICSID disputes to submit claims separate and 
independent from the claims of the corporation. This principle 
applies to all shareholders, no matter whether or not they 
own the majority of the shares or control the corporation. 
-1 -0.5 
4 The Argentine government has rightly pondered the domestic 
political viability of paying on an award that an annulment 
committee has delegitimized. If the annulment committee did 
not intend to kill the CMS award, it should not have wounded 
it so severely. 
-1 -0.5 
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28 When BITs prescribe treating the foreign investor in 
accordance with customary international law, they should be 
understood to mean the standard of international law 
embodied in the terms of some two thousand concordant 
BITs. 
-1 -0.5 
32 The term ‘treatment’ in MFN clauses is in itself wide enough 
to be applicable to procedural matters such as dispute 
settlement. 
-1 -0.6 
5 Although the exhaustion of local remedies rule is well 
established in the context of diplomatic protection, 
investment treaties are different, and arbitrators have rightly 
interpreted most of them as eliminating the rule. The decision 
to do away with the rule in investor-state arbitration was 
made consciously and for good reasons. 
-1 -0.7 
30 Fork-in-the-road clauses should always be interpreted 
narrowly, so as to only preclude attempts to re-litigate the 
exact same claim against the exact same opponent. 
-2 -0.7 
10 Increasing transparency and opening the doors to third-party 
amicus interveners in investor-state arbitration could 
potentially ‘re-politicize’ disputes and lead to the arbitration 
becoming a ‘court of public opinion.’ 
-2 -0.9 
39 The ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard in BITs is an 
independent treaty standard that does more than merely 
restate customary international law. If states wanted the 
international minimum standard to be applied to their 
investment treaties, they would have opted to incorporate 
that standard expressis verbis. 
-2 -1.0 
25 For all practical purposes, the ‘investment’ screen of the 
ICSID Convention should have no bite. There is not a single 
pending or concluded case that should be – or should have 
been – excluded on this ground. 
-2 -1.1 
18 A state’s decision to invoke ‘essential security’ to justify a 
measure, even if detrimental to a foreign investor’s rights, 
should be a self-judging action that renders an investor’s 
arbitration claim inadmissible. 
-2 -1.4 
12 While an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons 
may be classified as a taking for a public purpose, and thus 
may be legitimate and legal, the fact that the property was 
taken for this reason does not affect either its nature or the 
measure of the compensation to be paid for the taking. 
-2 -1.6 
3 Collegiality demands that arbitrators sitting on three member 
tribunals reach a common view as to how the case should be 
resolved. Dissenting opinions should always be avoided. 
-3 -1.8 
17 A state should be entitled to adopt precautionary regulations 
to protect against potential health or environmental threats, 
but where there is only limited scientific evidence supporting 
a health or environmental measure, the state – and not the 
investor – should bear the costs of adopting that measure. 
-3 -1.9 
 
Table 10: Z Scores for Factor 3 
No. Statement Q Sort 
Position 
Z Score 
19 Investors should never expect that the circumstances 
prevailing at the time the investment is made will remain 
totally unchanged. To determine whether frustration of the 
investor’s expectations was justified, the host state’s right to 
3 1.9 
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subsequently regulate domestic matters in the public interest 
must also be taken into consideration. 
37 When investment tribunals get it wrong, neither states nor 
investors have any meaningful recourse to a review 
mechanism. Investment treaty arbitration needs a permanent 
appellate body with a broader scope of review than the 
current ICSID annulment process. 
3 1.6 
26 Human rights law and investment law have many similarities; 
they are both aimed at legal protection of individual rights by 
means of legal and judicial restraints on government powers. 
2 1.5 
23 Every international convention must be deemed tacitly to 
refer to general principles of international law for all 
questions which it does not itself resolve in express terms and 
in a different way. 
2 1.4 
14 The level of due diligence required under the ‘full protection 
and security’ standard in BITs should depend on the host 
state’s development and stability. The availability of resources 
may have a decisive impact on a state’s ability to provide 
protection and security. 
2 1.4 
30 Fork-in-the-road clauses should always be interpreted 
narrowly, so as to only preclude attempts to re-litigate the 
exact same claim against the exact same opponent. 
2 1.1 
27 Umbrella clauses were not designed to produce a thin sliver of 
security, akin to a friendly reminder of the host state’s other 
obligations under the treaty. Rather, the intent was to create 
a system where at least certain straightforward breaches of 
contract could be redressed in an international forum. 
2 1.1 
5 Although the exhaustion of local remedies rule is well 
established in the context of diplomatic protection, 
investment treaties are different, and arbitrators have rightly 
interpreted most of them as eliminating the rule. The decision 
to do away with the rule in investor-state arbitration was 
made consciously and for good reasons. 
2 1.1 
6 An ‘objective’ test for defining an investment under the ICSID 
Convention is the correct approach. There is an objective 
limitation to ICSID jurisdiction separate from that to which 
the parties have consented. 
1 0.8 
39 The ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard in BITs is an 
independent treaty standard that does more than merely 
restate customary international law. If states wanted the 
international minimum standard to be applied to their 
investment treaties, they would have opted to incorporate 
that standard expressis verbis. 
1 0.7 
20 The dissenting opinion on jurisdiction in Tokios Tokelės  was 
correct. The ICSID Convention should protect all genuinely 
international investments but, by the same token, only 
genuinely international investments. This was actually a 
domestic dispute between the Ukrainian state and a 
Ukrainian investor. 
1 0.7 
31 The search for predictability and coherence in any legal 
system can quickly start one down a very short road to a loss 
of legitimacy if it results in a lack of attention to the 
fundamental economic and political purposes and social 
values used to justify the system. 
1 0.6 
7 Conflicting precedent is part of the system building exercise 
that investor-state tribunals engage in; divergence in awards 
does not need to be seen as defying the concept of a coherent 
and uniform system, but rather is part of the evolution 
towards a jurisprudence constante. 
1 0.5 
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38 Rightly or wrongly, arbitral tribunals and MFN clauses are 
developing the aggregate of bilateral investment treaties into a 
functional substitute for a multilateral investment 
instrument. 
1 0.5 
15 The range of important issues in international investment law 
on which academics disagree, and on which arbitrations have 
reached conflicting decisions, are not the temporary ‘growing 
pains’ of a system rapidly approaching coherence, but are the 
product of a much deeper conflict of interests. 
1 0.4 
24 An MFN clause in a basic treaty cannot be relied upon by the 
investor to expand the jurisdiction of an international 
tribunal. Jurisdiction in the basic treaty cannot be rewritten 
before the commencement of proceedings by reference to the 
provisions of a third treaty. 
1 0.4 
4 The Argentine government has rightly pondered the domestic 
political viability of paying on an award that an annulment 
committee has delegitimized. If the annulment committee did 
not intend to kill the CMS award, it should not have wounded 
it so severely. 
0 0.4 
13 New proposals for a comprehensive multilateral investment 
agreement would likely succumb to the same shortcomings 
that thwarted previous efforts. 
0 0.3 
16 Umbrella clauses in BITs should be recast to place strong 
reciprocal obligations on investors that requiring them to 
observe commitments made to the host state. These clauses 
should be structured to allow the host state to invoke the 
clause as a counterclaim or even to initiate a BIT arbitration 
against the investor. 
0 0.0 
8 An investor cannot establish an investment treaty breach 
based on a denial of justice claim if there exists any available 
domestic legal mechanism for having such conduct reviewed 
and corrected, which the investor failed to invoke. 
0 -0.1 
29 The rise of the restrictive approach to the definition of 
investment may well be related to the broader backlash 
against investment arbitration – certainly the timing of the 
two developments overlaps rather neatly. 
0 -0.1 
11 The rejection of ICSID is a phenomenon that seems to be 
limited to a minority of states and can be explained more by 
the countries’ internal political situation rather than a more 
widespread view of a lack of legitimacy. 
0 -0.2 
22 A shift to a default ‘loser pays’ rule in investor-state 
arbitrations that awards costs to victorious respondents could 
only be seen as foreclosing access to this type of justice for 
smaller companies. 
0 -0.2 
35 It is far from clear that the fear of arbitrator bias derives from 
governments and investors as opposed to pundits and 
academics. 
0 -0.2 
25 For all practical purposes, the ‘investment’ screen of the 
ICSID Convention should have no bite. There is not a single 
pending or concluded case that should be – or should have 
been – excluded on this ground. 
-1 -0.3 
17 A state should be entitled to adopt precautionary regulations 
to protect against potential health or environmental threats, 
but where there is only limited scientific evidence supporting 
a health or environmental measure, the state – and not the 
investor – should bear the costs of adopting that measure. 
-1 -0.4 
34 It is far from clear that the fear of arbitrator bias derives from 
governments and investors as opposed to pundits and 
academics. 
-1 -0.5 
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9 If umbrella clauses truly were intended to have such 
significant scope to protect investors, it seems suspicious that 
no investor had sought the protection of one for five decades. 
-1 -0.5 
21 It is beyond doubt that shareholders do, and should, have 
standing in ICSID disputes to submit claims separate and 
independent from the claims of the corporation. This principle 
applies to all shareholders, no matter whether or not they 
own the majority of the shares or control the corporation. 
-1 -0.6 
2 BIT partners turn to the US Model BIT with the equivalent of 
an IMF gun pointed at their heads. For many, a BIT 
relationship is hardly a voluntary, uncoerced transaction. 
-1 -0.6 
1 A teleological method of interpretation of a BIT provision that 
would result in the implementation of a treaty’s purpose in a 
manner not contemplated by the parties must always be 
rejected as contrary to the parties’ intention. 
-1 -0.7 
32 The term ‘treatment’ in MFN clauses is in itself wide enough 
to be applicable to procedural matters such as dispute 
settlement. 
-1 -0.8 
36 Litigants in investor-state disputes want fairness much less 
than they want victory. 
-2 -0.8 
12 While an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons 
may be classified as a taking for a public purpose, and thus 
may be legitimate and legal, the fact that the property was 
taken for this reason does not affect either its nature or the 
measure of the compensation to be paid for the taking. 
-2 -1.1 
28 When BITs prescribe treating the foreign investor in 
accordance with customary international law, they should be 
understood to mean the standard of international law 
embodied in the terms of some two thousand concordant 
BITs. 
-2 -1.1 
10 Increasing transparency and opening the doors to third-party 
amicus interveners in investor-state arbitration could 
potentially ‘re-politicize’ disputes and lead to the arbitration 
becoming a ‘court of public opinion.’ 
-2 -1.2 
18 A state’s decision to invoke ‘essential security’ to justify a 
measure, even if detrimental to a foreign investor’s rights, 
should be a self-judging action that renders an investor’s 
arbitration claim inadmissible. 
-2 -1.4 
40 The awards of many investor-state tribunals indicate that 
ideological preferences drive decision-making, rather than 
treaty text or legal norms. 
-2 -1.6 
33 There is a strong moral as well as policy case for governments 
to withdraw from investment treaties and to oppose investor-
state arbitration, including a refusal to pay arbitration 
awards against them. 
-3 -1.8 
3 Collegiality demands that arbitrators sitting on three member 
tribunals reach a common view as to how the case should be 
resolved. Dissenting opinions should always be avoided. 
-3 -2.1 
 
Table 11: Z Scores for Factor 4 
No. Statement Q Sort 
Position 
Z Score 
19 Investors should never expect that the circumstances 
prevailing at the time the investment is made will remain 
totally unchanged. To determine whether frustration of the 
investor’s expectations was justified, the host state’s right to 
3 1.8 
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subsequently regulate domestic matters in the public interest 
must also be taken into consideration. 
39 The ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard in BITs is an 
independent treaty standard that does more than merely 
restate customary international law. If states wanted the 
international minimum standard to be applied to their 
investment treaties, they would have opted to incorporate 
that standard expressis verbis. 
3 1.8 
7 Conflicting precedent is part of the system building exercise 
that investor-state tribunals engage in; divergence in awards 
does not need to be seen as defying the concept of a coherent 
and uniform system, but rather is part of the evolution 
towards a jurisprudence constante. 
2 1.5 
5 Although the exhaustion of local remedies rule is well 
established in the context of diplomatic protection, 
investment treaties are different, and arbitrators have rightly 
interpreted most of them as eliminating the rule. The decision 
to do away with the rule in investor-state arbitration was 
made consciously and for good reasons. 
2 1.4 
27 Umbrella clauses were not designed to produce a thin sliver of 
security, akin to a friendly reminder of the host state’s other 
obligations under the treaty. Rather, the intent was to create 
a system where at least certain straightforward breaches of 
contract could be redressed in an international forum. 
2 1.1 
8 An investor cannot establish an investment treaty breach 
based on a denial of justice claim if there exists any available 
domestic legal mechanism for having such conduct reviewed 
and corrected, which the investor failed to invoke. 
2 0.9 
13 New proposals for a comprehensive multilateral investment 
agreement would likely succumb to the same shortcomings 
that thwarted previous efforts. 
2 0.9 
21 It is beyond doubt that shareholders do, and should, have 
standing in ICSID disputes to submit claims separate and 
independent from the claims of the corporation. This principle 
applies to all shareholders, no matter whether or not they 
own the majority of the shares or control the corporation. 
2 0.8 
14 The level of due diligence required under the ‘full protection 
and security’ standard in BITs should depend on the host 
state’s development and stability. The availability of resources 
may have a decisive impact on a state’s ability to provide 
protection and security. 
1 0.8 
36 Litigants in investor-state disputes want fairness much less 
than they want victory. 
1 0.8 
1 A teleological method of interpretation of a BIT provision that 
would result in the implementation of a treaty’s purpose in a 
manner not contemplated by the parties must always be 
rejected as contrary to the parties’ intention. 
1 0.7 
24 An MFN clause in a basic treaty cannot be relied upon by the 
investor to expand the jurisdiction of an international 
tribunal. Jurisdiction in the basic treaty cannot be rewritten 
before the commencement of proceedings by reference to the 
provisions of a third treaty. 
1 0.6 
11 The rejection of ICSID is a phenomenon that seems to be 
limited to a minority of states and can be explained more by 
the countries’ internal political situation rather than a more 
widespread view of a lack of legitimacy. 
1 0.6 
26 Human rights law and investment law have many similarities; 
they are both aimed at legal protection of individual rights by 
means of legal and judicial restraints on government powers. 
1 0.6 
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40 The awards of many investor-state tribunals indicate that 
ideological preferences drive decision-making, rather than 
treaty text or legal norms. 
1 0.5 
17 A state should be entitled to adopt precautionary regulations 
to protect against potential health or environmental threats, 
but where there is only limited scientific evidence supporting 
a health or environmental measure, the state – and not the 
investor – should bear the costs of adopting that measure. 
1 0.4 
23 Every international convention must be deemed tacitly to 
refer to general principles of international law for all 
questions which it does not itself resolve in express terms and 
in a different way. 
0 0.3 
31 The search for predictability and coherence in any legal 
system can quickly start one down a very short road to a loss 
of legitimacy if it results in a lack of attention to the 
fundamental economic and political purposes and social 
values used to justify the system. 
0 0.3 
12 While an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons 
may be classified as a taking for a public purpose, and thus 
may be legitimate and legal, the fact that the property was 
taken for this reason does not affect either its nature or the 
measure of the compensation to be paid for the taking. 
0 0.2 
32 The term ‘treatment’ in MFN clauses is in itself wide enough 
to be applicable to procedural matters such as dispute 
settlement. 
0 0.1 
35 It is far from clear that the fear of arbitrator bias derives from 
governments and investors as opposed to pundits and 
academics. 
0 0.0 
30 Fork-in-the-road clauses should always be interpreted 
narrowly, so as to only preclude attempts to re-litigate the 
exact same claim against the exact same opponent. 
0 0.0 
29 The rise of the restrictive approach to the definition of 
investment may well be related to the broader backlash 
against investment arbitration – certainly the timing of the 
two developments overlaps rather neatly. 
0 -0.2 
6 An ‘objective’ test for defining an investment under the ICSID 
Convention is the correct approach. There is an objective 
limitation to ICSID jurisdiction separate from that to which 
the parties have consented. 
0 -0.2 
15 The range of important issues in international investment law 
on which academics disagree, and on which arbitrations have 
reached conflicting decisions, are not the temporary ‘growing 
pains’ of a system rapidly approaching coherence, but are the 
product of a much deeper conflict of interests. 
-1 -0.3 
38 Rightly or wrongly, arbitral tribunals and MFN clauses are 
developing the aggregate of bilateral investment treaties into a 
functional substitute for a multilateral investment 
instrument. 
-1 -0.4 
34 Those who challenge the legitimacy of international 
adjudication aim at the wrong target. They criticize the 
principle of the supremacy of international law when their 
real complaint has to do with the political choices of their own 
government in making the bargains reflected in international 
treaties. 
-1 -0.4 
37 When investment tribunals get it wrong, neither states nor 
investors have any meaningful recourse to a review 
mechanism. Investment treaty arbitration needs a permanent 
appellate body with a broader scope of review than the 
current ICSID annulment process. 
-1 -0.6 
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4 The Argentine government has rightly pondered the domestic 
political viability of paying on an award that an annulment 
committee has delegitimized. If the annulment committee did 
not intend to kill the CMS award, it should not have wounded 
it so severely. 
-1 -0.6 
25 For all practical purposes, the ‘investment’ screen of the 
ICSID Convention should have no bite. There is not a single 
pending or concluded case that should be – or should have 
been – excluded on this ground. 
-1 -0.6 
20 The dissenting opinion on jurisdiction in Tokios Tokelės  was 
correct. The ICSID Convention should protect all genuinely 
international investments but, by the same token, only 
genuinely international investments. This was actually a 
domestic dispute between the Ukrainian state and a 
Ukrainian investor. 
-1 -0.6 
10 Increasing transparency and opening the doors to third-party 
amicus interveners in investor-state arbitration could 
potentially ‘re-politicize’ disputes and lead to the arbitration 
becoming a ‘court of public opinion.’ 
-1 -0.7 
9 If umbrella clauses truly were intended to have such 
significant scope to protect investors, it seems suspicious that 
no investor had sought the protection of one for five decades.  
-2 -0.9 
22 A shift to a default ‘loser pays’ rule in investor-state 
arbitrations that awards costs to victorious respondents could 
only be seen as foreclosing access to this type of justice for 
smaller companies. 
-2 -1.0 
3 Collegiality demands that arbitrators sitting on three member 
tribunals reach a common view as to how the case should be 
resolved. Dissenting opinions should always be avoided. 
-2 -1.2 
16 Umbrella clauses in BITs should be recast to place strong 
reciprocal obligations on investors that requiring them to 
observe commitments made to the host state. These clauses 
should be structured to allow the host state to invoke the 
clause as a counterclaim or even to initiate a BIT arbitration 
against the investor. 
-2 -1.2 
2 BIT partners turn to the US Model BIT with the equivalent of 
an IMF gun pointed at their heads. For many, a BIT 
relationship is hardly a voluntary, uncoerced transaction. 
-2 -1.4 
28 When BITs prescribe treating the foreign investor in 
accordance with customary international law, they should be 
understood to mean the standard of international law 
embodied in the terms of some two thousand concordant 
BITs. 
-2 -1.6 
33 There is a strong moral as well as policy case for governments 
to withdraw from investment treaties and to oppose investor-
state arbitration, including a refusal to pay arbitration 
awards against them. 
-3 -1.8 
18 A state’s decision to invoke ‘essential security’ to justify a 
measure, even if detrimental to a foreign investor’s rights, 
should be a self-judging action that renders an investor’s 
arbitration claim inadmissible. 
-3 -2.5 
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Table 12: Z Scores for Factor 5 
No. Statement Q Sort 
Position 
Z Score 
36 Litigants in investor-state disputes want fairness much less 
than they want victory. 
3 2.1 
6 An ‘objective’ test for defining an investment under the ICSID 
Convention is the correct approach. There is an objective 
limitation to ICSID jurisdiction separate from that to which 
the parties have consented. 
3 1.7 
19 Investors should never expect that the circumstances 
prevailing at the time the investment is made will remain 
totally unchanged. To determine whether frustration of the 
investor’s expectations was justified, the host state’s right to 
subsequently regulate domestic matters in the public interest 
must also be taken into consideration. 
2 1.5 
1 A teleological method of interpretation of a BIT provision that 
would result in the implementation of a treaty’s purpose in a 
manner not contemplated by the parties must always be 
rejected as contrary to the parties’ intention. 
2 1.3 
18 A state’s decision to invoke ‘essential security’ to justify a 
measure, even if detrimental to a foreign investor’s rights, 
should be a self-judging action that renders an investor’s 
arbitration claim inadmissible. 
2 1.2 
16 Umbrella clauses in BITs should be recast to place strong 
reciprocal obligations on investors that requiring them to 
observe commitments made to the host state. These clauses 
should be structured to allow the host state to invoke the 
clause as a counterclaim or even to initiate a BIT arbitration 
against the investor. 
2 1.1 
31 The search for predictability and coherence in any legal 
system can quickly start one down a very short road to a loss 
of legitimacy if it results in a lack of attention to the 
fundamental economic and political purposes and social 
values used to justify the system. 
2 1.1 
37 When investment tribunals get it wrong, neither states nor 
investors have any meaningful recourse to a review 
mechanism. Investment treaty arbitration needs a permanent 
appellate body with a broader scope of review than the 
current ICSID annulment process. 
2 1.0 
24 An MFN clause in a basic treaty cannot be relied upon by the 
investor to expand the jurisdiction of an international 
tribunal. Jurisdiction in the basic treaty cannot be rewritten 
before the commencement of proceedings by reference to the 
provisions of a third treaty. 
1 1.0 
20 The dissenting opinion on jurisdiction in Tokios Tokelės  was 
correct. The ICSID Convention should protect all genuinely 
international investments but, by the same token, only 
genuinely international investments. This was actually a 
domestic dispute between the Ukrainian state and a 
Ukrainian investor. 
1 0.9 
14 The level of due diligence required under the ‘full protection 
and security’ standard in BITs should depend on the host 
state’s development and stability. The availability of resources 
may have a decisive impact on a state’s ability to provide 
protection and security. 
1 0.7 
15 The range of important issues in international investment law 
on which academics disagree, and on which arbitrations have 
reached conflicting decisions, are not the temporary ‘growing 
1 0.6 
352 
 
 
pains’ of a system rapidly approaching coherence, but are the 
product of a much deeper conflict of interests. 
12 While an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons 
may be classified as a taking for a public purpose, and thus 
may be legitimate and legal, the fact that the property was 
taken for this reason does not affect either its nature or the 
measure of the compensation to be paid for the taking. 
1 0.6 
2 BIT partners turn to the US Model BIT with the equivalent of 
an IMF gun pointed at their heads. For many, a BIT 
relationship is hardly a voluntary, uncoerced transaction. 
1 0.4 
33 There is a strong moral as well as policy case for governments 
to withdraw from investment treaties and to oppose investor-
state arbitration, including a refusal to pay arbitration 
awards against them. 
1 0.4 
8 An investor cannot establish an investment treaty breach 
based on a denial of justice claim if there exists any available 
domestic legal mechanism for having such conduct reviewed 
and corrected, which the investor failed to invoke. 
1 0.3 
38 Rightly or wrongly, arbitral tribunals and MFN clauses are 
developing the aggregate of bilateral investment treaties into a 
functional substitute for a multilateral investment 
instrument. 
0 0.3 
17 A state should be entitled to adopt precautionary regulations 
to protect against potential health or environmental threats, 
but where there is only limited scientific evidence supporting 
a health or environmental measure, the state – and not the 
investor – should bear the costs of adopting that measure. 
0 0.3 
13 New proposals for a comprehensive multilateral investment 
agreement would likely succumb to the same shortcomings 
that thwarted previous efforts. 
0 0.3 
29 The rise of the restrictive approach to the definition of 
investment may well be related to the broader backlash 
against investment arbitration – certainly the timing of the 
two developments overlaps rather neatly. 
0 0.2 
9 If umbrella clauses truly were intended to have such 
significant scope to protect investors, it seems suspicious that 
no investor had sought the protection of one for five decades. 
0 0.2 
27 Umbrella clauses were not designed to produce a thin sliver of 
security, akin to a friendly reminder of the host state’s other 
obligations under the treaty. Rather, the intent was to create 
a system where at least certain straightforward breaches of 
contract could be redressed in an international forum. 
0 -0.1 
30 Fork-in-the-road clauses should always be interpreted 
narrowly, so as to only preclude attempts to re-litigate the 
exact same claim against the exact same opponent. 
0 -0.2 
21 It is beyond doubt that shareholders do, and should, have 
standing in ICSID disputes to submit claims separate and 
independent from the claims of the corporation. This principle 
applies to all shareholders, no matter whether or not they 
own the majority of the shares or control the corporation. 
0 -0.3 
40 The awards of many investor-state tribunals indicate that 
ideological preferences drive decision-making, rather than 
treaty text or legal norms. 
-1 -0.3 
22 A shift to a default ‘loser pays’ rule in investor-state 
arbitrations that awards costs to victorious respondents could 
only be seen as foreclosing access to this type of justice for 
smaller companies. 
-1 -0.5 
35 It is far from clear that the fear of arbitrator bias derives from 
governments and investors as opposed to pundits and 
-1 -0.5 
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academics. 
23 Every international convention must be deemed tacitly to 
refer to general principles of international law for all 
questions which it does not itself resolve in express terms and 
in a different way. 
-1 -0.5 
7 Conflicting precedent is part of the system building exercise 
that investor-state tribunals engage in; divergence in awards 
does not need to be seen as defying the concept of a coherent 
and uniform system, but rather is part of the evolution 
towards a jurisprudence constante. 
-1 -0.6 
10 Increasing transparency and opening the doors to third-party 
amicus interveners in investor-state arbitration could 
potentially ‘re-politicize’ disputes and lead to the arbitration 
becoming a ‘court of public opinion.’ 
-1 -0.8 
11 The rejection of ICSID is a phenomenon that seems to be 
limited to a minority of states and can be explained more by 
the countries’ internal political situation rather than a more 
widespread view of a lack of legitimacy. 
-1 -0.8 
34 It is far from clear that the fear of arbitrator bias derives from 
governments and investors as opposed to pundits and 
academics. 
-1 -0.9 
5 Although the exhaustion of local remedies rule is well 
established in the context of diplomatic protection, 
investment treaties are different, and arbitrators have rightly 
interpreted most of them as eliminating the rule. The decision 
to do away with the rule in investor-state arbitration was 
made consciously and for good reasons. 
-2 -0.9 
4 The Argentine government has rightly pondered the domestic 
political viability of paying on an award that an annulment 
committee has delegitimized. If the annulment committee did 
not intend to kill the CMS award, it should not have wounded 
it so severely. 
-2 -0.9 
28 When BITs prescribe treating the foreign investor in 
accordance with customary international law, they should be 
understood to mean the standard of international law 
embodied in the terms of some two thousand concordant 
BITs. 
-2 -0.9 
39 The ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard in BITs is an 
independent treaty standard that does more than merely 
restate customary international law. If states wanted the 
international minimum standard to be applied to their 
investment treaties, they would have opted to incorporate 
that standard expressis verbis. 
-2 -1.3 
25 For all practical purposes, the ‘investment’ screen of the 
ICSID Convention should have no bite. There is not a single 
pending or concluded case that should be – or should have 
been – excluded on this ground. 
-2 -1.4 
3 Collegiality demands that arbitrators sitting on three member 
tribunals reach a common view as to how the case should be 
resolved. Dissenting opinions should always be avoided. 
-2 -1.6 
26 Human rights law and investment law have many similarities; 
they are both aimed at legal protection of individual rights by 
means of legal and judicial restraints on government powers. 
-3 -1.7 
32 The term ‘treatment’ in MFN clauses is in itself wide enough 
to be applicable to procedural matters such as dispute 
settlement. 
-3 -2.3 
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Table 13: Z Scores for Factor 6 
No. Statement Q Sort 
Position 
Z Score 
19 Investors should never expect that the circumstances 
prevailing at the time the investment is made will remain 
totally unchanged. To determine whether frustration of the 
investor’s expectations was justified, the host state’s right to 
subsequently regulate domestic matters in the public interest 
must also be taken into consideration. 
3 1.7 
12 While an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons 
may be classified as a taking for a public purpose, and thus 
may be legitimate and legal, the fact that the property was 
taken for this reason does not affect either its nature or the 
measure of the compensation to be paid for the taking. 
3 1.7 
40 The awards of many investor-state tribunals indicate that 
ideological preferences drive decision-making, rather than 
treaty text or legal norms. 
2 1.4 
15 The range of important issues in international investment law 
on which academics disagree, and on which arbitrations have 
reached conflicting decisions, are not the temporary ‘growing 
pains’ of a system rapidly approaching coherence, but are the 
product of a much deeper conflict of interests. 
2 1.3 
37 When investment tribunals get it wrong, neither states nor 
investors have any meaningful recourse to a review 
mechanism. Investment treaty arbitration needs a permanent 
appellate body with a broader scope of review than the 
current ICSID annulment process. 
2 1.1 
29 The rise of the restrictive approach to the definition of 
investment may well be related to the broader backlash 
against investment arbitration – certainly the timing of the 
two developments overlaps rather neatly. 
2 1.1 
38 Rightly or wrongly, arbitral tribunals and MFN clauses are 
developing the aggregate of bilateral investment treaties into a 
functional substitute for a multilateral investment 
instrument. 
2 1.1 
20 The dissenting opinion on jurisdiction in Tokios Tokelės  was 
correct. The ICSID Convention should protect all genuinely 
international investments but, by the same token, only 
genuinely international investments. This was actually a 
domestic dispute between the Ukrainian state and a 
Ukrainian investor. 
2 1.1 
14 The level of due diligence required under the ‘full protection 
and security’ standard in BITs should depend on the host 
state’s development and stability. The availability of resources 
may have a decisive impact on a state’s ability to provide 
protection and security. 
1 0.9 
39 The ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard in BITs is an 
independent treaty standard that does more than merely 
restate customary international law. If states wanted the 
international minimum standard to be applied to their 
investment treaties, they would have opted to incorporate 
that standard expressis verbis. 
1 0.8 
16 Umbrella clauses in BITs should be recast to place strong 
reciprocal obligations on investors that requiring them to 
observe commitments made to the host state. These clauses 
should be structured to allow the host state to invoke the 
clause as a counterclaim or even to initiate a BIT arbitration 
against the investor. 
1 0.8 
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33 There is a strong moral as well as policy case for governments 
to withdraw from investment treaties and to oppose investor-
state arbitration, including a refusal to pay arbitration 
awards against them. 
1 0.8 
31 The search for predictability and coherence in any legal 
system can quickly start one down a very short road to a loss 
of legitimacy if it results in a lack of attention to the 
fundamental economic and political purposes and social 
values used to justify the system. 
1 0.6 
4 The Argentine government has rightly pondered the domestic 
political viability of paying on an award that an annulment 
committee has delegitimized. If the annulment committee did 
not intend to kill the CMS award, it should not have wounded 
it so severely. 
1 0.6 
21 It is beyond doubt that shareholders do, and should, have 
standing in ICSID disputes to submit claims separate and 
independent from the claims of the corporation. This principle 
applies to all shareholders, no matter whether or not they 
own the majority of the shares or control the corporation. 
1 0.5 
27 Umbrella clauses were not designed to produce a thin sliver of 
security, akin to a friendly reminder of the host state’s other 
obligations under the treaty. Rather, the intent was to create 
a system where at least certain straightforward breaches of 
contract could be redressed in an international forum. 
1 0.5 
17 A state should be entitled to adopt precautionary regulations 
to protect against potential health or environmental threats, 
but where there is only limited scientific evidence supporting 
a health or environmental measure, the state – and not the 
investor – should bear the costs of adopting that measure. 
0 0.4 
9 If umbrella clauses truly were intended to have such 
significant scope to protect investors, it seems suspicious that 
no investor had sought the protection of one for five decades. 
0 0.4 
32 The term ‘treatment’ in MFN clauses is in itself wide enough 
to be applicable to procedural matters such as dispute 
settlement. 
0 0.3 
13 New proposals for a comprehensive multilateral investment 
agreement would likely succumb to the same shortcomings 
that thwarted previous efforts. 
0 0.3 
5 Although the exhaustion of local remedies rule is well 
established in the context of diplomatic protection, 
investment treaties are different, and arbitrators have rightly 
interpreted most of them as eliminating the rule. The decision 
to do away with the rule in investor-state arbitration was 
made consciously and for good reasons. 
0 0.0 
34 Those who challenge the legitimacy of international 
adjudication aim at the wrong target. They criticize the 
principle of the supremacy of international law when their 
real complaint has to do with the political choices of their own 
government in making the bargains reflected in international 
treaties. 
0 0.0 
30 Fork-in-the-road clauses should always be interpreted 
narrowly, so as to only preclude attempts to re-litigate the 
exact same claim against the exact same opponent. 
0 -0.2 
8 An investor cannot establish an investment treaty breach 
based on a denial of justice claim if there exists any available 
domestic legal mechanism for having such conduct reviewed 
and corrected, which the investor failed to invoke. 
0 -0.2 
2 BIT partners turn to the US Model BIT with the equivalent of 
an IMF gun pointed at their heads. For many, a BIT 
-1 -0.4 
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relationship is hardly a voluntary, uncoerced transaction. 
25 For all practical purposes, the ‘investment’ screen of the 
ICSID Convention should have no bite. There is not a single 
pending or concluded case that should be – or should have 
been – excluded on this ground. 
-1 -0.5 
24 An MFN clause in a basic treaty cannot be relied upon by the 
investor to expand the jurisdiction of an international 
tribunal. Jurisdiction in the basic treaty cannot be rewritten 
before the commencement of proceedings by reference to the 
provisions of a third treaty. 
-1 -0.6 
10 Increasing transparency and opening the doors to third-party 
amicus interveners in investor-state arbitration could 
potentially ‘re-politicize’ disputes and lead to the arbitration 
becoming a ‘court of public opinion.’ 
-1 -0.6 
3 Collegiality demands that arbitrators sitting on three member 
tribunals reach a common view as to how the case should be 
resolved. Dissenting opinions should always be avoided. 
-1 -0.8 
26 Human rights law and investment law have many similarities; 
they are both aimed at legal protection of individual rights by 
means of legal and judicial restraints on government powers. 
-1 -0.8 
18 A state’s decision to invoke ‘essential security’ to justify a 
measure, even if detrimental to a foreign investor’s rights, 
should be a self-judging action that renders an investor’s 
arbitration claim inadmissible. 
-1 -0.9 
11 The rejection of ICSID is a phenomenon that seems to be 
limited to a minority of states and can be explained more by 
the countries’ internal political situation rather than a more 
widespread view of a lack of legitimacy. 
-1 -1.0 
35 It is far from clear that the fear of arbitrator bias derives from 
governments and investors as opposed to pundits and 
academics. 
-2 -1.2 
1 A teleological method of interpretation of a BIT provision that 
would result in the implementation of a treaty’s purpose in a 
manner not contemplated by the parties must always be 
rejected as contrary to the parties’ intention. 
-2 -1.2 
28 When BITs prescribe treating the foreign investor in 
accordance with customary international law, they should be 
understood to mean the standard of international law 
embodied in the terms of some two thousand concordant 
BITs. 
-2 -1.2 
22 A shift to a default ‘loser pays’ rule in investor-state 
arbitrations that awards costs to victorious respondents could 
only be seen as foreclosing access to this type of justice for 
smaller companies. 
-2 -1.3 
23 Every international convention must be deemed tacitly to 
refer to general principles of international law for all 
questions which it does not itself resolve in express terms and 
in a different way. 
-2 -1.3 
6 An ‘objective’ test for defining an investment under the ICSID 
Convention is the correct approach. There is an objective 
limitation to ICSID jurisdiction separate from that to which 
the parties have consented. 
-2 -1.4 
36 Litigants in investor-state disputes want fairness much less 
than they want victory. 
-3 -1.6 
7 Conflicting precedent is part of the system building exercise 
that investor-state tribunals engage in; divergence in awards 
does not need to be seen as defying the concept of a coherent 
and uniform system, but rather is part of the evolution 
towards a jurisprudence constante. 
-3 -1.9 
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Table 14: Cumulative Correlation Percentage Among All Q Sorts 
Q Sort Cumulative Correlation % 
1 42 
2 55 
3 46 
4 47 
5 45 
6 53 
7 59 
8 27 
9 31 
10 49 
11 58 
12 52 
13 49 
14 49 
15 54 
16 36 
17 40 
18 78 
19 53 
20 56 
21 75 
22 70 
23 35 
24 42 
25 37 
26 25 
27 58 
28 52 
29 60 
30 14 
31 57 
32 73 
33 46 
34 68 
35 54 
36 41 
37 51 
38 58 
39 38 
40 41 
41 52 
42 46 
43 73 
44 29 
45 36 
This table shows the cumulative correlation between individual Q sorts and all other Q sorts in 
the study. The higher the percentage, the more correlated an individual Q sort is with other 
individual Q sorts in the study. The Q sorts indicated in bold are those that most correlated (Q 
sort 30) and least correlated (Q sort 18) with all of the other Q sorts in the study. 
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Table 15: Q Sort Most Correlated With All Other Q Sorts (No. 18) 
No. Statement Q Sort 
Position 
19 Investors should never expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time 
the investment is made will remain totally unchanged. To determine 
whether frustration of the investor’s expectations was justified, the host 
state’s right to subsequently regulate domestic matters in the public interest 
must also be taken into consideration. 
3 
40 The awards of many investor-state tribunals indicate that ideological 
preferences drive decision-making, rather than treaty text or legal norms. 
3 
5 Although the exhaustion of local remedies rule is well established in the 
context of diplomatic protection, investment treaties are different, and 
arbitrators have rightly interpreted most of them as eliminating the rule. 
The decision to do away with the rule in investor-state arbitration was made 
consciously and for good reasons. 
2 
13 New proposals for a comprehensive multilateral investment agreement 
would likely succumb to the same shortcomings that thwarted previous 
efforts. 
2 
15 The range of important issues in international investment law on which 
academics disagree, and on which arbitrations have reached conflicting 
decisions, are not the temporary ‘growing pains’ of a system rapidly 
approaching coherence, but are the product of a much deeper conflict of 
interests. 
2 
21 It is beyond doubt that shareholders do, and should, have standing in ICSID 
disputes to submit claims separate and independent from the claims of the 
corporation. This principle applies to all shareholders, no matter whether or 
not they own the majority of the shares or control the corporation. 
2 
26 Human rights law and investment law have many similarities; they are both 
aimed at legal protection of individual rights by means of legal and judicial 
restraints on government powers. 
2 
31 The search for predictability and coherence in any legal system can quickly 
start one down a very short road to a loss of legitimacy if it results in a lack 
of attention to the fundamental economic and political purposes and social 
values used to justify the system. 
2 
8 An investor cannot establish an investment treaty breach based on a denial 
of justice claim if there exists any available domestic legal mechanism for 
having such conduct reviewed and corrected, which the investor failed to 
invoke. 
1 
14 The level of due diligence required under the ‘full protection and security’ 
standard in BITs should depend on the host state’s development and 
stability. The availability of resources may have a decisive impact on a 
state’s ability to provide protection and security. 
1 
23 Every international convention must be deemed tacitly to refer to general 
principles of international law for all questions which it does not itself 
resolve in express terms and in a different way. 
1 
27 Umbrella clauses were not designed to produce a thin sliver of security, akin 
to a friendly reminder of the host state’s other obligations under the treaty. 
Rather, the intent was to create a system where at least certain 
straightforward breaches of contract could be redressed in an international 
forum. 
1 
29 The rise of the restrictive approach to the definition of investment may well 
be related to the broader backlash against investment arbitration – certainly 
the timing of the two developments overlaps rather neatly. 
1 
32 The term ‘treatment’ in MFN clauses is in itself wide enough to be applicable 
to procedural matters such as dispute settlement. 
1 
36 Litigants in investor-state disputes want fairness much less than they want 
victory. 
1 
39 The ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard in BITs is an independent treaty 1 
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standard that does more than merely restate customary international law. If 
states wanted the international minimum standard to be applied to their 
investment treaties, they would have opted to incorporate that standard 
expressis verbis. 
1 A teleological method of interpretation of a BIT provision that would result 
in the implementation of a treaty’s purpose in a manner not contemplated 
by the parties must always be rejected as contrary to the parties’ intention. 
0 
7 Conflicting precedent is part of the system building exercise that investor-
state tribunals engage in; divergence in awards does not need to be seen as 
defying the concept of a coherent and uniform system, but rather is part of 
the evolution towards a jurisprudence constante. 
0 
9 If umbrella clauses truly were intended to have such significant scope to 
protect investors, it seems suspicious that no investor had sought the 
protection of one for five decades. 
0 
11 The rejection of ICSID is a phenomenon that seems to be limited to a 
minority of states and can be explained more by the countries’ internal 
political situation rather than a more widespread view of a lack of 
legitimacy. 
0 
17 A state should be entitled to adopt precautionary regulations to protect 
against potential health or environmental threats, but where there is only 
limited scientific evidence supporting a health or environmental measure, 
the state – and not the investor – should bear the costs of adopting that 
measure. 
0 
24 An MFN clause in a basic treaty cannot be relied upon by the investor to 
expand the jurisdiction of an international tribunal. Jurisdiction in the 
basic treaty cannot be rewritten before the commencement of proceedings 
by reference to the provisions of a third treaty. 
0 
35 It is far from clear that the fear of arbitrator bias derives from governments 
and investors as opposed to pundits and academics. 
0 
37 When investment tribunals get it wrong, neither states nor investors have 
any meaningful recourse to a review mechanism. Investment treaty 
arbitration needs a permanent appellate body with a broader scope of review 
than the current ICSID annulment process. 
0 
4 The Argentine government has rightly pondered the domestic political 
viability of paying on an award that an annulment committee has 
delegitimized. If the annulment committee did not intend to kill the CMS 
award, it should not have wounded it so severely. 
-1 
6 An ‘objective’ test for defining an investment under the ICSID Convention is 
the correct approach. There is an objective limitation to ICSID jurisdiction 
separate from that to which the parties have consented. 
-1 
20 The dissenting opinion on jurisdiction in Tokios Tokelės  was correct. The 
ICSID Convention should protect all genuinely international investments 
but, by the same token, only genuinely international investments. This was 
actually a domestic dispute between the Ukrainian state and a Ukrainian 
investor. 
-1 
22 A shift to a default ‘loser pays’ rule in investor-state arbitrations that awards 
costs to victorious respondents could only be seen as foreclosing access to 
this type of justice for smaller companies. 
-1 
25 For all practical purposes, the ‘investment’ screen of the ICSID Convention 
should have no bite. There is not a single pending or concluded case that 
should be – or should have been – excluded on this ground. 
-1 
30 Fork-in-the-road clauses should always be interpreted narrowly, so as to 
only preclude attempts to re-litigate the exact same claim against the exact 
same opponent. 
-1 
34 Those who challenge the legitimacy of international adjudication aim at the 
wrong target. They criticize the principle of the supremacy of international 
law when their real complaint has to do with the political choices of their 
own government in making the bargains reflected in international treaties. 
-1 
38 Rightly or wrongly, arbitral tribunals and MFN clauses are developing the -1 
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aggregate of bilateral investment treaties into a functional substitute for a 
multilateral investment instrument. 
2 BIT partners turn to the US Model BIT with the equivalent of an IMF gun 
pointed at their heads. For many, a BIT relationship is hardly a voluntary, 
uncoerced transaction. 
-2 
3 Collegiality demands that arbitrators sitting on three member tribunals 
reach a common view as to how the case should be resolved. Dissenting 
opinions should always be avoided. 
-2 
12 While an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons may be 
classified as a taking for a public purpose, and thus may be legitimate and 
legal, the fact that the property was taken for this reason does not affect 
either its nature or the measure of the compensation to be paid for the 
taking. 
-2 
16 Umbrella clauses in BITs should be recast to place strong reciprocal 
obligations on investors that requiring them to observe commitments made 
to the host state. These clauses should be structured to allow the host state 
to invoke the clause as a counterclaim or even to initiate a BIT arbitration 
against the investor. 
-2 
28 When BITs prescribe treating the foreign investor in accordance with 
customary international law, they should be understood to mean the 
standard of international law embodied in the terms of some two thousand 
concordant BITs. 
-2 
33 There is a strong moral as well as policy case for governments to withdraw 
from investment treaties and to oppose investor-state arbitration, including 
a refusal to pay arbitration awards against them. 
-2 
10 Increasing transparency and opening the doors to third-party amicus 
interveners in investor-state arbitration could potentially ‘re-politicize’ 
disputes and lead to the arbitration becoming a ‘court of public opinion.’ 
-3 
18 A state’s decision to invoke ‘essential security’ to justify a measure, even if 
detrimental to a foreign investor’s rights, should be a self-judging action 
that renders an investor’s arbitration claim inadmissible. 
-3 
 
Table 16: Q Sort Least Correlated With All Other Q Sorts (No. 30) 
No. Statement Q Sort 
Position 
5 Although the exhaustion of local remedies rule is well established in the 
context of diplomatic protection, investment treaties are different, and 
arbitrators have rightly interpreted most of them as eliminating the rule. 
The decision to do away with the rule in investor-state arbitration was made 
consciously and for good reasons. 
3 
21 It is beyond doubt that shareholders do, and should, have standing in ICSID 
disputes to submit claims separate and independent from the claims of the 
corporation. This principle applies to all shareholders, no matter whether or 
not they own the majority of the shares or control the corporation. 
3 
2 BIT partners turn to the US Model BIT with the equivalent of an IMF gun 
pointed at their heads. For many, a BIT relationship is hardly a voluntary, 
uncoerced transaction. 
2 
13 New proposals for a comprehensive multilateral investment agreement 
would likely succumb to the same shortcomings that thwarted previous 
efforts. 
2 
22 A shift to a default ‘loser pays’ rule in investor-state arbitrations that awards 
costs to victorious respondents could only be seen as foreclosing access to 
this type of justice for smaller companies. 
2 
26 Human rights law and investment law have many similarities; they are both 
aimed at legal protection of individual rights by means of legal and judicial 
restraints on government powers. 
2 
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29 The rise of the restrictive approach to the definition of investment may well 
be related to the broader backlash against investment arbitration – certainly 
the timing of the two developments overlaps rather neatly. 
2 
38 Rightly or wrongly, arbitral tribunals and MFN clauses are developing the 
aggregate of bilateral investment treaties into a functional substitute for a 
multilateral investment instrument. 
2 
11 The rejection of ICSID is a phenomenon that seems to be limited to a 
minority of states and can be explained more by the countries’ internal 
political situation rather than a more widespread view of a lack of 
legitimacy. 
1 
23 Every international convention must be deemed tacitly to refer to general 
principles of international law for all questions which it does not itself 
resolve in express terms and in a different way. 
1 
31 The search for predictability and coherence in any legal system can quickly 
start one down a very short road to a loss of legitimacy if it results in a lack 
of attention to the fundamental economic and political purposes and social 
values used to justify the system. 
1 
32 The term ‘treatment’ in MFN clauses is in itself wide enough to be applicable 
to procedural matters such as dispute settlement. 
1 
36 Litigants in investor-state disputes want fairness much less than they want 
victory. 
1 
37 When investment tribunals get it wrong, neither states nor investors have 
any meaningful recourse to a review mechanism. Investment treaty 
arbitration needs a permanent appellate body with a broader scope of review 
than the current ICSID annulment process. 
1 
39 The ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard in BITs is an independent treaty 
standard that does more than merely restate customary international law. If 
states wanted the international minimum standard to be applied to their 
investment treaties, they would have opted to incorporate that standard 
expressis verbis. 
1 
40 The awards of many investor-state tribunals indicate that ideological 
preferences drive decision-making, rather than treaty text or legal norms. 
1 
9 If umbrella clauses truly were intended to have such significant scope to 
protect investors, it seems suspicious that no investor had sought the 
protection of one for five decades. 
0 
15 The range of important issues in international investment law on which 
academics disagree, and on which arbitrations have reached conflicting 
decisions, are not the temporary ‘growing pains’ of a system rapidly 
approaching coherence, but are the product of a much deeper conflict of 
interests. 
0 
16 Umbrella clauses in BITs should be recast to place strong reciprocal 
obligations on investors that requiring them to observe commitments made 
to the host state. These clauses should be structured to allow the host state 
to invoke the clause as a counterclaim or even to initiate a BIT arbitration 
against the investor. 
0 
27 Umbrella clauses were not designed to produce a thin sliver of security, akin 
to a friendly reminder of the host state’s other obligations under the treaty. 
Rather, the intent was to create a system where at least certain 
straightforward breaches of contract could be redressed in an international 
forum. 
0 
28 When BITs prescribe treating the foreign investor in accordance with 
customary international law, they should be understood to mean the 
standard of international law embodied in the terms of some two thousand 
concordant BITs. 
0 
30 Fork-in-the-road clauses should always be interpreted narrowly, so as to 
only preclude attempts to re-litigate the exact same claim against the exact 
same opponent. 
0 
33 There is a strong moral as well as policy case for governments to withdraw 
from investment treaties and to oppose investor-state arbitration, including 
0 
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a refusal to pay arbitration awards against them. 
35 It is far from clear that the fear of arbitrator bias derives from governments 
and investors as opposed to pundits and academics. 
0 
1 A teleological method of interpretation of a BIT provision that would result 
in the implementation of a treaty’s purpose in a manner not contemplated 
by the parties must always be rejected as contrary to the parties’ intention. 
-1 
6 An ‘objective’ test for defining an investment under the ICSID Convention is 
the correct approach. There is an objective limitation to ICSID jurisdiction 
separate from that to which the parties have consented. 
-1 
8 An investor cannot establish an investment treaty breach based on a denial 
of justice claim if there exists any available domestic legal mechanism for 
having such conduct reviewed and corrected, which the investor failed to 
invoke. 
-1 
12 While an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons may be 
classified as a taking for a public purpose, and thus may be legitimate and 
legal, the fact that the property was taken for this reason does not affect 
either its nature or the measure of the compensation to be paid for the 
taking. 
-1 
17 A state should be entitled to adopt precautionary regulations to protect 
against potential health or environmental threats, but where there is only 
limited scientific evidence supporting a health or environmental measure, 
the state – and not the investor – should bear the costs of adopting that 
measure. 
-1 
20 The dissenting opinion on jurisdiction in Tokios Tokelės  was correct. The 
ICSID Convention should protect all genuinely international investments 
but, by the same token, only genuinely international investments. This was 
actually a domestic dispute between the Ukrainian state and a Ukrainian 
investor. 
-1 
25 For all practical purposes, the ‘investment’ screen of the ICSID Convention 
should have no bite. There is not a single pending or concluded case that 
should be – or should have been – excluded on this ground. 
-1 
34 Those who challenge the legitimacy of international adjudication aim at the 
wrong target. They criticize the principle of the supremacy of international 
law when their real complaint has to do with the political choices of their 
own government in making the bargains reflected in international treaties. 
-1 
3 Collegiality demands that arbitrators sitting on three member tribunals 
reach a common view as to how the case should be resolved. Dissenting 
opinions should always be avoided. 
-2 
4 The Argentine government has rightly pondered the domestic political 
viability of paying on an award that an annulment committee has 
delegitimized. If the annulment committee did not intend to kill the CMS 
award, it should not have wounded it so severely. 
-2 
7 Conflicting precedent is part of the system building exercise that investor-
state tribunals engage in; divergence in awards does not need to be seen as 
defying the concept of a coherent and uniform system, but rather is part of 
the evolution towards a jurisprudence constante. 
-2 
14 The level of due diligence required under the ‘full protection and security’ 
standard in BITs should depend on the host state’s development and 
stability. The availability of resources may have a decisive impact on a 
state’s ability to provide protection and security. 
-2 
18 A state’s decision to invoke ‘essential security’ to justify a measure, even if 
detrimental to a foreign investor’s rights, should be a self-judging action 
that renders an investor’s arbitration claim inadmissible. 
-2 
19 Investors should never expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time 
the investment is made will remain totally unchanged. To determine 
whether frustration of the investor’s expectations was justified, the host 
state’s right to subsequently regulate domestic matters in the public interest 
must also be taken into consideration. 
-2 
10 Increasing transparency and opening the doors to third-party amicus -3 
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interveners in investor-state arbitration could potentially ‘re-politicize’ 
disputes and lead to the arbitration becoming a ‘court of public opinion.’ 
24 An MFN clause in a basic treaty cannot be relied upon by the investor to 
expand the jurisdiction of an international tribunal. Jurisdiction in the 
basic treaty cannot be rewritten before the commencement of proceedings 
by reference to the provisions of a third treaty. 
-3 
 
Table 17: Crib-Sheet for Factor 1 
Items Ranked at +3 
Those who challenge the legitimacy of international adjudication aim at the wrong target. 
They criticize the principle of the supremacy of international law when their real complaint 
has to do with the political choices of their own government in making the bargains reflected 
in international treaties. 
The rejection of ICSID is a phenomenon that seems to be limited to a minority of states and 
can be explained more by the countries’ internal political situation rather than a more 
widespread view of a lack of legitimacy. 
Items Ranked Higher for Factor 1 than any other Factor 
(+3) Those who challenge the legitimacy of international adjudication aim at the wrong target. 
They criticize the principle of the supremacy of international law when their real complaint 
has to do with the political choices of their own government in making the bargains reflected 
in international treaties. 
(+3) The rejection of ICSID is a phenomenon that seems to be limited to a minority of states 
and can be explained more by the countries’ internal political situation rather than a more 
widespread view of a lack of legitimacy. 
(+2) The term ‘treatment’ in MFN clauses is in itself wide enough to be applicable to 
procedural matters such as dispute settlement. 
(+2) A state should be entitled to adopt precautionary regulations to protect against potential 
health or environmental threats, but where there is only limited scientific evidence supporting 
a health or environmental measure, the state – and not the investor – should bear the costs of 
adopting that measure. 
(+1) It is far from clear that the fear of arbitrator bias derives from governments and investors 
as opposed to pundits and academics. 
(0) When BITs prescribe treating the foreign investor in accordance with customary 
international law, they should be understood to mean the standard of international law 
embodied in the terms of some two thousand concordant BITs. 
(0) Increasing transparency and opening the doors to third-party amicus interveners in 
investor-state arbitration could potentially ‘re-politicize’ disputes and lead to the arbitration 
becoming a ‘court of public opinion.’ 
Items Ranked Lower for Factor 1 than any other Factor 
(-3) BIT partners turn to the US Model BIT with the equivalent of an IMF gun pointed at their 
heads. For many, a BIT relationship is hardly a voluntary, uncoerced transaction. 
(-2) An investor cannot establish an investment treaty breach based on a denial of justice 
claim if there exists any available domestic legal mechanism for having such conduct 
reviewed and corrected, which the investor failed to invoke. 
(-2) The range of important issues in international investment law on which academics 
disagree, and on which arbitrations have reached conflicting decisions, are not the temporary 
‘growing pains’ of a system rapidly approaching coherence, but are the product of a much 
deeper conflict of interests. 
(+1) Investors should never expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time the 
investment is made will remain totally unchanged. To determine whether frustration of the 
investor’s expectations was justified, the host state’s right to subsequently regulate domestic 
matters in the public interest must also be taken into consideration. 
Items Ranked at -3 
BIT partners turn to the US Model BIT with the equivalent of an IMF gun pointed at their 
heads. For many, a BIT relationship is hardly a voluntary, uncoerced transaction. 
There is a strong moral as well as policy case for governments to withdraw from investment 
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treaties and to oppose investor-state arbitration, including a refusal to pay arbitration awards 
against them. 
 
Table 18: Crib-Sheet for Factor 2 
Items Ranked at +3 
Investors should never expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time the investment is 
made will remain totally unchanged. To determine whether frustration of the investor’s 
expectations was justified, the host state’s right to subsequently regulate domestic matters in 
the public interest must also be taken into consideration. 
The level of due diligence required under the ‘full protection and security’ standard in BITs 
should depend on the host state’s development and stability. The availability of resources 
may have a decisive impact on a state’s ability to provide protection and security. 
Items Ranked Higher for Factor 2 than any other Factor 
(+3) The level of due diligence required under the ‘full protection and security’ standard in 
BITs should depend on the host state’s development and stability. The availability of 
resources may have a decisive impact on a state’s ability to provide protection and security. 
(+2) An MFN clause in a basic treaty cannot be relied upon by the investor to expand the 
jurisdiction of an international tribunal. Jurisdiction in the basic treaty cannot be rewritten 
before the commencement of proceedings by reference to the provisions of a third treaty. 
(+1) If umbrella clauses truly were intended to have such significant scope to protect 
investors, it seems suspicious that no investor had sought the protection of one for five 
decades. 
Items Ranked Lower for Factor 2 than any other Factor 
(-3) A state should be entitled to adopt precautionary regulations to protect against potential 
health or environmental threats, but where there is only limited scientific evidence supporting 
a health or environmental measure, the state – and not the investor – should bear the costs of 
adopting that measure. 
(-2) Fork-in-the-road clauses should always be interpreted narrowly, so as to only preclude 
attempts to re-litigate the exact same claim against the exact same opponent. 
Items Ranked at -3 
Collegiality demands that arbitrators sitting on three member tribunals reach a common view 
as to how the case should be resolved. Dissenting opinions should always be avoided. 
A state should be entitled to adopt precautionary regulations to protect against potential 
health or environmental threats, but where there is only limited scientific evidence supporting 
a health or environmental measure, the state – and not the investor – should bear the costs of 
adopting that measure. 
 
Table 19: Crib-Sheet for Factor 3 
Items Ranked at +3 
When investment tribunals get it wrong, neither states nor investors have any meaningful 
recourse to a review mechanism. Investment treaty arbitration needs a permanent appellate 
body with a broader scope of review than the current ICSID annulment process. 
Investors should never expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time the investment is 
made will remain totally unchanged. To determine whether frustration of the investor’s 
expectations was justified, the host state’s right to subsequently regulate domestic matters in 
the public interest must also be taken into consideration. 
Items Ranked Higher for Factor 3 than any other Factor 
(+3) When investment tribunals get it wrong, neither states nor investors have any 
meaningful recourse to a review mechanism. Investment treaty arbitration needs a permanent 
appellate body with a broader scope of review than the current ICSID annulment process. 
(+2) Fork-in-the-road clauses should always be interpreted narrowly, so as to only preclude 
attempts to re-litigate the exact same claim against the exact same opponent. 
Items Ranked Lower for Factor 3 than any other Factor 
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(-2) The awards of many investor-state tribunals indicate that ideological preferences drive 
decision-making, rather than treaty text or legal norms. 
Items Ranked at -3 
There is a strong moral as well as policy case for governments to withdraw from investment 
treaties and to oppose investor-state arbitration, including a refusal to pay arbitration awards 
against them. 
Collegiality demands that arbitrators sitting on three member tribunals reach a common view 
as to how the case should be resolved. Dissenting opinions should always be avoided. 
 
Table 20: Crib-Sheet for Factor 4 
Items Ranked at +3 
The ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard in BITs is an independent treaty standard that 
does more than merely restate customary international law. If states wanted the international 
minimum standard to be applied to their investment treaties, they would have opted to 
incorporate that standard expressis verbis. 
Investors should never expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time the investment is 
made will remain totally unchanged. To determine whether frustration of the investor’s 
expectations was justified, the host state’s right to subsequently regulate domestic matters in 
the public interest must also be taken into consideration. 
Items Ranked Higher for Factor 4 than any other Factor 
(+3) The ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard in BITs is an independent treaty standard 
that does more than merely restate customary international law. If states wanted the 
international minimum standard to be applied to their investment treaties, they would have 
opted to incorporate that standard expressis verbis. 
(+2) Conflicting precedent is part of the system building exercise that investor-state tribunals 
engage in; divergence in awards does not need to be seen as defying the concept of a coherent 
and uniform system, but rather is part of the evolution towards a jurisprudence constante. 
Items Ranked Lower for Factor 4 than any other Factor 
(-3) A state’s decision to invoke ‘essential security’ to justify a measure, even if detrimental to 
a foreign investor’s rights, should be a self-judging action that renders an investor’s 
arbitration claim inadmissible. 
(-2) Umbrella clauses in BITs should be recast to place strong reciprocal obligations on 
investors that requiring them to observe commitments made to the host state. These clauses 
should be structured to allow the host state to invoke the clause as a counterclaim or even to 
initiate a BIT arbitration against the investor. 
(-2) If umbrella clauses truly were intended to have such significant scope to protect 
investors, it seems suspicious that no investor had sought the protection of one for five 
decades. 
Items Ranked at -3 
There is a strong moral as well as policy case for governments to withdraw from investment 
treaties and to oppose investor-state arbitration, including a refusal to pay arbitration awards 
against them. 
A state’s decision to invoke ‘essential security’ to justify a measure, even if detrimental to a 
foreign investor’s rights, should be a self-judging action that renders an investor’s arbitration 
claim inadmissible. 
 
Table 21: Crib-Sheet for Factor 5 
Items Ranked at +3 
Litigants in investor-state disputes want fairness much less than they want victory. 
An ‘objective’ test for defining an investment under the ICSID Convention is the correct 
approach. There is an objective limitation to ICSID jurisdiction separate from that to which 
the parties have consented. 
Items Ranked Higher for Factor 5 than any other Factor 
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(+3) Litigants in investor-state disputes want fairness much less than they want victory. 
(+3) An ‘objective’ test for defining an investment under the ICSID Convention is the correct 
approach. There is an objective limitation to ICSID jurisdiction separate from that to which 
the parties have consented. 
(+2) A state’s decision to invoke ‘essential security’ to justify a measure, even if detrimental to 
a foreign investor’s rights, should be a self-judging action that renders an investor’s 
arbitration claim inadmissible. 
(+2) Umbrella clauses in BITs should be recast to place strong reciprocal obligations on 
investors that requiring them to observe commitments made to the host state. These clauses 
should be structured to allow the host state to invoke the clause as a counterclaim or even to 
initiate a BIT arbitration against the investor. 
(+2) A teleological method of interpretation of a BIT provision that would result in the 
implementation of a treaty’s purpose in a manner not contemplated by the parties must 
always be rejected as contrary to the parties’ intention. 
Items Ranked Lower for Factor 5 than any other Factor 
(-3) The term ‘treatment’ in MFN clauses is in itself wide enough to be applicable to 
procedural matters such as dispute settlement. 
(-3) Human rights law and investment law have many similarities; they are both aimed at 
legal protection of individual rights by means of legal and judicial restraints on government 
powers. 
(-2) Those who challenge the legitimacy of international adjudication aim at the wrong target. 
They criticize the principle of the supremacy of international law when their real complaint 
has to do with the political choices of their own government in making the bargains reflected 
in international treaties. 
(-2) Although the exhaustion of local remedies rule is well established in the context of 
diplomatic protection, investment treaties are different, and arbitrators have rightly 
interpreted most of them as eliminating the rule. The decision to do away with the rule in 
investor-state arbitration was made consciously and for good reasons. 
(-2) The Argentine government has rightly pondered the domestic political viability of paying 
on an award that an annulment committee has delegitimized. If the annulment committee did 
not intend to kill the CMS award, it should not have wounded it so severely. 
Items Ranked at -3 
(-3) The term ‘treatment’ in MFN clauses is in itself wide enough to be applicable to 
procedural matters such as dispute settlement. 
(-3) Human rights law and investment law have many similarities; they are both aimed at 
legal protection of individual rights by means of legal and judicial restraints on government 
powers. 
 
Table 22: Crib-Sheet for Factor 6 
Items Ranked at +3 
While an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons may be classified as a taking for a 
public purpose, and thus may be legitimate and legal, the fact that the property was taken for 
this reason does not affect either its nature or the measure of the compensation to be paid for 
the taking. 
Investors should never expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time the investment is 
made will remain totally unchanged. To determine whether frustration of the investor’s 
expectations was justified, the host state’s right to subsequently regulate domestic matters in 
the public interest must also be taken into consideration. 
Items Ranked Higher for Factor 6 than any other Factor 
(+3) While an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons may be classified as a taking 
for a public purpose, and thus may be legitimate and legal, the fact that the property was 
taken for this reason does not affect either its nature or the measure of the compensation to 
be paid for the taking. 
(+2) The range of important issues in international investment law on which academics 
disagree, and on which arbitrations have reached conflicting decisions, are not the temporary 
‘growing pains’ of a system rapidly approaching coherence, but are the product of a much 
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deeper conflict of interests. 
(+2) Rightly or wrongly, arbitral tribunals and MFN clauses are developing the aggregate of 
bilateral investment treaties into a functional substitute for a multilateral investment 
instrument. 
(+2) The awards of many investor-state tribunals indicate that ideological preferences drive 
decision-making, rather than treaty text or legal norms. 
(+2) The rise of the restrictive approach to the definition of investment may well be related to 
the broader backlash against investment arbitration – certainly the timing of the two 
developments overlaps rather neatly. 
(+2) The dissenting opinion on jurisdiction in Tokios Tokelės  was correct. The ICSID 
Convention should protect all genuinely international investments but, by the same token, 
only genuinely international investments. This was actually a domestic dispute between the 
Ukrainian state and a Ukrainian investor. 
(+1) The Argentine government has rightly pondered the domestic political viability of paying 
on an award that an annulment committee has delegitimized. If the annulment committee did 
not intend to kill the CMS award, it should not have wounded it so severely. 
(-1) Collegiality demands that arbitrators sitting on three member tribunals reach a common 
view as to how the case should be resolved. Dissenting opinions should always be avoided. 
Items Ranked Lower for Factor 6 than any other Factor 
(-3) Litigants in investor-state disputes want fairness much less than they want victory. 
(-3) Conflicting precedent is part of the system building exercise that investor-state tribunals 
engage in; divergence in awards does not need to be seen as defying the concept of a coherent 
and uniform system, but rather is part of the evolution towards a jurisprudence constante. 
(-3) An ‘objective’ test for defining an investment under the ICSID Convention is the correct 
approach. There is an objective limitation to ICSID jurisdiction separate from that to which 
the parties have consented.  
(-2) It is far from clear that the fear of arbitrator bias derives from governments and investors 
as opposed to pundits and academics. 
(-2) Every international convention must be deemed tacitly to refer to general principles of 
international law for all questions which it does not itself resolve in express terms and in a 
different way. 
(-1) An MFN clause in a basic treaty cannot be relied upon by the investor to expand the 
jurisdiction of an international tribunal. Jurisdiction in the basic treaty cannot be rewritten 
before the commencement of proceedings by reference to the provisions of a third treaty. 
Items Ranked at -3 
Conflicting precedent is part of the system building exercise that investor-state tribunals 
engage in; divergence in awards does not need to be seen as defying the concept of a coherent 
and uniform system, but rather is part of the evolution towards a jurisprudence constante. 
Litigants in investor-state disputes want fairness much less than they want victory.  
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Table 1: Q Methodology Study Homepage 
 
 
Table 2: Q Methodology Study Login Page 
 
 
369 
 
 
Table 3: Q Methodology Study Socio-Demographic Information Page 
 
 
Table 4: Q Methodology Study Pre-Sort Page 
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Table 5: Q Methodology Study Q Sort Page 
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Table 6: Q Methodology Study Q Sort Page (Partially Completed) 
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Table 7: Q Methodology Study Q Sort Page (Completed) 
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Table 8: Q Methodology Study Exit Interview Page 
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Document 1: Invitation for Participation in the Q Method Study 
Daniel Behn, PhD Candidate 
Centre for Energy, Petroleum, and Mineral Law and Policy 
University of Dundee 
In April of 2009, Professor José Alvarez delivered a lecture to 
the Third Annual Juris Conference on Investment Treaty 
Arbitration titled The Evolving BIT. In that lecture, he stated 
that perceptions really matter in international legal 
development – whether or not they are ‘right.’ This simple 
observation was a statement that caused concern for some in 
the arbitration community who claimed that there is no place 
for these kinds of subjective concessions in the law; in fact, it 
was argued, they are antithetical to the very purpose and 
function of a rule of law. However, more recently, in his 2011 
Freshfields lecture titled Saving Investment Arbitration from 
Itself, Toby Landau QC argued that the arbitration 
community must pay more attention to the criticisms of 
investor-state proceedings. Landau claimed that the lack of 
inclusivity and the failure to account for all relevant 
perspectives are negatively affecting the development of the 
system as a whole. 
As a PhD researcher in the field of international investment 
law, I have always been struck by the fact that the discussion 
about international investment law spans not only doctrinal 
analysis, but also underlying values such as fairness, 
legitimacy, and justice. These values in turn comprise an 
element of conviction, and are often grounded in ideas of 
individual and political morality. Living in an era where dominant philosophical theories hold that values 
are both subjective and relative, claims that we can ever provide truly objective analysis about values tends 
to ring hollow. As such, attempting to gain reasonably objective knowledge about these considerations of 
fairness, legitimacy, and justice can be a challenge.  
The goal of this project is not to provide definitive answers 
about which perspectives on fairness in investment treaty 
arbitration are right or wrong; rather, the idea is to 
provide sufficiently objective analysis about these human 
subjectivities in a way that the discourse can begin to 
move from ‘perceptions matter’ to ‘this is how and why the 
various types of perceptions matter.’       
In attempting to measure and understand the 
perspectives, underlying viewpoints, and worldviews that 
all legal decisionmakers and commentators use to inform 
and influence the way that they approach legal problems, 
I hope that such knowledge can assist in delineating 
points of overlapping consensus (among participants 
using the system) about issues of fairness in investment 
treaty arbitration. While Landau claims that we have 
failed both practically and scholastically in shedding light 
on these important aspects of legal understanding, this 
study seeks to remedy some of these failings by creating a 
methodology for the measurement of what many consider 
to be immeasurable: subjective value perspectives.  
The study asks you to sort through statements made by 
actual participants in investment treaty arbitration. All of 
those statements reflect subjective perceptions about the 
diverse and complex issues currently under debate (such 
as, illustratively, the scope of MFN provisions or the 
definition of investment). The results of the study will look 
for the types of patterns that may emerge in the different 
ways that participants have rank ordered the statements. 
As someone knowledgeable in 
this area of law, I would 
grateful if you would 
participate in this study by 
visiting the following website: 
www.fairnessdiscourse.org 
To complete this Q-method 
study, please click on the 
‘Start the Study’ link, follow 
the instructions, and enter 
the following login code: TDM   
If you have any questions, 
please feel free to email me at:  
dfbehn@dundee.ac.uk 
This study is not a typical 
questionnaire; rather, it asks the 
participant to sort through a 
number of subjective statements 
(a process called Q-sorting) on 
issues of fairness in investment 
treaty arbitration and to rank 
order them in relation to each 
other. An example of the kind of 
statements you will be asked to 
sort through and rank order 
includes the following: 
“For all practical purposes, the 
‘ investment’  screen of the 
ICSID Convention should have 
no bite. There is not a single 
pending or concluded case that 
should be – or should have been 
– excluded on this ground.”  
Participation in this study will be 
conducted in strict confidence. At 
no time will participant identities 
be revealed. 
MEASURING THE IMMEASURABLE? 
AN INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN A STUDY ON INDIVIDUAL PERSPECTIVES 
ABOUT FAIRNESS IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 
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Document 2: Confidentiality Agreement for the Q Method Study 
 
 
Confidentiality Agreement 
for Participation in the Investment  
Treaty Arbitration Q Method Study 
 
Recipient of Information (the Recipient): Daniel Behn, Principal Researcher and PhD 
Candidate in International Economic Law at the University of Dundee’s Centre for Energy, 
Petroleum, and Mineral Law and Policy in Dundee, Scotland. 
 
Individual Disclosing Information (the Discloser): _________________________________________. 
 
This Confidentiality Agreement (the Agreement) covers the disclosure of information 
pertaining to participation in a Q methodology research study. 
 
1. The Discloser intends to disclose information (the Confidential Information) to the 
Recipient by participating in the Q method study on the role of fairness in the 
development of investment treaty arbitration at www.fairnessdiscourse.org (the 
Exclusive Purpose for the Disclosure). 
2. The Recipient undertakes not to use the Confidential Information for any purpose except 
the Exclusive Purpose for the Disclosure, without first obtaining the written agreement 
of the Discloser. 
3. The Recipient undertakes to keep the Confidential Information secure and not to 
disclose it to any third party, including but not limited to, any students or employees of 
the University of Dundee or the University of Dundee’s Centre for Energy, Petroleum, 
and Mineral Law and Policy.  
4. The Recipient undertakes not to disclose the identity of the Discloser to any third party, 
including but not limited to, any students or employees of the University of Dundee or 
the University of Dundee’s Centre for Energy, Petroleum, and Mineral Law and Policy.  
5. The Recipient undertakes to provide the Discloser with complete results of the Q method 
study upon request. 
6. The Recipient will, on request from the Discloser, return all copies and records of the 
Confidential Information to the Discloser and will not retain any copies or records of the 
Confidential Information. 
7. Neither this agreement nor the supply of any information grants the Recipient any 
license, interest or right in respect of any intellectual property rights of the Discloser 
except the right to copy the Confidential Information solely for the Exclusive Purpose of 
the Disclosure. 
8. The above undertakings of this Agreement will remain in force indefinitely. 
9. This Agreement is governed by, and is to be construed in accordance with, Scot law. The 
courts of Scotland will have non-exclusive jurisdiction to deal with any dispute which 
has arisen or may arise out of, or in connection with, this Agreement. 
 
 
Signed on ______________________, 201____: 
 
 
 
Daniel Behn (the Recipient)   ____________________________ (the Discloser) 
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